POSTWAR TACTICAL TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000100220010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 13, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Approve to IATIA e 2 347 : CIA-RDP82-00047R0 0-4 '-'~ 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE' AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT
CD NO.
COUNTRY USSR/Germany ?
SUBJECT Postwar Tactical Training
Developments in the Soviet Army
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PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION Of THIR TORY If PROHIBITED.
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1. Q. Has there been any major change in the training program for the Soviet
armed forces since 1946?
A. No. Training is basically that of World War II, modified by the experiences
of World.War II. As an example, during World War II tanks were often employed
alone without the immediate-support of infantry, and of course many tanks were
lost. In the postwar era, the basic doctrine is that tanks must always
be accompanied by infantry and that infantry must always be supported by
tanks. Therefore,, the major stress in training is placed on the employ-
ment of tank-infantry teams and cooperation between the branches of service.
2. Q. Are the regulations for the employment of tank and mechanized forces,
published in two volumes between 1945 and 1946, still in effect?
A. Yes, they are still the "Bible" for training and employment of tank and
mechanized forces. However, from time to time the Service Academies, in
cooperation with the General Staff, publish periodic information bulletins
for the information of officers. This publication is classified "secret"
and therefore does not get widespread dissemination to the troops, but is used
as a basis for changes in training programs.
3. Q. Does the Soviet Army recognize histories of World War II as a source of
determining practical and strategic errors? Do they take cognizance of
such errors)a.nd what action is taken to avoid making any such errors in
future wars?
STATE
A. Yes. The General Staff Sections are very much aware of the value of
World War II histories in determining what errors were made in the field,
and the Frunze Academy is making detailed studies of World War II tactics.
Naturally, many of these studies are used to donfirm the validity of tactics
in particular situations. Where there are studies of glaring tactical or
strategic errors, training directives are published in the periodic informa-
tion bulletins to bring them to the attention of all officers. For
example: certain tactical errors which the German General Staff found
to be rather common in Soviet units of division size and lower, were
pointed out as an example of errors which might benefit considerably in
future warfare; specifically,, the poorly coordinated make-up of march
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serials within a division size unit on the approach march, which in many cases the
Germans took advantage of in gainir,~g initial acva.r.ta.ge during a meeting engagement.
This of course is not Soviet field manual doctrine but was a result of poor road.
nets and impa.ssGble terrolr. Positive action is being taken to improve continuity
and compactness of march serials.
4. Is there any new doctrine adopted generally in the Soviet army which gives more
latitude of freedom to suborr?inate corrxc nders than they had in World War II?
A. Yes. Subordinate commanders are urged to exploit to the fullest any local success,
whereas previously, exploiting or pursuing units were given certain objectives to
reach at which they were supposed to halt. Now tactical doctrine prescribes no such
limits. should liko, as an example, to point out a peculiarity noted by the
-German officers during World War II, ht t is, a lack of deep penetration on the part of
units subordinate to the division. So consistent was this peculiarity that the
Germans could expect the Soviet tank forces of battalions and regiments to stop
some four to five kilometers behind the lines after acb.ievi.ng a. penetration. This
peculiarity did exist as it was co-_--anonly called for in operation orders but nowadays
there is no such limit placed on exploiting units.
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