VIET CONG RECRUITMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400170009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 22, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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Special Assistant to the President
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
22 November 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
f
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Komer
SUBJECT
: Viet Cong Recruitment
SUMMARY
Hard evidence on actual Viet Cong recruitment rates
scanty. An analysis of theoretical recruitment capabilities
and estimated manpower requirements, however, permits us
to frame an estimate of current recruitment rates which we
have checked against such evidence as is available. We believe
the Viet Cong may have difficulty in meeting their overall
recruitment goals but believe that the essential Communist
requirement of replacing VC main and local force losses is
being met by recruitment within South Vietnam. This recruitment -
averaging 3, 000 to 4, 000 recruits per month -- is not only
within VC capabilities but is almost certainly being met in
aoitual practice.
1. In response to your request of 17 November, we have taken a fresh
look at Viet Cong capabilities for recruiting manpower within South Vietnam
and endeavored to assess the current rate at which South Vietnamese are
being recruited and trained by the Viet Cong.
DOE review completed.
SECRET_
MORI/CDF Pages _1 -6
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2. The judgments, methodology and argumentation offered below
reflect the views of all components of this Agency concerned with Vietnam.
Per your request, however, this paper has not been discussed with any
other component of the intelligence community. Thus it constitutes a CIA
rather than a community appraisal, though we believe DIA and State would
probably be in substantial agreement with it.
3. As you are aware, hard evidence on actual Viet Gong recruitment
rates is scanty. Hence in responding to your request we have analyzed the
Viet Gong's theoretical recruitment capability, estimated their manpower
requirements and, in light of these, framed an estimate of current recruit-
ment rates which we have then checked against such evidence as is available.
This procedure does not yield very firm conclusions but, given the paucity of
hard evidence, we feel it is the beat available line of attack on this problem.
4. Viewng Recruitment Capabilities: The number of South Vietnamese
living under some form of Viet Gong control is at least 3, 5 million and could
be as much as five to six million people, depending on the extent to which
the VC have access to contested areas. The population to which the VC have
effective access for recruitment purposes (largely concentrated in the Delta
region) probably contains sorie 500, 000 physically fit young males. Within
this potential recruitment pool some 30, 000 to 35, 000 youths annually
become old enough for military service. In addition to this population pool,
/living in areas to which the VC have relatively unrestricted access/ the VC
can also draw on the population of military age in contested areas, on GVN
deserters and on recruits, from urban areas. On the basis of what we consider
its available manpower resources, we estimate that in 1966 the Viet Cong
had a theoretical capability to recruit and train some 7, 000 to 101 000
personnel a month. These figures are based on a consideration of available
males and hence are certainly on the low side, since we know the Viet Cong
make extensive use of females even in combat and combat support roles.
5. Recruit-rent at this rate would probably be close to the maximum
capabilities of the VC. Several factors combine to place this ceiling on VC
recruitment and training capabilities. The deterioration of the VC political
control resulting from allied military operations shrinks the population pool
to which VC recruiters have ready access. Increasing manpower losses
being sustained by VC forces and an apparent VC requirement to meet at
least part of the North Vietnamese troop losses in South Vietnam, diminishes
the number of cadre available for training assignments and hence imposes an
effective training limitson theoretical recruitment capability.
SECRET
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6. VC Manpower Requirements; There is little hard intelligence
on the actual manpower requirements which guide Viet Gong recruitment
activity. An examination of the known buildup of VC military forces from-
1961 through 1965 and the estimated losses sustained by the Viet Gong during
the same period, however, give some indication of recruitment requirements
that obviously were met. As shown in the following table, the total manpower
requirements during these five years -- to expand VC main and guerrilla
forces and to replace losses -- was on the order of 356, 000 & 371, 000 men,
or an average monthly requirement during this period of about 6, 000 persons.
During this period additional personnel were recruited to form the VC
political/military cadre and combat support units which now probably include
from 60, 000 to 90, 000 persona.
VIET GONG MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
1000's
Annual
Force Increases a/
Estimated
Losses b/
1961
1962
35
1963
1964
34
35-40
1965
54
80-90
Total
145
211-226
7. This 356, 000 to 371, 000 man estimate is based on current order
of battle holdings. A reappraisal of the strength of Communist irregular
forces which is currently underway indicates that accepted (i. e., MACV)
estimates of the strength of Viet Cong irregular forces may have drastically
understated their growth, possibly by as much as 200, 000 persons. If this
should prove to be the case, the buildup of Communist forces during the 1961-
1965 period would have required recruitment at a monthly rate of 9, 000 to
9, 500 persons. Even these higher requirements are within the above estimate
of Viet Gong capabilities to recruit and train from 7, 000 to 10, 000 personnel
a mouth.
a. Based on 1DIAIJCS OB figures, for main force and irregular units.
b. DIA/JCS figures 1961-1963, adjusted to include seriously wounded.
1964-65 figures are CIA estimates.
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8, Viet Cong recruitment requirements have varied sharply during
the 1961 to 1965 period, ranging from at least 40, 000 a year during 1961-
1964 to over 120, 000 in 1965, the year of the Viet Cong's greatest force
increase and the year during which their estimated manpower losses more
than doubled.'
9. 1965 also saw a leveling off in the estimated buildup of VC
regular forces. Although these forces will probably increase only by about
5, 000 personnel in 1966, the rising number of casualties being sustained by
the VC will keep the manpower requirements at about 1965 levels. We
estimate that Viet Cong forces will suffer manpower losses of from 90-
100, 000 personnel during 1966. ** This yields a total manpower replacement
requirement from 95, 000 to 105, 000 personnel for Viet Gong forces alone.
In addition the Viet Cong may be tasked with providing replacements for a
growing number of North Vietnamese losses. Depending on the extent of
North Vietnamese infiltration, the Viet Cong could be called upon to provide
as many as 15, 000 troops to compensate for northern losses.
10. Estimate of Actual Current Recruitment Rates: The precise
extent to which these theoretical manpower requirements are actually satisfied
cannot be determined on the basis of available evidence. e are reasonably
sure, however, the Viet Cong are having difficulty in meeting their recruit-
ment goals. This is reflected in the increased frequency of reporting on
Viet Cong recruitment difficulties and increasing Communist recourse to
forced conscription despite the adverse political effects of such coercion.
11. It should also be borne in mind that the figures on VC manpower
ar do not directly translate to true military recruitrr:ent requirements
.-,.g since a large number of the estimated losses are probably civilians -- either
innocent victims of military action or labor engaged for logistic support
activities and recruited or impressed only for short term periods. Furthermore,
The recruitment figures expressed here represent the personnel input
required after allowance has been made for the infiltration of personnel
from North Vietnam.
/Qur Ii e. the CIA) estimate of manpower losses rallieri, deserters,
captured and seriously wounded personnel in addition to the K.IA figures
reported as casualties by 3-2 MACV. /
SFCRET
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the Viet Cong undoubtedly compensate for at least some of their military
manpower losses by upgrading personnel assigned to irregular units (i, e.,
transferring them to main and local force units) rather than by direct
levies on the civil population.
12. W e believe the Viet Cong will consider it imperative to replace
the manpower losses sustained by their main and local force units. Our
estimate is that during 1966 such forces will lose some 35, 000 to 40, 000
troops as a result of casualties, disease, desertion, etc. If the VC are to
compensate for these looses and, at the same time, expand their main and
local forces by 5, 000 troops during 1966, their manpower requirements
for main and local forces alone would be on the order of 31000 to 4, 000
troops a month or 36, 000 to 48, 000 new troops per year.
13. One of the few captured documents giving meaningful aggregative
data on annual recruitment in a VC province indicates that total recruitment
in 1965 amounted to 1.5% of the total population controlled by the VC.
Recruitment specifically for military purposes (including militia and defense
forces) was just over 1% of the population. On a nationwide basis, recruit-
ment at this rate would be insufficient to meet total estimated Viet Cong
manpower requirements, but recruitment at this rate, projected nationally,
would provid from 35, 000 to 50, 000 personnel annually -- or enough to
meet local main force requirements outlined above. Hence this document
tends to confirm our estimate of what the VC need to do and in fact are doing
in recruitment.
14. A few isolated reports on recruitment programs indicate that
VC overall recruitment targets in 1965 were generally fulfilled by at least
50%. In Binh Binh province, for emple, the percentage of population
joining guerrilla forces has reached only 3.3%v of the lowland population and
5. 1% of the highland population -- compared to targets of 5% and 10%
respectively. Captured documents indicate, nevertheless, that the Conimu-
n sts in Binh Dinh considered 1965 recruitment sufficient to permit marked
increases in the strength of guerrilla and militia forces.
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15, In sum, although we are reasonably confident of our estimate
of VC manpower losses we lack adequate or detailed knowledge of the way
the Viet Cong attempt to compensate for these losses and, particularly,
lack hard evidence on the role of recruitment in this process, Nevertheless,
we believe that the essential requirement of the VC for replacing main and
local force losses which average 3, 000 to 4, 000 troops a month is not only
within VC recruitment capabilities but reflects a minimum recruitment
goal, that is probably being met.
Special s e a en or fair s
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December 21, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
SUBJECT: Approval of Project CABRIOLET
The President has authorized the conduct of Project CABRIOLET
with the understanding that there will be an appropriate public
statement as to the nature and purpose of the event prior to
the test. The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission will coordinate
with the Under Secretary of State on the timing, handling, and
content of the public statement. The statement will be cleared
with the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Department of Defense, and the White House prior to
release.
cc: SecState (Attn: Under SecState)
SecDef (Attn: Dep SecDef)
ACDA
CIAI- ~ 1
BOB
USIA
Spec Asst to President for S&T
is
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