SOVIET ACTIVITIES AFFECTING US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100930001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 APR 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Soviet Activities Affecting US
Interests
This is the fourth in a series of reports
that chart the USSR's actions to advance their
interests abroad. It gives special attention
to those activities that either seem deliber-
ately designed to counter US policy or have
the potential for developing into issues
inimical to US interests.
STAT
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachment:
As stated
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
15 April 1980
Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests
Summary
The USSR's. determination to contain US efforts to
criticize the invasion of Afghanistan, boycott the summer
Olympics, and limit the transfer of grain and technology to
the Soviet Union has Zed to sharper Soviet criticism of the
US and tougher Soviet behavior on a variety of foreign
policy issues. The Soviets have apparently chosen to go on
the offensive as far as US interests are concerned; Moscow
has stepped up its criticism of President Carter and US
allies such as the FRG's Chancellor Schmidt and Turkey's Prime
Minister DemireZ.. They have also responded negatively to
NATO on theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization,.which is
part of a larger Soviet effort to capitalize on differences
between the US and its West European allies.
At the same time, the Soviets are trying to create the
impression that they are capable of mending their fences
with the PRC and are in complete unity with European communist
parties on lazger foreign policy matters involving detente
and disarmament. These steps are designed to allow the
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This memorandum was prepared by the USSR-East European Division
of the Office of Political Analysis. Comments may be addressed
to
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Soviets to limit the damage caused. by their invasion of
Afghanistan, to present themselves as more forthcoming on
disarmament issues than the US, and to challenge US interests
in those areas in the Third World that are politically and
psychologically far removed from Afghanistan.
The Soviets would like to divert international attention
from their presence in Afghanistan by focusing on and under-
mining US support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace. process.
The USSR is likely to campaign more actively against the
Camp David process, Israel, and President Sadat. The Soviets
will try to capitalize on recent signs of US-West European
differences over recognition of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and criticism of continued Israeli settlements
on Arab territory. The Soviets will also try to undercut
Western influence in Southern Africa and to increase support
for South African liberation movements, particularly the
Namibian liberation movement based in Angola. Another
Soviet option could be to increase the Cuban presence in
the Third World, which could raise the temperature for the
US in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.
Signs of Soviet Truculence in the Wake of.Afghanistan
The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan was taken at
the expense of previous Soviet policy interests vis-a-vis
the US and Western Europe. In the wake of the Soviet invasion,
the Soviets have become more firm in rejecting NATO's proposal
for arms control talks involving TNF, more-vague in their will-
ingness to comply with the terms of SALT II, and,more willing
to respond measure for measure to US defense plans. In
public and private against such US allies as West Germany,
Norway, and Turkey in order to diminish support for Washington's
anti-Soviet line, to intensify frictions between-the US and
its NATO allies, and to undermine US efforts. to coordinate
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
In an effort to silence domestic criticism on.a variety
of issues,.the Soviets are turning the screws on their
internal critics, particularly the dissidents,. Jews, and
other "undesirable elements," that Moscow handled more
carefully when it had a greater equity in detente with
the US. These efforts are designed to stifle contacts
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between dissidents and Westerners, and to destroy the. domestic
appeal of the dissidents by depicting them as creatures of
US interests. The use of the KGB.to control internal dissidence
and the blatantly anti-Semitic aspect of the harassment of
the dissidents--most of whom are also Jewish activists--suggests
that reactionary forces within the leadership are asserting
themselves in order to inhibit increased. cooperation with
the West. This activity has a xenophobic aspect that suggests
more than: an effort to get rid of Moscow's troublemakers
before the Olympic games.
Future Opportunities to Challenge US Interests
Soviet officials have remarked privately that they see
no hope for any upturn in US-USSR relations before 1981 at
the earliest and have painted.a picture of US leaders and
policies. that make the prospect of renewed cooperation in
the near future appear highly unlikely. In their speeches
during the Supreme Soviet election campaign, Politburo
members Suslov and Gromyko questioned the reliability. of the
Carter administration as a negotiating partner by accusing
it of repeatedly violating international agreements. Soviet
leaders had little to say about SALT II and nothing at all
about subsequent strategic arms limitation negotiations with
the US. Moscow could decide that it prefers to be free of
certain SALT II restraints in any new environment of-heightened
competition with the US.
Current Soviet policy in the Third World hasnot been
helpful to US interests, but it could be worse if Moscow
decides to become more active in the Middle East and Africa.
The Soviets will probably try to campaign more actively
against the Camp David process and to isolate Sadat in the
Arab community. Moscow's recent support for an expanded
French role in the Arab-Israeli peacekeeping effort was
obviously . part. of an effort to divide western opinion in the
wake of Afghanistan and to su port,. the notion of Palestinian
self-determination.
If the Soviets are ultimately unable to reinsert them-
selves into the peace process, then they could turn to a
more destructive role over Middle East peacekeeping, including
a veto over the upcoming renewal of UNIFIL's mandate which
could damage the prospects of.a return to stability in
Lebanon and increase tensions between Syria and Israel. The
Soviets could also work against Israel at the UN, where
Moscow's Security Council seat would be leverage in the
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support of Arab efforts to sanction Israel.
Although the Soviets may become interested in. increasing
tensions in the Middle East, an Iraqi-Iranian clash would not
necessarily be in Moscow's interests. Such a confrontation
would distract Tehran's attention from Iran's intensified
clash with the US, could lead to Iraqi seizure of the oil
fields in Khuzestan, and would complicate Moscow's efforts to
balance relations with the two countries. Nevertheless, the
Soviets would try to exploit Iraqi-Iranian frictions over
the long term on the basis of Baghdad's dependency on the USSR
for military aid and Tehran's decreased ability to.deal with
its own leftist political forces and a Soviet threat on its
borders..
There are other Third. World situations where the Soviets
have opportunities for meddling, particularly in Cyprus due
to the recent failure of the Greek and Turkist communities
to narrow their differences and in Southern Africa if the
initiative of the Western Five for a Namibia, settlement
should collapse. Any failure to arrange a settlement for
Namibia would also bring about. a strong demand for sanctions
against South Africa, which would place the Soviets in a
favorable position in the UN against Western interests. In
the near term, the Soviets will-probably press Angola and
Mozambique to refrain from. expanding economic ties with the
West and Zambia to accept increased Soviet military aid.
Another Soviet option would be to step up the Cuban presence
in Africa . in. order to raise the temperature in the area.
The Soviets may also be tempted to challenge US interests
more aggressively in Central America and Caribbean, either
directly in Nicaragua and El Salvador or through Cuba in
Jamaica and Grenada. Cuba's current economic and social
unrest gives the Soviets additional. leverage over Fidel
Castro, and the price of continued Soviet economic and
military support could very well be more Cuban meddling.
The Soviets themselves have already laid. the basis for an
expansion of relations with Nicaragua, including trade,
cultural, commercial and party. ties. Defense Minister
Ustinov's'presence during recent high-level Soviet-Nicaraguan
ceremonials indicates that military matters may have been
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on the agenda as well. Moscow is already in a position to
exploit the leftist leanings of the Nicaraguan leadership
and the Cuban influence in Nicaragua.
The Soviets are having a certain amount of success in
Latin American states formerly identified with US interests.
Soviet grain purchases from Argentina remain ig ,
and there has been increased cooperation on a
variety of commercial matters, particularly in-
volving fishing agreements.
it Brazil with s eci
trying to increase tra e.w pal
emphasis on those Brazilian exports that could
replace items no longer available from the US.
-- The Soviets may be on the verge of a military
assistance arrangement with Mexico in view of the
Mexican army's'call for volunteers to study
Russian. Politburo candidate member Demichev led
a delegation to Mexico last week.
The Soviets have approached Mexico and other nonaligned
members of the Security Council about calling a SC session
to discuss US policy in the trust territory of the Pacific
Islands. Moscow has threatened in the past to raise this
issue at the SC, but has never raised it formally
Soviet "Peace Offensive" Likely
Since the Soviets see little prospect for progress on
disarmament with the US until 1981 and perceive the West
Europeans as unwilling to follow the US lead over Afghanistan,
Moscow will probably concentrate on Europe to pursue a
"peace offensive" and to persuade Western leaders. and public
opinion to forget Afghanistan. This offensive will have at
least three facets.
The Soviets are
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-- This month's session (April 28-29).of loyal Euro-
pean communist parties will be used to rally
support for a variety of detente-oriented issues
and to distract attention from Afghanistan.
The session will be tainted somewhat by the expected
absence of representatives from the Yugoslav,
Italian, and Spanish communist parties.
-- Next month's twenty-fifth. anniversary meeting of
the Warsaw Pact will probably. record a renewed
push on European security matters, particularly
the Warsaw Pact proposal for a conference on
military detente and disarmament (CMD). The CMD
proposal concentrates on confidence-building
measures that the Soviets view as a response to
West European efforts to engage the USSR on a
broadened discussion of military detente.in-Europe.
-- The Soviets will keep alive the idea of a CSCE
review conference in Madrid later. this year, which
they will use to gain approval of their CMD.proposal.
In this way, the Soviets hope to revive discussion of detente
in Europe and. to present themselves as willing to engage in
East-West negotiations on a broad range of security and dis-
armament issues in a variety of forums. The Soviets would
hope that a rejuvenation of detente would stiffen resistance
in NATO to Washington's efforts to deploy TNF, to increase
defense spending, and to embarrass the Soviets over Afghanistan.
The Soviets view Europe as the key political arena for
portraying. the US as the major obstacle to political and
military detente and the USSR as more forthcoming on dis-
armament.
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SUBJECT: Soviet Activities Affecting US Interests
Distribution:
Copy #1 - The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
#2 - Marshall Brement, NSC
#3 - DCI
#4 - DDCI
#5 - Executive Registry
#6 - D/NFAC
#7 - DD/NFAC
#8 - Exec. Secy, NFAC Production Board
#9 - NSC Presidential Briefing Coordinator
#10- NFAC/SRP
#11- NFAC Registry
#12- NIO/USSR-EE
#13- D/OPA
#14- D/OPA
#15- OPA/PS
#16- OPA/PS
#17- PPG
#18- PPG
#19- PPG
#20- OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
#21- Originator
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE (14Apr80)
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