COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE CSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000100520006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 2, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

~~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release a~ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
~~s~~- ~ a~V ur~srz ism ~ -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
? INFORMATION REPORT
SUBJECT Con~,un3:st Party of the CSR
PLACE.-
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED
PAS 4~' IR~'CR1[A~IOR
TN19 DOCUMENT CON TAIX9 INFO PYATI DN Pf ECTIXG TXE ATI ON AL
OF THE UNITED 9TA TEST RI TNIN THE MEAN I'N40F TI TLE 18~ lE CTI ON9E793
AXO 794r OF TXE U. 9. COOEF A AeIEHDE D. -ITS TRAN 8N19810N OR REVE?
CATION OF IT9 CON TENT9 TO ORlR CEIfT B N UNAUTHORIZED of R90N 19
PROHIBITED BV LAY. THE REPROO UCT ION CP TX 19 FORM IB PROHI BITE p.
DATE DISTR. ~ ~ 1952
N0. OF PAGES 6
N0. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT N0.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
1. ~.e sins m~ the Ceannunist Paa?ty in Czechoslovakia can be divided
intro two categoriese the general program, common to all Cox~nun3st
Parties, and. the somcalled "action pro~?anD" Where is no need
to touch-on the tirste which is ful~.y eagplained in "classical"
Co~nnunist litera?ture_. the action program, taileared to ?the
specific country, specified objectives to be attained within a
give~a pert?dB `ihe objectives off' the Czech Comtunist Party wire:
(a~ Fulfil~.nent of the revised five year plan which nean:t
inex?easing production in heavy industry and. agriculture;
this also included
(~-)
(2)
~~~ ~~ ~~ ~ DISTRIBUTION
Wining the nationD 2'here were extensive building pro~rans
for war production. In addition there were pl.anl~ to
reorganize armed forces according to the Soviet exassple
do`~rn to the snal3,est detail, and to organize a nonunental
training program for the great na,jority df the non military
people including men, women, and even. childrena
~ightenix~-up and improvement of the Coxanunist Party
itsel~o 7'hi~ was to be accomplished lay indoctrinating
the people and by the liquidation of the enemy class. 'his
Bhase of the program included detailed prograx>s dealing
with de bureaucratization of the Party apparatus; elinin~,-
tion o~ all unreliable and unenthusiastic dements as
well as those who were not sufficiently 'Minded; ed~xcation of
not only the members of the Party but a]~, except ?those class
enemies of jtaismmlEeninisn; elimination of the ia~fluence
of all churches (in ideological reeducation the catholic
Church is believed weakest, whereas the Protestant Union
of Czech Brothers i.s the strongest ideological enemy
tcagether with the Rational Czechoslovak church); acceleram
Lion of agricultural collectivation. ~3ut mast important was
the destruction of the large land owners and certain
intellectual groups except~.ng science and. related Melds.
CLASSIFICATION SRCRE'~/SRC tJRI~Y CR1[A'~7~OR
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
RECRET/sEC~~r IRP'~R~TIOt~
.Each ,.part of this pr~graffi was prepared in great detail b~ depart.-
merits ~ of the CP, and the effect of such programs was 1'olt in tie
daily life . of the natioi~~
2. As for achievement, the Czech Com~thLasts were
partially successfu as ar as ~ ~1 ling tha seised' f~:v? year
50X1
plan, that tYey~ were s~uccesaPnl in arming the country, but that .thtg
did nut re~aah their g?sl as far asp i~nproviag the Party stiachis>tery ~
concerned. .More specifically, u~atil serious difficulties crone i~
,
the Summer of 1951, the increase in heavy industry was .the greatesa-t
five year plan was a failure; this was partly due .to the rev~,e?ffi ~~'
the five year plan. in 1.950 and 19.51 which called for a sharp.ncreaad ,
in the production of A~A*~ent at the eapens~ of ca-nsumer gc?das.
my opinion,.,however,~ the mismanagement
and incapability of-the sgste~.
,
should be blamed for the difficulties, and also for .the-sharp decal ae
in 'the. standard of living. The speed oP solleotivization caused the
serious food situation. Many Czech economists think that voluntary
comperatives would solve the problem of uaeconomi,eal production of
small individual Farm unite, but everyone believed that cvileetiv~a-,
flan wa8 the- result of an order trom Moscow. The only s,chievest a out of the country. It is generally believed tb~at
it was only under the pressure of the Communist Party of th? 'C83
that this plan wasp suecesefully carried out. In addition, the
Gommunista achieved some suecess'1n indoctrinating the youth; this
c?uld become a very serious threat in a few years, especially if the
standard of livi~ag should improve because of better organization ?f
the eCOnom1C 8yst!?m.
3. The greatest strength of the Communist Party~in Czechoslovaki$ >I~ae
in its organization which led, supervised, and controlled sa]ssost `
every aspect of the daily life of the country, and in its le~d ere,
xho were absolutely incorruptible, w1111ng to make any and alb.
~sacrifiees, .and fanatically faithful. The controls of the Party,
fitting together like wheels of a very cot~plicated but accurate
machine, enabled the Party to forge ahead even ;though the ma,ority
of the people were opposed. Communist Party leaders did their duty
without regard to their personal well-being or feelings; they did-
hot hesitate to use terror or merciless methods against any~~-e oho
trieA to wmaken the Party program, even when this involved araari-
fices on the-part of themselves, their families, or their friemds~.
I donut mean to ilsply that the Party bosses didn~t live in relative
l~cti~ry compared to the masses.
~. The great weakness ?f the.Communiat Party in Czechoslovakia in sa~q _
opinion was that,~except For some of the youth, the nation as a
whole remained unaffected by Communist propaganda a~~, -
Wa~ _uni~~~: in k~.trec~. ~~' i oa~x~~ai~~n. ~e ~~a~Q~~
linl~ in the Party was the mass of ord~.nary members and ~inorj:'offi?ials
v1~w w-.rnwr ,........ .I L. iw _._________~ ____ ~._ _ .... .. _ _ _ -
t2xat mental aruelt~y and slavery -were more powerful~than~material' 5ox1
.h~4.4ew~... tires?. _.._?_ - ----1_?-- _--- ---~- -- - .. .. .. _
~.~~~~ . enovner wear~mess of the CP was the wide -gulf wh~.ch separated
~,~ Wsiv p?opie. ~ney were aware or the economic difficulties and
.LL ..~ _. ___i ____. _ _ _ _ _
attitude of the maaority of the nation. The system did not permit"
the leaders to see the true picture.
SECRET /~~s;L~i z~o~~~a~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
 .. _ R~~>:
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
agars a Czech they users one and the sage.
5. Outside the Communist. Party-there was no support for t2he regiffie and
even within the Party the opposition was very strong. Opposition --
50X1 against the CP was synonymous to opposition to the government; to the
have overes e e 8 rength or even t e 'ex ence of organized.
50X1
Qppositio~a. There were desperate actions by indiv'iduals~b~t Odoubt
50X1 that there are even now any, large organized groups.
50X1 ~. ens
50X1 gO~ of the production g ores mere 'caused by other. Faetor.s,
su4h as mismanaget~ent, 3ncapabil~.ty, and, last butt not least,. to a
certain enfant by passive resistance, which could. not be teased actual
50X1 SRbotage. The majority of the Czechs were- anti-~omnauni~t an4 them,- '
- - - _ . r~ . - --- -
50X1' - - - - -_-- - _ the ~ S"armera eo~osed the strangest anti-Gomist
element;
~""' land amners since Wor ar I there have been very Few large lal~a
50X1 owners j but the independent Farmers who owned at~d tilled the naa~oritq
oF~ theland. Even the smallest farmers hated aollect~ivizatior~ and -:the
Cvmaranist regime ..- II~e~ct strop mat in opposition to the Cou~iists
50X1 were the intelligentsia. this group was lest tm Cmm~au~iisrn
evexa before 19~+$ when it was the intelligentsia which weir Communism's
50X1 mQSt powerful supporter. it is true that a great pareentage
of the workers mere against the regime; some thought that th? workim
50X1 iF the economic situation improved, -the ~rcrkers ~ro~
age n supper he regime . But the intelligentsia would never a~a~.n
50X1 trust the Communists even if the eoonomie situation were gre8ltly
improved;-the rental slavery was far worse For thew the the,s~aterial
shortages. The class struggle still went on in the C3~t; cla~~ses had.
been suppressed but not obliterated. t3nly part of the working class
supported the regime; 'that part mss made up primarily qF those in
higher positions, the "workerst cadre", in all branches of ~dvernmeht,
-50X1 seeuritp Forces, army, and naturally, the Party apparatus.
6.
later. than January 1951; for 1951-5~, new cards were'issued.
onthigave each member a membership staffip. A11 cards expired not
ship mss again. opened for new recruits. The membership of the Party
had been closed in 19+9, but in-June or July 1951 the membership mss
again opened. There was a new regulation at that tune; to be
accepted For membership, a person had to rank high in achievement,
ie, shock-xorker, StaXhanovite f ulfillir~g his s~orn~s ~rox~e ahem 1Od ~~~ _~
~~ a youaag ger~on from the Czechoslovak Mouth Organization.
only exceptional persons out of these categories could ~e aaeepted
by the CP. Each basic CP organization was to look For such indi~-
iduais in its district, snd after closely exsr~ining them the board
of the organization. had to approavh them with the offer of member-
ship.- For workers this involved a candidacy of one yeas; for others,
this period was two years. In some eases the period to be served
as a candidate could be shortened. It was only after the 198 coup,
that a person-was required to become a candidate beFore he scold be
adasi.tted to membership . The duties of a candidate mere the: same ae
thosi~ required.of a member; the candidate, however, had only an
advisory vote which was not counted. Commtanist Party ~e~mbership
cards mere not-reviewed. The desitkarj at the beginxing of sash.
SECRET/SECIIRITY S.NP'OR,MATIOAfi
..~_
the Czechoslovak Communist Party had soffie
2,200,000 members in the Summer of 1951. At that time th? CP metnber-
SECRE'I~~:~~~t ~xFORtt~~'~os'
many-Czech reF~.gecs
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 : CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
SBCRST~SECtIRITY INP'OR~ATIDhi
7. It is difficult to estimate the num er of Czech - CPS meia~ers~'~rho v~ePe
50X1 ~~ ~ core; ~ .dependable members, after
closely observing the various Part or anizations the regal
' 50X1 ,~, Dore members were, very few
50X1 less than,: 20 9r o
50x1 the total Par y me era p . Sven ewer number here the abaolutaw;
50x1 ftics,?who ~rere Willing at arty time to give their lives at the
order of the Party; these fanatics could getually only be foutad amok
50x1 those employees high in the Party or important g?verament officials.
There.waa an eatreme~shortage of hard core CP members forappointm~te'
abroad .and to leading positions within Czechoslovakia. This rra$
particularly true of'the p t ons abroad where the meffibers were~~nbt.
50x1 under continuous control. difficulty of the cadre ~ '
departments in 1951 to fin no on y a e in this respect the
situation would not have been so bad) but really .trusted Party
members for assignment to the foreign service. Dozens of Party
members, already carefully selected by the application of very strict
' regulations, had to be rejected before a single one could be found
who could be trusted as iamtune against "being spoiled by Western
ideology". Such people were "securedN b the Part b sending them
50x1- abroad without their families . most. hard.;
core CP members were concentrated in a secur y Drees. A muoh
larger percentage of the membership of the Czech Coamiur~ist Party
consisted of. members, more or less apathetic to the Party, rho were
influenced ,fiery easily by material well-being. ~t least half of this
membership of the Communist Party was opposed to Co~nnunism; they
were desperately unhappy and hated the regime. In 19+6, in the last
50X1-free election in the CSR more than ~0 ~ of all voters voted.
for the CP, and the percentage was~even higher in
19+8. Many people gained the Party after having been lured b t2~e
50X1 Communist promises, plans for the future., etc . From 1~~+5-19~~~ the-
policy of the CP and its entire set-up and position in Czechoslovakia
were completely different from the activities.of the Party
50X1 0 or far that matter, from Comim~nist Parties ~,n other -coon r es, -
more and more Czechoslovakia was becoming like the IISSR and-the
50X1 people -hated it .
8.
that the uprising would result in dust another form of Co is~a.
It-would be sufficient that it was- an uprising against~thesent
regime. ~ `'
There was no exact Zvi er~ce as o.
hove deep the roots of the Sling-Svermova factionalism went. ~ The
different points of view of Gottwald and Slansky involved methods.
and.cduld not actually be considered factionalism. There were n4-
visible traces of a movement such as Titoism. Thedis~utes between`
Gottwald and Slansky concerned merely methods of economy, n=t Soviet
domination or the extent to which it had spread. Good_obse vexes
.felt when the Sling-Svermova plot was announced that t~.e gr at~
majority of the population would have gone al?ng with the;pl?tters'~
had there been open. uprising. This majority would include those who.
mere not Party members and knew nothing of Party problems;: they
-would simply loin anyone in opposing the regime. It w t31d x~z~t matter
In general the purges i.n Czechoslovakia have followed the patter
outlined in the Communist. teaching about the class struggle. The
aim of the purge was to destroy the "typical capitalist' elements
immediately. Other elements were to be left alone as long as they
were useful .? The-power was to be concentrated in a certain part of
the worker class' among those who were formerly underprivileged.
SECRET /s~~~.~~ z~0~~~?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 : CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 : CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
ssc~T/Srcv~ITy I~1FORMATI?N
-5-
(.the true proletax?iat). .The purges within the. Party itself were to
clean o~xt tlae unreliable elements, those elements which had performed
ce~t~ain services but were es sated to .deviate in the future-when the
50X1 going w8,8 $~$ug~r purges the sa~itl; misrq~axiage~nent and,
incapability that characterized the government of the country. Many
were purged for no reason whatsoQver; their disappearance served no
purpose. Tha first purges might have been designed to strengthen
the .hard fore of the CPa but more and more they served to decrease the
mer~ber~hip Qf the hard .core of'~ the Party not ?nly by reducing .the
.number of r~emberB but by tearing the blinders from.-the eyes of other.
members., By use of purges, the CP was able to cleanse the goverr~aent,
Party,.-and econo~aic organizations of unreliable or even. dangerous"
element~-, thus concent~?ating even more power in tkse hands of a few
hard care Pr~x^ty~members, In addition purges served to spread tear
among the Party and non-Party masses which helped to reduce sabotage,
organized active opposition, etc,
10. (there was no difference in the organizational setup
50X1 ~~~unist Party from that described in ~~any Forty book-
lets and per?iodicalsD ie "Funl~cionar"~ which were sold freely.
Committees for National Econaany (Naro$ohcsspodarska komise' - NHK)
-These c:~aarmnittees were in operation at the central, regional, and
district secretariats of tY~e CF until late 199 or early 1950.
when they were dissolved and partly replaced by PFO (Prumysl,
Peneznictvi, Obchod -Industry, Finance, Commerce)) Departments.
The head of the central NHK was L Fre~ka. Other ]reading members
and f1~11ti~ae employees included Dr C+oldman, Dr Otakar Pohl
(in charge of coal and chcr~ical industries, later domestic and
fo~^eign tra.+~sportation~ and Dr J Jancik (fox~aerly Jung};
Dr Otaker Poh~~. went with FreM1lka to tae office of the President,
and later, in 1950, became 0aneral Director of the State Bank,
the only bank in the C3Ra About 3G-3~, harried, inte111gent~`
and very well educat~+d, Pohl was consider?d a passive individual;
Many doubted that hea would be able to command the vast organize-
tion ~f tae State Bank, Dr J Janaik, who had been reeponsiblm
.for appoin~~ments to the higher positions in the natintsal
eaonomiG setup was relegated to a minor osition in the 31ova1~
Re i~~rnal cavernmerat in Eratislava.
(b) Eaah organization (secretariat} from the district organization
~p inQ.luded a ep~eoial committee (co~oeed of the moat trusted
members) called KSK (Komise Stranicke kontroly - Committee of~
Party Control). It wss the dut~r of this committee to examine,
clarity, and settle. all complaints of a Party member agair~st~
50X1 arit~ther Party me~aber. The KSK of tie Central .Secretariat was a
very power~?ul committee; there was no appeal-from its daQsiona.
50X1 3'his committee was Ing Jarmila TauBSi ova
5ox1 s~ ou a she plays an mpor are; par
n o airing the actual-information concerning the Sling-
9vermova~preparations to overthrow the regime.
SECRET /s~c~urtl~ a2~oz
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 : CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6
SECRET/SECURITY INFt3RMATION
_~_
The CP~organizatic~n in ~zechvslovakia had only the "desitkar"
~
there There no "tricetkari" or
leader Qf ten membera~ .
atovkari'" {~.eadera of thirty or one hundred memberaj. In
brwf, the duties of a desitkar were to collect dues, die~tribute
Forty publicat~.ons, distribute invitations for Party meetr~ga.,~
and tighten relations between .the board 6f the, local organ~.~a-
ton and -the individual members. Tricitkari had similar dt~t~.a~e,~
5ox1 not fore ten lout for. thirty members and not in the CP but
the: R4H (Czech UnitGCl Trade Unions..
{d) &ll` the' basic Communist organizational units included a .mbex
of the S1QB (rational Security Forces} who had to attend the
meetings of the organization and aerTTe as ari "advisor" to the"
Qrganizationa on matters of tational security. These pere~ns ,
{t
opinions expressed in public but especially those expressed ;:
in the region, living conditlc~na, behavior, activities,
organization the following infor~tation about non-Party mes'~be
were also charged with collecting from Party r~e~tbera in tY~e `
private converef~tiona. But according to an order issued early.`.
its 1951 the members of the security Forces (STB, SNB} and ~~,]? ;:
military personnel ~rere excluded from membership in the basi~+`
Party organization where they lived, and belonged only: to thelx"'
~Utyarove organiaaee~' {Units organizations}. Until the or?~~er~`
was published, `~neh individuals were members of the be,~ic: ;~''
organizations w'he3~e; .they resided and took part in their
e,Ctivtias .
~'~ie so-called . "cadre trustees", who had been. in charge mt, .:, ~;'
concerned. Cadre departments were retained from thedistrc~:ix
abolished in 1951) ae tar as the basic local organizations t~e~e
gathering in~'ormation about individuals in their region.*;`~ere`
Qrganizations up,
participation of the people.
larlyinterested in the .organization of such groups-and ~'
neighborhood, and the "voluntary-brigades"; they v~ere"partiou~-
university, the local F~arty organization was asked for a reps~r
on him. In addition to their boards or presidiums, the lae~tl
-Party organizations appolnted~otYxer officials to keep '~ eye
an-such groups as parents organizations at the. schools iu ~.
~embe~s).. For euample, when a studexit wished to entef- th?~.
ened~by the tact that they were very often asked-fvr opinan+~
The basic-local Party organizations were considerably e'tre
5ox1. { g) the Free-idiom of the Central Coaittee of the
Com~nu~aist Party met 'weekly ors Fridays the inner secretariat
da1ly~ the Central .Committee net twice or three times ~ yew;
50x1 these meetings. of the Central C~ittee; included ot2~er lead,
.Party officials who had been invited,-
ll. do nc~t think that the Czech CP had its oHn intelligence or es~~.age
network, bt~t all such a4tivitiesvaere directed by the Ministry Q
National Security which had-its own channels. There were memberse~c
t1~e.Party who served as agents of the Security Ministry in tie ~~
50X1 organixations,~ butOdoubt very mush that the Party organizatia
were wed direatiy,
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/05/10 :CIA-RDP82-000478000100520006-6