SIG(SPACE) MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00914R000600030026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 26, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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5z~lt.c) II
90953
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS NINGTON
November 26, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS, SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP FOR SPACE
SUBJECT: SIG(Space) Meeting
The SIG(Space) will convene on December 3, 1982, at 3:00 p.m.
in Room 305 of the old Executive Office Building. The.purpose
of the meeting will be to formulate a recommendation to the
President on the 4,f'_th;~Or'i.er?,ssue We will also review the
status of activities on the Remote Sensing Issue.
An issue paper on the Fifth orbiter will be forwarded early
next week in order to prepare you for the meeting.
Please provide Gilbert D. Rye (395-5022) with the name of your
representative at the meeting not later than December 1, 1982.
bert arl
D puty A s? tan o the President
or National Se rity Affairs
Attachment
? Distribution List
NSC review completed.
STAT
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DISTRIBUTION
WILLIAM SCHNEIDER
UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FRANK C. CARL.000I
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
GUY W. FISKE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE .
JOSEPH R. WRIGHT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
JOUN N. McMAHON
DEPUTY DIRECTuk
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LT GENERAL PAUL GORMAN
ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NORMAN TERRELL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR NUCLEAR AND WEAPONS CONTROL
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
RONALD B. FRANKUM
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
JAMES M. BEGGS
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
G. PHILIP HUGHES
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE VIE PRESIDENT
CRAIG FULLER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR CABINET AFFAIRS
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Attachment 2
Space Launch Policy Working Group -
Issue Paper on FY 1984 Budget Issues
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SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (SPACE)
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY WORKING GROUP
ISSUE PAPER
ON
FY84 BUDGET ISSUES
ISSUE: Should Orbiter production capability, in the form of the
initiation of a fifth Orbiter, be supported in the FY84
budget?
BACKGROUND:
By 1969, NASA had adopted a program plan to develop a manned Space
Transportation System (STS) based largely on reuseable components;
this system was conceived to provide cost-effective, routine, manned
access to space. Economics and politics, as well as technology,
were all critical factors in the decision process that led to
President Nixon's approval of the STS development in 1972.
As a part of this decision, all Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELV's),
with the exceptions of the Scout and Saturn V vehicles, were to be
phased out. The cost effectiveness of the STS was predicated on
maximum utilization of the Shuttle over its operational life.
The question of the number of Orbiters required for an effective STS
fleet was the subject of intense scrutiny by NASA, Congress, and
various Administrations for most of the 1970's. Original planning
envisioned a five Orbiter fleet. The estimates of STS demand and
the numbers of Orbiters to fulfill a given demand have fluctuated
continuously throughout the program. These fluctuations have lead
to a series of reviews of the question of fleet size.
In preparation for the FY 1977 budget, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) undertook a review of the STS mission model and studied
how many Orbiters beyond the first two were needed. To support the
OMB review, NASA and the DOD jointly reviewed the requirements for
Orbiters and issued a position statement that five Orbiters were
essential to meet National requirements. Following the OMB review,
the Administration did decide that five Orbiters were essential to
the Space Transportation System.
In 1977, under the Carter Administration, the question of the number
of Orbiters was studied again by OMB. The resulting Administration's
position was that only funding for a four-Orbiter fleet would be
requested by NASA. During subsequent consideration of the fifth
Orbiter question in 1978, the Congress decided that (1) a five
Orbiter fleet was an option which should be kept open, and that (2)
interrupting production of Orbiters between the fourth and fifth
Orbiter would have cost penalties. In February 1980, NASA testified
before Congress that, due to slips in all parts of the STS program,
a delay in fifth Orbiter funding until FY 1982 would probably not
cause substantial penalties. As a result of fifth Orbiter funding
deletion from subsequent NASA budgets, the production start has
become an FY 1984 budget issue.
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The STS was conceived, developed and supported to universally service
the U.S. military and civil government needs, the U.S. and foreign
commercial needs, as well as selected foreign government needs. The
commercial and foreign-government flights were a critical factor in the
economic analysis that showed the STS was a cost effective alternative
to our proven.and established ELV capability.
This concept was based upon U.S. policy of providing launching services
to commercial and foreign entities in keeping with:
The National Aeronautics and Space Act - which provides
NASA the authority to provide such services,
The COMSAT Act which requires NASA to provide such ser-
vices to COMSAT upon request, and
The President's Launch Assistance Policy of 1972 - which
states that the U.S. would provide, on a non-discriminatory,
cooperative or reimbursable basis, satellite launch
assistance to other countries or international organiza-
tions.
The current policies, National Space Policy (NSDD-42) and Space
Assistance and Cooperation Policy (USDD-50) reaffirm these previous
policies. The National Space Policy directs that the STS will be the
primary U.S. government launch system and that U.S. Government ELV's
will be maintained until the capabilities of the STS are sufficient to
meet its needs and obligations. Implementation of these policies
through the use of existing U.S. Government launch capabilities to serve
these customers has generated, to date, approximately $2.4 billion
dollars in launch service revenues ($1.0 billion from overseas).
The fourth Orbiter is currently scheduled for December 1984 delivery.
Unless a decision is made to continue Orbiter production in FY 84, the
production facilities, personnel, subcontractors and vendors will be
released.
The sale of STS services to foreign and commercial customers was a
critical factor in the economic analysis that concluded that the STS
would be cheaper than-ELV's for the U.S. Gvernment in the long run.
If this principle is violated, the economic viability of the STS as
the sole U.S. Government launch system is in question. Abandoning
the reimbursable market would constitute an abrupt change in policy
and would place the entire burden of STS operations on the U.S.
Government. This change, or any commercialization options that
result in increased operations cost to the U.S. Government should be
avoided.
For this study, conservative STS capability projections were made
and compared to the STS manifest over the period FY83-88 to evaluate
the adequacy of a four orbiter fleet to meet that demand. Based on
four test flights and one operational flight, the projections are
subject to a great many uncertainties. Nevertheless, their analysis
shows that a four Orbiter fleet only marginally satisfies the
manifest. Should an orbiter be lost, a three orbiter fleet cannot
satisfy the STS manifest. Many highly probable, but unquantifiable,
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factors were considered, but not included, in this comparison.
Consequently, operations under the optimistic conditions assumed for
this study are highly unlikely; prolonged operations with four orbiters
is considered to be high risk until more definitive estimates of
capabilities and demand are available.
Permitting the orbiter production capability to lapse at this time
introduces additional risk into the program. Accidents or anomalies
that require substantial rework of an individual orbiter or all four
initial orbiters will certainly be prolonged as venders, sub-
contractors, tooling and facilities are reinitiated and requalified.
The expense to reopen and requalify selected vendors, subcontractors,
and facilities will certainly be large.
The NASA FY 84 budget request includes the funding to produce and
deliver a fifth Orbiter. The fifth Orbiter funding is an issue in the
preparation of the President's FY 84 budget request. This request, in
fact, represents decisions of NASA management that production of the
fifth Orbiter is the most practical and supportable alternative from
available options.
These options can be grouped into four general categories--close out
Orbiter production, maintain Orbiter production capability, continuing
full Orbiter production, or start a Block II Orbiter definition.
I. Close Out Orbiter Production - This option offers near term budget
reductions on the order of $200-300M per year. However, a decision
to abandon production capability should be a last resort when the
Orbiter is projected to be the longest lead time item and the
critical path to STS operations. With only four test flights and
one operational flight as the experience base for projections of
system turnaround time, availability, reliability, maintainability
and attrition, a realistic assessment of flight operations
through 90 flights (end of FY 87) is extremely subjective.
This option also limits the capability to perform major Orbiter
repairs/maintenance due to the startup and recertification of
people and facilities before work orl major structural components
could be accomplished. This has potentially serious impacts on
repairs or modifications to major assemblies such as wings,
mid-bodies, crew module, or vertical stablizers.
In addition, once a subsequent decision is made to produce
additional Orbiters, the startup and recertification time is
added to the production time. An Orbiter can currently be
delivered in approximately 5 years. Conservatively 6 to 7
years would be required once the production base is abandoned.
Startup and recertification costs would be added to the costs
of identifying and establishing numerous vendors and sub-
contractors.
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II. Maintain Orbiter Production Capability - Two major approaches
are available under this option:
A. Sustain Sub-tie'r Production Ca abilities/Subsystem
Deliverables
This approach would maintain the qualified Orbiter
vendors and sub-tier subcontractors and effectively
sustain the capability to product critical com-
ponents and subsystems. It would not maintain
major subcontractors or prime production capability,
i.e., major structural assemblies.
B. Sustain All Production Capability/Major Assembly
Deliverables
This option would maintain the critical vendors,
sub-tier and prime subcontractors, as well as
the prime contractors' production capabilities.
The product of this effort would be the delivery
of major system assemblies as modular spares,
i.e., wings, mid-bodies, crew module, etc. An
additional advantage of this option is the con-
tinuity of the generic production base required
to respond to major repairs or structural main-
tenance requirements. It would not produce an
assembled Orbiter.
III.Continue Full Orbiter Production - Two approaches to
this option are:
This option clearly maintains all orbiter production
skills and facilities. In addition, this approach
also provides the ability to utilize the major
assemblies of the fifth Orbiter as modular spares
if.required; this production capability also provides
the ability to respond to major repairs and structural
maintenance requirements.
B. Initiate Another Block Buy of Orbiters
This option also maintains the full range of Orbiter
production skills and facilities while offering the
most robust program. In effect, this option provides
for a "full pipeline" of components, subassemblies,
as well as major assemblies. This ensures a flexible
and responsive repair and maintenance capability.
While the block buy concept offers the economic
advantage of quantity production, the cost savings do
not presently appear to be commensurate with the
associated large financial commitments. Selection
of this option at this time also requires a commitment
to maximum STS capacity before accurate demand and
capability assessments can be made.
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IV. Initiation of a Block II Orbiter - Without a detailed study,
this option is conservatively estimated to require 7 to 9 years
from initiation to delivery. This option also does not, of
itself, maintain orbiter production capability which would
conceivably lapse during the definition and design phase. This
option also requires a commitment based on extremely limited
operational experience; the ability to accurately define the
requirements and improvements of a BLock II design based on this
data is questionable. Since little or no serious study has
been accomplished on this option, the technical and financial
risks are judged to be very high.
CONCLUSIONS:
National Space Policy directs maintaining U.S. world leadership in
space transportation. Maintaining world leadership requires continued,
rather than periodic, commitments. These commitments require fiscal
backing to implement U.S. policies. Without budget commitments,
such policy statements are meaningless.
The U.S. cannot abandon its highly successful ELV capability, transi-
tion totally to the STS as its only access to space, and abandon
the production base for orbiters concurrently and seriously entertain
intentions of remaining a world leader in space transportation.
With only five STS flights we do not have adequate data to make
reasoned and confident decisions on orbiter fleet size. We need
more experience to firmly assess such critical factors as turnaround
time, system availability, maintenance, attrition, and demand.
Prudence and sound management demands maintaining all STS production
capabilities until we have solid assessments of the critical factors
above.
To prematurely constrain ourselves to a four Orbiter fleet in the
face of these many uncertainties will only erode confidence in the
STS as a viable, dependable approach to space transportation.
Foreign nations' perception of the U.S. as an unreliable source of
launch services will be reinforced; we must offer them a service
that is available and reliable to meet their needs as they, not we,
perceive them. Both U.S. and foreign commercial customers will also
view the STS as a high ris14 approach to obtaining a firm launch date.
The business community is primarily concerned with schedules; signi-
ficant launch delays translate rapidly into large economic penalties.
Any perception of the U.S. turning away from its commitment to a
fully exploitable STS as we have always stated, will accelerate
the transition of foreign and commercial customers from STS planning
to other options. The only other launch service options realistically
available will be provided by the French, the Soviets, and, potentially,
the Japanese.
Turning Western and third world countries as well as commercial
customers away from the U.S. is counter to all U.S. policy and interests.
The development of the STS was undertaken to meet the "demand" of
the entire mission model, including the sale of STS s vices to
commercial and foreign customers. This was a critic ctor in
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the economic analysis that concluded that the STS would be cheaper
to the-U.S. Government than the existing expendable systems. If
this principle is violated, then the economic viability of the STS
as the sole U.S. Government launch system is in doubt. Abandoning,
partially or fully, the commercial and foreign market would increase
the S^S operating burden of the U.S. Government. Any options that
result in increased operations costs to the U.S. Government should
be avoided.
The STS should be exploited as it was conceived and designed; the
system should be aggressively optimized (i.e., make it fully
operational and cost effective) and marketed to serve our best
interests--be they economic, political, or national security. Only
in this way can we offset the financial commitments already made.
For the U.S. Government to turn only to its own needs at this time
is directly counter to all U.S. interests and will increase the costs
to the U.S. Government users.
While a decision at this time to allow the Orbiter production capability
to lapse is considered inappropriate because of the many uncertainties
precluding definitive analysis, a decision to proceed much beyond a
fifth Orbiter commitment is inappropriate for the same reasons.
A balanced, low-risk option should be selected that preserves our
basic capabilities, assures maximum insensitivity to errors in
projecting system capabilities, as well as demand, and maintain our
most flexible options for more careful consideration when firm data
is available.
Based on the conclusions of this study, we recommend continuing the
Orbiter production base. FY84 funding sB-ou_IT_Ee supported tor the
production of the fifth Orbiter.
This will productively maintain the production capability and will
deliver an orbiter in FY88, if before that time firm data leads to
the conclusions that a four Orbiter fleet is adequate, the unassembled
components could be used as modular spares (wings, mid-bodies,
crew modules, etc.) and none of the investment is wasted.
On the other hand, if we conclude that the demand dictates follow-on
Orbiters, the production base is in place to support that decision
under the most efficient conditions.
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Attachment 3
IG(Space) Working Group Report on Space Launch Policy
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IG (Space) Working Group Report
on
Space Launch Policy
INDUCTION
The IG-Working Group on Space Launch Policy was tasked to identify issues that
had an FY-84 budget impact and provide recaranendations to the IG (Space) by
November. The only FY-84 budget issue identified was the NASA requirement to
fund a fifth orbiter production start in FY-84.
The Working Group constrained its review of this essentially programmatic issue
to the policy implications of either starting fifth orbiter production in FY-84
or not. Several reasons for this approach were considered pertinent. First,
the composition, background, and talents of the Working Group members were
such that detailed programmatic issues could not be independently evaluated.
Second, inadequate time was available to visit the operational NASA centers to
seek and objectively review technical, production, and financial data. And
finally, the charter of the Working Group was felt to be confined to general
policy level issues.
Consequently, the approach chosen was to base our review on previously accan-
plished studies and analyses updated by the most current information available
fran NASA and their prime contractors. New data or responses to Working Group
questions were considered in the context of previous studies and conclusions.
No attempt was made by the Working Group to verify or validate the programmatic
material presented.
DISCUSSION
An initial review was made by the Working Group to confirm that the orbiter
was, in fact, the critical path to STS operations rather than facility through-
put or other factors. NASA's data confirmed this to be the case by FY-88 -
after the initial system build-up.
Based on this conclusion, we next reviewed the STS capability and flight demand
studies as well as the most current NASA data. Based on this information, an
optimistic STS launch capability under the most favorable operating conditions
was canpared to the STS manifest through.. FY-88. The confidence in even these
relatively solid missions requirements becanes lower in the FY 87-88 timeframe;
however, enough other considerations existed such as the three year lead time
for commercial satellites and the.uncertainty in the physical ability to mix
the various payloads on a single mission, for the Working Group to conclude
that the manifest represented a most conservative (minimal) demand projection
and it should be used as the basis for this study.
The Working Group estimated that under best case conditions, an average of
7.5 flights per year, per orbiter, was achievable. This is optimistic for
several reasons. As an example, it assumes the turn-around time at Vandenberg
to be equal to that at Kennedy. During the period considered, FY 86-88, this
is optimistic by essentially a factor of two (i.e., 60 days at Vandenberg vs
28 days at Kennedy).
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The need for major inspection and maintenance was recognized and estimated to
require five months of down time after every 25 orbiter missions. This effec-
tively reduces the operational flights per year, per orbiter, to 6.6. This
estimate was used by the Working Group when comparing capability against the
manifest demand.
The evaluation shows that four orbiters can provide 26 flights per year under
most favorable conditions. This capability would marginally satisfy the mani-
fest in FY-88 (i.e., 23 flights). The loss of a single orbiter in service,
and, in fact, any number of other unfavorable conditions, could preclude
satisfying the demand.
Several examples of such unfavorable conditions were identified and the asso-
ciated impacts estimated in a gross sense:
Major Configuration Upgrades - Orbiter modifications and upgrades were con-
sidered extremely likely; a near-term example is the Centaur modifications
required in FY-86 to support the Galileo and International Solar Polar Mis-
sion. The effect of these modifications and the critical spacing of the
launch windows (i.e., 30 days apart) in reality lowers the effective rate
for these two orbiters to four flights each for this specific year.
Major Anomaly or Failure - While the STS has been extremely successful to
date, only five missions, using a single orbiter, have been flown. A major
system problem during the -FY 83-88 period was considered possible. This
would require analysis, possibly additional inspection and testing, and con-
ceivably the grounding of the entire fleet until the issues were resolved.
Based on comparisons with US Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) and selected
aircraft programs, an estimate of one to six months was judged to be real-
istic. No means of estimating the frequency of such an occurrence was
identified.
Forced Landi at a Contingency Landing Site - The requirement to land at a
contingency site outside the continental United States was also considered
a possible occurrence during the FY 83-88 period. Even if no damage to the
orbiter was incurred, one to three months could easily be required to return
the orbiter to the US and subsequent service.
Accidents - Accidents were considered to be possible; unfortunately, no
means of estimating either the frequency or severity of such accidents could
be established. However, all operational experience intuitively indicates
the prudence and need to plan for accainodating such problems. The pure
statistical probability of losing one orbiter in 183 flights is 0.509 at a
reliability of 0.9996.
Threats - Several evaluations of the system vulnerabilities to hostile acts
va~n performed. After reviewing these reports, the Working Group con-
cluded that, while the probability of such an occurrence was low, the poten-
tial impact on STS operations was high. For instance, if an orbiter were
damaged or destroyed, the systems capability would be effectively reduced by
25%.
- Attrition - The present orbiter design specification is for a useful life of
100 operational flights. No firm data exists to determine the validity of
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this specification. It may be unattainable or unduly pessimistic; only
flight experience will provide the answer.
Such considerations, while judged to be realistic, could not be quantitatively
considered by the Working Group when comparing projected capability against the
manifest.
A final concern of the Working Group was responsiveness to major repairs or
modifcations during a period when the orbiter production capability was not
available. The ability to bring tooling out of storage, recertify it and the
necessary personnel, acquire materials, fabricate,. test, qualify and deliver a
major replacement, such as a wing, while not technically in question, poses a
serious potential scheduling problem. NASA and contractor estimates to repair/
replace a wing are on the order of six months if the production base is in
place and 36 months if it is not. Such added delays if the production base is
unavailable was considered unacceptable for a critical, high visability, opera-
tional program.
CONCLUSIONS
While a comparison of optimistic capability estimates with the relatively con-
servative manifested demand through FY-88 shows four orbiters to be slightly in
excess of that demand, other considerations strongly support the requirement
for reserve. 'Operations under the optimistic conditions assumed for this
evaluation are highly unlikely. Prolonged operrations with four orbiters,
especially without an on-going orbiter production base, should definitely be
considered high risk.
While no single factor at this time drives a conclusion that the fifth orbiter
is an absolute requirement, the combination of the many system uncertainties
support the conclusion that a fifth orbiter may be required to reliably assure
an operational availability of four orbiters.
Clearly the US Government should not abandon its proven ELV capability, a:. is
currently programmed by FY-88, transition totally to the STS as its only access
to space, and concurrently terminate the orbiter production. Such actions
would be inconsistent with current US space policies and creates a serious
risk to all elements of the US space program. In fact, the concept of termi-
nating orbiter production and repair capability is counter to the realities
of a continued commitment to the STS as our prime access to space. Attrition
alone requires a periodic replacement or orbiters; if the 100 flight per
orbiter life estimate is accurate and five years are required to deliver
another orbiter, initial production of a replacement orbiter for Columbia
would be required around 1990 with three subsequent replacements started over
the next three to four years.
Collectively these considerations led the Working Group to conclude that con-
sideration of the need for a fifth orbiter as a point solution is too narrow
an issue. The basic issue should be consciously decided in the context of cur-
rent Presidential policies, rather than as an isolated budget decision.
The programmatic strategy of the most cost-effective program to maintain the
production capability is the responsibility of NASA as the STS Program Manager.
That issue is considered to be beyond the scope of the charter of the Working
Group. However, the option currently proposed by NASA, i.e., the production
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Group. However, the option currently proposed by NASA, i.e., the production
start of a fifth orbiter in FY-84, satisfies all the concerns and issues posed
by the Working Group.
.RECOMMENDATIONS
A responsive and viable orbiter production and repair capability should be
maintained.
NASA, as the STS Program Manager, should continue to be charged with iden-
tifying the appropriate programmatic options to efficiently meet this objec-
tive.
All Departments and Agencies with any interest in the STS program should
continue to support NASA, as the Program Manager, in its efforts to achieve
a fully operational and cost-effective system.
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Attachment 4
Interagency Space Launch Policy Working Group -
Selected Briefing Charts*
* This is an early version of this briefing. The briefing that will be
presented at the SIG(Space) meeting has been prepared by NASA and differs
considerably from this version.
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INTERAGENCY
SPACE LAUNCH POLICY
WORKING GROUP
RECOMMENDATION ON
FY 84 BUDGET SSUE
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INTERAGENCY-SPACE-LAUNCH POLICY W0RKING.SRO
h1EMllGIiSWP
o CHARLIE GUNN NASA
o MAJOR THOMAS MAULTSBY DOD
o COL GEORGE OJALEHTO DEPT, OF STATE
o JAMES CHAMBERLIN ACDA
DCI
o LT, COL JAMES HARSHBARGER JCS
o OBS.ERVERS
o BART BORRASCA OMB
o JAMES LEONG OSTP
COCHAIRMAN
COCHAIRMAN
STAT
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WORKING GROUP BASELINE
o NO NEW STUDIES PERFORMED
o REVIEWED PREVIOUS STUDIES
o UPDATES USED WHEN AVAILABLE
o U.S, ELY CAPABILITY EXHAUSTED BY FY87
o DELTA'S
o ATLAS CENTAUR'S
o TITAN'S
o STS IS:
o CRITICAL NATIONAL RESOURCE
o ONLY U.S. ACCESS TO SPACE BY FY88
o STS ORBITER PRODUCTION NOW PHASING DOWN
o EXAMINE FY84 BUDGET ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS
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POLICY BASIS FOR U.S. SPACLACTI:VJILCS.
o U.S. IS FULLY COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING WORLD LEADERSHIP IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION--
NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (NSDD-42, JULY 4, 1982)
o U.S, WILL MAKE THE STS AVAILABLE TO ALL AUTHORIZED USERS--DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN,
COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT--NATIONAL SPACE POLICY (NSDD-42, JULY 4, 1982)
o U.S. LAUNCHES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COUNTRIES, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, OR
FOREIGN BUSINESS ENTITIES--SPACE ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION POLICY (NSDD-50,
AUGUST 6, 1982)
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) IS THE PRIMARY SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE OF THE U.S,
(NSDD-42, JULY 4, 1982)
o 'STS CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITIES SHALL BE DEVELOPED TO MEET APPROPRIATE NATIONAL
NEEDS (NSDD-42, JULY 4, 1982)
o MAJOR CHANGES TO THE STS PROGRAM CAPABILITIES REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
(NSDD-42. JULY 4, 1982)
EXISTING U.S. POLICY STATEMENTS MANDATE A STRONG
AND RESPONSIVE U.S. SPACE LAUNCH CAPABILITY TO
BE MADE AVAILABLE WORLDWIDE
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INTERAGENCY SPACE LAUNCH POLICY WORDING GROUP
ISSUE
ARE STS CAPABILITIES AND CAPACITIES WITH FOUR ORBITERS SUFFICIENT TO
FULFILL NSDD-42 & 50 POLICIES?
5-
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INTERAGENCY SPACE LAUNCH POLICY WORKING GROUP
APPROACH
o STS CAPABILITY
o STS DEMAND
o CAPABILITY VS, DEMAND
o OTHER CONSIDERATION
o CONCLUSIONS
o RECOMMENDATION
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STS FLEET CAPABHJTY
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CIS-. DILITY-DLILRMLNI NIS
o FLIGHT-TO-FLIGHT TIME
o GROUND PROCESSING TIME
o MISSION DURATION
o MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE
o CONTINGENCY TIME, FOR
o OPERATIONAL DELAYS
o SYSTEM OgTAGES
MAJOR CONFIGURATION UPGRADES
- MAJOR ANOMALY/FAILURE
- FORCE LANDING
- ACCIDENTS
- THREATS
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STS GROUND TURNAROUND. TIME
CUMULATIVE
THRU FY 1908
30 . 440 0- cc :.0 l 90
9.A?114=1' t_,V, yA'rn
OT--B?--016'
11119162
REALISTIC MINIMUM
20 DAYS
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STS MISSION DURATI-OX-JJM
o ORBITER CAPABILITY: 30 DAYS ON--ORBIT
o NASA STS MANIFEST (1982-1987); MISSIONS AVERAGE 5,9 DAYS ON-ORBIT
o EXPECT FUTURE MISSIONS TO LENGTHEN IN DURATION
o WORKING GROUP'S ASSESSMENT
[AVERAGE MISSION DURATION: 5 DAYSI
/0
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STS FLIGHT-TO-FLIGHT TIME
o WORKING GROUP'S ASSESSMENT:
o GROUND TURNAROUND
PJ S
o MISSION DURATION
28 DAYS
5
1 REALISTIC MINIMUM 33 DAYSI
i
NOTE: TURNAROUND AT KSC AND VAFB ASSUMED EQUAL
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STS OPERATIO14S
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE
248 WORK DAYS
5AAYS/WEEK - 3 SHIFTS/DAY
248 DAYS
33 WORK DAYS
7.5 FLTS/YEAR
OPERATIONS COITI1DE1CY
WEEKENDS & HOLIDAYS
117 DAYS
I?-
OP--82-0123 11/22/82
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ESTIMATE OF MAJOR PERIODIC MAMILME-D-M-TIM
o EXTRAPOLATION FROM COMMERCIAL AIRLINES DATA
o AIRCRAFT MAJOR INSPECTION AND OVERHAUL--APPROX EVERY 7 YEARS (25,000 HRS)
o AIRCRAFT DOWNTIME: APPROX 15 DAYS
o ORBITER ASSUMPTIONS
o TWICE AS FREQUENT--EVERY 3/ YEARS (42 MONTHS)
o TEN TIMES IN DURATION--150 DAYS (5 MONTHS)
o ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER'S ESTIMATE
o 10 MONTHS DOWNTIME AFTER EVERY 25 FLIGHTS
WORKING GROUP ASSESSMENT
5 MONTHS DOWNTIME AFTER EVERY 25 FLIGHTS
13
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ESJ _IN'ATE._Q.F_LA, OR21JIOIII.EJ`'IAI.NTE`,ARCL_I EQ.UI_REMENTS.
STRUCTURAL INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
? VISUAL-
* DYE PENETRANT FOR CRACKS
? X-RAY FOR CORROSION
? PULL TEST THERMAL PROTECTION TILES FOR BOND STRENGTH
? AREAS OF CONCERN
? STRENGTH
? HIGHLY STRESSED/FATIGUE AREAS
? FRACTURE CRITICAL PARTS
? MAJOR MEMBERS AND JOINTS
? EXAMPLES
? VERTICAL TAIL (-4MONTHS)
? WING (-I MONTH)
? CONTROL SURFACES (--1.5MONTHS)
? CORROSION
? LOW/BLIND AREAS (HORIZ OR VERT)
? EXAMPLES
? WING CARRY-THRU ('/2MONTH)
? STRUCTURE BEHIND BLANKETS (3MONTHS)
? BEHIND RCC PANELS (4MONTHS)
? THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
? TILE BOND STRENGTH (4MONTHS)
23Acrc -- UP
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EFFECTIVE ORBITER FLIGHTS PER YEAR
o ORBITER FLIGHT CAPABILITY--7,5 FLIGHTS PER YEAR
o MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE DOWNTIME
o 5 MONTHS AFTER EVERY 25 FLIGHTS PER ORBITER
25 FLIGHTS 12 MONTHS
0
X
7,5 FLTS/YR YEAR
40 MONTHS
o 40 MONTHS OPERATIONS + 5 MONTHS MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE = 45 MONTHS
25 FLIGHTS' 12 MONTHS
X
45 MONTHS YEAR
6.6 FLTS/YR
EFFECTIVE ORBITER FLIGHTS PER YEAR = 6,6
/(4
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EFFECTIVE ORBITER FLIGHT C1PA ILITY
REALISTIC MAXIMUM
6.6 ORB1TER FLIGHTS PER YEAR
TURNAROUND: 33 DAYS PER FLIGHT
MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE AFTER
EVERY 25 FLIGHTS-5 MONTHS
DOWNTIME
2 3 4 5 6
EFFECTIVE ORGITER FLIGHTS PER YEAR
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4
10
OP-82-0107 /
11 /22/82
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STS OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE
240 DAYS .
STS FLEET CAPACITY
4 ORBITERS X 6.6 FLTS/YR/ORBITER = 26 FLTS/YR
OPERATIONS CONTINGENCY
WEEKENDS & HOLIDAYS
117 DAYS
J
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ESTIMATE OF CONTINGENCY REQU RED FOR OPERATIONS DELAYS
EST I MATED DELAY IMIL
INCIDENT
(DAYS)
* SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE PI'MLEMS 1-2
co FLIGHT HARDWARE
? LAUNCH PROCESSING SYSTEM
? GROUND SUPPORT EQUIIII*kALNT
* PAYLOAD/CA1160 PROBLEMS
ar CARGO INTEGRATION JEST E01,11[wil.-W
o ORE31flER INTERFACE
PAYLOAD OPERATIONS I;O,---J fh6i'
.. CI:N I E11
Ni1SS10N SI)PP0'RT U--
MISSION CONTROL CENTER
? RANGE SAFETY
"DHSS
l--2
~+ VVA~iILI)
ASCENT
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER I-IEC'G\ILI IY
DESCENT / LANDING
UI CiiEti(ILEt) UOW11TIML (i.'cIlJ~Jh) -~"L
w OVERI-IAUI"
.$ R FUI1I3ISEI~V [NT
~+ INSPECTION
~- CONFIGURA l"It)N Ui'GHADLS
Mi CELt.:1IJEUU:;
PHHIOI iFI `( IViISSIGN SCHI.:i.)UI .ING
SPARES SI iOIiTAG[/RLPAIII
? QUEUE CASCADING
SHARED ORBITER FERRY
ROOT-SUM-SQUARED OF DELAYS PER FLIGHT
o WORKING GROUP'S ASSESSMENT
AVERAGE 3/ DAYS ^Y PER F'-IGIIT _l.
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2-5
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STS OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE
248 DAYS
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ASSESSMENT OF STS FLEET CAPABI-LIIY
[OUR ORBITERS X 6.6 FLTS PER YEAR = 26 FLIGHTS PER YEAR
o 28-DAY GROUND TURNAROUND--70% LEARNING/VAFB & KSC EQUAL
o 5-DAY MISSIONS
o MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE EVERY 25 FLIGHTS PER ORBITER (5 MONTHS DOWNTIME)
o WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS ADEQUATE TO ABSORB OPERATIONS DELAYS
o NO CONSIDERATION OF SYSTEMS OUTAGES FOR:
-MAJOR CONFIGURATION UPGRADES
-MAJOR ANOMALIES/FAILURES
-FORCED LANDINGS
-ACCIDENTS
-THREATS
17
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FACTOR NOT CONS I DERED IN STS F I F F T-CAPABILLTI
INCIDENT
ESTIMATED RECOVERY TIME
(MONTHS)
? MAJOR CONFIGURATION UPGRADES 6-8
$ MAJOR ANOMALY/FAILURE 1-6 (FLEET GROUNDING)
? FORCED LANDING AT SECONDARY
LANDING SITE 1-3
? ACCIDENT 2-6 (LOSS OF ORBITER)
? THREATS UNKNOWN (LOSS OF ORBITER)
t6
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UUNohIUEPvbI fEM flJu
EXPERIENCE
? MAJOR CONFIGURATION UPGRADES
? MIXED CARGO MOD FOR STS-5
o SPACELAB MOD FOR STS-9
? STRUCTURAL LOADS MOD
RECOVERY TIME -
MONTHS
? MAJOR ANOMALY/FAILURE
o DELTA
o CENTAUR
? TITAN
? APOLLO
o X-15
o X-24
o DC.-10
81%C* -- c>i->
OP-82- 0100
11/1/8?
19C
, ,.:ate
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ESTIMATED ACCIDENT RECOVERY TIME
? HARD LANDINGS
m DAMAGE TO LANDING GEAR ONLY (-- 2MONTI-IS)
? DAMAGE TO STRUCTURE (-'-5MONTHS)
* DAMAGE TO WING
(LANDING GEAR COLLAPSE (-6MONTHS)) ? DAMAGE TO PAYLOAD BAY DOOR(S) (--2MONTHS)
0 OVER TEMPERATURES ON FUSELAGE (-3MONTHS)
* IF NEW WING REQUIRED 36 MONTHS
19 r4c1:-
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STS DEMAND
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PROJECTED STS DEMAND
80 ;
1990
FISCAL YEAR
H-
2000
OP-82 0106
11122182
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: ct7su. tnQ
1.)(N)
COMMLI?CIAI_ ,i
F-O/IEIGN
85 __ -r.
FISCAL YEAR
()P N7 0! 1.7
!1l 111,'8:
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2
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STS MANIFEST
FY
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
TOTAL
NASA
3.00
4.25
3.00
5.50
4.17
5.58
25.50
(29%)
COWL & FOREIGN
2.00
3.25
5.00
4.25
7.50
4.00
26.00
(29%)
DEPT OF DEFENSE
0.00
2.00
2.33
5.66
9,33
10.33
29.65
(33%)
UNASSIGNED
0.00
0.50
2.67
1.59
0100
3.09
7.85
( 9I)
TOTAL
5.00
10.00
13.00
17.00
21.00 ,
23.00
89.00
o STS MANIFEST PLANNING BASED ON AN AVERAGE 91 PERCENT LOAD FACTOR.
o ACTUAL CARGO LOADING ANALYSES INDICATE AN AVERAGE 75 PERCENT LOAD FACTOR,
o ADJUSTMENT OF STS MANIFEST TO 75 PERCENT LOAD FACTOR INCREASES THE
FLIGHT REOUIREIIJ' T FROM 89 TO 108 TOTAL FLIGHTS,
Z L7I
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ASSESSMENT OF-DEMAND
o PAST DEMAND PROJECTIONS --OPTIMISTIC
o STS MANIFEST (FY83-88)
o STS DEMAND POST FY88
--BEST CURRENT ASSESSMENT
o NASA BUDGETED PROGRAMS
o DOD BUDGETED PROGRAMS
o COMMERCIAL/FOREIGN BOOKINGS
--STILL ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY
o DOUBLE BOOKINGS WITH ARIANE
o LAUNCH-ON-NEED MISSIONS
o NEW PROGRAMS
--ALL ASSESSMENTS PROJECT GROWTH
.o TELECOMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE
o DIRECT BROADCAST WORLDWIDE
o VIDEO CONFERENCING
o ELECTRONIC MAIL
o GEOSYNCHRONOUS PLATFORMS
o MATERIALS PROCESSING
o SPACE STATIONS
o DOD NEW MISSIONS
STS MANIFEST IS REALISTIC DEMAND PLANNING BASE
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CAPABILITY US. DEMAW
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STS 1rAIRtiST
15
4 ORBITERS
81
85
.FISCAL YEAR
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ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITY VS. DEMAND
o FOUR ORBITER FLEET IS MARGINALLY CAPABLE OF MEETING MANIFESTED DEMAND
o THREE ORBITER FLEET CANNOT SATISFY MANIFESTED DEMAND
o NO TOLERANCE FOR:
o ADVANCED ATTRITION
o LONGER DURATION MISSIONS
o SYSTEM OUTAGES FOR MAJOR ANOMALIES/FAILURES OR ACCIDENTS
o SURGE DEMAND
o FUTURE GROWTH IN DEMAND
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OTHER CONSIDERATIQIS .
o AN STS RESERVE CAPACITY:
o INSTILLS CONFIDENCE IN LAUNCH COMMITMENTS
o INDUCES DEMAND
o ENABLES RESPONSE TO NEW NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND FOREIGN CHALLENGES
o PERMITS CONFIDENCE PHASE-OUT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ELV'S
o FACILITATES MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES AND RISK
o EXPANDED STS USE IS KEY TO U.S. LEADERSHIP AND PROGRAM SUCCESS
o LOWERS COST PER FLIGHT FOR ALL CUSTOMERS
o COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN REVENUES HELP OFFSET U.S. GOVERNMENT BASE COSTS
o ACCELERATES CONFIDENCE IN AND COMMITMENT TO SYSTEM
o ENHANCES U.S. COMPETITIVE EDGE IN RELATED MARKETS
o THERE ARE STILL MAJOR STS PROGRAM UNCERTAINTIES
o FLEET CAPABILITY
o REDUCTION IN TURNAROUND
o MAJOR PERIODIC MAINTENANCE DOWNTIME
o AVERAGE OPERATIONAL DELAY TIME
o EFFICIENCIES IN MANIFESTING MIXED CARGO (LOAD FACTOR)
o IMPACT OF ORBITER CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES
o VAFB VS. KSC TURNAROUND AND MISSION CHARACTER
o PAYLOAD SCHEDULE CONFLICTS
o ORBITER WEAROUT/REPLACEMENT LIFE CYCLE
o ATTRITION RATES
30
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OTHER CONSIDEI TMS (CONT'D)
o FLEET DEMAND
o U.S. GOVERNMENT BUDGET AND NEW INITIATIVES
o COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN GROWTH PATTERN
o FOREIGN ELV COMPETITION
o STS ORBITER PRODUCTION LINE AND SUBCONTRACTOR SUPPORT NOW PHASING DOWN
o MAJOR SUBCONTRACTOR COMPONENTS DELIVERED BY END OF 1983
o MAJOR STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS DELIVERED BY MID-1984
o EROSION AND SHUTDOWN OF PRODUCTION LINE AND SUBCONTRACTORS IS A
MAJOR RISK
o STS IS DOWN IN EARLY 1985
o ELV'S ARE DOWN IN LATE 1985
o DELAY OF A FIFTH ORBITER ONE YEAR (FY85 VS. FY84)
o REQUIRES RESTART AND REQUALIFICATION OF LINE AND SUBCONTRACTORS
o COSTS AN ADDITIONAL $165M ($1,760 VS. $1,595)
3(
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SUMMARY OF OTHER CONSIDERATIQIl,S
o EXPANDED STS USE BENEFITS THE U.S, GOVERNMENT AND ALL USERS
o RESERVE STS CAPACITY INSTILLS CONFIDENCE, INDUCES DEMAND AND IS HEDGE AGAINST
UNCERTAINTY AND RISKS
o STILL MAJOR STS PROGRAM UNCERTAINTIES--FLEET CAPABILITY AND DEMAND
o PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL ORBITERS AT REASONABLE COST AND LEAD TIME IS ERODING
o ASSESSMENT OF OTHERICONSIDERATIONS
o AN STS RESERVE CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL TO USERS CONFIDENCE
AND TO MANAGE PROGRAM UNCERTAINTIES
o AN ORBITER PRODUCTION CAPABILITY SHOULD BE MAINTAINED UNTIL
PROGRAM UNCERTAINTIES ARE RESOLVED
3z_
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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT
o FOUR ORBITER FLEET CAPACITY.OF 26 FLIGHTS PER YEAR IS REALISTIC MAXIMUM
o NO RESERVE CAPABILITY FOR:
o SYSTEM OUTAGES
o LONGER DURATION MISSIONS
o. SURGE DEMANDS.
o FOUR ORBITER FLEET IS MARGINALLY CAPABLE OF MEETING THE STS MANIFESTED DEMAND
THROUGH FY88
o DEMAND IS EXPECTED TO STEADILY INCREASE BEYOND FY88
A THREE ORBITER FLEET CANNOT SATISFY THE MANIFESTED DEMAND
o ORBITER PRODUCTION AND SUBCONTRACTOR SUPPORT IS NOW PHASING DOWN
ABILITY TO SATISFY NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
WITH A FOUR ORBITER FLEET CANNOT BE ASSURED
33
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Attachment 5
Talking Points for SIG(Space) Meeting -
Commercialization of Operational Civil Remote Sensing
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Washington. D.C. 20230
NOV 3 U 198Z
TO: Michael J. Bayer
Associate Deputy Secary Hof Com
FROM: Anthony J. Calio
Deputy Admi ni strilTor
SUBJECT: Talking Points for SIG(Space) Meeting on December 3,
1982
On Fri day, November 26, John McElroy was tol d by Col . Rye
that a SIG(Space) meeting will be held on December 3. He said
that two subjects would be discussed: the fifth Space Shuttle
orbiter and civil space remote sensing. The fifth orbiter
discussion is intended to reach a decision in the meeting, but
the remote sensing discussion is only to advise the members of
status.
Per your request to John McElroy, the attached chart is
provided to give the DOC member an outline of the steps in
progress.
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COMMERCIALIZATION OF OPERATIONAL CIVIL SPACE REMOTE SENSING
Status: December 3, 1982
o CCCT has met a number of times (December 1981, March 1982, April 1982) on the issue
of the best approach to commercializing the Landsat and whether the civil weather
satellites should be included as well.
o The most recent meeting reached a tentative decision not to include the weather
satellites, but elected not to finalize the decision pending receipt and analysis of
industry views.
o Industry views were solicited by a notice in the Commerce Business Daily and
received on October 22, 1982.
o The views were analyzed by an outs.ide advisory committee and a Government committee.
o The outside committee. recommended formal solicitation of firm proposals for industry
ownership and/or operation of the land and weather or land (only) satellites. It also
recommended against formation of a vertical monopoly in remote sensing. Further, the
committee supported submission of an urgent FY 83 supplemental to ensure Landsat data
continuity. Principal attention was paid by the committee to the land satellites,
rather than the weather satellites.
o The Government committee perceived some national security concerns in commercialization
of the land and weather satellites. The evaluation focused on the weather satellites
more than the land satellites.
o The CCCT will meet in mid-December to reach a decision on these matters.
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