SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A032700730001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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NFORMATION- REPORT ? o ? ? REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT
NOFORN
COUNTRY Soviet Union/Communist China/
East Germany/Hungary
SUBJECT Survey of Recent Developments
DATE OF INFO.
DATE ACQUIRED
DATE DISTR.
OCS1
18 February 1957
NO. OF PAGES 1
REQUIREMENT NO. RD
REFERENCES
Attached are copies
containing a discussion of' cen events in the Soviet bloc and
Yugoslavia. These are forwarded to you for retention.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN
AIR I I FBI I I AEC I I On I X
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by
INFORMATION REPORT ' INFORMA-FiON
for 3 and 16 January 1957,
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-F I STATE ARMY
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c. The Yugoslavs claim to represent true Communism in tine ideological
discussions with Soviet views and strive to find a convincing
interpretation of ?4a.rxism and Leninism which could be realized
without a bureaucracy misusing its pc.. era. Kardelj was orderfd to
prepare a statement. The Yugoslavs hope that by reducing the bureauuor
Pervuchin may to some extent eenfirm the Yugoslav view. They hope
to reach a compromise with Moscow. So ,= after the Con reae of the
Communist Party of Italy at which the isolation of the Yugoslav
Communists became apparent, Tito took up a Chinese offer and ordered
his ambassador in Peking to request the Chinese government0s
mediation between t'oscow and Belgrade.
Soviet Zone of Cerrcaae a
a. On 1 January 19579 a large government delegation left Pankow for the
USSR to continue the tolke which a CDR delegation had started in
'oscow in mid-December 1956. he main
talks will begin in '. oscow on 4 January 1957. The delegation ''hich
is headed by Crtewohl includes Ulbricht and all other deput- prime
ministers. the GDR government is
seeking a new econgmic a reement which would substantially enlarge
the aid promised by ?toscow in July 1956, and also l:laced special
emphasis on a hard-currency credit. Following the example of Poland,
the GDR government will also try to conclude a contract on the presence
of Soviet troops in the GDR by making reference to the follo-ings
(1) German offices had not been consulted or informed recently when
Soviet units were transferred.
(2) The Panko- government received protests from the population and
regional administration regarding acts of vandalism and
requisitions by Soviet units.
In one instance even a shooting developed
between Soviet soldiers and NVA personnel).
(3) The GDR government is urged by the Soviet Zone population -ith
reference to Poland to obtain similar Soviet consent.
Although in preliminary talks i uschkin turned down all such attempts,
the CDR government will a,,ain try to obtain a contract on the Soviet
forces in East Germany because of mounting political x-ressure in
the Zone. An ADT? directive issued on 18 December 1956 showed9 however,
that the Politburo has misgivings about the outcome of the talks,
.since it demanded that all reports on these talks must be submitted
to the Politburo prior to publication. The directive stated that
"if the `'Ioscow talks failed to produce the desired results, all official
statements would have to be-edited most carefully".
b. The invitation of R.uysmann, the President of the Chamber of Deputies
of Belgium, which had been scheduled for late 1956 was postponed to
the spring of 1957, since it was considered inappropriate that-he
should tour the zone in view of the bad morale of the population.
No invitations will for the same reason be extended tther 9lestern
delegations. Existing conflicts will, however, be maintained by
letter "in order not to disrupt them by the present situation in
the GDR".
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that these comritteess would anyway develop into a political factor
which would have to be taken into accnt? ':aorkerss' committees will
at rresent only tentatively be established in 20 enterprises. The
whole problem is serious for the SED, especially since the elections
of the chairmen of the Association of ."utual_ Farmers Aid (VdgB)
held rrior to Christmas an well as the elections for the plant labor
union headquarters In November 1956 resulted in a defeat of most of
the ST'D candidates. The manipulations which had previously been used
to rag'up elections for the S::.D apparently did not do under the present
circumstances
by large groups of the workers.
The discussion on the rights and tasks on the planned workers committees
has not yet been terminated. The Central Committee is against any
further concessions in that question and definitely turned down the
establishment of a central workers committee which had been demanded
4. The mood of the population declined further prior to Christmas,
rasrticularly because of changes of norms, Va poor food situation
and cutdowns of working hours results in a .reduction of 'ages.
the mood of the population 25X1
was not one of incr.-Aced resignation. Although their attitude became
more guarded and restrained because of intensified informant activities,
the mood of the w-orkersss was one of pronounced restiveness and in many
enterprises almost bordered on mutiny. 'Brawls between workers and
functionaries or factory police were an almost daily occurrence for
example in the Schwarze Pumpe combine and insults such as "there is
a core for you" or "you are all back-listed" were shouted to functionaries
making speeches at mwetings in other enterprises. 25X1
the M as well as the Association for 25X1
Sports and sechaics (GST) and the factory combat oui s were unreliable
for the regime and, in the event of an outbreak of riots against the
regime, would side with the population.
4. Red China
a. Chou en-Lai tried to increase Red Chin a s prestige with the Asia
tour he now completed. Ile specifically tried to strengthen Pekin*? s
influence on the group of the Bandung countries and contrived to
adjust himself to the mentality of the non. committed countries in
Asia. He tried to make these countries believe that Red China was
a peace-loving nation and that Co nism was no align affair in dssia,
Ile also employed the tactics previously employed in Bandung and only
stressed those things which they had in common such as "anti-
Colonialism'". he obtained
only a small number of concrete agreements but was able to score the
propaganda effects desired by Poking. In an effort to increase these
effects, a large number of lied Chinese cultural and sports delegations
will folks- up his tour. The most important part of his trip were
his visits in India. Chou and Nehru
discussed the following questions:
(1) Red Chinanss relations with India. fehru was intsra sted in making
it clear to the world public that the good relations bet??een
India and Red China were above any criticism. India also wanted
to show Chou that a successful rehabilitation could be made by
non-Communist means.
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(2)
The relations between Japan and the Bandung group. Chou rind
I:ehru reached agreement that it was appropriate to loosen Jaapan? e
ties with the IIS in order to incorporate her into the group of
the Bandung countries. Only such a solution could Trevent that
Japan became the center of a new bloc forming in Asia. Chou
assured that Peking would make a number of economic concessions
promoting a getting together of Japan with Red China, Korea and
1lorth Vietnam.
(3) The relations with the Unitod Staten. Chou assured that Red
China was interested in a political and economic rapprochment with
the US but did not endorse Nehru?e demand for a softening up of
the po?~er blocs. Chou exri cted that influential American economic
groups would. advocate a rapprockrent between Red China and the
US in order to open the Chinese market to American industries.
(4) The collaboration of the Afro-Asiatic countries. Chou stated
that Red China did not want to bring her weaker neighbors under
her will o
(5) The relations of India and Red China with Pakistan.
Pakistan tried to get Ghouls sup, ort for Pakista xP
claims in Xashmir.
b. The lest statement which the Chinese Politburo made in late Decerrber
195 rartially met the frame for Chou? ss impending talks in ' aosco- and
again showed that Peking is cup orting demands for a srecial road to
Socialism only if these policies do not question the solidarity of the
Eastern Bloc paartieu)arly in regard to Foreign policy and economic
and militerv asp' ects.
t',e
follo- ing questions will figure prominently in Chous talks in ~a:oscow2
(1) The Soviet hegemony in the Eastern 43loc.
(2) Red Chinas relations with the Satellite countries in Eastern
7urope.
(3) The Bandung problem. Coordinating the policies toward the
Bandung countries is probably necessary because of Soviet
Tarticipation in a second Bandung conference which ::.oscow is
seeking-.
(4) 'Further boviet economic aid for Red China. Chou is Interested
in preventing the Soviet economic offensive in the Afro-Asiatic
area from impairing Red China? s own needs.
Chou will clarify these questions and then
discuss ideological qu'etions in ;varaaw and negotiate a further
improvement of trade relaatioxus between China and Poland.
II. P:;ilita
1. Riungary. Therc are no indications of a. substantial change of the strength
and location of the Soy iet troops employed in Hungary.
2. The reorgrnizati.onu of the Hungarian Armed Forces,i.ncluding those elements
of the border guard troops which remained in existence as such)is srking
further h. adwny. There are indications that the cadre personnel was
again registered and a new year class will be drafted. Orders on
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I
25X1
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Christmas and Kew year leaves and on the execution of annual inventory
mensure8 were is8aued. The term. "comrado?? which had been drop p4 during
the rebellion again reappeared.
Arms and ammunition no longer needed or ira need of rerair are to be
turned in to a central depot "with the help of the Soviet forcesP.
Jed
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N~FC)R
N
Ca The di Seneelon of Far Eac t po1ici.e nhie:f ly concern e Red Chinnaae
piano in regard to the queatione ins 'or a and "orrnoea, Pekinr;,,9a
strnd on Fox oca. rrnnined unchanged. Chou eta,ted, however, tbet all
prob' eme in .Aela i.ll be eolved 'vithovt; force n Ti':+.ie political view,
is based on the actual power ettuation in the ' `r ?rro'ooea Straits ee well
as the reflection thy-it Red Chlna?e repltatiWn. a, aonk? the B nidun :
group could be &rpairstd by Violent acetone.
lIn L lt. a ',.
'7uR7 (_Hunga i_a re
ao Per$onnet
Al onr with the slowly pro d :r e *,ing rehabilitation of the Hungarian Aimed
Forces. of orte are being aarade to purge sj ieli:ahl e eent and thus
create an ol'picerw co:"-s true to the gose.,,ncent 11.ue~ Large portions
rand probably n en the rz7w jori ty of the l eviou.o o-P there core of the
ITunp
,a ^iccu rriy fol ` cox' th u e regi.we in a mo :s of reeig'rnation, since
Vey are a...ari that any re'belh .one V .:-A would be nonneenee if no chences
of Su cce se are avni . b'c e0 Apili.c.a.tion for reen ..:.eteeent arr, consequently
only {8._ tly caueed b ct.;vaa3.1. loyalty and partly by op-!- ortuni.em.
Reenli_stne it in made o ea upon a loyalty t ment which Condemns
counter..-vevoiuutionary forcee,, the b =%,utal_ white ta:rarorier., capitalist
restore t,ion of -ort? arc stabv?erre:iiree activit e ; by capi.tohiet grou ,e end
cor rl ete?.y indor?ee?c 3C vaRevol a l~ ; a 7;n kern and i rx :1e` ere Governrc'nt'
catebli as ed on 4 .a?oveeaber 1956 and reco niece the neceeaity of 9?requeating
the help of the, friendly Soviet Army for the quelling of the counter-
revolT)t_; oner}' o:rce`~i boco-(;.ce of the d.:7nger of as counteer-revolution - i.th
.hob the Th g?81?__an people .a.yael the Hungarian c'atherl.and is threatened".
1h1o0ay vhea yard ei_gn nehio..l.edge "with their cignFature th.att t',ev will
strictly obey oil o:x,ek,,.rv, ;-ivied by. the reuoluti-naary porkers rod fr?rmerg
"ovre~7 mc'r.t raa cli en a'?.ll ~~i.hIt ': ordo e
i~r` i.nin r plon h f'. to he + 4A':' m t f f$'3 .' 1. ?ter than enid
-
J enura:e 195 + o Recr i _. t,e who -were eche ruled to be drafted in the fall of
1956 6Wi~ 's. not be draft ''d, ho-' :'e e r N. educ i,e n of the term of ?ervice
7 e al roc
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