ALBANIAN MINORITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R014500140002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 7, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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ilTELLOPAX 2$
JFEB 1952
CLASS[ F! CATION SLrR /CONTRO , m U.s OF'F'ICIALS O
SECURITY INFORMATION
IN MATRON REPORT REPORT
CD NO.
COUNTR'r'
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE
ACQUIRED
oslaviaa ai 1 Lni.a
Alban .an Minority
in Yugoslavia
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED By LAW. THE. REPRODUCTION OF, THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
The Serbiane `compelled the Albanians to abandon their homes and s
and 1'ontenegrins in them.
Po t pgj _qUd star c 1Ks p o-l P
UPPLEMENT TO
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
The Albanian minority in Yugo via comprises a population o*? approximately
900,000 individuals living in." he Kosovo, Montenegro, and Western Macedonia.
The Kosovo-is theoretically a part oo the Autonomous Region belonging to the
Republic o- Serbia, which in turn is incorporated within the Yugoslav Federated
Republics. By adding Metohija to Kosovo, the Autonomous Region received the
name of Kosmet. The Kosmet has approximately 750,000 inhabitants, 85 per cant
o4H whom are Albanians by origin and language.
2. At the time the borders oe Albania were established by the London Coneerence
in 19139 the Kosovo was ceded to Serbia. Numerous Kosovars and other'Albanians
living in the newly acquired Serbian territories sought re-Page in Albania.
These people settled in Fusha a Krujeas, Mamurrasp Fushle Mbretit (Elbasan),
Mysegeja, and other localities. Others were expelled by the Serbians. These
included a great number of notables, among whom were the B11aca family, and
numerous dignitaries o4? the Catholic Church. Fathers Shtjefen Kurti, Gjon
Bica, and Mikel Sho.la managed to.save their lives by escaping to Albania in
19290 At that time the Albanian Government sent a violent protest.to the
League oP Nations concerning the murder of? Father Shtefen G jecov. The murder
is described in a book by Doctor Vasf'i Samimi, published in Tirana in 1943.
3. The Yugoslav authorities took advantage or the ignorance o-? the large masses
o2' the Albanian minority, and under the pretext that they were Turks because
o" their Moslem faith, denied them the right to speak their language and 50X1-HUM
attempted to uproot their traditions and their patriotic or national sentiments.
STATE LPv~
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On 7 April 1939, Albania was occupied by Italy and thereafter the Albanians
living within the 1913 borders of free Albania, animated by patriotism and
love of freedom, fought against Italy and Germany, who had deprived them
of'thetr freedom. The wartime situation of the Albanians in Kosovo was
quite different. they had been subjugated. to Yugoslavia, and Ita]r and
Germany liberated thew The Profound traces of the Yugoslav yoke-will re-
"1'?l9L 9 when Kosovo seemed tv have. reach. a bo om o e a yes
,
people were rescued and united with Albania. 50X1-HUM
50 Groups at teachers and administrative officials were sent bythqp Albanian
Ministry of .Public Education -in Tirana to the' Kosovo in 194l and 1942.
Then' "missionaries of freedomN understood the status and sentiments of the
g
Kosoyars. They managed. 'assuage old rancors and desires of revenge, or-
Zedadministrative questions on.a democratic basis, and settled the
potitign of Serbian and Merfteiiegrin minorities'by recognizing their equality
cif - right o with the Albanians. " This meant that ;the Slav minors was not
burdened with taxes and eiitiilar hardships. From 1941 until l9 , Slavs were
aWle,t obtain positions: asgoveinrnentofficials, and enjoyed ndividual
lit art ,es. ; T ey were not subjected to militaq service. Bec use of their
nati;t n l `p ^ids9 "however, fete 5irbiins and Mon . t onggrtne cared to accept aY r
type of statefunction, nor did they nerd. to since they had grown rich by
epplbit'ing their Albanian slaves. Yet many of them could have accepted jobs,
since thy spoke Albanian fluently.
6. (Under tae Albanian reginge in K?sovo, the Serbs and Montenegrins enjoyed the
protection a~ the courtsgai~ist (abuses by) the. Albanians, and in cases of
use the state' would ixi aroma dtpect1y in their favor. For pstance, in
9 solder of the Skandi rberg Division, killed a Serb in Prizren as
the-result of.a blood feud.. It was Xhafer Deva in person who ordered that
the murderer be shot on the spot where the crime was committed.
7. The Co munists began slowly to gain success by intr,gues among'`the Albanian
intellectuals', capturing the` souls of the intelligericia with slogans about
the vfersign occupation1. and glittering appeals for 5workers' rights.
Fina i1.,, they proposed that the Albanians unite with the Communist Party in
the fight for national liberation against Nazi'Faecist imter~aliam. Next,
they sowed discord and hatred'between the Albanians and their Koeovar
bretbran. The functionaries. who arrived from free Albanian were well re
oe&ved by the Kosovars, yet the latter did not invite the functionaries into
their' homes because of (family? ? regional?) differences. This allowed
ha Ssbp and the Montenegrins to offer the functionaries hospitality and
c?urte y `axed to implant in>.the Albanians the conviction that th' Kosovars
were` rsl .gious fanatics. Meanwhilq the Communists were disseminating their
ow
.,A propaganda to the effect that the functionaries were venal servants of
tote' ocv'iapier and betrayers of workersi rights.
~. The-SerbIontenegrin minority which lived for the most part the cities
soon showed a strong inclination towards Communism. It hao fact long
been their method of survival to adapt themselves to new currentq and to
profit; by the humors of destiny. the Communists among them reaped the
i? r
e t
t h
f th
i
o
a
o
s
e
r w
rk ih 1942 when the iitd th Albain to br
,ynceenasun
a:city Pec ~Peja), in part destroying it. Since the Albanian
authorities were anxious to placate the Slav inhabitants, the Communists
welt'. offers successful in impelling them to mistreat the Kosovar population.
In the early days following the liberation of the Kosovp, it was the
Co unnists who pretended to be the most fanatical missionaries of Albanian
naionalimn. They adopted this course with the'ultimate purpose of
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subjugating the Kosovirs to international Communis- and Pan Slavism.
Among-the Communist leaders were Fadil Hoxha,9 Mehmet Hoxha, IChevdet Coda,
tie-brathere Nimani, Hysni Zajmi, Ismet Shagir, and others.
In the Minter of 1943 there were large-scale massacres 9f Kasovars in
Rosajo Five hundred men were killed by knives and machine gun fire in
attacks first by the Chetniks, and later by the Partisans. Despite
calamities such as this, ; tY e Kooovars remained staunch and loyal to their
ail.ange with the House 6tSavoy.o They enlisted in the National Army of
e A ,banian Government,. and. organized themselves in battles with the
P t is 6' and .Chetn .ki . they fo4ght. off Partisan and Chetriil attacks at
F s , ' dill" j e, Ro zaqj , Tutinit, Koeoveka Mitrovica, Raska and Kursumli j a,
bh mobkiain heig+t,s of-the, t ijilane area, along the Morava River, and in
all.localities whazs s Albeni was spoken. .They affirmed their right of
independence by reconstitut ng in 1942 the--Sgcond League of Prizren,
headed-by Bedri Pejani. With this League they. revived the traditions of
the Pi:iat.League." AU Albanians responded to the Leaguers appeal, ready
to:defend the borders-of the mother"country. They defended these borders
until the arrival of the Soviet.,Arry in Serbia.
U. The Kasovars defended their homes, religion' traditions and freedom with
the assistance of the Albanian National-:Army. In this they were greatly
enc9uraged by the Germans, ~ although there were no regular A s troops in
the. Koeo 'p. The reaseli for'this ie..gist the Kooovars felt hat the struggle
against- ie Communist b!.avs was their own problem. Also, attevr Germany
reached an agreement with Italy on 14 September 1943, she was no longer
irtet^ested'in.routing Serb Partisans in Yugoslavia. Becauseth Kasovars
had decided that the struggle with the Communists was their own problem,
kh;ir forces were only ;Flanked. by `Albanian troops. Two companies belonging
ti 'the Hall Kombetar'.ergar4zation arrived, on the Lim River in. June 1944,
led by? Jtup Kazazie Sule ji ar tleshi, who lager fell. in battle; Halim
`Bege ja; ,and Professor, Saragi. These men were a symbol of encouragement to
the Kgsovars, although=they'were compelled after a short period of time to
return to'~Albaniae
12. The courage of the Kosovars' was firm in defending the borders of the
Kosovp, but events proved stronger than their valor for the power of the
xis w s,gradually waning. However, a principal preoccupatiQn'of the
Kosovsrswas the internal situation in Albania. The Yugoslavs had managed
to infilt?ate the ranks of the leaders of the Albanian politigal parties
rind ,,to ?'sow confusion. This staid, of affairs lasted until ;the 'time of the
Mukaj.Conference. The Albanian Communists did not as yet dare to come in
.front of the Albanian Y. pl.e in the company of 'Serbian leaders. They
knew that a showdown -oud' be inevitable in such an event., especially on
thee'eueetion'of the Kosovo. Conse4uently the chief of the Albanian Com-
munists, Sales Boshnjaku, who was actually the ill-famed Dusan Mugosa,
order64 that Enver Hoxha, Mustafa Gjinishi, Omer Nishani, and others of
them kind,,be proclaimed national liberators.
-13.._The sppreberisions of Albanian patriots were great because of the disinte-
gration of the Axis, the opening up of a second front by the Allies, and
the fact that the Communists were recipients of greater Allied aid than
the anti-Fascists (sic). The Communists outwitted the Albax4an nationalists
a demand that diseussion of the Kosovo question be postponed until it
oquld be settlead at ailater date by a plebiscite. The Kasovars were, so
peak, caught in a web prepared by those two masters of intrigue,
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.Dusan Mugosa and Miladin Popovico It was impossible to fight the'Albanian
Communists headed byEnver Hoxha, and at the same time to resist the
Montenegrins, Serbians., Chetniks and Bulgarians. Despite their adverse
fate,, the'Kosovars did All in their power to save their independennce.
F +'- '19111. until-1944 they stood firm as a stone wall,, defending their
borders. They maintained public order in their region, and were an im-
portant factor in quelling the troubles provoked by Communists in Albania
proper.
The Ai'assnian Communist Partisans were not strong enough to dis p b the
pub1.i d i
c
?
t5. TheSlavO used the same tactics in Albania. Dusan Mugosa and Miladin 50X1-HUM
n
4r
er, s cc they numbered only between 1,5 and 3Q armed groaps,,
Their only accomplishments were to stop three vehicles, which were carrying
civilians, and in-killing Father Lorenzo Mitrovici and a moldier in
Raetolio (Djakova), as well as in'knocking down five telephone poles.
,Very few Kosovars gave support to the Corgmunist Party. That~Geni Bey
K ryeziu, a member of one of the oldest, most noble, and most influential
families in. Diakovo as well as. in Kosovo ' as a whole gave moral support to
?opovic ran the Partisan movement in Albania, but were never overtly at
the head of it. They presented themselves to the Albanians as
collaborators in the 'anti-Fascst and nationalist cause. They used the
same taetis in taking advafit4ge of Abas Kupi and his supporters in
Albania; and Gani Bey;in Yugoslavia. Pressure was exerted through
emissaries, Fadil Hoxha, the brothers Nimani, Ali Shygri,, et, cetera.
lb. whet -were' the forces which these Partisan brigands had at their disposal
in the,Kosovo? In October 19119 when S'hefget Peci, con- 50X1-
mander of-the Third Albanian Communist Division, met Fadil Hoxha,
commander of the forces of national liberation of Kosovo-ietohija, the
latter had only 80 followers'. of whom 20 belonged to Geri Bey lryeziu,,
who had just broken with--the,Communists because of their assassination
of his adviser, Lazar Fundo. In consequence Kryeziu was forced to remain
in ?hiding for a short time. On 5 January 1945, he was arrested and his 30
followers shot. The enati.onal liberatorse. gathered signatures affirming
their.-contention thatrKryeziu was a bourgeois traitor'and had'-sold him
-
eelf ? to Karadjordjevig. He was condemned to five years of prison without
trial, later he was assassinated.
17. The population of Kosovo did not intentionally commit suicide,, hut
ambitious leaders, led it to ruin. It responded with enthusiasm to the
call to enlist in the Albanian national army; it fought wherever necessary'.
exposing itself to the attacks of the Partisans and the Chetniks who
attacked its borders.
18. Me~'hile, the intellectuals and the ideologists pursued their spurious
theories ur}der the influence of the preconceptions of Red propaganda.
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If, in 1.944, energetic measures were taken by the Germans and by the
government in Kosovo and Metvhija against the Serbo -Montenegrin and the
fei Albanian Communists, the people realized that these were for their
0 *A welfare and did not withdraw their loyalty from the government for
one moment. The judg(sent of the Kosovar people wasa They have done
well even though there were Albanians among the guilty."
19. With the crumbling,of the Axis, the Partisans in Albania were able to
1t up their heads
nd
l
a
open
y enter the political scene. For Kosovo,
the days following the withdrawal of the Albanian Government were
.ecisive. In December 194 4., the Albanian Brigades occupied Prizren,
Djakovo
nik
J
D
i
a
,
u
. uQ
ecan
, Pej
, and penetrated deep into the heart of
Kosovo. Kosovo was defeated by the Serbian mind, but its instrument
was the Albanian Partisans,
2O. The Kosovars are full of hatred against Enver Hoxhao It would be well
to, remember this fact, and to take advantage of it at the decisive
moment of the future conflict. Under the Yugoslav occupation, the
Albanians made superhuman sacrifices to protect their liberty, both
irndividual and national. They spent their blood freely in the fight
ag11 ainst the Communists and the Slavs, since it was always the11ideal of
their country which inspired them. The Kosovars, even though they under-
stood that the Italians-and Germans were invaders, nevertheless thank
and remember them with sympathy, since it was after all th who gave
tiiffl freedom to defend themselves against the Slav Communists. eey~ sts. This
people remains faithful to its national cause, and puts its'life at the
..disposition of any civilized and peace-loving power which will allow it
to fight Pan Slavism masking itself as Communism.
Social Situation under Albania
21. From 1941 when the Kosovo was united to Albania,, until 1944 when Slav
Communists seized power, Serbian and Montenegrin subjects were treated
in like manner as the.Kosovvar Albanians, that is to say, with perfect
equalityq Discomfort was suffered only by those individuals who were
against the regime, and dealt in political intrigue. There was complete
freedom of religious worship. Public order was exemplary. Albanians,
Serbians, and Montenegrins alike could travel undisturbed to cities in
Albania proper, there merchants would go to sell their wares and purchase
manufactured goods.to take back. No one went hungry because there was an
abundance of food in the country as well as in the cities. Stores were
always well stocked with various merchandise, and new shops were being
opened to the public. The cost of living did increase during the war
years, but this was largely because the Albanian Government had abandoned
the gold standard.
22. After thirty years of slavery, the groups of teachers and voluntary
missionaries who. were sent to the Kosovo by the Albanian Government were
the first to address the Kosovars in the Albanian language.. In con-
nection with this, Albanian schools were organized in Kosovaka Mitrovica,,
secondary schools and a gymnasium were opened in Prizren, a normal school
at Djakovica, and a secondary and an adv4nced normal school with dormi-
tories for 500 students were established at Pristina. The newly established
elementary schools in villages were staffed with Albanian teachers.
Whereas in a short period of time the cadre of teachers greatly increased
in the Kosovo, it diminished in Albania itself, since the government of
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Zog had never vizualized the necessity of an extensive teaching cadre.
During this time a thorough study was made of Serbian administrative
laws so that they could be synchronized with the Albanian laws. A whole
administrative system was created which included courts, the armed forces
and police in villages, sports organizations, summer camps for the young,
et cetera. In addition, fifteen scholarships were established for
students who desired to further their studies at a foreign university.
The purpose was to educate for the future a certain number of specialists
who would be familiar with the spirit of F--Iculture, 50X1-HUM
23. Through the tenacity of the Government in developing public education be-
tween 1941 and 19449 the spirit of nationalism was upheld in the souls of
the Kosovars, in its teachers, officials, and students in particular. The
inspectorates and directorates of public education and schools of the
secondary level, were well provided with libraries stocked with Albanian
reading matter on intellectual subjects of all kinds. More Albanian
language books were published in the Kosovo than were published in Albania
during her independence. Neither was the lack of books felt in elementary
schools oa~ among Government officials. The Serbians and Montenegrins com-
plained that the Government had not established a larger number of Serb
elementary schools. The reason for this is however, that the Slavs had
never formally requested that this be done.
Political Situation from 1944 until the Tito-Hoxha Rift
24. All volunteer nationalist forces opposing Communism gathered in mountain
hideouts under the leadership of Ymer Berisha, Mulla Idriz, and Lluan Gashi.
In 1944, the nationalist volunteers of the Kosovo were defeated by the 3,
5, 7, and 17 Brigades of the Albanian Army under the command of Shefqet
Peci, a native of Mallakastra. All the cities of the Kosovo were occupied
by these brigades which were guided or led by?independent groups of
Kosovar Partisans. The entire population of the occupied region was auto-
matically conscripted, by a Partisan military order, into the "Army of
National Liberation". Only one fifth of the able-bodied men, the nationalist
volunteers of the Kosovo who remained in the mountains, escaped mobili-
zation.
25. As German forces withdrew, the Albanian 5, 7, and 17 Brigades pursued
them to the Banat, encountering epidemics such as typhus, and consequently
deatho Only one fourth of these forces returned. In the meantime,
Shaban Palluzha of Drenica received orders to form a new Kosovar brigade
which would join the Albanian brigades in pursuit of the Germans.
Numerous nationalists were to be found among the men recruited by Palluzha.
Aware of this fact, Professor Ymer Berisha, of Drenica, dispatched his men
to the spot to persuade the nationalists to stay at home. This took place
on 16 January 1945- When the revolt had sufficiently matured. Berisha
appeared among the revolters and gave a fiery patriotic speech against
joining the Albanian Brigades. He stressed that the Kosovo was being
cra,wen1y abandoned to the Serbians and Montenegrins, adding that the Slavs
were getting rid of the Albanians by sending them after the Germans.
As a result, all joined Berisha against the Serbians.
26. The battle in favor of the Communists initiated under Shaban Palluzha
against the Kosovo evolved into an illustrious national epic. The in-
surrection of the nationalists was set off in Drenica and Llapja, the
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inhabitants of which were loyal to the nationalist spirit of Xhafer Deva.
Following this, militants from all parts of the country joined in the
insurrection. Heroic battles of the Albanian race against the Slavs were
once again repeated on the rough mountain peaks and glaciers. Some six
hundred Kosovars fell in battle, but the Slavs paid with 2,500 dead. The
three major battles fought were at Drenica, Gnjilane, and Ferizaj.
27. The nationalists put up a fierce fight at Drenica. Endless lines of carts
crowded the roads through Kosovo transporting ammunition and food to the
men by day, and returning with the wounded and sick at night, bound for
hospitals at Pristina, Mitrovica, and Pee. The joint command of the
7 Brigade was aware that the Kosovars were determined to fight to the end,
so it invited Mufti Asim Luzha, former representative of Drenica to meet
with it for the purpose of alleged negotiations. The safe conduct clause,
however, was violated, and the Mufti was shot on the spot. After this
insidious murder, the fighting in the mountains grew to be more furious
and determined, and it was there that Shaban Lluzha died in combat.
28. The Gnjilans region rose in revolt under the leadership of Mulla Idri z,
remembered in folk songs as "MuderrisH. Idriz encouraged his men by citing
verses by Pasha Vaso Shkodrani, such as "-The Religion of the Albanian is
Albania". In the spring of 1945 nationalist forces, attacked and won the
town of Ferizaj. Unfortunately, the victory was short-lived for lack of
ammunition, a weakening of discipline, and lack of strategic planning.
Moreover, as additional Communist forces were freed by the German with-
drawal, they swooped down upon the town from all sides. A fierce battle
raged, but here toot, nationalist forces were overpowered. The damage in-
flicted upon the city testifies to the tenacity of the resistance.
Approximately one thousand of the enemy died in battle, whereas there were
barely 200 dead among nationalist forces in the battles of Gnjilanec and
Ferizaj. When the Communists resorted to massacres of the population in
reprisal for their losses, the nationalists were obliged, reluctantly, to
give up the struggle.
29. Unlike the other peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia who are subjected to
sufferings brought on by Communism, the Kosovars are the victims in
addition of Serbian chauvinism. As long as relations between Marshal Tito
and Enver Hoxha remained on a friendly plane, the Kosovars were not well
treated by the Albanian Communists. Thus the Kosovars who fought the
Slavs or fled to the mountains because of Serbian oppression, were so to
speak, caught between hammer and anvil. Communism as applied in the Kosovo,
has nothing to do with Marxist doctrines. It is merely a product of hatred
which the Serbians and Montenegrins have for the Albanians. Here Communism
is aimed at breaking down the energy of the Kosovars in order that they
may be extinguished, and their property taken over by the so-called
liberators.
30. In Communist Albania, Koci Xoxe, a Serbophile, was in charge of foreign
relations with Yugoslavia. However, the servility which he and his
assistants demonstrated in the arrests and tortures of Kosovar nationalists
stunned even the Yugoslavs in whose favor this was being done. Ram Bllaca,
former minister; Professor Selman Riza, leader of the Irredentist Party
and former mayor of Pee; Muharrem Mitrovica;'Captain Gjon Destanishta;
and numerous other civilians and military men were arrested in Tirana and
turned over to the Yugoslav Government, where they were tried and sentenced
to various terms at hard labor. Others were sentenced to death.
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31. Dusan Mugosa and his close collaborator Miladin Popovic are the two men
largely responsible for the Communist defeat of Kosovar Albanians. The
return of the Yugoslavs to the Kosovo and the policies which they re-
presented encountered a terse but.. pithy response. on 14 March 1945,
Haki Taha, a teacher, assassinated Popovic in Pristina. As a result Taha
was arrested, shot, and dragged through the streets, with a sign ironically
pinned to his chest bearing the words "Death to the traitorst Freedom to
the Albanianst" The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic
by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar,
Montene ro.
Another proof of the massacre
of these men is the fact that no dead are registered in Bar on the official
Communist lists for 17 and 18 March. 50X1-HUM
32. From October 1944 on, the Communists maintained a fairly accurate register
.of the names of those persons in the Kosovo and Metohija regions on whom
major penalties including death sentences were imposed. Names of
Albanian martyrs who were hanged or shot can be found listed in registers
of the so-called People's Courts. Such death sentences were actually
dictated bb the Communist Party and the text passed on by the UDB, and
merely pronounced by the Court during the brief appearances before the
judges of the defendants, in order to create the impression of a fair
democratic trial. During the dark and cold nights of 1944, 1945 and 1946
prisoners sentenced to death were taken out of their cells, packed into
trucks and dispatched to deserted localities such as Germis, Karakaci,
Llukaci, Moglice, Giafe, and Kalas, or to the hills of Ibrit, Svecanit,
and Gnjilane, where they were ordered to dig their own graves. After the
execution the graves were hurriedly covered with a little earth or snow.
When the snow melted, the decomposed corpses were laid bare.
33. When such horrible deeds can be committed in a country, it is futile to
speak of freedoms. Events as they occurred,speak for themselves. For
example, when general elections were being prepared, supposedly to re-
present a free expression of the people of Kosovo, Slav authorities or-
ganized a meeting in Prizren, by invitation only, in the early part of
May 1945, and delegates were selected exclusively from among the
"national liberators". It was at this meeting that the newly organized
Albanian Committee for the.Kosovo and Metohija and the organization of
the People's Front put forth a resolution stating that "the Albanian
people, by their own free will, express the desire to remain within the
borders of Yugoslavia." When people inquired of the political commissars
during the elections why there were no Albanian ballot boxes, these
officials would reply "Wherefore? All the. world knows that Enver Hoxha,
Tito and Stalin are one and the same. There will no longer be borders
between us and Albania. We have become brothers by the blood we have
spilled together. Nothing will ever again separate use"
34. An insight into the critical situation created in 1944, when the Com-
munists seized power in the Kosovo, can be obtained from statements made
by members of secret nationalist organizations following their arrest.
The group of Halim Spahiu, former chief of the municipal board of Prizren,
was arrested in July 1945. One of the members of this group had on him
a list of 72 names. After an inquiry lasting approximately one year,
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six of the 72 men in question were shot, among them Halim Spahiu, Tahir
Deda, and Rexhep Kabashi. Eight other persons whose names were also listed
were sentenced to various terms of punishment. A group of teachers headed
by the veterinary, Dr. Sylejman Lleshi of Tirana, was arrested in
Djakovica. Twelve men of this group were sentenced to various terms of
punishment.
35. On 11 August 1946, the prisoners of the Pee penitentiary attempted an
escape. Unfortunately they were caught, and upon this occasion, Dr.
Sylejman Lleshi, Skender Curri, Mirteza Kryeziu, and Bajram Shllaku, all
members of a nationalist organization, plus ten other prisoners, lost
their lives. Members of the nationalist organization of Pristina, among
them Gjon Sereqi of Ferizaj and Sylejman Aliu of Prizren, were arrested in
the spring of 1945. This group had assisted Lluan Gashi and his companions.
Members of another nationalist organization, headed by Father Bernadin
Llupi, clergyman of Pee, were arrested in the summer of 1946. Father Llupi
had maintained contact with Professor Ymer Berisha, chief of the nationalist
forces operating in Yugoslavia with Ndue Perlleshi acting as liaison agent.
Other members of Father Llupios group included Marija Shllaku and the
teacher Gjergj Martini, both from. the Shkoder area, who were later killed
in an encounter with the Partisans. They were liaison agents between the
nationalists of Shkoder and those of Djakovica, Prizren, and Pristina.
36. All the secret organizations and their subordinate local branches en-
deavored between 1945 and 1947 to maintain contact with the political
leaders hiding in the Kosovo. In this manner the organization of Halim
Spahiu maintained contact with Ymer Berisha and Muharrem Bajraktari, while
the organization of Sylejman Lleshi was in contact with Ymer Berisha and
Jup Binjaku. Binjaku on the other hand endeavored to establish contact
and coordinate his actions with those off' Dem Ali Pozhani. The. organization
of Father Bernardin Llupi had contacts with Ymer Berisha, Ndue Perlleshi,
Pashuk Biba, and Ndoc Mirakaj.. The Pristina organization was linked with
Ymer Berisha, Lluan Gashi, Gjon Sereqi, and Abdyl Hensin. The organi-
zations.of,Gnjilane maintained contact with Mulla Idriz. Liaison agent
for the organizations of Vitina, Kamenica, and Presevo was Sul Hoti.
37. To the nationalists who were awaiting assistance from abroad, no help was
forthcoming. In the meantime OZNA was growing more powerful from day to
day. On 6 August 1946, a meeting was held between representatives of the
nationalist refugees and Ymer Berisha, leader of the Kosovar resistance
groups, who presided at the meeting. The nationalist refugee delegates
were Pashul Bib Mirakaj, Ndoc Kol Mirakaj, and Nik Sokolli, who were
entrusted with the task of establishing efficient collaboration with the
Berisha group. Unfortunately OZNA agents found out about the meeting.
In the affray which followed, Professor Berisha, the spirit, strength and
brain of the resistance, lost his life. Still other leaders fell in
Albania, including Jup Kazazi and Mark Gjonmarkaj.
38. It was evident at the trial of the secret nationalist organization of
Skoplje, held in 1946, that the Albanians of Macedonia were animated by
the same spirit as that of the Kosovars. The nationalist organization of
Skoplje was headed by Azem Morava and Captain Hysni Rudi. Nobody in the
Kosovo was sentenced for having been a member of the Albanian Monarchist
Party since they were all considered as members of Xhafer Deva's or-
ganization. In his reports to the Communist Party, Dusan Mugosa described
the Kosovars as members of the Balli Kombetar, and they were considered as
such at the Serbian Communist trials. Dusan Mugosa derived his conclusion
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from the fact that there were actually groups of Kosovars among the
followers of Xhafer Deva in Albania who called themselves Ballasts.
In Albania, Deva had political contacts with Mehdi Frasheri, All Klissura,
Abaz Ermeni, and Vasil Andoni. This is why prior to 1948 these four men
and their followers were considered by the Yugoslavs to be inspired with
the same political principles as the Balli Kombetar. 'J
99. Immediately after the Communists seized power in the Kosovo, they launched
an active propaganda campaign, distributing leaflets throughout the region
and organizing indoctrination courses wkich everybody was compelled to
attend. Those who were absent without justification were accused of
sabotage, arrested, beaten, and then paraded through the streets under the
supervision of OZNA officials. The populace was obliged to demonstrate by
following them, and anyone who did not interrupt his work to follow the
demonstration was also beaten and taken along with the prisoner to share
his fate. The OZNA, later known as the UDB, was particularly active in
19)46. Numerous persons were assassinated or simply disappeared. on the
other hand, the Albanians likewise were quite active in that year in the
creation of secret nationalist organizations. No specific law existed
providing for the punishment of individuals dissatisfied with the newly
created situation, and OZATA was therefore obliged to frame them as political
criminals. If this was not possible, individuals considered to be un-
desirable were accused of belonging to some political group and sentenced
by the local People's Court to from six months to one year of heavy labor.
Presidents of these courts were confidential agents especially appointed for
this purpose.
40. The situation of the Kosovars had never been dangerous and as serious as
it was between 1944 and 1918, when their only alternatives were prison,
suicide, or humble acceptance of the Communist hand Slav yoke. During this
time there were at least three times as many Albanians as there were
Slavs in penitentiaries of the Republic of Serbia. Every town had two
or three OZNA sections, and each section had its own prison, guarded by
the Army. Even the militia had its own prisons. The prisons of the
Kosovo, where there were never less than six thousand prisoners, were
crowded with Albanians. The largest penitentiary in the Kosovo Region,
where there were never less than a thousand prisoners, is located in
Pristina. Currently the construction of a prison with a capacity for two
thousand prisoners is under way in this city. The largest penitentiary
within the Republic of Serbia is in Nis. It contains approximately five
thousand prisoners, four thousand of whom are Albanians. Here, where the
soul of the prisoner is shaped by tortures to the body, the most refined
methods are applied to break the patriotism of the Kosovars through
"re-education+'. The prison has two departments, one known as "Hell", and
the other as "Purgatory'". The latter contained four thousand convicts in
1946 to 1948, 29500 of whom were Albanians. In the prisons of Mitrovica,
Pozarevac, and Kraguj,evac, four-fifths of the convicts were Albanians.
One-half of the inmates in the Idrizov penitentiary of Skoplje are Albanians
from Macedonia who are mistreated by the guards in the same manner as the
Kosovars.
.Economic Situation up to 1948
41. In line with Communist economy, the Partisans began in 1944 with the es-
tablishment of collective farming or cooperatives. This contributed
greatly toward the impoverishment of the population. The peasant who
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formerly had enough to live on eventually became quite poor, andcoon-
A*gtJctriffy, lost interest in his work or labor. He became indifferent to
whether the crop was good or poor, since the State took all but the pre-
scribed minimum for his own needs. Agricultural products and cattle were
merely taken away from peasants by members of the local board of the
Communist Party. Families with enough bread even on holidays were rare,
for the State took away wheat from the Albanian peasant, and gave only a
little corn in return. In addition to this, there werelIvoluntaryfl loans
contributed to by the peasants, and organized by regional committees of the
Party. In this regard a campaign would be launched, and the citizens called
upon to compete in offering to the State the surplus of their crop in the
form of grain, wool, meat, honey, or similar products. Collectors would
then proceed from house to house seizing the property of undesirable
persons such as those who were not Party members, those who did not support
propaganda in favor of the People's Front, youth activities, or persons who
had relatives in prison. Under such circumstances, how could one expect the
peasant to work with zeal. He was obliged to sell all he had at home,
and all the yields of his crop, or go to prison. This is the reason that
there are so many Albanians in the penitentiaries of Gnjilane, Ferizaj, and
Nis.
42. When the Government had sequestered its share of the foodstuffs and crops
of the peasants, it would issue a proclamation that they were free to sell
their products on the open market* only then could one note a handful of
peasants c mJng to town to sell a few meager items and to purchase others.
Usually th"first day at the market would pass calmly. On the second or
third day, however, the militia would appear, take the name of the sellers,
and seize their goods on the grounds that they lacked permits to sell the
merchandise in question.
!3. A large number of young people from the Kosovo were compelled to work on
construction projects such as canals, roads, and railroads, or on the re-
construction of Belgrade. Whatever construction projects were carried out
in the Kosovo were not for the benefit of the Kosovars. New buildings
erected were meant to quarter Serbian and Montenegrin officials. Likewise,
in the interests of the Slav colonists, new homes were build, lands made
fit for cultivation, factories constructed, roads laid down, and forests
exploited; but the manpower for such work was provided by the Albanians-.
Albanians had to be satisfied with hard labor and a morsel of dry bread.
Serbians and Montenegrins on the other hand were not to be seen at this
type of work since more lofty jobs were reserved for them inwgovernment
offices, within the militia, or in other supervisory capacities.
44. Albanians have preferred to work in the mines rather than in the fields
in order to escape the taxes imposed upon agricultural workers. Con-
sequently thousands .of Albanian miners are to be found in Trepce,
Zemunica, Golesi, Deva near Djakovica, and elsewhere. The unfortunate
workers who are victims of accidents and cannot continue work are
decorated with beautiful medals, and their names cited in the papers.
These are the.substitues for invalid pensions.
Cultural and Social Situation up to 1948
)&5. From the Communists seizure of power to the break with the Cominform, the
promise of Albanian language teaching in the Kosmet was maintained, al-
though the Slavs looked with displeasure upon the opening of Albanian
schools. In the beginning, on the basis of the promises given, the
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official language was Albanian, but this concession suffered various
obstructions in March and April 1945. Thus for example, the Serbs pre-
tended that Albanians'acked technical terms corresponding to those in
Serb, especially in the field of administration. They also averred that
the creation of special schools would be necessary, if the Albanian
language were to be used., and this involved a great loss of time and great
expense.. As a result, the Serbs tried to persuade the Albanians that the
existence of Albanian alongside Serbian was futile, since the Kosovars
understood the latter. Gradually, the Serbian language replaced Albanian
both in civilian} and military offices, although some traces of the Albanian
language could still be found in public offices until the latter part of
19145. The schools continued to maintain correspondence in the Albanian
language with the educational centers to which they were subordinate, but
even this procedure went out of practice when necessity demanded a greater
speed and efficiency in dealing with Communist officials. Translating into
Serbian took time and rendered the work more laborious.
46. The question on the official use of the Albanian language in the Kosovo,
as authorized by law, was frequently discussed. After 1948 it became an
issue when the propaganda campaign conducted by the Albanian Government
over the press and radio on this matter became extremely fierce. As a
result, the problem was again re-examined. In the meantime, the population
was granted permission to address requests and petitions to the municipal
councils in the Albanian language. However, since the members and secretaries
of these councils were Serbians, they could always claim not to know
Albanian, which invariably caused a delay and even complete failure to act
on the petitions. Thus, despite the statute authorizing the use of Albanian,
Serbian remained the administrative language.
47. Teachers on the staff originally sent by the Ministry of Public Education
in Tirana to the Kosovo in 1941 and 1942 were gradually released by the end
of 1945, with the exception of three or four individuals who successfully
ingratiated themselves with the authorities. The majority of the teachers
were accused of membership in a secret nationalist organization. Among
those sentenced to death were Bedri Gjinaj, professor at the normal school
and director of the elementary school of Djakovica; Dr. Sylejman Lleshi,
professor of the normal school of Djakovica; and Skender Curri and Myrteza
Kryeziu, both of whom were teachers in Djakovica. Professor Gjon Sereqi,
native of Ferizaj, escaped to the mountains but was later caught by OZWA.
Professor Kil Margjini was sentenced for having been vice-president of the
Second League of P rizren; he died in Pozarevac. Students who had attended
courses in pedagogy were accused of collaboration with the above professors,
and sentenced to various terms of punishment in 1945. Albanian instructors
in Western Macedonia received similar treatment.
48. The elimination of nationalist professors in the Kosovo in 1945 was done
in full accord with Enver Hoxha. New educational personnel was dispatched
from Albania, hastily recruited from among semi-ignorant students who
had no special training in pedagogy. They were sent in two groups, one
in 1945 and the other in 1947, and numbered some forty to fifty.persons.
Other prospective teachers were recruited locally, and training courses
organized for them. In order to create the impression that new
educational cadres were being formed, numerous courses were given. Although
schools which were established between 1941 and 1944 were maintained, new
schools were eventually opened both on the elementary and secondary levels.
New secondary schools included a high school in Pristina and a school for
pedagogy in Djakovica. other types of schools included agricultural,
technical, and mechanical schools, as well as trade schools and music
schools, but the language employed in all these schools was Serbian.
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49. The history of the Yugoslav national struggle for liberation, the structure
of the Communist Party, and biographies of Communist leaders were taught
in Albanian as well as in Serbian schools. Since text books on these
subjects were not available in the Albanian language, teachers were
obliged to translate the material and explain it to their pupils in
Albanian. Most teachers in Albanian schools did not have a fluent com-
mand of Serbian, and this fact slowed down the educational progress
considerably. As was the case before the war, Albanian history was still-
not taught in the schools. Any student who knew any facts of Albanian
history had learned them through his own patriotic initiative. The Serbs
dared even to dispute the origin of Skanderbeg. Whenever the story of
Skanderbeg came up for discussion, Party officials would declare that the
problem had not as yet been solved. Its solution was finally entrusted to
Dusan Mugosa.
50. Albanian textbooks for reading and arithmetic were published in 1946 and
1947, and were used in the first, second, and third grades of elementary
schools. The speller was published at the same time. The reader and
geography book for the fourth grade of elementary schools were likewise
published in 1947? The science book for the first grade of high school
was published in 1947, With the exception of the speller, all the above
publications had been translated from Serbian.
51. Boarding schools were established in Prizren, Djakovica, Pec, Pristina,
Kosovska I :trovica, and Gnjilane in 1946. The food was not sufficient to
meet the needs of growing youngsters who were expending energy in their
studies. Thus in 1947 the daily ration of bread comprised a mere 350
grams. In 1948 the daily bread ration was increased to 500 grams. However,
in the spring of the same year the pupils were sent out to work on con-
struction projects. The work was planned b7 the Party, and "volunteers"
were chosen from lists compiled for that purpose by youth organizations.
Names of the "volunteers" selected were gloriously heralded in newspapers
in order to make the young folk proud of their achievements, although the
work done by them was sheer loss of time, since the basic and hard work
on these projects had previously been done by political convicts from
the various republics of Yugoslavia.
52. When a group of Albanians desired to present a play in their own language,
all types of excuses were fabricated to prevent them from renting a
theater for this purpose. In response to requests, the Party would state
that the principle and desire were legitimate, but that various diffi-
culties were involved such as lack of Albanian costumes, lack of
appropriate furniture, decorations, scenarios, et cetera. These replies
were as often as not delayed. In addition, rumors would circulate that
the subject of the play was not suitable because it was not in accordance
with Communist ideology.
_53. Albanians do not frequent libraries very much, nor do Serbians and
Montenegrins for that matter. Although there are only a very few books
in Albanian, the libraries abound in material containing speeches and
biographies of the,Yugoslav Communist leaders. The library of the
Inspectorate for Public Education in Prizren, and the libraries of the
secondary schools had been well stocked with Albanian books between 1941
and 1944, which were partly collected, and partly donated by the Ministry
for Public Education in Tirana. These libraries were later looted by the
Partisans, who donated some of the books to the Party libraries, and
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destroyed the others. Party libraries now keep some of these books as a
reference on the facts and thoughts of the Albanian past, so that they may
eventually be utilized in the future as misconstrued and slanderous
propaganda.
Present Political Situation
54. The Yugoslavs soon perceived the nature underlying Soviet tactics, and
realized that Cominform ideologies were merely a cover for the ambitious
Panslav projects of the Czars, implemented by Stalin. Soviet plans were
partially realized in.Albania by Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. Koci
Xoxe, a pro-Serb Communist was sentenced to death, and Albania gave an
outward indication of repenting for her submissive policies toward
Yugoslavia. Albania likewise attempted to manifest great concern and pity
for the Kosovo which she had occupied in 1944 and 1945, and which she
abandoned to the mercy of the Slavs in 1946. But the Albanian population
did not submit so easily to the Communists, and this particularly pertains
to those living in mountainous regions. Thousands of people were
massacred and imprisoned. Others successfully escaped to 50X1-HUM
55. Albanians living. in the Kosovo, in Western Macedonia, and Montenegro
fortunately have had no illusions regarding the Yugoslav brand of Communism.
The Communists during their four years of power were not successful in
their attempts to convert them, whereas in Albania the people have often
been duped by the Yugoslavs. When Yugoslav-Albanian relations were severed,
the Yugoslavs incited the people of the Kosovo against Albania in order to
create discord between them. It would be foolish to believe in the
sincerity of the Yugoslav Government in its endeavors and resort to all
possible means to incite the Albanians against the government of Enver
Hoxha, since the Yugoslav Communists themselves brought Hoxha and his
group to power, and were responsible for the loss of the Kosovo through
the help of Albanian Communists. The Kosovars will fight in the future
as they have in the past for reunion with their mother country, but the
conditions will be that a future Albania guarantee the democratic freedom
of its subjects, and that she remain within the orbit of the Free Nations.
56. From 1948 onwards those Kosovar nationalists who were suspected of plotting
the reunion of their region with Albania, were considered or sentenced as
Cominform supporters. Such was the case, for example, of Rifat Berisha
of Drenica, who at an opportune political moment succeeded in becoming
president of the People's Front of Kosmet. Accused of being a Cominformist
he consequently fled to the mountains. He was later surrounded on Istok
Mountain and perished in the encounter. There is no doubt but that he
worked for the nationalist cause. After his death three groups of in-
dividuals were arrested in Drenica under the accusation of belonging to
a secret nationalist organization directed by reactionaries whose leader
was Berisha. Twelve young men who were members of this organization are
today awaiting their trials in Pristina.
57? Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups
of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts
and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct
propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape from
their country. Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped
and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and
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released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. Since
1918 all Albanian Communists seeking refuge from Enver Hoxha's dictatorship
have been welcomed in Yugoslavia. Much propaganda was likewise
disseminated during 1948 by Yugoslav authorities to persuade Albanian
nationalists to come to Yugoslavia. Unfortunately some such persons who
did escape during this time have not been heard of since. One such case
is that of the nationalist Marku Bib Vokrri and his fifty men. It was only
in the latter part of 1949 that Albanian refugees were received in the
capacity of emigres. Some among them were even armed by the Yugoslavs
and sent back to Albania to fight in the resistance against Hoxha.
Albanian officers have been particularly well received of late and met at
the border by Montenegrin officers. Many of the officer refugees currently
occupy important positions, and 70 per cent of them in the Kosovo are to be
found either in the Army or in the UDB.
58. Despite the precautions undertaken by the Yugoslavs against border in-
filtrations, HoxhaSs armed groups have succeeded in penetrating Yugoslavia.
One of these groups under the leadership of Shaban Braha of Luma, en-
countered UDB troops near Prizren in September 1951, and all of the members
of the group were killed. The Kosovars have been rendered desperate
through the policies of repression adopted by the Yugoslav Government, but
they have not, regardless, kbandoned their national aspirations. Those
among them who live in the vicinity of the border zone are exhausted from
the nocturnal visits of the armed forces and from the noise of artillery
pieces and machine gun fire both day and night on either side of the
border.
59. &fter 1948 there were numerous Kosovar townsmen and peasants living in
Albania who wished to return to the Kosovo. Those who returned were im-
prisoned and tortured. One such case was that of Ndue Preng Bajraktari of
Prizren who returned with six-companions, confident in his belief that
Yugoslavia had become a democratic nation. They all were arrested and
sentenced to six years imprisonment on charges of having collaborated with
the Italians between 1941 and 1943-
60. After the Yugoslav-Albanian break, Yugoslav authorities successfully
persuaded Albanian officials who had come from Albania to remain in the
Kosovo by promises of monetary remuneration in return for signing a
declaration against the Albanian Government. When the declaration was
signed, their names were published in the newspapers and broadcast over
the radio, which severed any possiblities they may have had of returning
to their own country. The promises, however, were forgotten. Those among
the officials who asked for the promised remuneration were threatened, and
accused of misleading the Kosovars, as well as attempting to unite Kosovo
to Albania. They were then either imprisoned or transferred to other
localities where they'were kept under surveillance. Such cases include
Professor Serafin Mazreku, a man of seventy who with numerous sons had come
from Shkoder; Muharrem Ymeraj of Tepelena; and Hysni Selmani and his family.
Not only had these men never had anything to do with the Hoxha authorities,
but they were indignant at the mere mention of Hoxhaos name or Communist
ideology.
61. Between 1945 and 1917, well-known organizers of the nationalist movement
within their districts disappeared, including Ymer Berisha, Gjon Sereqi,
and Captain Rudi. These men set examples of great patriotism working
either individually or as group leaders. There were some among the
nationalists who did not escape not because of the lack of 50X1-HUM
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opportunity, but because they chose to remain. Such is the case-of Ibrahim
Lufti, secretary of Reis el Ulema the Grand Mufti of Sarajevo, who later
became prefect of Kosovo. Lufti shot himself rather than to be taken alive
by the Serb Communists. Sula Hoti will likewise be remembered as the leader
of Albanian volunteers who fought in the epic battle against Partisan
brigades near the,village Lisocke of Kamenica in December 1944. Mulla Idriz
(Muderiz) of Gnjilane another hero, fought against a group of 600 Bulgarians
in Gnjilane, who was betrayed and tortured to death. Ndue Perlleshi and
Ndoc Mirakaj, heroically gave their lives in an encounter with Albanian
Communists.
62. Sali Rushit and Sahit Shabani, teachers and revolutionary nationalists from
the vicinity of Gnjilane murdered two UDB officers in Viline in July 1950,
and then fled to the mountains. After a year of guerrilla activities,
both men and their families were killed near Prizren on 24 August 1951.
The Vocoli brothers from Vucitrn have become famous in the nationalist move-
ment during the past few years, giving moral support to men of their
district, and performing patriotic actions against those who have joined the
enemy since 1947. The group organized by Sali Lisi of Kercova, Macedonia,
likewise met with heroic deaths.
63. During the construction of the Brcko-Banovic road, a secret organization
known as the ?'Young Moslems" was created, composed mainly of young people
from Bosnia and Hercegovina, but also including a number of young Albanian
members. The aim of the organization was to unite all Yugoslav Moslems
in their fight against Titoism and Communism. Since the organization was
uncovered in Pec, it was disguised at the trials as an Albanian organization.
The Bosnians who were tried were given light sentences or set free, whereas
Albanians were either accorded death sentences or a minimum of ten years at
hard labor.
64. The Germans created much ill-feeling during the period of occupation be-
cause they had published in Tirana the names of those who were imprisoned
or upon whom sentences had been passed. However, when the Serb Communists
seized power, they put their victims to death secretly without much ado,
avoiding the publication of names. Only the UDB and the local organization
of the Communist Party were informed on what was going on. Moreover, the
local organization in question would omit to inform the Central Committee
of the Party in Belgrade, considering these crimes to be of little
significance.
65. There have been at times some men of courage who have gone to Belgrade to
make inquiries regarding the crimes committed against the Kosovars. The
Central Committee appeared surprised, and replied quite sincerely that it
had not as yet been informed on the matter in question, and that it would
refer to the Party Board of Kosovo for explanations. Members of this
Party Board are Gjoko Pajkovic, Pavle Jovicevic, Cedo Topalovic, Ismet
Shaqir, Kol Shiroka, the Nimani brothers, and Mehmet Hoxha. As board
members, these men do not like to disclose that there exists dissatisfaction
in the Kosovo, and besides, they do not wish to cAste time".14 lengthy. aL
correspondence. In their reply they are likely to state that the
population is eager to collaborate with the Serbians in the construction
of socialism in Yugoslavia, and that it is loyal to Marshal Tito and the
Party. As a result, the radio and press stress the wonderful situation
created in the Kosovo and in Serbia by men of extraordinary brains and
skill.
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66. The aims of present Yugoslav policies concerning the Kosovo are quite clear.
Thirty-five KNOJ officers attached to units stationed in Kosovska Mitrovica,
Pee, Djakovica, Prizren, Pristina, and Ferizaj, were selected to study the
Albanian language in September 1951. While Albanian is being taught to the
Yugoslavs, there are numerous Kosovar students who have requirements for
military schools, but who are turned down. There are some, however, who
are occasionally sent to schools for non-commissioned officers. The few
Albanian officers who are to be found in the Yugoslav Army are former
Partisans.
Present Economic Situation
67. The years following the Tito-Cominform break were extremely difficult for
Yugoslav economy in general and the economy of the Kosovo in particular.
These years proved to be even more difficult than that of 1917. Relief 0 -
however,, with the arrival of goods in the summer of 1950. 50X1-HUM
Rigorous grain quotas were established by the Government until 1951. All
possible coercive measures were applied against the peasants of the Kosovo
in order to compel them to give to the State the prescribed quota in grains.
Because cooperative farming did not provide the Government with more grain
supplies than individual peasant contributions yielded in the past, the
.Communists did not particularly insist that they be maintained. The peasants
were told by the authorities that they did not have to work exclusively in
collective farms, but could return to work on their own lands which were
cut to very small proportions by the Government. The peasants of the Kosovo
are burdened with taxes, the restitution of surplus grains, l$voluntary< and
obligatory work, loans to the State, and numerous contributions to Govern-
ment organizations. They have to ration cards for foodstuffs and textiles,
no discount on travel tickets, and no social security. When a Communist
regime has deficits, it forces loans upon the population. Government em-
ployees are obliged to surrender half of their salaries, and the peasants
are obliged to turn over 2,000 dinars worth Hof ,.their- pioduft, Fortunately,
there was an improvement (sic) in the spring of 1951.
68. The peasants and a large majority of the townsfolk of the Kosovo are never
sure that they will be able to obtain necessary articles, since many types
of merchandise are not available in the stores. Many scarce articles are
sold only to privileged persons. Not even Government employees can purchase
some articles despite the fact that they are amply provided with ration
coupons. Clothing and footwear are extremely difficult to obtain.
Pristina, a town of 26,000 inhabitants, has only three textile shops which
open only twice a week, on the days when merchandise arrives. These shops
do, however, always have excellent articles in their window displays for
propaganda purposes. Such items are reasonably priced, also for propaganda
purposes.
69. After the Yugoslav Government was accorded assistance the 50X1-HUM
economic situation within the country improved visibly. A price list
established by the Government for agricultural products per kilogram,
in the Kosmet area after the harvest season, demonstrated that prices in
1951 were lower than in the two preceding years.
50X1-HUM
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70. A common laborer or simple employee with family was allotted the following
daily supplies for his ration coupons.- 1 kilogram of corn, 750 grams of
meat, 250 grams of sugar, 250 grams of butter, 1,250 grams of potatoes,
1 kilogram. of onions, 250 grams of oil, 2 kilograms of cabbage, 1 kilo-
gram of eggs, two apples, et cetera. Such individuals could never pay for
the entire ration from their mea er daily salary of from 100 to 120 dinars.
The prices for these foods are exorbitant considering the
fact that these foods are obtained in the form of gifts from the producers.
and cost the Government nothing. The Government will not allow free 50X1-HUM
market prices on food products because of the huge profits it makes through
fixed prices.
71. Materials and textiles are even more difficult to obtain than foodstuffs
because of the extremely high prices for such items. It is a rarity to see
anyone wearing a new suit, and if an individual is seen sporting such a
garment, he is invariably suspected of black market activities at the
expense of the population. The purchase of textiles and other merchandise
is rendered difficult through lack of currency. 50X1-HUM
72. The fact that the Kosmet area is not a direct recipient of
aid is justified by the Regional Communist Committee on the grounds that
the majority of the Kosovar population own fertile land; although the
inhabitants are obliged to surrender a certain amount of their crop to
the Government, they are presumed to retain for themselves a large per-
centage of their produce. The Kosovo area has nevertheless indirectly
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benefited from thel assistance proffered in 1950, since 50X1-HUM
greater prosperity has resulted from the chain of reaction of general
economic improvement throughout Yugoslavia. Textiles and foodstuffs for
example, are again appearing on the free market. The only direct aid given
to this area was in the form of beans, condensed milk in tins, and powdered
eggs for children. However, none of these items are distributed gratis.
73. The somewhat improved economic conditions in the Kosovo area have not
alleviated the problem of unemployment, which appears to be steadily in-
creasing. A brief visit to any of the towns in the Kosmet region, such as
Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica or Pristina, will be sufficient to give the on-
looker an idea of the situation. Here in public squares large groups of
Albanian peasants will be seen waiting from dawn to dusk for some kind of
manual labor. Speaking to each one of them will reveal a story of misery.
They are starving perhaps because of having lost a limb in the mines of
Serbia and having, as a result, been abandoned to a tragic fate. In many
cases, Serbian doctors refuse to tend to them. It is of little assistance
to be supplied with documents certifying to disability incurred in an
industrial accident.
74. Prospects of life for those Kosovars who work in the mines are somewhat
better than average because of the higher salaries offered. Individually,
however, the Albanians are not successful in gaining any advantage from
this relative wealth because of their large families which are still in
great part patriarchal. Their physical endurance is soon exhausted, and
on the average they return to their homes in a poor state of health. If
they voluntarily quit the mine, as they frequently do, they lose all rights
to indemnity.
75. The living conditions of Albanian employees of the Yugoslav Government have
not been of the best in the past two years. Yugoslav Government workers in
the Ministries bog down the bureaucracy instead of contributing to its
efficiency. Some of these men have consequently been 'released, while
others have been successful in obtaining letters of recommendation for
the "-rifugium peccatorium-' of the Serbs, the Kosmet, despite the fact that
the administration of this region was already top-heavy. It is hardly
necessary to add that Albanian Government employees have been obliged to
make way for the Serbs in the Kosmet. Even hotel employees have been re-
placed by the Slavs.
Religion
76. In their campaign against Catholicism, which they define as black inter-
nationalism, the Yugoslav Communists did not spare even the small number
of Albanian Catholics of the Kosovo region (approximately 25,000 persons).
Between 1941 and 1944, persecution did not limit itself to religion, but
extended to various other aspects of life. In the campaign against Albanian
Catholics, the Government availed itself of Albanian Communists of the Moslem
faith as well as o Serbians and Montenegrins. Severe measures,
including arrests, were used by the Government authorities against the 50X1-HUM
Catholic clergy, particularly after the assassination of the priest Father
Petar Bernardin Lupi in 1946, and the trials of Don Pjeter Berisha and Don
Mark Shiroka which followed. In 1950, members of the Catholic ecclesiastical
administrations of Djakovo and Pee were expelled and sentenced to from two
to three years of prison. They were accused of sabotage, by having
attempted to join the Catholic clergy of Yugoslavia in a protests
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20 50X1-HUM
77. Whereas the Orthodox churches were spared from persecution, on the one hand,
numerous mosques and Catholic churches were closed to worshippers on the
other, Asim Luzi, the Mufti of Djakovo was assassinated. Other religious
personalities of the Moslem faith were imprisoned, and consequently forced
to abandon all religious activity and assume employment as clerks in
various offices. The basic accusation aimed against them was that they
had stood in support of the reactionaries, from whom they were getting
support in return. Notwithstanding these and similar activities, Communist
laws in Yugoslavia decreed the freedom of worship.
78. Actions undertaken by the Communist Government in Yugoslavia were directed
against the religious principles of the Moslems and Catholics, and aimed at
undermining the religious consciousness of the faithful.
Orthodox theological school which would be subsidized by government funds.
Fanatical Serb chauvinists comprised the staff of instructors. In the
spring of 1950, upon the anniversary of the foundation of the school.,
pictures of it were placed for sale in book stores throughout Kosmet. The
caption accompanying the pictures read "Praised be God for the liberation
of the Kosovo". Numerous complaints and protests from anonymous Albanians
flowed into offices of the regional committee and the corresponding com-
mittee in the Serbian Government. The reply released from these offices was
to the effect that "the clergy is free to pray to God, in whom it believes.
We cannot interfere with their prayers".
.79. During Serb Orthodox religious festivities, the Government allowed Com-
munists to take part in religious rites. These were carried out with much
pomp, and the participants included vast numbersof the Montenegrin and
Serbian population. Communists seized this occasion to sport their
Partisan medals and decorations acquired in 1911. They appeared on the
scene well shaven and wearing new apparel, and the Orthodox priests blessed
and praised these men who had taken part in the liberation of the Kosovo
region. The religious procession wound its way from one Orthodox church
to another, pausing at numerous. points on the way for the delivery of
speeches. The final point was the cemetery. Here prayers were delivered
for fallen heroes. Mosques and Catholic churches, now reduced to ware-
houses for the storage of such things as cement, potatoes, machinery or
other goods were ignored. Confronted with such a spectacle, one can well
imagine the feelings within the hearts of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia.
80. In the beginning, the Orthodox faithful were closely watched during church
services,, or when making an offering. At present, however, no one bothers
about them anymore, even if they spend all day in church. Now that the
Orthodox clergy has thrown out of its churches sacred objects, it can run
from church to church and fully dedicate itself to its religious cult.
81. Great religious fervor, however, is to be found among the Moslems who com-
prise the larger part of the population. Although many mosques have been
closed, the faithful flock in large numbers to those which are open,
demonstrating in this way solidarity and scorn for the Communist oppressors.
82. Numerauas Albanian families living in Prizren, Pristina and Pec speak
Turkish as fluently as they do Albanian. As a result there is an attempt
on the part of the Serbs to maintain that those who speak the Turkish
language are of Turkish ancestry, and should therefore be educated in that
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m 21 50X1-HUM
language. They take advantage of the profound religious sentiment among
the population of the area to discourage the friendship which the Kosovar
Moslems have with the Catholics of that area, and which they say is not
tolerated by the Moslem religion. Kosovar Albanians who persist in this
friendship should consequently be considered Catholics, and in that case,
why do they not go to Rome?
83. The anti-religious propaganda campaign which has been developed into an
art by the Government has had its effect upon the population. Any measure
which will prbve a vulnerable point of attack is utilized. There is no
lack of promises of employment, or assistance in food or clothing, in order
to induce or win over the populace. The Government has been successful in
winning the cooperation of such men as Hafiz Bajram of Djakovo, Sheh Ali
of Prizren, and Xhevdet Pallaska, secretary of Reiz Ulema of Sarajevo.
The latter are men of no moral, religious, social, or patriotic scruples.
Cultural Situation
84. Statistics reveal that new elementary and secondary schools for instruction
in the Albanian and Serbian languages in the Kosovo region were opened up
as early as 1951. The purpose of these schools, however, was to deliver
the coup de grace to Albanian nationalism. There were, in 1950 and 1951, as
many as 27 elementary schools and 28 secondary schools or gymnasiums covering
the four lower grades. From among pupils attending the gymnasiums,
approximately, 95 per cent were Montenegrins and Serbs, while only from 15
to 20 per cent were Kosovar Albanians. The poor economic status of the
Kosovar population was largely responsible for this low attendance. There
is very little assistance in clothing or money to poor students. In rural
areas particularly, the situation with regard to students, uniforms is bad
since the students depend largely upon contributions of local committees.
85. The Government compels even the youngest children to be educated to hate
the so-called reactionaries, who include both rich and poor peasants.
An antagonistic attitude is even cultivated against their parents, so that
the young generation shall grow up to be staunch supporters.of Communism.
The names of children who have been cajoled into revealing family secrets
are placed at the top of the list for annual assistance given to poor or
deserving students by the school.
86. However, not withstanding the various shortcomings of the schools, the fact
that their number has increased in the Kosmet and other areas where
Albanian is spoken is in itself of great significance. Also, the cultural
level in secondary schools has greatly improved, particularly in the field
of music and fine arts. The Music School at Prizren has made marked pro-
gress through the courage and perseverance of Professor Lorene Antoni, of
Prizren, who breasted great, opposition to make possible the revival of
Albanian art, its traditions and folk songs. The attendance at this coi-
educational school is high.
87. After the Yugoslav-Cominform break, the Government found it necessary to
revise its stand on various administrative and propaganda issues. Among
the first steps taken was an intensification of defensive propaganda
through the press and cultural clubs. From 1948 until the present time
this change on issues was gradual. All publications have been placed under
a system of control to insure that they comply with the new concepts of
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Tito's Yugoslavia. This entailed. much loss of time in the Public Education
Offices of the Serbian Government because of the slow process of trans-
lating from Albanian into Serbian. Since it was not within the
jurisdiction of the offices where the translating was done to exercise
censorship or control over school texts written in the Albanian language,
it was necessary to wait until the other competent offices had given their
approval. In the meantime,., official relations between Yugoslavia and
Albania grew more and more tense, and consequently politics were likewise
introduced into these Albanian text books. The results included:
a.. Erratic methods applied to Albanian text books. Approval for translation
would first be given, then withdrawn. Although the original in Serbian
would already be in circulation, when it came to translating the text
into Albanian, the author would be accused of Cominformism;
b. Delay in approval of funds for translation;
c. Delay in issuance of permits to print books in the Albanian language
after they had been translated. Although a pedagogical commission was
entrusted with jurisdiction over such matters, it was further necessary
to obtain a permit from a higher commission in Belgrade in charge of
political censorship. As a result the text would lie for months in the
library of the pertinent Ministry;
d. Long delay in printing at the publication offices in Belgrade;
e. Long delay for distribution procedures to be established. Suggestions
for distribution on the basis of the number of students in the secondary
schools of the same localities are sent to book stores of the larger
center's within these localities. Because the Serb booksellers are more
interested in the sale of Serbian books., they delay their replies,
often omitting the information requested; and
f. Lately rules regulating the sale of books in the Albanian language have
been changed numerous times, and each time the cost of the book has
increased. The rules issued in 1949 for Albanian-books were actually
applied only in 1951. These rules facilitated the publication of an
Albanian anthology, the writings of Bajran Curri, a book on Albanian
folklore, and a text for use in elementary schools. Most of these books
were translations from the Serb language.
88. Attempts on the part of Serbs and Montenegrins to sabotage Albanian
intellectual life by all means available date back to the break of diplomatic
relations with Albania. In 1951, government authorities made obligatory
the education of the Albanian minority at the secondary and university
levels in Serbian schools. The justification for this measure was that
printing offices were submerged with work and it was impossible to further
burden them with books written in Albanian.
Communism Versus Albanian Nationalism
89. Current Yugoslav ambitions in the Balkans are seriously opposed to demands
of Albania for recognition of the rights of the Kosovar people. In the
event of a war, the Albanian nationalists would represent a serious threat
to Southern Serbia. Students particularly play an important role in the
nationalist movement. The greater the efforts on the part of the govern-
ment to imbue them with Communism, the more their spirit of nationalism
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50X1-HUM
is reinforced and the firmer is their hope and belief in a future, which,
if not fully satisfactory,, will at least be better than Communism.
50X1-HUM
90. University students of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia have been able
to achieve an intellectual level equal to that of the students
Many out of despair have joined the resistance, operating in small
groups. Such clandestine nationalist groups seriously worry government
authorities, who fear that mere arrests will be insufficient to eliminate
such activity. Every possible repressive measure is utilized to achieve
results. Men without conscience are chosen from among fanatic Kosovar
Moslems and from among Albanian Communists and placed in the employ of the
Serbian Government, either in administrative posts in the Kosovo, or in
offices for public education.. The purpose is to weaken the nationalist
sentiments of the Kosovars. 50X1-HUM
91. The main aim of Yugoslav internal policy in Kosmet, is to transform the
Moslem Kosovars
In order to further their own interests, a portion of the city-
dwelling population adopted the Turkish language for commerce and dealings
wrath the government. With time, however, many families came to feel that
Albanian Shoulc' only bdsed to talk to uneducated persons. A purely
worldly reason led several Kosovar families to speak Turkish, in much the
same manner as in certain mundane drawing rooms there is a craze to speak
in French rather than the mother tongue. After thirty years of Serbian
domination, however, the Turkish language spoken by this group has been
corrupted by an admixture of Albanian and Slav words. Even giving in-
struction in the Moslem faith in Turkish has become difficult for the,
Kosovars. Though there are still a number of families in the cities of 50X1-HUM
Prizren, Pristina, Mitrovica, and Vucitrn, who continue to speak Turkish,
They also could have manifested their
feelings in 1915 when they fell back to Serbian domination. In fact, this
was done by a minority in the city of Skoplje and in the village of Menuse
in the Prizren district.
92. The 8th of March, 1951, a festivity day for the Anti-fascist Women of the
Communist World, was chosen by the government authorities as the opening
day for the Turkish language schools in the Kosovo. Presiding at the
inauguration was Xhavid Nimani, member of the Communist Central Committee,
and the address was delivered by Shaqir Ali, and a member of 50X1 -HU M
the Communist regional committee. On the morrow of the festivities, the
latter stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy rather than to again con-
sider himself as of Albanian origin. In his speech he said that socialism
had a tendency to march with gigantic and dynamic steps toward cultural
heights, and that the Albanian language, by nature poor, could not maintain
the rhythm required to reach these lofty summits, and that consequently,
it was necessary to study the Turkish language in order to get there. The
8th of March was planned in all its details by Communist supporters such as
Boro Milatovic, member of the Committee for Public Education in 1944, Mita
Milkovic, formerly president of the same committee, later Serbian minister
for public education. ,LL: Jagosh Gjilasi, a Montenegrin, currently an instructor, Nikola Vojdovic,
and Nikola Jasicic assisted by Alush Gashi, member of the Inspectorate for
Public Education, and by Stathi Kostari.
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93. Prior to 8 March 1951 when Turkish schools were established in the Kosmet
upon the wishes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, a propaganda machine to
campaign in support of same was put into action under the direction of
Alush Gash., Members of the Communist Party in the Kosmet are amazingly
successful in interpreting even the slightest desires of the Central
Committee communicated to them either by voice or letter. During a meeting
of the Regional Committee on 12 March 1951, Gjoko Pajkovic, Secretary
General of the Party,, said that the Government was ready to give full
support to all those speaking their mother tongue, the Turkish language at
home, and who hoped to educate their children in this language. It is in
this manner that the Yugoslav Government is firmly resolved to solve the
question of anti-Slavism in the Kosmet.
91. Details of the plan to denationalize the Albanian minority were discussed
at numerous secret meetings held in the Inspectorate for Education in
Pristina, at Communist Party meetings, and in the home of Gjoko Pajkovic.
In this regard, three meetings are known to have been held by Pajkovic,
two by Dusan Mugosa, one by Petar Stambolic, president of the Republic of
Serbia, one by Mosa Pijade, and one by Aleksis Aksentijevic, former finance
minister in the Serbian Government. The result of all these meetings was
the decision to take positive action against any Albanian "chauvinists"
who dared raise their voices to question hose who 50X1 -HU M
pretended that their mother tongue was the Turkish language. The first two
prominent men to oppose such measures were individuals whose patriotic
records were by no means immaculate. Perhaps after seven years of numerous
criminal deeds they rose to the defense of their people as a result of a
guilty conscienoel Fadil Hoxha was dismissed from his position as
president of the Regional Council for having argued that such procedure was
not included in the Party directives. His release was effective upon the
orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party., and only because of
his past Partisan services was he given a purely formal position of In-
spector within the Communist Committee for Serbia. Xhavid Wimani, the
other to succumb, was released from his position in the Economic Directorate
of the Region. .
50X1-HUM
95? Communist Party. meetings aimed at convincing Albanians of the Moslem faith
to join the group, are held daily at Prizren. Promises,
cajolery, and even menaces of arrest are resorted to, particularly when
dealing with those who speak the Turkish language. Individuals who were
discriminated against in 1915 such as businessmen whose property was con-
fiscated,, and other persons who were prohibited the practice of their
religious functions were now being favorably approached. Among basic
themes developed at such meetings in Prizren, the following ones taken
from a teacher's notebook are significant.
a. Everyone has the privilege of being educated in the language of his
choice, or which he considers to be his mother tongue, providing of
course, that this meets with the Party line;
b. Turkish language schools will be opened up everywhere on the basis
of the existing laws;
50X1-HUM
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c. Tactics to be employed in order to achieve the desired result are that
the Albanian language is not as well developed as the Turkish language,
and that it is not possible to continue to maintain a slackened pace in
cultural development;
d. Be wary of Albanian chauvinism;
e. Avoid Albanian chauvinism which cannot benefit you, and endeavor to
uncover the "Ballist" followers of Enver Hoxha and Xhafer Deva; and
f. your children should be educated in 50X1-HUM
Turkish schools. The Government will assist you in this end. Albanian
chauvinists to date have done nothing for you.
96. A commission made up of two UDB officers and various zone representatives,
community councillors and members of the Regional Committee, is in charge
of recruiting the youth for registration in Turkish schools. This is done
by a door-to-door canvas. The campaign is carried out with great vigor in
Pristina and Prizren, whereas the drive is somewhat more reserved in
Kosovska Mitrovica, Fee, Vucitrn and Gnjilane. An arbitrary list is drawn
up of the prospective pupils. Parents are advised to send their children
to the Turkish school, and on the opening day attendance is called on the
basis of the list drawn up by the commission. In this manner, parents find
themselves in a fearful dilemma, not knowing whether to bow down to force
or to follow their own conscience and desires.
97. Approximately 500 students, largely of the elementary grades, but also in-
eluding numerous students of the gymnasium level, were obliged to abandon
Albanian schools and enroll in Turkish schools in the 1951-52 semester.
This number includes students attending schools at Manuse, Stanovci,
Vucitrn and two other areas in the district of Pristina, where Turkish
is largely spoken because of its Circassian population. The following is
a partial list of statistics covering Albanian students forced to attend
Turkish schools.-
1950-51
1951-52
Prizren
97
800
Pristina
63
350
Mitrovica
90
200
Pee
70
120
Gn j ilane
a
34
100
Vucitrn'
s
26
83
98. Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their
students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result
approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were
either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from
Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their
dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined.
The following is a list of statistics on teachers who became destitute
after the closing of Albanian schools in 1951-521
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Location Dismissed Instructors Schools closed
Pristina 30 10
Prizren 35 12
Pee 22 7
Mitrovica .30 12
Gnjilane 28 10
Kamenica 10 6
Vitine 15 8
Djakovo 10 6
Podujeve 10 4
Vucitrn 8 5
Ferizaj 8 6
Total 213 90
99. The Yugoslav Government's justifications for these measures are given in
the following arguments,
a. Necessity to cut down on the cadre of instructors for budgetary purposes;
b. To renew the cadre with more competent men;
c. To provide for the possibility of militarizing the corps of instructors;
100.^ Another method employed by the Yugoslav Communist Party to weaken the
Albanians was to transfer capable instructors from the large cities to
smaller ones. Teachers who were less qualified were appointed to their
posts and the excuse proffered was that it was imperative to send the
capable instructors to smaller backward areas where they would be in-
strumental in helping to raise the cultural level. The truth of the matter
is that since Turkish schools were located in the larger cities, it was in
the interest of the Government that Albanian schools should exist among
inferior conditions so that the population would be attracted to Turkish
schools. Serbian and Turkish schools received ample government support,
while Albanian schools had great difficulty in obtaining even a small
financial assistance., and even their premises and classrooms were taken
away from them.
Yugoslav Policies
101. Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region., the application of which Dusan
Mugosa is largely responsible for, can be listed as followsg
a. To separate Albanians of the Moslem faith from the Catholic Albanians,
and thereby to do away for all time with the problem of an Albanian
Moslem minority;
b. To keep the Albanian minority at a low cultural level;.
c. To take advantage of hostile dissensions among the population in order
to eliminate Albanian nationalism. Thus in the event of a war., large-
scale nationalist movements would be prevented at the very incept with-
out the need to resort to much bloodshed, since one must keep in mind
that in the event of hostilities, Albanian nationalists would not lack
the support of the Albanian Government;
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27
e. To smooth the way for a census in the Kosmet in order to convince the
interested Powers that the Albanians do not represent 85 per cent of
the populations but rather less than 50 per cent; and
50X1-HUM
102. Recent laws stemming from a reorganization of the public education system,in
Yugoslavia demand that 40 per cent of the Albanian high school graduates be
barred from further pursuit of their studies. In connection with this steps
were taken in 1951 to eliminate as many as 60 per cent of the students at
the examinations required for higher learning. It is alleged that the doors
of the law faculty are barred to Albanian students so that they may not be
in a position to defend their rights.
103. In the early part of July 1951, the Committee of the Serbian Communist Party'
called together a group of Albanian students to explain. to them the motives
for the opening of Turkish schools. Upon this occasion the students were
informed that 50 scholarships granted by the State had been reduced to 15.
Of the officials present, Dusan Mugosa, Mehmet Hoxha, and Fadil Hoxha are
listed among other Communist personalities.
Albanian Arts
104. It is customary during any Albanian artistic or cultural, and particularly
dramatic presentations, to commence with a long speech in praise of Tito and
the Communist Party for their deep understanding of the arts, and to express
appreciation for the permission accorded Yugoslav writers to present their
work to the public. All presentations given in the Albanian language are
translations from the Serbo=Croat. As such they are deprived of interest,
since they are already known to the theater-going public in their original
version. At the end of the presentation, agitators who customarily attend
all Albanian cultural showings whistle or mock the actors in order to provoke
the Albanians and to uncover among the audience those who voice their protest.
Albanian actors are advised by the Communist Party to be well prepared, since
an unfavorable reaction on the part of the public would make it necessary to
discontinue the performance. Various methods are employed to provoke and
rouse Albanian artists, and thus to prevent them from further appearing in
public. In the summer of 1951, six prominent actors in the Kosmet were
expelled from the theater and replaced by practically unknown actors. The
intention was to convince the public that the Albanians can not act.
Social Situation
105. Yugoslav Communists upon assuming power, did not desire to find themselves
in open contradiction to promises made to the Albanians in 1945 by leaders
of the National Liberation Movement, and kept many senior officials of
the Albanian minority in the Government. The majority of these officials
demonstrated great flexibility in adapting themselves to the new situation.
From 1950 on, however, the trend was to turd over the better positions to
Serbians and Montenegrins. The Montenegrins in particular became easily
assimilated with the population of the Kosmet. Gjoko Pajkovic from Berana
became chief of the Regional Council, while numerous subsidiary, councils
were headed by other Montenegrins.
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106. The application of Communist theories within the social field entails
in itself a subdivision of the population into classes. This new
Communist society can be divided into the following groups or classes:
a. Privileged Party class which is in power;
b. White collar workers, factory workers and workers of government
cooperatives, who are entitled to ration coupons and pensions; and
c. Wide masses of the proletariat living in cities and villages, and
reactionaries who are obliged to work without the compensation of
rights or privileges.
107. To the above subdivision, another or fourth class can be added in the
Kosovo region,`that of the Albanian minority. Albanians in Yugoslavia are
not treated in the same way as are the Montenegrins and Serbians. Proof
of this is in the excessive application of the laws when dealing with the
Albanians as opposed to the Montenegrins and Serbians; also in the higher
quotas which they must meet in grain contributions to the State, in higher
taxes, and in higher payments for other obligations demanded by the
Government. Albanians are obliged to take in Serbian employees coming
to the Kosmet, as roomers. There have been cases when entire families were
assigned to a single room to make way for the newcomer, who need only pay
an illusory monthly rental of 150 dinars per room. This sum will not even
cover the electricity consumed by the tenant. On the other hand, homes of
Montenegrins and Serbians are not registered with the housing office. This
is alleged to be done as a compensation for their suffering during the past
war. In recent times, Serbians have been known to rent their rooms for a
monthly profit of from 600 to 1,500 dinars.
108. A group of fifty sanitation officers came to the Kosmet in the summer of
1950 equipped with medical supplies of all kinds. Instead of alleviating
human suffering, they gave lectures on socialism, and took films in the
very poor homes of the gypsies. These films were later shown to the
Yugoslav public under the title of "Life in the Metohij". Not a single
two-story building was shown, nor for that matter, any of the picturesque
castles of the region. The purpose of this type of propaganda was to
convince the Communist public of the incapacity of the Albanian people to
rise to a higher social plane, and of the prodigious efforts undertaken by
the regime to improve the life of these semi-primitive people.
;.. Albanian Resistance
109. In order to withstand the numerous injustices of the Yugoslav Government
toward the Albanian minority, Albanian nationalists decided that if they
could unite the dissatisfied population of the cities and villages in the
Kosmet into groups, they could channel common efforts toward a common good,
and give rise to a movement which would have a national rather than a
local character. After several meetings between a small number of
individuals in the homes of Mehmet Ali and Ymer Doda, Albanian nationalists
in Pristina, the following decisions were reached on 15 February 1951 .
a. Creation of an Albanian nationalist organization with headquarters in
Pristina. The organization would be given a simple title in order to
avoid any suspicion on the part of Yugoslav authorities on the one hand,
and internal discord on the other;
be The aims of the new organization would be directed toward the ultimate
unification of the Metohija region and other Albanian territories with
Albania. The organization will cooperate with all parties, but not
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c. The following are various methods and procedures to be implimented
within the organizations
1) To group together nationalists and dissatisfied Albanians who are
Yugoslav citizens, so that in the event of troubles in Yugoslavia-
or a third world war, they would be prepared to revolt, even if no
outside assistance should be forthcoming;
2) Extending of moral and material assistance to families of Albanian
patriots who have either been imprisoned or have escaped abroad;
3) Closer relations with nationalists in Albania;
4) To establish contact with Albanian political refugees in exile;
5) To counteract through the use of propaganda Yugoslav Government
measu
i
res a
med at breaking up the unity of the Albanian population,
or any similar measures undertaken by the Communist Party or by
royalist Serbians or Montenegrins;
To undertake protective measures against Government intrigues
directed toward the Albanians, and to uncover covert Serbian
and Montenegrin organizations; and
7) To attempt to establish nationalist organizations in all cities.
These organizations will be under the jurisdiction of the central
organization in Pristina.
d. In connection with the new organization, an executive council will be
established,made up of cells A and B. Cell A is to be made up of a
group of restricted members who will meet every time it is necessary,
and no member will be allowed to be absent from the meeting unless for
a very serious reason. Cell B will be made up of a larger group of
members who will have the right to act upon their own individual
initiative, but only and always under the direct jurisdiction of Cell A.
)110. The following results have been achieved to date on the establishment of an
Alb
anian nationalist organizations
a. In Djakovo, Prizren, Pec, Plava, Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Podujevac, Vitine,
Gnjilane, Uskup, Tetovo, and Presevo, basic groundwork has been laid
by the establishment of branch organizations under the jurisdiction of
and with the same structural set up as the headquarters organization.
Cell A in the provincial councils is composed of three persons, but
only a single individual establishes contact with the Pristina head-
quarters. Further efforts are to establish branches
in Rahovec, Dragasi, Suharek, dna in various areas of Macedonia, Kumanovo
and Montenegro;
b. Followers are being recruited from among political prisoners in Pristina,
and internees in labor camps;
c. Operational activities are being carried out by members of the Bloku
Kombetar Indipendent, Gjon Gjinaj and Kol Cuni; and
d. Operational planning is in part being completed by Zef Nikaj, member of
the council. of Cell At and Gjon Gjinaj and his companions. Nevertheless,
great caution in being employed in the implementation of propaganda' measures
against: Government:attempts to. break up the. unity of the Albanian population,
and in protective measures against Government intrigue.
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111. In'order to ca into effect the various methods
procedures
for a secret Albanian nationalist 50X1-HUM
organ `za on Cell A' of
the headquarters organization is hoping to reach an agreement with emigre
Gjon Gjinaj on the following questions:
a. To establish relations and reach an agreement with nationalists in
Albania to cooperate for the successful creation of a free Albania.
Such cooperation will depend upon political events;
b. To obtain from some prominent Albanian political emigre an accurate
account of the political situation in the Kosovo, and to exhort the
population to be patient and to wait until the right time has come;
c. In the event that the Kosovars (sic) should find themselves exposed
to danger, they should be able to find shelter or elsewhere, 50X1-HUM
with the assistance of Albanian nationalists] and
d. Radio transmitting stations which are anti-Communist in character,
should be supplied with material which will inform the rest of the
world of the actual situation of Albanians in Yugoslavia, and assure
the Kosovars that they can count upon assistance in the
event of an emergency.
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114. The majority of Kosovars living in Yugoslavia share the opinion that
with the loss of the Kosovo and other territories to Yugoslavia, Albania
has been deprived of much of its dynamism, and will require the
assistance and protection of This would mean a 50X1-HUM
decided lessening of Albanian sovereignty. A smaller faction of
Albanians believe that once Albania has been freed of Communism, she will
be able to win back the Kosovo. This faction favors the coordination of
efforts with Albanian nationalists before the possible outbreak of a
third world war, and the need to reach an 50X1-HUM
advanced understanding with Yugoslavia on the destinies of the Kosovo
and of Albania proper.
115. The nationalist intransigent faction, as a specific,group comprises
approximately 65 per cent of the Kosovar population. This faction
desires to reunite with Albania. It is estimated that at an initial
outbreak of hostilities the faction would rise at once to 85 or 90 per
cent.
116. The Communist or philo-Communist faction among the Kosovars which desires
union with Enver Hoxhaos Albania, is not much greater than five per cent.
Those who desire the return of the Karadjordjevic dynasty in Yugoslavia,
and the return of Zog in Albania, vary between 10 and 15 per cent.
117. The following are various factors which 'contributed toward increasing the
original suspicions of the Kosovars toward emigres entering Yugoslavia
since the bitter dissapointments caused by Yugoslav political successes
with Esad Pascia Toptani, Ahmet Zogu, and lately with Enver Hoxhas
The person to whom the Yugoslav Government gave the assignment of
directing Albanian emigre affairs is Dusan Mugosa, a Montenegrin,
b, In March 1951 Yugoslav authorities did not place Albanian refugees
at the head of the Prizren Committee but rather well known men who
had served in the UDB, and who had no scruples or sentiments of
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118. Because the Kosovars themselves experienced the terrors of Communism
in 1944, they sympathise deeply with the emigres, the majority of whom
are either friends of theirs or belong to Albania's foremost families.
They feel instinctively that it is part of their duty to help these
refbgees"whohave abandoned their country and loved ones, not out of
gain, but out of the will to survive. It is the hope and belief of the
Kosovars that Communism will be overnomA in the n ar future through the
work of Albanian 50X1-HUM
emigres abroad,
119. Yugoslav Albanians are not completely confident that their own emigre
leaders will place national questions above individual differences or
party differences, or even above their personal interests. The Kosovars
know that they do not have in their own country the necessary cadre of
political men, and for this reason they turn to their leaders who are
living abroad. What they demand of these leaders can be listed as follows:
That political parties in exile refrain at least temporarily from
matters of dissention, or at least until such time as the death
blow has been dealt to Communism;
b. That one among them be appointed by all parties and political
factions to speak and work in the name of the Kosovar people, and
that he be supplied by them with the necessary material., in order
to bring light upon the facts and rights of Albania in having her
own borders restored;
c. That they should not lose faith with the Albanian heroes who although
representing various parties., had fallen for a single ideal;
d, The Kosovars cannot lift their voices directly in protest to
Yugoslav policies, and it is up to radio transmissions from abroad
to inform the rest of the world
that the leaders in exile agree with the demands of the Kosovars
for national vindication;
a. To send to the Kosovo a number of covert groups just prior to the
outbreak of war,, or in the event of serious movements in Yugoslavia;
and
f. To publish an irredentist paper which will inform the rest of the
world of the policies of denationalization conducted by Yugoslavia
120. The Kosovars are convinced that Albanian political parties abroad will
not be able to obtain satisfaction for their nationalist demands 1
if divided and incapable of eliminating their diverse 50X1 -HU M
antagonisms. It is for this reason that they request that a "committee
of national unification" be established., which will bring together the
efforts of the leaders, and still maintain the individuality of the
various parties. The Kosovars also ask that their leaders reach an
agreement with the more prominent emigre leaders of other countries,, such
as Croatsg..Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians., who have 50X1-HUM
escaped from Yugoslavia, on the following poin s:
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a. To publish facts and statistics on the atrocities committed by
Serbians and Montenegrins during World War II;
b, To inform the rest of the world that Yugoslavia is the vanguard
and instrument of Slav supremacy in the Balkans (sic);
c. To expose for their denationalization activities in 50X1-HUM
Kamuria(sia and for' their plans f'br conquest in .Solitbern: Albania;
d. To publish statistics on the Albanian population who are Yugoslav
citizens in order to prove that Kosovar claims are justified;
e. To prove that it is ridiculous that Albania, the smallest nation
in the Balkans, should have aggressive aims towards her neighbors;
To present the case favoring an Albania which will be an equal
partner in a Balkan confederation, and that .will safeguard 50X1-HUM
these rights;
g, To ascertain that there will be an exchange of Slav minorities in
the event that the Kosovo should be reunited with Albania;
h. To emphasize the fact that Albanian Communists had received more
material aid in the last war than was the case with the nationalist
parties;
i. To stress that the Albanians are a religious people with patriarchal
sentiments, and are tied to traditions which are in absolute
contradiction to Communism; and
To seek the collaboration of a government which does not have
territorial interest in Albania.
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