TRAINING AND MANEUVERS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

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CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1
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RIPPUB
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C
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32
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December 22, 2016
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July 20, 2009
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2
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Publication Date: 
May 20, 1955
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 liq CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. COUNTRY USSR/Austria ?(Soviet Zone) REPORT Training and Maneuvers in the Soviet DATE DISTR. Army DATE OF INFO. PLACE ACQUIRED DATE ACQUIRED REQUIREMENT REFERENCES This is UNEVALUATED Information 20 May 1955 32 ARMY review completed. C-O-N-F-I-D E-N-T-I-A-L A:...ibution by ?#,.,) INFORMATION REPORT INFORMAHON REPORT '25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL REPORT COUNTRY USSR/Austria (Soviet Zone) SUBJECT Training and. Maneuvers in the Soviet Army DATE OF INFORMATION PLACE ACQUIRED THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 A. GARRISON TRAINING The Training Year -.General matter o common knowledge bec:attset:of t~hc.;wdel~he;gi.Yena.to.,_it in military periodicals and newspapers. The training year was. divided as follows: a. Winter Period This period, which began on I December, marked the beginning of the *tning year. Unite moved out into the field and rebai e4 these ?Or winter cap, returning to their permanent stations on 15 Apr l b. Semi-Annual Inspection - Units were inspected at their home stations ..by a commission (inspektorskaya proverka). (See paragraphs 59 through 62 for.further details.) c. Preparation for May Day - From 25 April to 30 April, all units prepared for the First of May holiday and also continued training. The training time was utilized by unit CO's to review subjects in which their men were weakest. No set schedule was followed and each company CO had a free hand in selecting his own training subjects. d. 'Preparation for Summer Training - From 2'May to 10 May, units prepared for movement to their summer camp. There was little or no training. This short period was spent in the care and cleaning of equipment, the servicing of vehicles, and the repair . of barracks and post details. r~sBSexzer~ 25X1 DATE DISTR. 2$ Jaa. 1955 NO. OF PAGES 31 ti REFERENCES: { '25X1 :25X1 1.25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -2- e. Summer Training Period - From about 10 May to 15 October, units conducted summer training in the field. f. Semi-Annual Inspection - Near the end of summer training, units were inspected in the field b7 a special commission. This inspec- tion lasted about ten days. g. Preparation for the New Training, Year - From the latter part of October to 1 December, units were again engaged in the care and cleaning of equipment, repair-of barracks, etc. All of this was done in preparation for the new training year. At this times new replacements arrived, were given some very basic training, and were then integrated. into various units. The Trainins Year . 11 In the Soviet Zone of Austria, the Soviet Army followed the same training year schedule as outlined` above. he 95th Oda. '25X1 Rifle Div., there was an importan . e: ecause it was responsi- ble for guarding the demarcation line.between the Soviet and Western zones all year, it never went into the field in accordance with the training schedule. Only.the field training described below was con- ducted within the division. the rifle regiments w_ une uiv ion conauezea no iel training; most training was con- ducted-wherever units-happened to be located along the demarcation line. It was possible that the howitzer, artillery, and the tank- SP regiments of the division which were permanently stationed at Allentsteig ' N,A,8+?1l. ' E:-15,-19+ a~:t;W1 . ngcareaAPoT ed.:,f1 1 ,;t ?ain; ng in adeorrdanxde ;.wilc. the above schedule. In June or July 53, most of the units were removed from the demarcation line to their permanent caserne areas* only a few un s of each rifle regiment remained on the line. the let Rifle b With Odes. RifleYRegt. was in the regimental caserne area at Auhof (N 4e-21, in limited field exercises. battalion participated in field exercises at bat- tallon -1_ev_0_1_jx in 1953 each rifle ne nen#L of the division held rmitea rie exercises, It was also rumored that the 95th Gds. Rifle ID.ivtw.e minus those ;,units on duty on the demarcation line, was to go to summer camp in 1954 during the summer training period. Training Years 1951-53 . practically e same. Beginning with the 1953 training year, there were some changes in the training. For the first time, there were some unit exercises in the field and more emphasis was placed on' chemical training, field and tactical training, and range firing.1 CONFIDENTIAL e training ma erial covered in 1951 and 1952 was Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 25X1 25X1 LJ/~I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL 7. Near the end of the 1953 tr inin ins of troops is could have been the result of Ministry o Defense Order 3 , issued in summer 1.953; which would affect the entire Soviet Army.2 The purpose of the reshuffling was to insure that one-third of the personnel would be in the first year of service, one-third in the second year, and one-third in the third year. Thus', the Soviets would be assured of two-tk.i!.ds of second and third-year personnel throughout all army units. Training Year 1254. In the training year 1954, there were further changes. First, training.. which had been'conducted eight hours daily for six days a week was cut to six hours a day six days a week. Second, further emphasis was placed on chemical, field and tactical training, and on range firing. Third. training in battle atomic daf'Anap wAR d n hrr,r9,inoA 8. About 400-500 replacements arrived in the regiment in the early part of November 1953. They had, had less than a month of training in the USSR And were kept in a group at the regiment while undergoing two weeks' quarantine. Officers and NCO's were assigned by the regiment to instruct these EM in very basic military training, e.g.,close- order drill, rules and regulations of the service, military courtesy and discipline, political training, etc. In the meantime, the second and third-year,personnel put the caserne in order; barracks were repaired, equipment was cleaned and repaired, vehicles serviced, the firing range was policed, etc. All of this was in preparation for the coming training year. During this time, the second and third- , year men were required to participate only in'political training' and, occasionally, in a two-hour class. There was no planned training program during this time,with.the exception of the political training. EM who had completed three years of conscripted service were demobilized during the latter part of October and early November. Towards the end of November, new replacements had completed quarantine and were broken down among the regimental sub-units. 9. The regiment was then ready to begin training ygar 19-54. On the first day of training, the entire regiment was formed with its standard, colors, and band. The CO addressed the assembled group.5 Following the CO's address, the regiment marched off to its firing range about one half kilometer from its caserne at Auhof (N 48-21 E 14-20) At the firing range, all of the regiment's weapons. an& most of its equipment we're laid out for the purpope d allowing the men to become acquainted with them. This type of training was known as material exhibition (osmotra tekhniki). It lasted all day and the "ounty fair" method was used to present it. Companies were rotate? froth point to poiat'and spent a half hour at each point. There was also demonstration firing of the rifle company weapons. Following this, the units began to train according to. the schedule that was put out by the regiment. 0. During the average training week, the companies spent about two to three hours on physical training, four hours on political training, ten hours on weapons training, including range firing (ognevaya- podgotovka), six hours on tactics, four hours on close-order drill, and two hours on manuals and regulations. Other subjects, such as, field sanitation, map reading, chemical.training, atomic warfare training engineer training, completed the week's training. At the beginni of'the training year, there were three to four hours of field sanitation and personal hygiene. This was given during the first month and was not repeated again for the remainder of the CONFIDENTIAL I C, 25X1'' 25X1 25X1' 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL 11. 12. 13. training year. Map reading was given only during the summer training period and consisted of two hours each month. Training for officers in atomic defense measures started at the beginning of training year 1954 and was introduced in January 1954 to the EM. EM had a total of 16 hours of atomic warfare in January 1954.4 Each company had guard duty about one day a week, during which time there was no training given. Pr ogress of . Training .- 1954 continued primarily on the platoon level. able to function as units, even though the majority of. training point where the platoons were well-trained and the companies were training had progressed to.the who had already participated in practically the same type of training for one or two years, and, in most cases, with the same platoon, This was eeau a two- ra s or the personnel were second-and r -year men battalion indicated that it could function as a unit within two.mouthe after the beginning of the training year. Each year, from February to the end of the training year, the platoons, companies, and bat- talions improved, reaching their peak by the end of the summer training period. contusion and lack of coordination during hese exercises, he rifle the entire regiment-could not function as a unit at any time without first receiving regimental- level training. Because the lot Rifle Bn.- and the 8th Rifle Co.'of the 3rd Rifle Bn., i.e.,four out of nine companies, were stationed on the demarcation line, there had been no opportunities in 1953 or up to March 1954 to. assemble the entire regiment in afield exercise or maneuver to determine whether it could function as a unit. Trainin ins Demarc ionnLine Units 14. Each regiment of the 95th Oda. Rifle Div, had one rifle battalion in addition-to one or two rifle companies on demarcation line-duty; they conducted their own training where they were stationed. The let Rifle Bn. and the 8th Rifle Co., 3rd Rifle Bn., followed the regimental training schedule get out for the 287th Ode. Rifle Regt. The training day for these units was only.four hours instead of six. The units were broken down into platoons, with one platoon at each cheokpoint while the platoons were broken down into two groups each.. One group manned a checkpoint while the other participated in the training these groups were rotated every 24 hours. Although most of the training was done in the vicinity of where the units were stationed, personnel of the 8th Rifle Co., 257th'Ods. Rifle Regt., were brought in groups to the regimental caserne area for the purpose of using the rifle range. The lot Bn. had its own firing range. W and Re-enlistee Training L5. EW and most re-enlistees (sverkhsrochniki) sel- dom participated in unit training. Political training an some range firing with individual arms. were the only required training. Because all SW and most of the re-enlistees were in supply or other rear-echelon CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL positions, most of their training was done on the job. Re-enlistees in line units participated in all the . training. of the unit to.which they.were assigned. 6. EW fired once a year with a email. German rifle, type'TOZ-8 or TOZ-9. Re-enlistees'in rear-echelon Jobs tired the Moesin-Nagant carbine or the PPSh 8MG once or'twice annually. Occasionally, re-enlistees W 1ft -required to participate in close-order drib. or attend a specific class designated by their CO. Generally,. both EW and rer enlistees -spent 'most of their .time oa the job but-participated in. alert training when given. i+acti*al raining J. Tactical training was conducted primarily on platoon or squad-I.vel in, or near,'the oaeerne area. .The greatest portion of this training was practical work'. It was diffi+Ouit to maneuver in the area used by the regiment beoat}ee it was no, s**11. Units, partielpat6din tactics' from the very beginning of 'the training.: year,: both' It 1953 and, ! 1954. , About three 'time. a. year, compamy-eieed tactical problems'were con- ducted about 15 'km. from. the oaserne. DuriA 1953, tactics higher than platoon and oompany41eve1 involved the rfle battalion and were conducted-at the Allentsteig training area. 9. During 1954, tactics higher than platoon and companyr'level involved the rifle battalion soon after ,the training year comm~enced. Weapons Training a. Range Firing -0. ac r ere iment ad its own sma arms rage. The range could be used for weapons firing from-indiv ua arms an some r ng from small crew-served weapons, such as LMG'e, HMQ.'s, PKP's and ZPU'e. It was also used for firing dummy training rounds from the RP? !4O-nun rocket launcher. The regimental SPA-76'e also used the range for sub-caliber firing. 1. T/O&E crew-served weapons of the battalion artillery and regimental artillery had to:be fired at the Allenteteig training area. These units went to the area times annuall and spent about one month there each time, the AA units of his regiment also conducted o b. Range Firing Courses. 2. There were standard range courses for every weapon of the rifle regiment 25X1 25X1 25X1 see courses were taken 25X1 rine n , n course n an a one (Kure Strw re kovog ?ruz ya , pu s e in 3.940,~ ey 25X1 were a n.ar throottgout the Soviet Army. This manual pertained only to weapons of the rifle company] however, there were other manuals prescribing range courses for other weapons of the rifle regiment. Listed below are the courses for individual arms and crew-served weapons . 25X1 CONFIDENTIAk Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -6- (1 (3 TT Pistol Course One 50 x 50 cm. bull's eye at 25 m, five rounds with a time limit of 15 seconds. The center ring counted 10 points, the next ring nine, the next eight, etc. A score of 35 was excellent, 30 good, and 25 qualifying. All regimental officers fired this course four times each year. About 40 percent failed to qualify in 1953 during the semi-annual inspections and, as a group, re- ceived a rating of unsatisfactory in this Bourse. In addition to the pistol, firing, the regimental CO organized record'firing with another weapon for all regimental officers twice annually. The weapon to be used was dependent on the wishes of the regimental CO and was normally one of the weapons of the rifle company. 'All platoon leaders and company CO's were required to know how to fire any T/O&E weapon of the unit to which they.were assigned. During the semi-annual inspection, unit officers were often required to fire an exercise with any designated T/O&E weapon of the platoon or company on request of the inspecting team. Because the unit to be inspected was rated during record firing, platoon leaders often voluntarily joined in the firing of their platoon in order to raise the platoon's score. Although the officers fared badly in TT pistol firing, they were generally much more proficient in firing other small arms. Carbine Known-Distance Course (Odinochnaya Uchebnaya Strel'ba) Record firing consisted of four exercises: (a) Exercise One - 100 m.; prone position; three rounds; target -- 20 x 30 cm. rectangle on a 50 x 50 cm. square. Score: 21 points out of a possible 30 points, excellent; 18 points, good; and. 15 points, satisfactory. (b) Exercise two - 200 m.; prone position; four rounds; time limitrtwo minutes; target - 50 x 50 cm. head-and-shoulders silhouette mounted on a 1 x 1 m. square. A score of 28 points out of a possible 40 was required of second and third-year men for a rating of excellent, 24 points for good, and 20 for satisfactory. Soldiers in their first year of service were rated as excellent with 24, good with 20, and satisfactory with 18 points. (c) Exercise Three - 300 m.; standing position in a trench; four. rounds; time limits one minute; target - waist silhouette 75 x 50 cm. Score Four hits-;excellent; three hits, good- two-hits, satisfactory. A parapet was used as a support in this exercise. (d) Exercise Four - 200 n.; kneeling position sighting from behind a corner; three rounds; target - head and chest silh,-4tte 50 x 50 cm. which appeared for 30 seconds. Followi.g this, at 300 m.; standing position behind a post which represented a tree; three rounds; target - waist silhouette 75..K 50 cm. which appeared for 30 seconds. Score: a. total of four hits on both targets, excellent; three hits, good;.and two hits, satisfactory. or r~'at. 1n1~;1e ``shot :li`ir ti (Boyevaya Odin ?chnaya St,;. ~1'ba) There were three groups of targets. The first group consisted of three head-and-shoulders silhouettes side-by-side,,mounted on a x 1 m, square, about 120 m. distance. These three targets appeared for 40 seconds; Firing was done from a standing position .in a trench. Following this, the firer jumped out of the trench, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -7- moved forward, and prepared for the second group of targets. These were two head-and-chest silhouettes, 50 x 50 cm., side-by- side, at a distance of 150 in. from the trench. Firing was by the fire-and-movement method using the off-hand position. The targets showed three times for five seconds at five-second inter- vals. The firer moved in short 50-m. runs. As targets were hit, they were withdrawn. When the firer was about 30 m. from the row of targets, he heaved a dummy hand grenade at the target positions. Following this, the firer moved about 50 in. past the targets and prepared for the next group of targets. The third group consisted of three full silhouettes side-by-side, each in the shape of a running man at a distance of 300-350 m..,The three targe.ts'appeared,, for 20 seconds; firing was done from a feeling position. A total of seven rounds was given for the three groups of targets. Time limit for the course was four to five minutes. A total of five hits with at least one hit on each group of targets was considered excellent; four,.good; and three, satisfactory. (4) PPSh SMG Kn?wn-Distance Course which onsisted of the following four exercises: (a) Exercise One'; -50 m.; prone position; time limits one minute; three-round single-fire at a head-and-chest silhouette, 50 . x 50 cm. Score: Two hits, excellent and one hit, satisfactory. (b) Exercise Two - 100 :n.; prone position,; time limit, 30 seconds; nine rounds in short bursts at a waist-silhouette, 50 x 75 cm., mounted on a one-meter circular background. Six hits, excellent; five hits, good; and four hits, satisfactory.. (c) Exercise Three- 150 m.; standing position in trench using a parapet as a support; time limit.-one minute; 10 rounds in short bursts at three full-silhouette targets, 50 x 150 cm. One hit on each target, excellent; one hit on two targets, good; one hit on one target, satisfactory. (d) Exercise Four - EM were given 12 rounds in two magazines of six rounds each. One waist silhouette, 50 x 75 cm. target of 100 m. distaste. Firing was done from a',kneeling position, sighting around. corner. The second target, a full silhouette 50 x 150 cm., was 150 in. away. Firing at' `s target was from a standing position behind apost. A total.of six hits on both tayrgets with at least one hit in each target was ex-- cellent; five, good; four, satisfactory. Both targets appeared for 30 seconds. (5) PPSh SMG Combat Course The starting line was a waist-high trench. Each man was given two magazines, one with 10 rounds and one with 15 rounds. To his front, at 100-120 m-, three head-and-chest silhouette targets.side-by-side appeared three times for five seconds at five-second intervals. The firer jumped out of the trench and fired on the move, using the off-hand position, in short bursts on any of the three targets. Nearing the row of targets, the firer tossed a practice hand grenade .at them.. Following this, he changed to the 10-round magazine while moving 30 m. behind tYe row of targets when three full silhouette targets appeared 150 m. to his front three times for 20 seconds at five-second intervals. This time, the firing was conducted.from a prone position and-in place. A total of three hits, with at least one on each group of targets in each row, was considered excellent, two hits on either target was good, and one on either target was satisfactory. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -8- (6) DP or PPM LM0 Known-Distance Course This consisted of three exercises. All firing was conducted from a prone position. Two men, the gunner and assistant gunner, set up the MG for all the exercises. (a) Exercise One - 200 m.; nine rounds in short,bu'sts at an MG target. which consisted of one head-and-chest silhouette and one head-and-shoulders silhouette joined and mounted on al x 1 m. shield. The time limit was one minute. A total of :fix hits on,either of the silhouettes was can- sidered excellent; five hits, good, and four hits, satis- factory. EM in their first year of service could adore one less than the minimum per category and still qualify. (b) Exercise Two - 300 m.; 10 rounds in short bursts at three full silhouettes. The time limit was one minute. Firing was from a standing position in a trench with the MG on the parapet. One hit on all three targets was excellent; one hit on two'targets was good; and,one hit on.one target was satisfactory. (c) Exercise Three - 200 e.; 14 rounds in two magazines; target full silhouette in the form of a,runn ng'man?pulled laterally by. 'ropes across the firer's front a distance of 30m. and then reversed. This silhouette was pulled O seconds one way and 10'seconds the other. The gunner fired the seven rounds in one magazine while the target was moving one direction and then changed magazines and fired at tai target as it moved in the opposite direction. A total of three hits was considered excellent; two hits, good; and one-hit, satis- factory. Although source believed there was possibly a. fourth exercise, he could not remember any details about it. (7) DP. or PPM LMQ Combat Course EM were given two magazines, one had 25 rounds, and the other had 15 rounds. An Ma target, consisting of a head-and-chest silhouette and a head-arid-shoulders silhouette, joined and mounted on a shield, appeared. at 300-350 M. The gunner and his assistant ran forward 50'r., set up his MG and'fired at the target which remained up for 70 seconds. This target was withdrawn and then three head-and- chest silhouettes appeared it about.200'm: to the firer's'right for 30 seconds. The gunner relayed his weapon and the targets were withdrawn as they were hit. All targets not hit.afte"r 30 seconds were withdrawn. Gunners displaced about 30.m. and then three ft-silhouette targets appeared twice, each time for about 20 seconds at a distance to the front of 400--6500,*. A total of six targets hit with at least one hit on each different row, of targets was considered excellent; five targets, good; and four. targets, satisfactory. There were also exercises for the Goryunov HMG which source could not remember. During the semi-annual inspection in fall 1953, EM of the 287th ode. Rifle Regt. received, for range proficiency in all regimental weapons, a rating of four out of a possible five. a. Unit Range Firing Schedules In 1953, EM .,in rifle companies and in the Regtl. Req.on. Co. fired one or two exercises (described in the preceding paragraphs) with their individual weapons about 15 times. In addition, these EM.,had fired every other company weapon iLt? least i`)oncetm Th e' `-hwas doublei'theo amoun't of range firingr of r t1e previous year. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -9- 25. lin March 1954, all EM 25X1 in rifle companies and the Regtl. Recon. Co. had fired all of the exercises prescribed for their individual arm with the exception of the combat course; however, they were about ready to fire the combat course as well, The general procedure was to fire only one exercise each time range firing was scheduled. For example, if there were four exercises for the carbine record course, EM fired the first exercise one day, the second another day, etc. The exercises were fired in order because they became progressively more difficult. In addition to having fired all. of the exercises for his individual weapon., each.EN of the rifle companies and the Recon. Co. had also fired'one exercise from another weapon than that with which hewa5, armed. At that rate there would be still more 25X1 range firing in the training year than in the training year 1953 because units usually did not complete all four exercises until about August of a given year. 26. Sub-units ther than the rifle companies and 25X1 the Recon. o., re a rs and second exercise for their indivi- dual arms (the carbine and PPSh) about three to five times annually. Individuals in these units usually did not fire for record or- familiarization with any individual weapon other than the one with which they were armed. 27. twice as much ball ammunition was expended in 1953 - 25X1 25X1 as In the-previous years and that from all appearances, more asununi- tion would be expended during 1954 than during 1953. d. Night Firing 28. The following night-firing courses for the rifle companies were also given, each conducted twice a year. (1) Rifle Squad This course usually took place at dusk with the squad located in a trench as if occupying a defensive position. To illuminate the area, homemade torches or-30-second rocket flares were used. The squad leader gave the squad a theoretical-mission and also pointed out individual targets. When a flare was used, eight full-silhouette targets appeared 150 m. to the front when it went off; each was shown twice for 20 seconds. The squad re- mained in the trench and fired at these targets. Following this, a second group of seven full-silhouette targets appeared -120 m. to the front. The squad remained in the trenches and engaged these targets. A total of 140 rounds was allowed for the entire exercise. T'i.,.ty of these rounds were given to the men armed with tr a !FSh and 80 were divided between the LNG and men armed with the carbine. A score of 12 targets .it was, considered excellent, 10 targets hit was good, and eight targets hit was satisfactory. (2) Night Combat $in&-Shot Firing (Boyevaya Nochnaya Odinochnaya Strel'ba) This course was fired with the carbine and PPSh. EM were given five rounds. The firing line was in a trench. Three full- silhouette targets appeared 150 m.. to the firer's front. These targets were shown three times, each time for 10 seconds, at five-second intervals. Homemade torches or 30-second rocket flares were again used to light up the area. A, score of. three hits, one on each target, was considered excellent,.. two hits on two targets was good, and one hit on one target was satisfactory. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL +10- e . Sniper Training 29. A regimental sniper's school was organized in the 287th Gds. Rifle Regt. prior to the winter semi-annual inspection. Two officers were designated to conduct the course. Three EM from each company'were sent to the school for a period of two months. While these men attended the school, they took no other training.' 25X1 "., 25X1 cons era a 25X1 time was open in firing the Mossin-Nagant 1091730 rifle with 6 x (approximate) optical eight. The proficiency of the grm~pp .av~s coh?e'E' during the inspection and the students were then returned to their respective units. f. Emphasis. 30. Great emphasis was placed on range-Firing with all types of weapons. All ' '4 to tried to impress the inspecting commission durl t .s mem1- annual inspections. Because all platoons were rated on range ..'.i.ring, each tried-to get a high score. Any cheating on the range was cause for disciplinary action. awunknown officer 25X1 who passed out extra ammunition to the EM of the sniper's school to obtain a higher score before the inspecting commission in spring 1953. When the commission discovered that the extra rounds were fired, the officer was ordered to be tried by the Officer's Honor Court. The court held up his promotion one year and also reprimanded his superior, Lt. Petr Alekseyevich Strizhachenko. Training Schedule 31. The schedule given below was followed six days a week by all units of the 287th Gds. Rifle Regt. except those on demarcation-line duty. The schedule was based on Moscow-time which was two hours ahead of Austrian time. The same general schedule existed throughout the Soviet Army. a . EM: Reveille 0700.(0800 in winter) PT 0705-0730 Prepare for inspection and barracks cleanup 0730-0750 Morning inspectiow,(in formation). 0750-0810 Breakfast and preparation for training 0810-0900 Training 0910-1500 Dinner 1500-1600 Compulsory sleep 1600-1730 Sick-call 1700-1800- Political information and lectures 1800-1830 Political masswork (Political masswork included organized athletics, cross- country run, volleyball, obstacle course, and politi- cal movies.) 1830-2000 Care and cleaning of weapons. and equipment 2000-2100 Supper 2110-2150 Free time 2200-2300 Roll call 2340-2305 Reading of company detail rosters and administrative work Evening walk Taps 2305-23 0 2330-2345 2400 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -11- 32. During breaks between winter and summer training periods and the break between the end of one training year and the beginning of another, fatigue details were held in place of training. Political training was held all year. 33. One company officer was required to be present at reveille formation. On Sundays, reveille and all meals was one hour later,, EM were kept occupied with political lectures, organized athletics,': 15-kilometer cross-country runs, obstacle courses, work details, and political movies. b. Officers: Reveille 0730 Personal hygiene 0?30-0800 Breakfast 0500-0900 Training 0900-1500 Dinner 1500-1600 c. Demarcation Line Units: 34. Units stationed on the demarcation line, followed 25X1 a different sc e-u e ? an at observed in the regimental caserne area. The group undergoing training observed. reveille one hour later than it was observed in the regimental caserne area. Following breakfast, this group had training in accordance with the training schedule followed by the units in the regimental caserne area. However, it spent only four hours instead of six on training. Dinner followed the four hours of training and the group then had a two-hour rest. Following this, the group prepared for guard mount and relieved the other half of the platoon. The group relieved was then free until recall at 2400 hours. The following morning this group underwent four hours of training. .Physical Training. 35. much stress was placed on physical training. in 25X1 addition to he calisthenics given in the morning from Mondg to Saturday. The 15-kilometer cross-country runs (marsh-brosok) were organized two or three times a month on Sundays. On other Sundays, the regimental PT Officer and the unit political officers kept the EM busy. Unit line-officers had to personally take charge of their 'platoons whenever there were runs..- Officers wore gas masks and carried pistols but did not have full field equipment. 'EM had.full field equipment and carried individual weapons.. A maximum of two hours and. five minutes was allowed for the march. One hour and.50 minutes was considered excellent. platoon once marched 25X1 the 15-kilometer distance in one hour am 43.5 minutes. The last three kilometers was marched wearing gas masks. For the entire. distance, the platoon ran 200 meters and then walked 200 meters. After completing the cross-country run, EM usually went directly to the firing range where they fired an exercise with their individual weapon and then proceeded to run.the obstacle course. After completing the course, they cleaned their weapons and equipment and were then free. Political Training a. Themes 36. Political training was slanted to create hatred for the American forces. A subject commonly taught during the training was entitled ..The Ameri- can Imperialist - Worst Enemy ?f.the..World and the Safety or Our Mother- land." The general theme of this subject was that from the earliest times of the existence of,the Soviet goverment, t1e American imperia- lists had tried to overthrow it. In 1918-1922, the Americans tried to snuff out the life of the young Soviet republic by military intervention and were responsible for committing countless atrocities during these .CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -12- years. From that time, they never ceased activities aimed at under- mining the USSR. They poisoned Japan and Finland against the USSR and helped Hitler to establish his heavy industry and military might. They acted as allies of the USSR during World War-II but, `at the same time, desired the destruction of the USSR and delayed opening a second front in Europe. Truman stated that if it appeared that the USSR was winning the War, the US would then support Germany; if Germany was winning,, the US was then to'support the USSR. Thus, the US would cause the two nations to kill off each other's population. 37. After World War II, the US attempted to foment a new world war by stirring up the Korean conflict and using Korea as a springboard for launching its offensive against China and the USSR. It surrounded the USSR with military bases,penetrated it with spies and diversionists, organized alliances and political blocs against the USSR, and did tot fulfill promises made at international conferences, etc. 38. Another political training subject given much attention was entitled, "Soviet Commanders - The True Patriots of the Soviet Motherland." The aim of this topic was to create a "love" for officers and generals because they were the flesh and blood of the working people. A 'con- parison was made to US military leaders, to the effect that all US generals were "big capitalists who worried only about themselves." In the US Army, soldiers of minority races were persecuted and looked upon as draft animals. 39. During political lectures, it was pointed out that the Americans permitted World War II to end only because they'saw that the Soviets were about to defeat the Germans. The Americans opened the second front so they could seize a larger sphere of influence when the opportunity arose. Most of the propaganda was aimed at the Americans even though many of the themes in the propaganda carried the'term "Anglo-American." A smaller portion of the propaganda was directed against West Germany. It was pointed out to the.Soviet soldiers that the Germans were building a new Wehrmacht with which to invade the Soviet Union. In general, the propaganda was of such a nature as to create an intense hatred for the Americans. Military news-- papers never ceased to depict the Americans in a bad light. Articles in these papers stated that American officers raped 13-year old girls, that American servicemen beat up or killed taxi drivers instead of paying the fare, that Americans 'recklessly exceeded speed limits. and wantonly killed innocent Germans, that America used. rrn warfare in Korea and China, etc. Both officers and E were that the US was an extremely. powerful nation and was not to be underestimated. b. Organization 40. Political training was considered one of the leading subjects. All personnel, officer and EM, were subject to this training which was. broken down into the following five groups; a First Group - Privates.in first year of service. b Second Group - Privates in second and third year of service. c Third Group - Sergeants. d . Fourth Group --Reenlistees. e ,Fifth Group - Officers 41. Platoon leaders were the instructors for the first two groups and the Co. Deputy CO for Political Affairs instructed the sergeants' group. Political training was condtOted each week on Monday and'-Friday for Wo-hour periods. These two days were designated by the Division CO. Common sxbjects covered were: (a) Live and Learn According to the Manuals CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 b Defense of the Fatherland - The Sacred Duty of the, Soviet Warrior c Soviet Armed Forces - On Guard for the ' Peace of. the World, and CONFIDENTIAL -13- the Security of Our Motherland (d) Soviet Forces in the.Years of Foreign Intervention During the Civil War e Soviet F?rces During the Years of the Building of Socialism f Soviet Forces During World War II g Respect for the Customs of Countries Occupied by Soviet Forces The above subjects were often supplemented or replaced by subjects of current political significance. c. Political Training for Officers 42. Political training for officers was conducted four hours weekly on Wednesday afternoons. The officers who instructed one of the soldier groups (listed above) were not required to partidipate fully in political training. They participated three or-four times monthly ,at political seminars which lusted three to four hours. At these seminars, officers received training in""political subjects that were, in turn, to be presented to those groups which they taught. The officers made up their lesson plans during the seminars. These lesson plans were approved by the political instructor who was either the Regtl. Propaganda Officer, the Regtl. Party Organizer, or a Bn. Deputy CO for Political Affairs. The remainder of the regimental officers, those who did not instruct one of the oonsoriptee groups, were required to undergo political training in one of three groups. The first group studied the history of the Communist Party; the second group studied the history of the Party according to the works of Lenin and Stalin; and the third group studied political economics or a,similar subject. These groups met five or six times a month, occasionally during duty hours; other times off-duty for two hours. Instructors for these groups were either the Regtl. Deputy 0 0 for Eolitical Affairs, the Regtl. Propaganda Officer, the Regtl.Party Organizer, or a Bn. Deputy CO for Political Affairs. These instruc- tors presented the subject material to the officers. The officers then studied the material, made lesson plans, presented the completed plans at the next meeting, and had a gjgestion-and-answer period. Officers were rated for this training. NCO Training 43. The company CO's conducted NCO training which was given twice-weekly and, on the average, t'otaled ' about six hours each week. The usual theme was leadership and discipline or the introduction of new subjects before they were presented to the EM. The company CO.11s merely super- vised the training in the company. Other than the training conducted' with the NCO's, the company CO took an active part only in field training or whenever it was necessary for close-order formations of company size. While the NCO instruction was conducted, the patoons continued training under the supervision of their leaders. If there was a shortage of officers, one of the NCO's remained with the platoon. Officer Training 44. The CO conducted officers' training on Thursdays. 25X1 These classes lasted four to six hours, depending on subject.. The instructor was usually the Bn. Deputy CO for Line Matters or the Bn. Chief of Staff. Occasionally, the Bn: CO also presented a subject., At these classes, the battalion officers had training in atomic matters, tactics, map reading, communications training with the RBM-l radio, weapons, training methods, or close-order drill. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL =14- 25X1 45. On Wednesdays and Saturdays, all battalion officers were scheduled for two hours of physical training but they usually sat around and told stories or slept. Because this physical training was to be Conducted in a large room on the second floor of one of the '''buildings, they had no difficulty in fooling the Bu. CO or anyone who checked up on them; they posted a guard to warn them. 46. On Wednesdays,. the regiment officers had four hours of political training. 47. On Monday evenings, the regimental CO or his chief of staff conducted a regimental officers' call which lasted two to four hours. Training lectures were given, discipline discussed, new subjects introduced, and new orders from the Ministry of Defense or CGF Hq. were read. Personnel Conducting Training 48. The greatest portion of training was conducted in platoon formations by platoon leaders. Platoon leaders were expected to, personally con- duct training on atomicwaxfare, chemical warfare, squad and platoon tactics, map reading, close-order drill, weapons, some political subjects, field sanitation and hygiene, some physical training,and practically any other subject that appeared on the training schedule. The platoon leaders were also expected to read certain unclassified manuals such as, the Garrison and Guard Dut Manual, the Garrison ut Manual, the Disciplinary Manual as well as excerpts from such o assiried documents as a Combat &nual; however, this was usually delegated to NCO's. 49. For the most part, NCO's were assistant instructors and did little actual instructing unless there was a shortage of platoon leaders. In such cases,,an NCO would act as platoon leader and instructor. Because officers were required to spend an average of two days each week at officer calls and officer training, NCO's were utilized to a limited extent as instructors. The regimental training schedule was, however, arranged so that only the simplest subjects were sebedu1ed when the NCO Is substituted for the officers, (e.g., close- order drill, reading of unclassified manuals, physical training, preliminary rifle instruction, etc`. 50. Although each company had a medical NCO, platoon leaders were also however, the medical NCO was required to give the simple rs -a training during the first.month of the training year. 51. The chemical NCO, at battalion-',level, did not give any chemical training; this was conducted solely by platoon leaders. 25X1 25X1 Problems Encountered in Training 52. There were men of many Soviet nationalities 25X1 They included Tatars, Bashkirs, Moldavians, Ukrainians zer ay z anians, Chubashes, as well as the Great Russians. about 25X1 40 percent was non-Russian, many of whom were ac .and 25X1 and did not understand the Russian language well. Many could not assimilate such subjects as map reading; weapons training was also difficult to conduct because these groups could not understand firing commands. During political lectures, men of the non-Russian groups often pleaded complete ignorance. Unit political officers held special classes in Russian for them but there was a complete lack of interest on their part. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -15- 53. EM in their third year of training also presented a problem. They practically quit all work as their demobilization time approached. They displayed a complete lack of interest in training and did just enough to get by. As soon as the summer training period ended, these men were separated from the other EM and quartered in separate barracks. While awaiting demobilization, they were used for fatigue details. Training Methods 54. Because of the fact that men of the non-Russian nationalities were often backward and had language difficulties, the officers and NCO'e conducted virtually all training by means of demonstrations (lichnyy pokaz). No training films were shown to line units; however, films of a technical nature were shown to rear service units. The only training film was one which dealt with sports in the Soviet -1 55. There were various types of charts in the companies, battalions, and regiments All were made by the Ministry of Defense an were unc ssified.. The charts covered almost every training subject and included uch things as cross-sectional diagrams of masks, mines, weapons, etc. b. Mock-ups 56. Each company had many training aids which were either locally-.made or factory constructed. Each rifle company had mock-ups of all company weapons and also had each weapon detail stripped and mounted on a board. c. Commander's Kit (Komandirskiy Yashchik) 57. The commander's kit contained all the equipment and instruments used in preliminary rifle instruction (e;g., for sighting, triangula- tion, etc.). The kit also contained cross-sectional samples of every type of round used by the rifle company. Inspections a. Regular 58. In order to check training progress, daily inspection of training was conducted by the company CO's. Battalion deputy COs for line matters or battalion chiefs of staff usually made a daily inspection as well. The Regt. Deputy CO for Line Matters or the Regt. Chief of Staff made several training inspections a week; there were two or three formal inspections by a regimental commission each month. In addition, company CO's held weekly question periods with their companies to determine if EM had assimilated the week's training. All commanders from the platoon leader to the regiment CO conducted alerts of their units to check their ability to follow alert plans. b. Semi-Annual 59. All inspections and checks were made merely in preparation for the inspections that everyone feared. These were the semi-annual inspec- tions (inspektorskaya proverka) conducted by a commission from the Ministry of Defense or from the CGF Hq. When the commission from the Ministry of Defense was not available to conduct these inspections, the CGF conducted it,-in Austria. In the USSR, a unit voks inspected by a military district commission when the Ministry of Defense missed it. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Training Aids Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -16- 60. It was impossible for the commission to check all units in Austria, consequently, the following general procedure was followed: The commission selected one division for inspection; the divisions not inspected by the commission from the Ministry of Defense would then be checked by a commission from the CGF. The Moscow or CGF commission probably checked.only one regiment of a division. The remaining regi- ments were then checked by a commission-from the division headquarters. In turn, ,this division commission probably checked only two battalions and the regiment checked the remaining battalions. Thus, every man was inspected semi-annually. by a higher headquarters. 61. The most important subjects inspected were discipline, political training. weapons training, and tactics. If a unit failed to get a passing rating on any one of these, less of how good the other three were. In addition.to the four main training subjects mentioned, every other training subject, such as, close-order drill, physical training, chemical training, etc.', was checked. Administrative aspects of the unit, such,as,rear services organizationf condition of equipment, living conditions of officers and EM,.com- plaints, food, morale, etc., were also checked. 62. Normally, about 40 officers made up the inspection commission that inspected a regiment; the commission was headed by a high-ranking officer., usually a general, and was broken down into several groups; each group inspected a specific subject or item. Tactical training was inspected in the field. In connection with this, the unit being inspected was required to carry out a practice alert for the commission group that was inspecting its tactical training. Weapons training was inspected on the firing range, close-order drill at a formation of a given unit, and political training during a political class, with the inspecting officer phrasing political questions to the assembled EM of a unit.' There was no break in training during these inspections. The units continued training six hours a day. The training schedule was organized during the ten days of inspection so that every unit could be individually inspected in every phase of training. e. Inspection Deficiencies 63. The following deficiencies were pointed out dun n the inspection held by the COP commission 1 Low state of discipline and excessive drinking by officer personnel. 2 Poor personal appearance of NCO's and privates. 3 Close-order drill not up to standards. 1# Unsatisfactory conditions of barracks and living quarters 5 Poor organization of rear services. 6 ' Platoon leaders not spending enough time in instructing their subordinates, (7) Unsatisfactory utilization of vehicles and poor condition,'of vehicles. (8) Political and military training was below standard (9) During the'practice alert, NCO''s,privates,'and even officers, did not know their duties; there was too much confusion, too much noise, and transportation arrived too late. (10) Poor condition of weapons,?laok of proper care and maintenance of all organic equipment. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -17. 64.' There was much criticism during every semi-annual inspection but, to the best of source's knowledge, nothing positive was ever::/; done. Many directives from both Div. H. and COF Hq. called for'all personnel to improve discipline and raise the standard of.trainin ? however. everything remained as it had been. e genera s a e o ec p ne was poor an o a outward appearances, the life of~the EM was unbearable; however, s no a rac rom the fighting abilities o e regiment Ino disciplinary s a$arneio anyone result o a poor showing during the semi=s,nnual inspections. Any individual or unit that received. a poor rating was subject to much criticism and harrasement so that they strove to improve for the coming inspections. d. Incentives and Rewards 65. There were certain incentives to assure that all personnel would strive to 'make the semi-annual inspections a success. The commission from Moscow gave certain gifts to those individuals or units who had dis- tinguished themselves during an inspection. If a division had been deemed outstanding by the commission, the division CG and one or two other high-ranking staff officers were awarded gold watches. Other high-ranking officers might receive knives, sabers, hunting weapons, cameras, etc. Occasionally, an entire platoon"or company was singled out as outstanding in a military district or occupation area and each EM received a cheap watch. Individual EM were sometimes awarded 10- day leaves for outstanding performance or received some printed form of recognition. NCO's could be promoted on the spot. Often, the commission made a presentation of a small gift to an EM on the range during its inspection of firing. Individuals selected as outstanding among EM in a certain subject often received 50 Austrian schillings .or were presented with a bank book with a 50-ruble bank balance in their account in the USSR. 66. Headquarters that were lower than Moscow were also authorized to give out incentives in recognition of outstanding performance of units or individuals (e.g., CGFA might give out gold watches and certificates of achievement to officers; this headquarters was also authorized to reward EM with practically the same gifts as Moscow.) Division head- quarters was authorized to reward individual officers with inexpensive watches and letters of achievement. EM could get promotions, leaves, letters of commendation, and possibly small gifts; the regimental headquarters usually gave officers lettee of commendation. EX were rewarded for outstanding performance with gifts such as shav%.ig kits, books, 50 Austrian schillipgs in cash, a bank account of 50 rubles, or promotions and leaves for approximately five EM semi-annually. Source was once awarded a certificate of achievement (list pokhvala) in recognition of the superior performance of his platoon in 1952 on all subjects. The presentation was made by the division CO. Source's company CO'recei rdd an Omega watch at this time. 67. In order to be eligible to receive a gift or recognition, it was necessary that an individual be outstanding in all subjects. If he were an outstanding soldier but his discipline left something to be desired, he would not receive a reward. EM who had undergone punish- ment for infractions of rules or regulations.,, but who had excelled in some particular subject during the semi-annual inspection,. were rewarded by having a notation made in the disciplinary book that the punishment was revoked. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -18- 68. Although many presentat crE, were made on the spot, the usual procedure was to have a higher headquarters forward the rewards or letters through channels. Sometimes, presentations were made at formations by an appropriate headquarters. Following the inspections, orders were received from higher headquarters concerning presentations made throughout the COP. These orders named individuals or units either by FPN's or by numbered unit designations; these orders were classified secret. The EM were informed during unit formations of units or individuals who had been singled out for outstanding performance during the semi-annual inspections; however, in these bases=extracts of the orders were made and unit designations or FPN's were purposely left out so that EM would not know the units by their official designations. B. SPECIAL TRAINING 25X1 Air Ground Support There was no r-ground support training given 25X1 lthough there was quite a bit of attention given in 25X1 e 195 F el Service Regulations (Polevo Us v) to methods of coordination a ween air and round 'u7nM: no such train ng was given to troops the manual 25X1 called for various-colored identification cloth panels to be used for ground troops during daylight hours and for various-colored flares to be used during the night to outline forward trenches. It also stated that Soviet planes would make several the frontline troops know th were 25X1 for Air support, only a division CO or higher would be able to call Use of New AT Weapons 70. Even though each rifle company was supposed to have nine RPG-40 rocket launchers in its T/0&E. in March 1954, EM had not received any training with this weapon. The regiment had received four of these weapons for the purpose of instructing platoon leaders so that they, in turn, could instruct EM. The other new AT weapon in the regiment was the SPG-82 rocket launcher. Each rifle battalion. had received two of these weapons for each SPG platoon but the only men who had received any training with this weapon were the personnel of the SPG platoon. EM of rifle companies had merely been given some very general information on nomenclature and characteristics of these weapons during the first day of the training year, EM in the rifle companies were told that, in theory, the SPO's would be employed in the defense of the rifle battalion against armored attack and that these launchers would support the attack by a rifle battalion. Artillery Suonort "71. EM received practically no classroom braining in artillery support;; however, they did participate in some practical work when the battalion artillery, regimental artillery, and some divisional artillery elements were used to support the rifle battalion in reinforced battalion field exercises during 19531l Tank-Infantry Cooperation 72. The only training in this subject) was.the participation in reinforced battalion d exercises during 1953 when emphasis was placed on supporting weapons, cooperation of tanks, SP guns, and artillery in support of the rifle battalion.1 CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -19- Displays and Tactical Use of New Weapons 73. The first day of the training year was the only time that EM had a chance to become familiar with weapons that were not in their par- ticular platoon or section. At that time, all T/O&E weapons and equipment of the regiment were displayed for the purpose of acquainting EM and sergeants with the general characteristice.lO In general, EM were only familiar with weapons and equipment of their own par- ticular platoon. Large Scale Motor Moves 74. There was no special training) involvin -? scat a motor mnUAR, hnw?~ra~n Regimental artillery accomnanied tha hatter line ryr thaws e road march was organized as follows% a. Advance Guard (Golovnaya Pokh9dnaya Zastava) 75. The advance guard consisted of four SP-76'e and one rifle platoon which was mounted in a truck. b. Main Force (Osnovnyye Sily) ~6. The main force followed the advance guard by three kilometers. Contact between the lead SP gun and the battalion CO, who was in the main force, was by RBM-1 radio. The main force was headed by the regimental 57-mm AT battery which was normally followed by regimental engineer elements. On these moves, there were no engineer elements; con- sequently, directly behind the 57-mm AT battery was the rifle platoon. Within the rifle battalion, the three rifle companies were in column followed by the MG company and the 82-mm mortar company in that order. Behind the rifle battalion was the regimental 120-mm mortar battery and behind it were the rear service elements that accompanied the force. The prescribed distances between units of the main force was 100 m. The prescribed distance between vehicles was 50 m. but actually 20-25 m. intervals were maintained. Contact was visual throughout the main force. o. Rear Guard (Tylovay.a Pokhodnaya Zastava) '7. This consisted of one platoon of infantry mounted in one truck which followed the main force by about 500 m.j contact was visual. The rear guard had no radio to maintain contact with the main force. '8. The return from the Allenteteig training area was also in tactical road march formation, using,,the same formation as described above. Although the moves to the training area were fairly well organized, the move back to the oaserne was completely disorganized. There were many vehicle breakdowns along the way and one-fourth of the vehiolOW were late getting backs they back to the caserne over a'period of one day. motor moves were kept to an absolute minimum because the regiment had limitedc~ fuel supply and was interested in eoonomlzing whenever,possible.l1, CPX's (Command Post Exercises) 9? division CPXs were e on an average of three times a year. All command personnel of all regiments, separate battalions and division, all signal units CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -20- down to regimental level, and regimental level took part. the purpose of the CPX was to test the combat readiness of the respective divisional units as a team and to give the various commanders practice in coordinating and conducting the battle. He also knew that participating headquarters received ratings for their part in the CPXs and that the command group of his regiment, who had participated, received a rating of two (unsatisfactory) out of a possible five in all the CPXs conducted in 1953. Engineer Eridgirg Operations 80. for the purpose of the exercise, the enemy was with- drawing and the battalion had to pursue the enemy to prevent him- from regrouping and setting up a defense on the other side of the stream. After the tactical march started, the battalion was assembled for a demonstration by the engineer bompany on the use of the various types of engineer river crossing equipment that was in its T/0&E. Following this, an assembly area was selected from which the battalion moved out in tactical formation towards the crossing site. Here, the engineer company helped the rifle companies cross the stream in two- platoon groups; the remainder of the rifle battalion did not cross the stream. One LMN squad-sized rubber boat, one A-3 platoon-sized wooden boat. and a seven-man rubberized fabric float were used. he regimental engineer company had sufficient equipment to transport only one rifle company across a stream at a time. It gave a demonstration of the way the MPK flotation suit was to be used. -81. The company was capable of constructing a short floating footbridge by joining together rubberized fabric floats stuffed with buo ant material such as straw or ha 82. constructed a bridge during CPX's the engineer battalion 83. On rare occasions, there were classroom lectures on the subjects "The Ford, Its Organization and the Method of Overcoming it (Hrod Yego Oborudovaniye I Poryadok Preodoleniya) and "Means of Crossing (Sredstva Perepravy). Officer and NCO Training Courses . NCO Leadership Instruction 64. Each regiment had its own NCO school where sergeants were trained CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 25X1' 25X1 25X1 25X1 LORI Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -21- b. Advanced Officers' Training School (Kura Usovirshenstvovaniya Ofitserskogo Sostava) 85. There was an advanced officers' training school in Baden (N 48-10, E 16-14) for Soviet officers on duty in CGFA. Officers were selected by.a headquarters, higher than regiment, for attendance at the school; one of the prerequisites for attendance was five years of comissioned service. The duration of the course: .was either six'monthe or one year. From 1951 to 1953, two majors and two oo an from the regiment `? Sniper's School for Officers this school was 36. There was a sniper's school organized by the division each year- Tho? length of the course maw iti dmv. d. Party Organizer's School 37. The division also had a Party organizer's school and offic who once a mouth for seminars which lasted three to four was apparently for self-improvement subjects s? beeauseThhis This school officers did not train anyoneoncompletiont of the course?.the e. Marx-Lenin Institute 8. There was a Marx-Lenin Institute either in Baden or Vienna for those officers who wished to attend. The school was conducted evenings and officers who attended f. Institute of Foreign Languages e ne u e of Foreign Languages in Moscow. 11111 that any officer who passed an'entrance exam to this institute could take a four-year course o nstructiou at the institute itself. Defense Against Air Attack a. Passive D. There was little training in the rifle companies on defense against air attacks. Soldiers in the rifle companies received some very rudimentary training on how to take a lead on a plane.. During tactical marches, the men were told to give the alarm "air" (votoukh) whenever an enemy plane-:was spat' d and then to disperse on theground in- a prone position. During tactical road marches, one man on each vehicle was designated as an air observer. Other than this, any defensive training against air attack depended strictly on the platoon leader. All the regimental vehicles, other than those in the rear services, had locally-made blackout headlight shields that were always on them. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 L~.)A 25X1 L~.)A 25X1 LJ/\ Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -22- b. Active 91. Whenever troops were in the field for tactical training on a company level, the HMG's (Goryunov) were posted as separate posts against air attacks. The HMG was easily converted to an AA weapon because it used the 1931 "Universal" tripod. Sometimes one rifle squad was posted as security against air attacks. Most of the training on defense-against air attacks in the rifle battalion was in h A G ZPU platoon of the battallon artillery. The regimental AAA platoon had con s enable traininz In ensive air measures Defense and Attack - Alert Plans 92. There were alert plans in t e event of an attack by American forces. One of the alert plans called for action to be taken in the event of an actual alert and another was for training purposes. a. Actual Alert 93. There were regimental instructions pertaining to the action to be taken by the regimental duty officer during off-duty hours. In the event that alert notification was received during duty hours, the regimental CO was to take the same action as the regimental duty officer. The notification of an actual alert was to, come from divi- sion or CGFA Hq. in the form on one word "fig" (storm). After the duty officer received the word "bury f" and determined its origin and validity, he was to open a sealed box that housed the switches to a siren and arouse the personnel. Following this he was to call the regimental CO. According to instruction, he was'then to proceed to follow the action outlined therein until the arrival of the regimental CO. The. instructions outlined in the envelopes were promulgated by division headg?arters.l3 The envelopes, the code work, and the duty officer's instructions were changed about four times annually. All signals were to be given by the siren. There were several types of signals, such as, one long blast, two long blasts, and a series of interrupted blasts. Source forgot the meaning and purpose of each. ?4. When an alert was given, the following action was to prevail in the regiment subunits: Company duty-personnel were to rouse the troops and all personnel would don full field equipment and draw weapons. Each company had its own plan of on following this. According to i.netructione designated Ounnere were to rouse the company officers if they were asleep, while other designated EM blacked out the windows in the barracks with blankets. The 3d Plat. was to proceed to the regimental food and forage storeroom to draw rations for the entire battalion. The let Squad, 2d Plat. was to go to the regimental clothing and equipment storeroom to pick up.-helmets, ponchos, and other designated equipment. The let Squad, let Plat. would proceed to the regimental Emmunition dump and pick up ammunition for the company.. One or two EM were designated to remain in the company after the troops left for the purpose of turning in items that remained behind which consisted. of post, camp, and station property that could not be taken along. 5. The remaining personnel were then to move out by companies in tactical formation to designated defense positions a few hundred meters from the regimental caserne as soon as they were ready and without awaiting any order. The battalion signal platoon was to be a lit up among the companies so that each rifle company would have a radio and radio operator. Each radio operator knew exactly to which company he was to atth himself. Designated vehicles wer'b to arrive at the initial CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -23- defense positions and troops would load up and the regiment would move out in a tactical motor-march to a predesignated assembly area or await further orders. As far as source knew, the re imental assembly area was in the vicinity of Rei.chenau (N 48-27, E 14--20). In the event of a real alert, source could not state whether it would be the actual assembly area.) b. Practice Alerts 96. Practice alerts were held once a month by the regiment on orders of the regimental CO. The same order as outlined above was followed with the exception of: (1) The alert notification was by the regimental CO and the term "bursa" was not used; this term was used only in the event of a real alert. 2 The two coded envelopes were not opened. 3 Rations were not picked up and designated personnel merely reported to the regimental food and forage storeroom and signed in. (4+) Ammunition for the battalion was not picked up and the designated EM reported to the regimental ammunition dump and signed in. (5) Equipment was not picked up at the regimental clothing and equipment storeroom; the designated men merely signed in. (6) The company emergency ammunition supply was loaded but the cases were not broken open. 97. The general practice during the alerts was to have the units carry out the alert plan up to the point of occupying the initial defense positions and awaiting the arrival of designated transportation. With this, the alerts were usually terminated. 98. In addition to the monthly regimental practice alert, the battalions usually held their own practice alerts once a month. Company CO's and platoon leaders could also call practice alerts for'their particular units provided that they received permission from the next higher commander. In such oases, these units only carried out the alert as it pertained to them and.,consequently, there was a lot of simulation. 99. Alerts were generally conducted one hour before reveille and training began immediately after an alert was called off. Whenever regimental alerts; were held, one long blast on the siren was used to notify personnel'. There was a bell in the officers' dormitory which was connected to the office of the regimental duty officer. This bell was used to alert the officer personnel of the regiment. All personnel of the regiment were acquainted with the signals that were to be used in the event of an alert; these signals were frequently changed. 00. had taken place. alert notification outlined for the actual alert. Rations were given out, clothing and equipment items were picked up, ammunition was picked up from the regimental ammuni- tion dump and taken out of.their cases. No one knew what was going on but the units occupied the initial defensive positions and awaited further orders. The troops remained in the positions for four hours before the order came that they were to return to the caserne. Berlin riots CONFIDE-9112M The regiment followed the plan 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -24- 107.. When practice alerts were in the regimental caserne area, the units ~on he demarcation line did not participate which were separate fros- the Arlan described above the units on the demarcation line would be sacrificed in the gvent of an actual alert. Training in Germ and Chemical Warfare a. General 102. There was no training in germ warfare but during political training it was presented. that only Americans resorted to germ warfare. In chemical training, EM were instructed that the enemy would be the one to resort to chemical attack; and, therefore, it was necessary to know how to protect oneself against chemical attack. b. Gases L03. Soldiers spent about four"hours annually learning the general characteristics of foreign gases, such as mustard, lewieite, G-agents (Tabun), phosgene, diphosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. Ministry of Defense training charts were used for this instruction, c. Equipment _04. EM spent an additional four hours annually in classroom instruction on the use of the individual protective items against chemical attack. These items included the Shlem-1 helmet gas mask, protective boots, protective cape, and protective gloves. EM were shown how to remove the boots by stepping on the heel tab of one boot, partially removing it, then stepping on the tab of the other boot, kicking this boot completely off, and then kicking off the other partially-removed boot. 'EM were taught that the boots would be carried in the waist belt during combat and in the combat pack at other times. During practical training, EM practiced putting on the protective items of individual equipment; there were time limits for donthing each item. The time limits were prescribed by a chemical manual which was classified secret and was in the possession of the regimental Chief of Chemical Services. EM were required to don the Sao mask and the cape in eight to ten seconds and the boots in 20 seconds. During a march, an additional second was added to both time limits. d. "Chemical Training Days" 05. In addition to the above chemical training, there were two additional phases of chemical training. One phase consisted of a weekly 30- minute practice period in which all EM of the regiment practiced masking and putting on the protective boots, capes and gloves. In the other phase, one day a week was designated as 'chemical training day," The entire regiment, including officers, EM, and EW, were r M to participate; however, for all practical purposes, only line companies actually fully-observed this day. "Chemical training day was the responsibility of the regimental Chief of Chemical Services and on this day, the troops wore the gas masks while attending training.. At the beginning of the training year, the gas mask was worn for half an hour; each week this was increased. by 15 minutes, so that by May, troops,were wearing gas masks for five hours on "-chemical training days." From May to the end of the .training year, the troops wore gas masks five hours each "chemical training day. Occasionally, the regimental Chief of Chemical Services set off an RDG-l smoke candle on a "chemical training day" but this was mostly to harrass rear service personnel who were lax in the training. CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -25_ On Sundays when cross-country runs were held, the last three kilometers wer r ith s e un w ga Masks. 106. EM spent about two hours annua ' getting acquainted with the smoke grenades and their use. smoke grenades known 25X1 acid he m ke dl o s ccann e, type AD-21. EM were taught that 25X1 chemicals were dispersed by artillery, mortar, aerial bombs, spray grenades, smoke pots, and special machines. e. Decontamination 107. An additional four hours was 1pent each year to show 41M how to decon- taminate themselves and their equipment. EM were taught how to use the individual Anti-gas packet, although they never received such a packet. If issued, it was to be carried in gas mask carriers, and consisted of a 100-gram bottle of `clorethene with?thebottle.wrapped in gauze. The gauze was to be used for swabbing personnel and indivi- dual equipment. EM were taught that this packet was effective against lewisite and mustard. It could also be used against tabun provided that individuals or equipment were first swabbed with a water alk - line emulsion. For decontamination against atomic exposure, only water -??` would be used. 108. Artillery and mortar units were shown how to use the artillery and mortar deactivation kit. Thi*1kit consisted of two vials, one vial with a red cork and the other'? ith a black cork; both were 10 cm. long. An unknown powder from the red-corked bottle was mixed with the solvent in the black-corke4 bottle. A brush similiar to a shaving brush was then screwed'on the vial containing the mixture. When the vial was inverted, the liquid ran onto the brush and was brushed on the contaminated equipment. Machine gun units had a similiar kit which was smaller. f. Detection _09. There were no chemical reconnaissance kit ,or chemical detectors in the regimental sub-units items of this nature were in the possession o the regimental Chief of Chemical Service. Individuals were taught to spot the presence of gas by watching grass which had turned yellow, snow which was discolored, unusual smoke or clouds hanging over the ground, and by smell and watching the reactions of other soldiers. g. Gas Chamber Exercises .10. The regiment had an earthen-covered dugout in its area that was, used both as a gas chamber and a model of a collective shelter., The entrance was covered by several poncho baffles. At the rear entrance, there was a filter improvised of layers of straw, coal, rooks, and loose dirt; this dugout could hold about 15 men. EM were run through it for the purpose of checking their gas masks. A weak concentration of tear gas was released and a broken gas mask hose was simulated. The EM unscrewed the hose from the canister and the face-piece and then screwed the canister directly to the face-piece. A bad face- piece was also simulated, wherein the face-piece was removed and the individual breathed directly through the hose and/or canister. h. Emphasis. 11. In 1953 and up to March 1954, much more emphasis was placed on chemical training. Prior to 1953, there had been no "chemical training days." In late 1953, after the introduction of atomic defense training, there rows also'increased emphasis' bn chemical ttdinint,, ;e.msuse` it w C~ taught that the same individual` items of protective`etiipment used'asiinst chemical' attacks could also be used against atomic attacks. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -26- i. Flamethrowers e regiment an division and there was no training conducted on flamethrowers, here were separate portable flamethrower companies Otdel'naya Rota Rantsevykh Ognemetov) in the Soviet Army which would be attached to divisions, or higher echelons during wartime. Atomic Defense Training 3 Night T;aing 13. On an average of two times a month regiment participated in night training. The majority of this training'was of a practical nature, usually began at;:dusk, and lasted two o three hours. The training was conducted near the regimental oad~e'rne area and. was limited to platoon level due to lack of sp-oe in that area. The subjects covered in rifle companies were the listening post, the squad r platoon in the night attack, the squad, or platoon in night deense, and the squad in-night patrol. During daylight hours, EM were shown how to set up the platoon weapons for the defense at night. For this purpose, riflemen were shown how to set up firing positions using tree forks as supports; a support was driven into the ground and the carbine or PPSh rested on it so that it would fire waist-high. Gunners on LMB's were shown how to utilize a makeshift board out in the form of three steps for the purpose of forming a support and bracketing-the LMG fire at three different levels. Once the EM knew how to bracket their fire during the night, they applied the method in other night training. The rifle platoon practiced setting up night defenses. L4. EM were shown how to set out a listening post in front of the lines, how to run a wire or rope to the post, and signal back and forth by tugging on it. EM were also taught how to improvise warning devices when setting up a defensive area at night, by tying empty tin cans on a wire or bush in front of the lines'. A pebble was put into each can to rattle when the cans were disturbed. There were no factory-made trip flares used in night training; because none were available. EM were told that intervals between men in the defense at night would be one half less than during` daylight hours. When training was conducted on platoon defensive positions at night, one or two men were designated as the enemy with their mission to penetrate the defenses. For these problems, blank rounds were used. -5. One class was conducted to enable EM to 'orient themselves at night. They were shown how to tell directions by the stare and also how to use the compass at night. The latter training was a total failure because the compasses in the company were defective and the EM did not seem to assimilate the instruction. .16. EM were shown how to conduct a night patrol in squad strength. For this purpose, one or two men were designated as sappers to clear a path through atu enemy mine field and to out through any wire entangle- ments. Enemy minefields were simulated with wooden dummy mines but wire obstacles were actually constructed to add realism to the problem. EM were told that the return route was always different from the departure route and that the most, common mission for the infantry company patrol was to seize a prisoner, documents, or weapon. EM were shown how to dress for the night patrol and what equipment to take. (See Section A, paragraph 28 of this report for other night training courses.) CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL 27 Airborne and Air Transport Operations Training never classroom lectures any training on this s b ec except w eat ,,soldiers underwent no training or received any instruction that-'they would lie off the land in combat. C. COMBAT READINESS Amount of Training Necessary for Combat Readine 18. Under the present system, one-third of the men in Soviet units in' Austria had two years service, one-thtiod had three years of service, and the other third was starting its first training year. Consequently, one-third of the personnel had already undergone two years' training and another third had had one years' training. These men, therefore, were well-trained and could easily support the remaining one-third, which was sufficiently trained within two months to be considered combat-ready. Factors Determining Combat Readiness 19. There were no specific factors used to determine combat readiness of units. As long as two-thirds of the personnel'were in their second year of service, source felt there was sufficient continuity in the company and battalion for it to be considered always combat-ready; the second and third-year conseriptees had functioned as a team long enough to act and function as an organized unit up to rifle battalion level.. However, the entire regiment had not participated together as a team] therefore, it was zestionable as to whether it could operate sufficiently well as a regiment. Because each regiment had to have one battalion on demarcation-line duty, it was necessary to limit +14, training on the highest level at any time to that of a reinforced bat- talion. Periodic alerts described in paragraphs 92 to 101, unit inspections, and the semi-annual inspections aided to an extent in determining the combat-readiness of units. Extra Familiarizat3cn Firing 20. EM in rifle companies were expected to know how to, fire all the company weapons. 'Great.emphasis was placed on each manttheroughly knowing the weapon with which he was armed. Each EM in the company fired his individual arm about 15 times annually in 1953. (See paragraphs 20 and 21). In addition to this, each EM fired an unspecified number of exercises with other company weapons. All EM it the rifle companies in the 287th Gds. Rifle Regt. were required to know how to fire the Goryunov HMB and for this purpose, each EM fired two very simple familiarization exercises with this weapon. D. NCO SCHOOLS 21. Each regiment in the division had a school for the training of sergeants. The length of the course was nine to ten months. The more promising recruits were selected from each company shortly after they arrived in the unit; candidates for the school were never selected from among the second and third-year soldiers. The number of students trained at the school depended ?n the number of ' required for the following training ,rear; six to ten students 25X1 were chosen annually. These soldiers usually had five or six classes of civilian schooling. Students were required to undergo a physical examination prior to their acceptance and to take a regimental examina- tion The school was set up along the 25X1 lines or a r e company w o core and NCO's located there con- sidered as permanent oadre.l The training program,in,the school CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -28- generally covered the same subjects that were taught in the rifle companies,, the only. difference was that the subjects were covered more thoroughly. _22. Students were required to know how to make lesson plans. They received leadership training by being required to hold various positions of command from squad leader to assistant platoon leader. while at the school. After graduation, most of the students returned to the companies from which they were selected while other were sent wherever needed within the regiment. It was found to be more advan- tageous to select students of non-Slavic gzoupe because they turned out to be more forceful than the soldiers of Slavic background. The majority of the graduates received the rank of junior sergeant and a small minority were graduated as privates or privates first class. After six months in the grade of junior sergeant, they were eligible for promotion to sergeant and,after one year in rank, as sergeants, were eligible for promotion to senior sergeants. Because these men had so Tittle time remaining on their tour of e4~~n scripted duty, it was almost impossible for any of'them to becomemaster sergeants. Consequently, most. company first sergeants were,only senior sergeants. Although the above system of promotions was army-wide, it was a recent policy in Austria to promote men without regard to time in grade through the media of awards or for outstanding duties. This was usually done on Soviet holidays or during the semi-annual inspec- tions. E. SPECIAL TRAINING FOR NEW ARRIVALS .23. new arrivals underwent a two-week term of 25X1 recruit-duty or training in quarantine, in October, as a group at the regiment. Following this, all new arrivals were assigned to various companies and then underwent the same general training as EM in their second and third year of service, except for range training, physical training, and political training. Men of the first year of service fired the same range courses as the men in their second and third years of service; however, they were given more rounds to hit the target and not required to get as high a score. A different set of physical exercises was given to new arrivals until they became conditioned to the point where they could participate in,,the same physical training as that given to EM in,the second'and third year of service. New arrivals, as a group, followed a slightly different course of political training. (see paragraph 36-39),'. F, BASIC TRAINING -24. Basic training continued to be given in the USSR but there was no basic training given in Austria; however, the now arrivals had undergone, very little basic training in the USSR. They had varying periods of basic training but, in most eases, it was less than a month. This was why it was necessary for new arrivals to undergo the two-week training in quarantine immediately after arrival in 14--ho "&&4 me.,4- 25X1 G. UNIT TRAINING .25. Almost all training he squad and platoon level. $ach sub-unit followed the regimental training schedule as i app e to the particular unit, 'e.g., rifle companies trained spparately, mortar companies separately, MG companies separately, eta If the schedule called for weapons training, each unit or company learned the weapons that were in it3T/O&E. Squad and platoon training included tactics, weapons, close-order drill, physical training, engineer training (fortification, camou`laga,and mines), chemical training., field sanitation, basic field manuals and regulations, map reading, political training, and range firing. Company-level training CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 126. L27. _29_: 25X1 included tactics, weapons company formations and inspections. Battalion training include' tsstics,, batl aliop~fyarmationsy and ;inspections _and alerts Regimental training included limited tactics, alerts, and inspections. Source again emphasized that the bulk of the training was done at platoon level and broke down the training as follows: one-tenth political, one-third-weapons and range firing, one-fifth tactics, one-tenth close-order drill, one-tenth PT, and the remainder for various other subjects which included about 10 hours annually for field sanitation and personal by iene, 15.hours.for map readin ., 30 hours for anti-tank training (combined with field exercises), four hours for engineer training, 40 hours for manuals and regulations, and 20 hours for special training (i.e. atomic, etc.) H. SUMMER TRAINING AND, MANEUVERS CONFIDENTIAL Additional Information on IrrY^ IM 1953 Exercises a. Participatipg Units The 3d Rifle Bn., minus the 8th Rifle Co., did n o t these exercises and remained in the regimental caserne area. Under normal conditions, when a unit went to summer, or winter camp, one company was left at the permanent caserne area. A company was relieved every 15 days by another company so that all units could get a maximum of field training. b. Equipment and Supplies L28. When the battalion went to the field, all of the T/O&E weapons and equipment accompanied it. Enough rations, gas and oil, and ammunition was taken along for the exercise. A normal army unit left the post, camp, and station property in the permanent caserne arear everything else would be taken to the field. (The movement 25X1 to the Allentsteig training area was described in paragraphs ). e. Facilities in Training Area _29. divisional artillery (i.e., the artillery regiment, the how zer regiment, and the tank-SP regiment) was billeted all year in and::around Allentsteig in several casernes formerly occupied by German troops under fen. Paulus' command. F_ (These units had permanent-type messing, recreational, and bathing facilities. They merely attached portions of their regi- ments to those units who came to the area for field training. Units that came to the area for field and tactical training, or for firing. brought their own field kitchens. There were no bathing facilities for them and each time_____________ battalion participated in 25X1 training in the area; "no bathing facilities were MMade' available. Con- aequently, ' EM sand officers had to wash the best wa .; ,they could. or wait until they returned to their ho o._,stations, battalion was 25X1 accompanied to the:area by the regimental club officer who had a make-shift Chevrolet truck that contained (.movie equipment, phunogra hs. .loudspeaker, and a librar to provide recreation for the troops 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL -3O.a d. Camouflage. =30. No camouflage was used on the permanent installations that housed the artillery regiments in the *]llentsteig training area. The only time camouflage was used was during tactical training, In the majority of' the eases, this consisted of trees and shrubbery and other natural foliage. The regimental engineer eo. had a few camouflage nets that were utilized fo n ng purposes only but there was no netting in other subunits of the regiment. There were no special mock-ups of fortified areas or facilities for conducting oombat-in-cities training but there were several types of ranges used for all types of artillery and tank firing. irzi'I, lirul 31. area aria ~t'~' >t~tia io?n on the 1"~ r7r~',m vac, liven e. Restriction of Personnel training. Officers and EM were told that they were not to visit the nearby caserne areas'of the artillery regimental however, three officers disregarded these instructions and went to a small town not far from the area. hey became very drunk and unruly and a major rrom the omen aura tried to send them back to their units w hout any further action. One of the officers drew his pistol on the major and told him to leave and to stop bothering him. In a very short time, all three officers were apprehended and tried by the Officers' Honor Court. The officer who drew the pistol was punished by having his promotion held up for one year, the second officer was demoted one rank, and the other was reprimanded. pating personnel were restricted to the area where ey underwent battalion conducted its . exercises all partici- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 5. o to The lot Rifle Hn. and the 8th Rifle Co. ware not presen ; therefore? throughout this report when the regiment is mentioned in re and to training, it must be kept in mind that these units participated in training only in their immediate 7. B. 9. 10. = to did not include new weapons Comment: All the information given in this arc ra h from tH Field service Reaulations. is only general.[ CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1 CONFIDENTIAL . --31- Comments L_ caG never been opened, CONFIDENTIAL these envelopes Approved For Release 2009/07/20: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400220002-1