SOVIETS OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101240001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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11 July 1980
SOVIETS OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
The recent Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan
were largely a political ploy; they do not affect Soviet
military capabilities in the country. President Brezhnev's
assertion that life is gradually returning to normal may be
overdrawn, but it does suggest that the Soviets do not
anticipate an imminent need to substantially increase their
forces in Afghanistan over the near term. Over the longer
term, the Soviets continue to have three broad options for
dealing with Afghanistan:
--They could decide--perhaps after the Olympics
or at the end of this summer's fighting season--
to pour in more troops and try once and for all
to eliminate the insurgents. Any substantial
build-up, however, would take time. For example,
doubling the size of the force in Afqhanistan and
creating the necessary support structure could
take from six to twelve months.
--They could continue along their present course
working gradually to increase the effectiveness
and support of the Babrak government, perhaps
modestly augmenting their military force and
simultaneously continuing to improve its anti-
insurgent capabilities.
--They could decide to sacrifice their post April
1978 gains in Afghanistan in order to pursue
seriously a political settlement while trying to
extract US concessions for a broader regional
settlement (i.e. the neutrality of Pakistan and
Iran, a drawdown in US force levels in the Indian
ocean).
Below we examine the advantages and disadvantages of the var-
ious options as the Soviets might perceive them.
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Option I - Substantial Reinforcement
The Pros
--This option holds out the best prospect-
for reducing the insurgency to manaqeable
proportions.
--It would show the Soviets as moving decisively
to defend their interests.
--It could frighten Pakistan and Iran.into ending
aid and sanctuary to the Afghan insurgents.
--It could reignite the international reaction
to Afghanistan and could hamper Soviet efforts
to isolate the US from the Muslim world and
its West European allies on the issue.
--It could prompt Pakistan to turn to the US for
military support.
--It could deepen concerns about getting involved
in a Vietnam-type open-ended quagmire as expressed
by the Soviet generals in March.
--It would have a more serious impact on the
domestic economy than current Soviet operations.
Option II - Hunkering Down
--It is the course the Soviets appear to be
embarked upon and it would not require any
wrenching new decisions.
--The absence of any major new developments
in Afghanistan--such as a large troop rein-
forcement--would facilitate international
acceptance of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.
--It would be less costly than the substantial
reinforcement option.
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--Present forces may not be adequate to prevent
a further deterioration of the situation; Soviet
forces are stretched thin in their efforts to
maintain security in the city, keep open key
lines of communications and assist in quelling
the insurgency.
--Prolonged failure to improve their situation
could create an appearance of weakness and
expose the regime to greater internal and
international criticism.
Option III - A Political Solution
--It would permit the Soviets to extricate
their forces and avoid a long debilitating
conflict in Afghanistan.
--It would also permit them to resume the
major lines of their preferred diplomatic
posture toward the rest of the world.
--No political solution acceptable to the
insurgents would leave the Soviets with
a pro-Soviet leftist government in Afghani-
stan such as they have had since the April
1978 revolution.
--The Soviets could hardly avoid appearing
to have suffered a major defeat.
--The leadership which accepted such a solution
could be vulnerable to internal criticism.
How the Soviets Might Choose
Our best estimate is that the Soviets over time will
have to do more than hunker down, but probably will not
embark on as rapid and substantial a build-up as is feasible.
In part this is because they are concerned with the impact
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on world opinion; in part because the present drain on
resources and Soviet lives is tolerable; and in part because
they may not yet fully appreciate the extent of their mili-
tary predicament. Even if they do recognize that the war is
going badly, they may be prepared to wage a war of attrition
in order to keepAthe costs down and achieve success over the
longer run. We doubt that a gradual limited reinforcement
will quell the insurgency. The Soviets may well also step
up diplomatic and military pressures on Pakistan. This
course, if successful, could weaken the insurgency.
Even if the Soviets decide on pursuing essentially
military solutions to their Afghan problem, they can be
expected to continue talking about their alleged interest
in a political settlement. Additional token troo' with-
drawals right be forthcoming; perhaps timed to influence the
proceedings of the CSCE Review Conference this fall. The
Soviets still have a few expendable units in the country.
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SUBJECT: Soviets Options in Afghanistan
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NFAC/OPA/NESA/SAAC) (11July80)
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