NORWAY: A TNF UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100200001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

LIJNPTTJF7 r-77-01 -
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CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
31 January 1980
MEMORANDUM
NORWAY: A TNF UPDATE
Summary
Prune Minister NordZi's Labor government, in office
since January 1976, does not appear seriously threatened
in the near term by either its domestic or foreign policy
problems. Nordli's support for theater nuclear force
modernization is not a major domestic political issue,
although he is under considerable fire for clumsy manage-
ment of the Norwegian economy and Oslo's delicate relations
with Moscow. NordZi is taking steps to improve the situation,
however, and the right wing opposition, which lacks a
parliamentary majority, is not pushing for an early con-
frontation with the Prime Minister. The chances of a
challenge to the government will increase as the .198.1
election approaches, but NordZi's opposition is likely to
base its attack more on domestic economic issues than on
foreign or defense policy.
This mermrorandten, requested by the National Security Council and the
Department of State, was prepared by the Western Europe
Division, Office of Political Analysis, and the European
Division, Office of Central Reference. The paper has been coordinated with
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the
National Intelligence officer for Western Europe. Research was completed on
28 January 1980. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Chief, Northern
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The Near Tern for Nordli: Challenges Under Control
Nordli's minority government has been severely criticized for mis-
managing the economy, fumbling relations with Moscow, and supporting
NATO TNF modernization. Only the domestic economic issue poses a serious
threat to the coalition, but the government does not face an immediate
challenge.
The government can count on the two votes of the Left Socialist
Party for its majority on most domestic issues. The Left Socialists are
extremely reluctant to permit a takeover by parties to their right and
as a result see little to gain from toppling the government. They have
threatened to abandon Nordli only once--when a proposed agreement with
the Swedish automaker Volvo reserved a significant slice of an industrial
development project for private ownership. In that instance, the party
was prepared to join the center-right opposition, which objected to the
substantial share reserved for government ownership, to prevent completion
of the deal. The deal was killed in Sweden, however, before coming to a
vote in Norway.
Oslo has mishandled a series of conflicts of interest with the USSR
in the northern maritime areas. The opposition has charged Nordli with
mismanagement on this issue, and the media have joined in attacking the
government. The government has been depicted as too susceptible to
Soviet pressure and generally disorganized in its dealings with Moscow.
To avoid further charges, Nordli recently reshuffled his cabinet and
other appointees with the aim of improving coordination among diplomatic,
commercial, and security officials dealing with Soviet affairs.
Other personnel changes Nordli made last October were designed to
reduce strains between right and left wing factions within the Labor
Party. Nordli deliberately placed left wing spokesmen in domestic
cabinet posts; he hopes these ideologues will become pragmatists when
they are forced to deal directly with problems and obliged to share
responsibility for the results.
Nordli is unlikely to face a serious opposition challenge on foreign
or defense policy, because his party contains the hulk of the anti--
nuclear, antidefense activists and he has successfully muffled them.
Other, more extreme opponents of TNF are not very numerous and will be
isolated by the government's determined efforts to emphasize the arms
control aspects of the 12 December NATO decision. The recent Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan is likely to isolate the extremists even more,
and reinforce the overwhelming Norwegian approval of NATO participation.
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After 1980
If the government fails to get a majority on a major issue and
resigns, the new government will be faced with the same parliament because
the Norwegian constitution makes no provision for early elections. Although
the right wing opposition parties worry that they would be hurt by
an extended period of government responsibilty--the right cannot muster a
majority on most issues--they see some advantage in being the incumbent when
the 1981 elections roll around. This means that, although Nordli is
probably safe for 1980, there is a good chance the opposition will press
its charges of economic mismanagement against the government next year.
TNF Opinion Makers
Although TNF is unlikely to pose a threat to the government, support
for the modernization program is not unanimous. The Conservative,
Center, and Christian Peoples Parties and a majority of the Labor Party
support the government decision in favor of TNF modernization. The
Socialists, Liberals, and a sizable minority in the Labor Party oppose
it. The Parliament's Disarmament Committee is evenly divided on the
issue. The dividing lines seem to be mainly between various internal
party factions, not between parties.
The following government, parliamentary, and party leaders are
likely to be instrumental in shaping Norwegian views:
Knut Fdenland
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The pragmatic
Frydenlund, who began his career as a diplomat
is respected for his expertise in international
affairs. A strong supporter of NATO and Norway's
role in NATO, Frydenlund stresses the importance
of Allied support for his country in its relations
with the Soviet Union. At the same time he
insists on bilateral negotiations with Moscow on
sovereignty-related issues. Frydenlund believes
NATO has a strong responsibility to seek relaxation
of tensions with the Soviet Union and will
support his government's policy giving priority
to arms control negotiations.
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Thorvald Stoltenberg
Reiulf Steen
General Herman Zeiner Gundersen
Minister of Defense. Formerly under-
secretary of the Foreign Ministry,
Stoltenberg became Minister of Defense
in October 1979. He is a leading member
of the Labor Party and is known inter-
nationally for his negotiating ability
through his experience at the United
Nations. He has repeatedly stressed
that the government's decision on
production and deployment of TNF is
firm, but has also insisted that strong
arms control measures need to be part of
the plan. His reputation as a persuasive
negotiator means he will play a key role
in future TNF decisions.
Minister of Commerce and Shipping;
Chairman of Labor Party. Reiulf Steen,
labor leader and spokesman of the Labor
Party left, was brought into the cabinet
in October 1979. He is one of the most
prominent ideologues in the Norwegian
Labor Party, second only to Prime Minister
Nordli. Steen has been reluctant to state
his preference plainly. He has denied that
he "wants" TNF modernization, but says he
is willing to go along if NATO is
committed to arms control negotiations.
He continues to point to Olso's prohibition
of nuclear weapons in Norway during peace-
time.
Chairman, NATO Military Committee.
An intense, serious, extremely competent
professional solider, totally dedicated to
the NATO mission, Zeiner Gundersen supported
the neutron bomb, increased defense
spending, and TNF modernization. He also
criticized Brezhnev's unilateral
force cut. Although he is expected to
retire from the military in July
1980, his views will still be respected
within the MOD and by Parliament. He is
likely to become an expert public commentator
on Norwegian military matters.
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Johan _Jorgeen HoI st
Arvid Johanson
Under Secretary, MFA. Hoist is Norway's
foremost authority on international security
and nuclear weapons deployment policy in
Western Europe. Some of his considerable
influence was gained during his three years
(1976-79) as under secretary in the Ministry
of Defense. Hoist, who has advocated the
need for NATO-wide resolve and solidarity
on TNF, has become more of a voice for the
arms limitations aspect of the 12 December
decision since assuming his new position.
He should have a large voice in any decision-
making on TNF.
Minister for Environmental Affairs. A long
time, well-liked member of the moderate wing
of the Labor Party, Rolf Hansen is noted for
his outspoken, decisive manner. He is considered
a strong leader, capable of making quick
decisions. As Minister for Defense for three
years (1976-79), he proved an efficient,
organized manager. An advocate of NATO and
of a strong defense, Hansen favors increased
military spending. He would have more
influence if he still held that post, but
undoubtedly his suggestions will have some
impact.
Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs
Committee. Labor Party leader Johanson
favors negotiations for force reduction by
both NATO and the Soviet Bloc countries. In
November 1979 he believed that balance was
about to shift in favor of the Soviets, but
in December he became the most prominent
personality to shift his views and has now
endorsed the Danish six-month delay proposal.
He will have considerable influence in
discussions on the issue.
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Lars Korvald Christian People's Party parliamentary Leader.
Korvald has a reputation for being a hard-
working, dependable public servant who listens
to his advisers and has a talent as a solid
negotiator. Prime Minister for 10 months
(1972-73) as a compromise coalition leader,
Korvald remains a potential candidate for that
office again should a nonsocialist coalition
be formed in the future. Korvald is favorably
disposed toward the United States and supports
Norway's ties to NATO and Western Europe. He
sees no alternative to support for TNF moderni-
zation. He believes that if Norway wants to be
a member of the Alliance, it has to share such
responsibilities, The majority of the Christian
People's Party will support this position.
Kaare Willoch Conservative Party parliamentary Leader. Norway's
leading nonsocialist politician, Willoch is a
hard-working, intelligent, middle-of-the-roader.
Very 'interested in foreign affairs, Willoch is
unequivocally pro-West in general and pro-NATO
in particular. He supports TNF because he
believes the Soviets have superiority in Europe,
both in nuclear and conventional weapons. He
is sure to carry most of his party with him.
Hans Hammond Liberal Party parliamentary Leader. Rossbach
iossbach is highly skeptical of the TNF plan. He believes
that Norway should not support the modernization
plan without exhausting the possiblities for
negotiation. He also rejects the idea of first
attaining new weapons in order to use them
subsequently as a negotiating chip in future
relations. He will probably persuade many
members of the Liberal Party to accept his
interpretation on TNF.
Sissel Ronbeck Minister of Consumer Affairs and Administration.
She has been strongly critical of TNF, but is
not expected to have much impact on the issue.
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Einer Forde
Minister, of Church and Education. Forde
has expressed strong opposition to the TNF
decision, but is not likely to play a role
in the debate.
Per. Hysing-Dail Chairman of the Parliament's Defense Committee.
Hysing-Dahl is one of the most knowledgable
members of Parliament and a recognized authority
on defense matters. Hysinq-Dahl has worked hard
for a greater national military effort, increased
defense spending, and closer alliance ties.
Hysing-Dahl has considerable visibility by virtue
of his roles as a powerful Conservative Party
politician and chairman of the extremely
influential Parliamentary Defense Committee.
He stresses pre-stocking of military material
to a greater extent than most Norwegian
politicians. He says the government must make
completely clear that it will support TNF, which
he views as the only way to ensure a balance of
forces between East and West. He should exert
substantial influence in decisions relating to
TNF modernization.
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DISTRIBUTION: NORWAY: A TNF UPDATE
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