CUBA: A MORE RADICAL BENT IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101370001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101370001-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
CUBA: A More Radical Bent in Latin America
The current trend toward more radical Cuban behavior in
this hemisphere began in early 1979 when Havana realized
that the revolution in Nicaragua was progressing much more
rapidly then had been expected. Having already been caught
off guard by the "revolution" in Grenada, the Cubans signi-
ficantly increased their support to the Sandinistas in an
effort to catch up with the pace of events. F-1
At the same time the revolution in Nicaragua was advanc-
ing to its successful conclusion, a negative trend was
developing in many countries of the hemisphere that caused
Havana to suspect that its cautious diplomatic approach over
the past decade would pay only paltry dividends. Carefully
cultivated relations with Venezuela and Peru deteriorated
sharply, ties with Guyana took a turn for the worse, and
events in Jamaica suggested that Prime Minister Manley--the
object of considerable Cuban favor--might well be on his way
out of power. Some friction developed even with Panama's
General Torrijos and at year's end Cuba had to suffer the
This memorana 4 prepared by the Latin America Division of the
Office of Political Analysis. It
reflects information available through 12 Juno. Questions zn.a
J
comments may be addressed to Chief, Latin America Di.uision,
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embarrassment of a prolonged and fruitless clish with Colombia
for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.
The failure of legitimate diplomacy to bear fruit fcr
Havana contrasted sharply with the success of those forces
that followed the "armed struggle" line in Grenada, Nicaragua,
and--in 1980--Suriname. Moreover, conditions in El Salvador
appeared to increasingly favor the proponents of "armed
struggle" and similar possibilities seemed to be developinq
in other areas. The lesson of the 1970s appeared to have
been that armed struggle succeeded where diplomacy failed.
Last fall, Cuba began to show signs that policy makers
were beginning to look more readily toward violent revolu-
tion as a useful policy tool. At the time of the nonaligned
summit, the Cubans pressed for the independence of the three
French Overseas Departments (Martinique, Guadeloupe, and
French Guiana) in the summit's final communique as well as
in the press, suggesting that Havana was willing to sustain
damage to its ties with Paris in order to gain prestige
among world revolutionaries. Cuban propaganda organs began
devoting more space to Haitian dissidents and to the situa-
tion in Honduras, depicting the Honduran military government
in a derogatory manner that contrasted with the previous
even-handed treatment. 1
Havana had entertained hopes that the Honduran military's
leftward bent of several years ago would result eventuall`,
in a radical regime that would be acceptable as a Cuban ally.
The turn-about in press treatment indicated that Havana had
abandoned such expectations and looked to Honduras as an
appropriate target of armed struggle.
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The warm greeting that Havana accorded the M-19 terror-
ist group that seized the Domincan Embassy in Bogota
Colombia, indicated where Cuba's inclinations lay.
The Cuban actions indicating an increased interest in
the policy of violent revolution were occurring at the same
time a shift was taking place in the upper levels of the
Cuban policy-making apparatus. Hardliners, mainly members
of the guerrilla elite who fought in the Sierra Maestra in
1957 and 1958 to overthrow ex-President Batista through
violent revolution, were gaining President Fidel Castro's
ear while those elements of the leadership who served as a
moderating force on Castro seemed to have lost his confi-
dence. Most significant in this trend was the reappointment
of Ramiro Valdes as Minister of Interior--that part of the
Cuban government that is responsible for internal repression
and external intelligence operations. F-1
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Valdes had previously served as Interior minister from
1961 to 1968 and was noted for his ruthlessness in counter-
intelligence and his promotion of the policy of "exporting
the revolution." His replacement in 1966 coincided with a
shift toward more pragmatic policies just as his reappoint-
ment in December 1979 coincided with the adoption of more
radical policies. F-1
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SUBJECT: Cuba: A More Radical Bent in Latin America
Distribution:
Orig. -
2 - D/NFAC
1 - D/ORA
1 -
1 - PDB Staff
2 - OPA/PS
3 - PPG
4 - LA/OPA
1 - C/LA
1 - DC/PA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000101370001-1