ARMS SHIPMENTS TO EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 23, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000
23 June 1980
Arms Shipments to El Salvador
Introduction
The 15 January plane crash is the first tangible evidence
of gunrunning to Salvadoran revolutionaries, and subsequent
information is beginning to define the extent of official
involvement with the mercenary operation. Official Costa
Rican collusion is most likely, and certain Panamanian
officials appear to have at least tolerated the activity.
The effort parallels the ongoing--even accelerating--
activities of the Cubans to establish a secure arms ferry to
Salvadoran insurgents. At this point, however, we are unable
to state with confidence that Havana was definitely connected
to this specific episode .
Arms smuggling to El Salvador utilizes a variety of routes,
countries, and combinations of official and mercenary involve-
ment. Our information is clearest regarding the Costa Rican
link--the heavy involvement of San Jose officials and private
citizens, primarily for,personal profit, is well corroborated.
Panamanian officials also appear implicated, although less
directly. This would fit within the general parameters of
Torrijos' policies regarding corruption (allowable as long as
major, publicity is avoided and top officials are cut in) and
El Salvador (where Torrijos has not firmly settled on a policy,
but would see limited arms smuggling as permissible and even
advantageous--certainly not worth making a serious effort to
halt).
This memorandum was requested by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs. It was prepared by the Latin America Division of the
Office of Political Analysis, and it has not been coordinated outside the
Division. Information in this memorandum reflects information available
through 22 June 1980. Questions and comments may be directed to Chief,
Latin America Division,
PA-M-80-10283
Near Duplicate of C05513990:
RIP
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
We are nonetheless reasonably certain, based on reporting
since last July, of Nicaragua's witting involvement in the
arms flow, despite a lack of specifics in many cases. Managua's
reported training of Salvadoran insurgents and arrangements to
work ' tandem with Havana on the arms flow at the turn of the
year, ]indicating
Managua as a primary arms transit point, seem convincing,
Havana has been actively arranging a clandestine arms
supply network since last July although, as in the case of
Nicaragua, we are not confident of the overall volume of
shipments managed by Havana. The use of mercenaries in many
of these operations, quite possibly serving more than one
master, tends to blur somew~the lines of involvement of
the various governments.
Although sizable quantities of arms have been reported
on some individual shipments, many of them may be more limited.
The Salvadoran insurgents arsenal, while improving, still
appears below their expectations and needs--firepower remains
one of the clearest cut advantages of the Salvadoran military.s
The diversity of routes and the fact that the several
governments involved either lack the capability or will to
shut them down--or intend to see the weapons flow increased--
suggests that it will be extremely difficult to prevent arms
from reaching the Salvadorans in present quantities.
Arms - And Foreign Involvement for Salvadoran Insurgents
The guerrilla weapons inventory is improving, but still
deficient. The incidence of more sophisticated weaponry,
while significant, still remains spotty.
tend to substantiate the existence of supply routes for Havana-
or Moscow-supplied arms through Nicaragua. Individual
mercenaries are also dealing with Salvador's left, and certain
Costa Rican officials are involved in supplying arms through
their territory. The sum total of these and other deliveries,
while important, still appears limited.
Security forces in May captured the first antiaircraft
machinegun taken from the guerrillas. Uniformed guerrillas
are more common and regular guerrilla cadre carry a greater
array of automatic weapons, such as G-3s, and FALs. However,
this is a heterogeneous assortment and some members of the
guerrilla bands are still limited to handguns or lack weaponry
altogether.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
The extent of Nicaragua's involvement remains veiled,
although a series of reports point to its continuing, if
circumspect role.
was recently told of three principal arms supply
routes for the insurgents--all three routes transited or
staged directly from Nicaragua.
in May stated that many of a weapons or the
insurgents were brought from Managua in small boats. In
April __reported a Soviet decision
to begin sending arms to Salvadoran revolutionaries--again
Nicaragua was to be a principal route. A Sandinista delegate
at a Communist conclave in Mexico in April pledged all-out
support for Salvadoran revolutionaries at the appropriate
moment, but noted the time was not ripe to do much more than
attempt to discredit the ruling junta.
reported this year that training of Salvadoran revolutionaries
at camps in Nicaragua is still going on, and while this is not
solidly confirmed it appears highly likely.
a training facility for 250 Salvadorans was
still unc ioning in March. In May, a Salvadoran labor leader
who fled to Nicaragua was promised military training and return
infiltration by Interior Minister Borge.
Considerable evidence also indicated that through April
arms for Salvadoran insurgents were funneled through Costa
Rica and that the former Costa Rican minister of Security and
several subordinates were directly involved, principally for
monetary gain. The subsequent departure of the minister and
the media outcry over the allegations will now make deliveries
more difficult but not close them off--given the venality of
officials and the apparent guerrilla bankroll.9,ow-owcZ
In May, a Greek freighter
captain so rounds o pistol ammunition to the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
The crash in El Salvador in mid-June of a Panamanian plane
carrying a large load of ammunition--which may have originated
in Panama, Costa Rica, or Nicaragua--was tangible evidence of
the gunrunning to guerrillas.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
? I I
Cuban training of Salvadoran insurgents has picked up
this year. Overall, we believe more than 500 Salvadoran
leftists have received training in guerrilla warfare and
related subjects in Cuba since late 1978.
reported about 180 members having received Cuban training by
late last ear. In February and March,
320 Central American leftists--predominan y
Salvadorans--transited Panama en route to Cuba for training.
----
c..l.._A^r =nc
of
ue to depart for Cuba, via Costa Rica, in May
ftists continue to transit Panama--whose
l
e
Many of these
position vis-a-vis El Salvador is still equivocal. Panamanian
strongman Torrijos is anxious to play a role, as reflected by
his meetings this month with all major actors--left and right--
on the Salvadoran scene. In the last six months, he has
shifted from tilting in support of the guerrillas toward more
serious exploration of other options such as incorporating
leftist elements into the governing structure. Always flexible,
it is entirely possible that Torrijos has authorized some ?
support of the illas to maintain his bona fides while he
mulls his course
The variety of routes and suppliers being used and the
intermittent nature of the shipments points -to deliveries
that may still be relatively modest. On the other hand, this
same diversity means that this flow is likely to be nearly
impossible to shut down and that the guer illas can probably
t
at least maintain their present armamen
Cuban Involvement
Active Cuban involvement in planning for the clandestine
airlift of arms from Costa Rica to El Salvador dates from late
1979 when Daniel Enrique Herrera Perez, then chief of the two-
man Cuban covert "operations center" in San Jose, arranged for
the purchase of a small air charter service company operating
out of Limon, Costa Rica for use in delivering arms clandestine)
made in late July 1979, shortly after the FS vic ory in
Nicaragua. Several flights also may have been made from Liberia
in northern Costa Rica, but detailed information of specific
flights and cargo carried is not available.
We believe that Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran
insurgents at this time was confined largely to propaganda,
funding, training and the provision of a limited amount of arms.
25X1
I
25X1
25X1
I
25X1
25X1 I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
Based on al ~e believe Havana was
cautioning the insurgents against a premature confrontation
and urging the various guerrilla groups to unite and develop
political structure and support.
In recent months, however, Havana has turned more radical
and activist, encouraging Salvadoran--as well as Honduran and
Guatemalan--leftist groups. to move forward on the liberation
struggle. This shift is one of several indicators of the
growing influence of hardliners in the Castro regime. It also
may represent Havana's belief that the growing violence in
El Salvador makes increased arms shipments necessary.
Information
Wrongly supports this reading of the mood in Havana.
n early April 1980 the chief of the Americas
Depar en of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist
Party, Manuel Pineiro Losada, ordered his representative in
San Jose, Fernando Comas Perez, to begin collecting and if
necessary purchase all of the weapons and munitions available
in Costa Rica for delivery to Salvadoran insurgents. We are
unable to confirm--but we find credible--Cuban estimates that
at least 10,000 weapons originally destined for the Sandinistas
last year--including shipments from Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia,
Panama, and Cuba--should have been available in Costa Rica at
the present time.
Arms deliveries began later in April and we strongly
suspect that Comas and the Cuban covert "operations center"
in San Jose controlled and directed the operation. Both Comas
and Julio Perez Toledo maintained contact with former Minister
of Public Security Echeverria and President Carazo's son Mario.
Moreover, the increased Cuban involvement
coincides with a growing aggressiveness
in Cuban propaganda treatment of the situation in El Salvador.
For a few months after the junta came to power, the Cuban media
generally avoided the Salvadoran issue, indicating uncertainty
about where Havana's best interests lay. Since early 1980,
however, Havana has intensified its verbal attacks on the junta.
In his lengthy speech on 1 May, Fidel Castro underscored Havana's
view: "the Salvadoran situation . . . demands the most ample
support to halt . . . :the imperialists." This theme was con-
tinued by Havana's international news service, which stated
that "the popular revolutionary struggle" was intensifying in
El Salvador, and that "international support for that combative
nation is also rising."
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
Costa Rican Involvement
Nothing-so far revealed in investigations undertaken
by Costa Rican, Salvadoran or Panamanian authorities adds
much to the general picture of clandestine arms traffick-
ing
Both circumantial and specific evidence mom a wide
variety of sources shows that both private and official
Costa Ricans--motivated more by financial than ideolog-
ical considerations--are involved in virtually all
aspects of the trafficking, from procurement to delivery.
The publicity surrounding the 15 June incident may slacken
or temporarily halt the traffic, but the Costa Ricans do
not have the resources to end it, even if they wanted to.
After the plane crash, Carazo bypassed the Ministry
of Public Security and directed the office of National
Security (OSN) to investigate the incident. The OSN's
preliminary report, however, is described as "notable
for its incompleteness," which is about what we would
Carazo is said to have been
expect. For some time,
losing confidence in the Ministry of Public Security
and its recently resigned head, Juan Jose "Johnny"
Echeverria Brealey, who by all accounts is deeply
involved in arms trafficking. The OSN may not be
much more reliable, though, since its deputy director,
Johnny Chaverri, is a long-time confederate of
Echeverria, is himself implicated in the arms traf-
ficking, and also serves as liaison with Panama's G-2,
Manuel Noriega, who may also be involved.
Except for the probability that the Costa Rican
public and media will force elaborate airing of the
case, President Carazo would probably be content with a
face-saving whitewash. At least one of his sons seems
to be involved in the commercial aspects of the arms
trafficking. This son, Mario Carazo Zeledon, as well
as other family members and business associates were
o be in contact with Adalberto
Marrero, chief o e costa Rican desk in the Americas
Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Com-
munist Party, when Marrero visited San Jose in late
February early March. President Carazo has used his
son Mario on several occasions to carry out diplomatic
efforts with the Cubans, principally with regard to
Cuban refugee problems.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
In any case, the OSN's scanty preliminary report
has so far determined only that two planes--apparently
Panamanian--answering the general description of those
involved in the incident arrived at a Guanacaste Prov-
ince airstrip, Tamarindo, on 14 June. This airstrip
has not been specifically mentioned in previous report-
ing, which most often seems to involve fincas known as
El Hacha and Hatillo, but the clandestine use of
Guanacaste's numerous airstrips is very well documented.
These two planes are said to have made two early
morning flights on 15 June, the second of which allegedly
led to the crash, although there is a discrepancy between
the supposed departure and the time of the crash. The
OSN report contains no detail of registration, tail
numbers, or even exact t e. The two planes involved
-HP 776 and HP 882--do not
appear in any although we
have accumulated a certain amount of detail over the
past several months on other aircraft--mostly of Costa
Rican registry--used in the trafficking.
The OSN report claims that the truck used to deliver
the arms to the planes belonged to a San Jose firm, the
Alvarex Company, which has not been mentioned in any of
our previous reporting. Various truckloads-of arms have
been alluded to especially in
late March and early April, generally traveling from the
San Jose area to Guanacaste, but we have not received
sufficient names, descriptions or license plate numbers
to be specific.
The OSN report, attempts to tie in a Panamanian Air
Force pilot, Lt. Rodolfo Castrejon, who allegedly arrived:.:
in San Jose on 14 June flying an Aerocommander (HP 776
is said to be the same type) with Panamanian Air Force
registration FAP 500. Aside from the similar types of
aircraft, the connection is unclear and does not agree
with reporting from Panama. We have no previous reporting
on Lt. Castrejon, although we do have the names of a
half-dozen other involved pilots employed either by
Costa Ricans or directly by Salvadoran revolutionaries.
The Salvadoran investigation has charged, for
example, that Manuel Enrique "Pillique" Guerra was
the pilot of the second plane involved in the incident,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
which is quite possible. Guerra, a former vice minister
of Public Security, now owns and operates severa
it charter And other aerial service companies. He has
ona been involved in the clandestine arms traffic, and
notes a severs individuals tried to forestall
the OSN investigation. One, Willy Azofeifa, is now an
fficial of the Ministry of Public Security, and was
xecutive assistant to the ministry's ex-director,
ohnny Echeverria.
mplicating him, along with Echeverria, in the clan-
estine arms business. The other person who may have
ttempted to ward off.the Costa Rican investigation
s Panamanian G-2 Noriega, who reportedly called OSN
eputy Director Johnny Chaverri. As mentioned earlier,
haverri has known connections with the Panamanians
nd is involved with Echeverria
Ind others in the arms trafficking to El Salvador.
comments that if a complete
nvestigation were actually undertaken, the following
osta Ricans would be implicated:
-- "Johnny" Echeverria: It is clear that he
has been a major figure in arms trafficking
and probably still is though he resigned from
the ministry in early June. Within the
past several months, for example, he is
reliably reported to have been involved
in at least: two -other cases. Similar- to
when the Sandinistas were using training
camps in Guanacaste, Echeverria has publicly
ordered security forces to search the area
while privately telling them not to find
anything. In addition,
he has afforded official
protection to persons implicated in clandestine
arms trafficking, is reliably reported by
several sources to have taken bribes from
various revolutionaries, and is openly con-
nected to Salvadoran and other arms pro-
curers or expediters.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
-- Fernando Munoz Marin and Sidar Ulate Solano,
director and deputy director, respectively, of
the Civil Guard, as well as a Major Gregorio
Chang (or Chan), a local commander: all three
involved
with Echeverria in both the January and March
arms diversions from Costa Rican stocks to
revolutionaries; they were also said to be
involved in the cover-up sweeps in Guanacaste.
-- Mario Carazo Zeladon, the President's son.
-- Enrique Montealegre Martin, former vice minister
of Public Security and presently Costa Rican
Ambassador to Nicaragua: Although Montealegre
was probably involved in supplying arms to the
Sandinistas, and is. alleged to have been a
confederate of Echeverria and others more
recently, he was
posted to Nicaragua in order to get him out, of
the way after he protested the continuing
supply of arms to the Salvadoran revolution-
aries. .-
-- Rolando Francis Brenes, director of the Rural
Guard: Alleged to have been involved with
Munoz, Ulate, and Chang in both the arms
diversions and cover-up sweeps, but we have
little specific evidence.
Panamanian Involvement . ._ -
Two Panamanian civilian planes, HP 776 and HP 882--a twin-
engine, ten-passenger Aerocommander and a smaller Piper Seneca--
were involved in a gunrunning mission to Salvadoran revolution-
aries. The HP 776, flown by Panamanian civilian pilot Cesar
Rodriguez, crashed in El Salvador. Both Rodriguez and his co-
pilot--reportedly Mickey Van Seidlitz., the ,deputy director of
Panama's Civil Aviation Authority--were picked up by a second
plane and returned to their point of origin in David, Panama.
Both Ridriguezand -the pilot 'of the second plane--Manuel Guerra,
a Costa Rican--are known profiteers and gunrunners who reportedly
have been smuggling to Salvadoran revolutionaries over the past
two months.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
HP 882 is owned by Floyd Carleton, a business partner with
Rodriguez in the bankrupt charter "Executive Air Service." The
ownership of HP 776 is not clear, however; it is presently
registered to "Aviones de Panama," in whose hanger it has been
maintained for several months.
Early this year the National Guard confiscated HP 776 in a
narcotics smuggling investigation and placed it in the care of
"Aviones," which, according to press reports, is a dealership
representing the manufacture of the Aerocommander. In May the
Civil Aviation Authority granted "Aviones" a provisional license
for HP 776.* Panamanian military intelligence chief Lt. Colonel
Manuel Noriega reportedly helped expedite that licensing.
Another small plane-owned by "Aviones" also is implicated in the
smuggling operation through Costa Rica.
The evidence ointing to Intelligence 25X1
Chief Noriega's-involvement is reasonable, although fragmentary.
A Costa Rican official that 25X1
Noriega called Costa. Rican security o icla s to request at the
investigation. be blocked. Noriega's claim that he was contacting
San Jose because the Panamanian Air Force chief had warned him
that the investigation would harm senior Panamanian officials
is thin and unconvincing.
We estimate, however, that this was not a major gunrunning
scheme by the Panamanian Government. The individuals involved in
the flights apparently are mercenaries who were party to gun
running to the Sandinistas in 1979 and who may well have been
involved in other smuggling schemes. By most accounts, the arms
they ferried originated in another country--either Costa Rica or
Nicaragua. -The-favors Noriega reportedly did the pilots--and his
toleration of their activities--probably were purchased. Noriega's
knowledge of the specifics of the operation is highly likely;
Torrijos was possibly aware of its outlines, although there is
some chance this was essentially a profit making venture by
Noriega.
The operation is neither out of character for Torrijos nor
inconsistant with his Salvadoran policy. In the absence of
publicity, Noriega or Torrijos probably would not have wanted to
take action to halt*the smuggling. Aside from probable financial
gain, the smuggling fits with Torrijos' well documented use of
Panama for the transit of Salvadoran revolutionaries to Cuba and
elsewhere for insurgency training. At a time when Torrijos is
10
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
trying' to improve his lines of communication with Salvadoran
leftist groups, he could view allowing such operations as bol-
stering his credentials without becoming actively involved. With
the Salvadoran military's attention focused on Nicaragua, Cuba,
and Costa Rica, the sub rosa operation was relatively low risk
and not caluclated to impede his dialogue with Salvadoran military
progressives.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101420002-4