SOVIET ARMY MORALE, FRATERNIZATION AND PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000500120002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 26, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

S171 LISiTh
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Tit50X1
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by lat.,
C-E..CRET
COUNTRY Austria/USSR
REPORT
SUBJECT
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Soviet Army Norle.,
and Propaganda
Fraternization DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
26 July 1955
16
DATE OF INFO.
REQUIREMENT NO.
RD
PLACE ACQUIRED
REFERENCES
DATE ACQUIRED
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVF.
Lq BRARY SUDJMT AND AREA ODES 0 6)
2,42406
7/55
173.5 INOT)
)73.75 Ntxx)
23 .ii Nin)
n, N(xic)
234.3
;73.4 NoT)
.73.8 NM
239.5. NI X.9
w( v)
N
893.3
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STATE
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
h, FBI AEC
(Note! Washington distribution Indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)
iNFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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COUNTRY
SUEI)ECT
SECRET
Austria (Soviet Zone)/USSR
Soviet Army Morale, Fraternization: and
Propaganda
DATE OF INFORMATIC
PLACE ACQUIRED
111111?1?1111111.111MMINIIIMINONS
SOURCE
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
REPORT NO,
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DATE DISTR. 24 June 1955
NO. OF PAGEt0a15
REFERENCES:
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'mow
A. MORALE FACTORS
1. Platnlinta
a. Movement to Austria
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'
the solicy regarding Soviet dependents current
in Austria, was governed by an unidentified Ministry
of Defense Order, published in the fall of 1953, that first permitted Soviet50x1 H*1
officers and civilians and, in theory, extended tour EM (aver4s*ochniki) to
bring their wives and children to the Soviet Zone of Austria. (See T40215
for other summarized provisions of this order, Its, provisions for dependents, ?.
were as follows: ,
No explanations were given to the vast majority of Soviet troops
who were conscript NCO 's and. Pvt's as to why their 'dependents were not
authorized to come to Austria.
Autholised personnel who desired to bring their dependents to
Austria baa to submit to their immediate commander a written request for
their movement, showing names, ages, and place of residence.of the dependents.
Only wives and children were authorized movement'. The commander endorsed .
the request to the division headquarters (or its equivalent) and attached .
a -certificate which stated that the dependents were authorized mevetent
under current regulations and were the lawful wife and children of the
requestor who was a member of his unit.
'Division headquarters granted or disapproved the movement and
notified the officer concerned and COF headquarters. Upon receipt of
division approval, sponsor's initiated within their unit the necessary travel
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documents and transportation requests which were then sent to the dependents.
The dependents then exchanged the transportation requests for rail tickets
and proceeded to join the sponsor. All travel Was at government expense
except for subsisten,ce en route and movement of household goods, which were
moved at the sponsors expense.
Upon notification by division that approval had been granted to
certain indiViduals to travel to Austria, COP' headquarters then notified the
border officials at CHOP (4825N-2211E), USSR', which is a specified border
crossing point for COP personnel, that individuals had permission to enter
Austria and Dilw, the Soviet Union. All dependents travelled with only
their Soviet civilian identification books, the travel certificate sent by
the aponsorsand the travel request. They received no special passports or
visas. Upon arrival in Austriasthe sponsor's unit took the Soviet citizens'
identification 'card and gave each dependent a certificate which stated that
these were in the unit headquarters for safekeeping.
b. Children
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most of the officers did not
bring school-age cnilaren to Austria as there were no approved facilities
available; although they could if they desired. His unit wa$ informedshow-
ever, that there was a plan to open Soviet dependent schools in Austria in
the fall of 1954. All dependent wives who had teacher training and/or
experience were asked to register as teachers, andsfor planning purposess
each individual was asked to register his children who were of school age
in the spring of 1954.
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c. Orientation
,dependents (approximately 30 officeriewives). were
oriented by the battalion CO in several sessions as to their responsibilities'
and rights while in Austria. This orieztation was followed by several
classesson unknown subjectsiconducted by the battalion Chief of Gunnery
Training.
.2. Rotation of Officers
it was also announced that Soviet Army officers
would () onger be rotated to the USSR and that service in the Soviet Zone
.
1.1 .Longer
of Austria .would be on the same footing as service in an Okrug in the USSR.
This was based. on the same, order announcing that dependents would be 50)0
authorized to come to Austria. I,those officers who were
to be rotated after three years of foreign service were retained regardless
of their own wishes, but they were riven the o?.? ?? ? 50X1
dependents.
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From the time of the order, officers were rotated only for compas7
pionate or health reasons, only three officers were
returned: two for tuberculosis and one because his parents were aged and
had no one to assist them. These parents resided in LENINGRAD, but the
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officer was rotated and sent to NOVO-SIBIRSK.(5502N-8253E), Siberia.
3. Passes
Officprs had approximately' the same freedom of movement as extended-
tour EM had.." This freedom did not include, in practice, permission to
fraternize,. For officers and extended-tour EM 4 this was frowned upon by
Source's battalion .CO. All other battalion personnel, who were the
Obligatory-tour NCO'S and privates, were under compulsion to remain in
garrison at all times,.
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? These restrictions were disobeyed whenever the conscripted EM had the
opportunity to absent themselves with reasonable impunity. The majority of
cases involving breaking restriction consisted of groups of individuals
running off to town after liquor. As it was very difficult to do this F un-
noticed, EM would wait until they had a garrison movie or were on sentry
duty and would then go. They generally entered the first drinking establish-
Nent they came across and drank as rapidly as they could. The sentries
would go with their PPSh guns. None of these sentries were
ever caught at this, to Source's knowledge,
Prior to the arrival of officer's dependents, the officers would
also sneak off to drink but after their" wives came and there was more
opportunity for them to have ivnormal life at home they did not do this as
often. Prior to thissofficers made a habit of going into town and the NCO's
and privates found it risky to frequent drinking establishments for fear of
running into an officer who would report them even though he himself was there
Officers did not find themselves compromised by being in the same drinking
establishment. After the arrival of officer-dependents, the EM found it
less risky to go into town and this practice greatly increased.
4. Leave
explained to the EM; however,
to be as follows:
a. Officers.
the leave policy was never adequately.
generally accepted
Source stated that it was
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Officers were authorized one 45-day leave per year, not including
travel time. After the arrival of dependents in Austria, Source was told .tha:50X1
those officers who had their families with them were authorized only 30 days
per year, not including travel time.
b. Sverkhsrochniki
The extended-tour EM (sverkhsrochnik) were entitled to a leave
shortly after signing up for a two-year period of service. Their leave
during the first year of extended service was authorized as 30 days (not
including travel time). Every year after the firststhey were authorized
45 days (not including travel time).
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c. Conscripted Cadre Personnel
All cadre conscripted EM about 50) received at 50)X1.
least one leave during their tour of service in Austria. Some of the men
had had two leaves.Source was able to list at least three men who had had
two leaves. Generally,these leaves were f ten dayscduration(not including
travel time). Source went on leave for a 12-day period and received
an additional seven days for travel. Source was unable to state whether suchmxi
leaves were authorized or not.
d. Trainees
All trainees received no leaves except for
compassionate reasons and then only If the BM was considered an outstanding
soldier. The compassionate reasons were generally verified in an official
communication from a Voyenkomat to the battalion CO requesting that the
subject EM be granted leave.
e. Leave Policies
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Source stated that only two factors were considered in granting
any leave in his unit. These were merit and compassion. Length of service
was never considered and he knew that most EM in his unit served their
full three years without any leave. Obtaining a.leave Mastairly-simple
for the extende&tour EM and they generally went on their full leave at
least once a year. He knew of two conscripted EM who had gone on leave 50X1
twice in the same year.
The main complaint regarding the leave system
was that the CO controlled the granting of leaves.
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6. Discipline
n any gyen montn,no more tnan two men would be confined for a day or two 50:00
ach. On one occasion an officer, SR Lt (fnu) OBNOSKIN,was confined for
0 days for insulting a superior. He, called the Battalion Dep CO for Political-.
Tfairs a "razvratnik" (a rake or libertine).
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Although the obligatory tour EM Were very carefully watched and had
little opportunity to drink, they still managed to dose. Source stated
that an EM drank at every opportunity and would run risks for alcohol:
every time. There were several EM sent back to the USSR for "sYstematic
druhken0e4e,but_they were not from Soyrces-En and be had no further
details on this.'
a. Cases of Disobedience
Source stated that disobedience was more dr a passive nature in
Austria than in the USSR. He stated that discipline wasstricter in
Austria and that the EM were more cIoiely supervised. HoweverIEM often
refused to sing at the "evening walk" (march), would not march proper4,
and,often,flatly refused to perform good work. On an occasion when a
platoon sergeant was extremely demanding of his men. in physical condition-
ing, they decided to teach him a lesson. This sergeant had made a-habit
of making his men run twice around the area, just on general principle, while
he himself gave commands without running. The men now pretended not to
hear his commands and ran- up to a wall. When he came up to them and gave
them a right turn, they ran out of the area and he had to chase.them.again.
This sergeant subsequently became less severe inhis demands on the platoon.
In the 'USSR, Source stated that on two occasions in basic training,
his own platoon sergeoWt was roughed up by the trainees. Once he was
complimenting his platoon on their cooperation in the training effort after
he had been awarded a commendation for good discipline in his unit. The
platoon then gathered around the sergeant (who was actually hated by the
trainees) and cheered him; throwing him high indthecairthrWt4MeS.7and19n1y
catching him twice.
The second time that the sergeant was beaten was during the
evening bed check. He came into the platoon barracks and the men staged
what Source called a "Vechernyya pereklichka" (evening rollcall). , One of
the men immediately threw a pillow at the candle putting it out. Then
everyone began throwing stones, pillows, bootsland other items at the
sergeant. The sergeant suffered several cuts and bruises and the men told
him that he had better ease up on them with their training. The men
received no punishment as apparently the sergeant was afraid to take
action; he also became leas severe with the platoon.
Also while in basic trainingiSource had heard of a trainee
aompany with an unidentified unit at MULINO (5617N-4256E) that consisted
pf mostly athletes from MOSCOW. ?He heard the trainees were running this,,
.lompany to suit themselves and that the sergeants were very cautious in,
:heir dealings with their men. Source had no further information. .
In his own battalion, Source had knowledge of only one occasion
;here a higher headquarters had called attention to a. breach of discipline..
Le believed that this was because the battalion CO kept the EM of the
.attalion carefully supervised and permitted very little opportunity for
hilandering. Alsoaany breach of discipline or violation of order was
uickly hushed up and action taken within the battalion without any aware-
ess of it by a higher headquarters.
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Morale
morale in the Soviet Army as he saw it, was very
poor. He stated that the best example of this was the three commandments 50)0
of the Soviet soldier as taught to him by his platoon sergeant who was a
friend of his in basic training. These were as followsl
"Never do today what you can leave undone until tomorrow"
"Never leave until tomorrow that can be eaterLtodayl!':
"No one has yet died from sleep"
These attitudes, characterized the Soviet out-
look on military life. le felt that all personnels including civilians,
tried to do only the bare. acceptable minimum in their task, whatever it
was. The great majority of the obligatory tour EM looked upon their tenure
of military service as a repulsive necessity and looked forward to their
day of demobilization. Few EMpexcept? extended?tour EM (sverkharoohnikOshad
any desire to be officers as this would require an indefinite period of
service from them. Those EM who extended their tour were generally from
Kolkhozes and of ignorant peasant stock to whom military life was an improve-
ment over their civilian status. Source stated that he knew of only one
extended-tour EM who did not come from a Kolkhoz into military service and
he was a transplanted peasant whose family had moved into a city to work in
a factory in a very-menial position. 5
One of the specific things that created low morale was the close
restriction of the Soviet obligatory-service EM. These EM were never per-
mitted any off-duty freedom to visit the Austrian civilian community. They
were not permitted alcoholic beverages and were always under the super-
vision of an NCO or an officer.
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Dissatisfaction was not only prevalent among the EM. ,Source, on
occasion, had heard officers complain over the lack of freedom in inter-
course with the civilian population. He had heard officers compare the
standing rule in the Soviet Army of not speaking to Austrians
with the practice of other occupation armies. These officers expressed
their embarrassment in being forced to be abrupt and discourteous when
addressed cordially by the even-friendly Austrians, including the local
Communiet6.
a. Officer-Candidate Morale
Another specific incident illuatratina nnnin mnrAlo AnA
discipline
masa platoon of future reserve officer trainees. LE This platoon went to(
ODETZENDORF to bathe and then proceeded to get drunk in a body. A group
.of sergeants had finished bathinufirstard thensneaked out of the bath
;-
house to a nearby tavern and the platoon joined the sergeants. When all of
the men of the platoon had twit all their money. on dripk414 they 'returned
to unit carrying certain members of the platoon who were too intoxicated to
Walk. They arrived in the company with no semblance of a military formation
and loudly sang bawdy and vulgar songs. The platoon leader then came into
the barracks to bring order to his platoon but he was thrown out,bodily.
Then,the company commander entered the barracks, but even he was beaten up
by the platoon sergeant and a squad sergeant. There was no punishment
meted out to any member of the platoon.. although the company held a general
assembly and its political officer declaimed for two solid hours on the evils
of drinking. There was also a battalion Komsomol meeting which called in
the Komsomol members of the platoon and reprimanded them. (The squad sergeant.)
involved in beating the company commander happened to be the. battalion
Eomsomol organization secretary.) None of the men in the platoon appeared
frightened or shamed by their conduct; and they were only sorry that the
platoon leader, who was quite popular with his men, had gotten into trouble
over this breach of discipline
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On several occasionssthis same platoon refused to eat the food
in the'mess hall because it was of such poor quality. Although this would
not have been a serious offense individually, it reached the proportions of
a mutiny when it was done collectively. If any.:ring leader could have been
ascertainedship punishment would have been ,Severe As was, the personnel
Of this platoon all ;stuck together and',0e0h.'soldier'fully.accepted the
blame for his 'personal actions. this 'reasoWi,noneofthe members of
the platoon were punished. The resultvof:the. hunger strike was that a
doctor came to the enlisted mess and inspected the fOod.'' The mess sergeant
Was then reprimanded'for:having improperly yashedthepots in the kitchen.
There was no marked improvement in,the4044t7. of tile food.
Although poor quality Of food, had a great dial to do With making
the meals unappetizing, careless food preparation by the cooks and the lac*
of supervision by the iesponsible authorities made this food even worse. Lack
of Such items as' cream, milk, butter, eggssand spices made the menu very
dreary and monotonous. On the other 'hand' unit officers received these
items to some extent in their own mess.,
b. Reaction to Political .Officers
The activities of the political officer, in the unit also
contributed to lowered unit morale. They irritated the personnel by their
constant nagging, informing on the EM and officers alike, and presenting .
dry and uninteresting political subjects that the men, were required to learn
during instruction. As an example, there- Were long sessions of propaganda,
on the progress in the USSR and statements regarding Soviet production Most
of the EM expressed themselves that they could not care less as to how many
tons of coal a Certain coal mine produced in 1954 compared to its 1952 out-
put. The political officers also made a nuisance of themselves by concerning
themselves with items such as training, supply, and assignments within the
battalion, Which were no of their business.
c. Inadequate Food and Clothing
Poor food and clothing contributed to a large degree to
the feeling of unhappiness among-' most of the soldiers. The clothing was
of poorer quality than Source had been used to at home, and was issued in
insufficient quantities to permit the maintenance of a decent ,standard of
cleanliness. Likewise, Source stated, the food was of poor quality and had
little or no variety from meal to meal.
8. Offiqer-EM Relationships
The main privileges enjoyed by officers that were resented
by the EM were as follows:
a. Officers were permitted to have their families with
themswhered5 EM,with the exception of the extended-tour EM(sverkherochniki)3
were not.
b. The officers had a more varied menu with better quality
food in their mess hall and received more and better clothing.
c. The officers were permitted to drink intoxioants and
were authorized to visit civilian communities. Neither one of these two
privileges was permitted to the obligatory-tour EM.
d. The EM were also resentful of the wide difference i
the pay scale of officers and the EM.
Source stated that most of the ill feeling aMong privates
Ln the Soviet Army was against the sergeants and not against the officers.
ie felt that this state of affairs was due to the close contact that the
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privates had with NCO's, consequentlysmost of the privates' hardships were
blamed on them. Also, many of the sergeants were not well educated and were
cruel and despotic to their subordinates in many cases. The officerson
the other hand4were aloof and did not come into close contact with the
privates. Source further stated that the NeWs in the Soy Army were in
excellent physical condition and had grown hardened and more used to the
life than the new induCtees who served as privates. It WassthereforetpoSsible
for the NCO's to beat individual privates in a fight. .
c. There was a sign in the garrison Military Sales Store which
specified that the store was open apprexiMely six hours for officers and
their dependents and for only two hours to enlisted personnel.
9. Organized Troop Entertainment
Although movies were presented in the club on Saturdays and Sundays
as a fOrm of entertainment, they ceased to become enjoyable when they
.became compulsory fortall trainees by the order of the Battalion Dep CO for
Political Affairs in nen The major portion of the movies shown in
br satellite entertainment films which had
propaganda 'flavoring such as, the Czechoslovakian film ''Operation"B" which
depicted the military operation against the insurgent followers Of Bandera.
:Phere were occasional US movies shown such as a black' and white version of
"The Three Musketeers', "Meet John Doe", and "Senator". The US films were
in English anduprior to the start of each filmsa caption shot was run off
which stated that the film was a captured war trophy taken in the battle
for BERLIN.
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Source stated that in spite of the English sound track, most, of
the men thoroughly enjoyed seeing the US movies. He stated that he personally'
was very much impressed that in the film "Senator", scenes showing the US
Senate in action also showed that spectators were permitted in the gallery.
When films became compulsory. in Source's unitpthe political officers
explained to the EM that this action was being taken to prevent personnel.
from getting into trouble. Source stated that prior to this order many
trainees would sneak off to the nearby town to GOETZENDORF to drink alcoholic
intoxicants during the time when they were authorized to be absent from the
companies to attend films. P
10. Policies on Promotion and Re urn to the USSR
Source was not too aware of Soviet Army promotion policy as being
a cause for dissatisfaction in his unit and he had only the following com-
ments to make on this topic.
He believed that in his unit, the EM,outside of the extended tour
Dersonnel (sverkhsrochniki) were not too anxious for promotion as it was'
rumored for a time during 1954 that all,eNCO's might have their compulsory
:our-of-service extended to four years. This was the reason that many
len gave for their inattentive, neglectful application to duty. Source
Btated it was not unusual for EM to commit minor infractions of orders in
prder not to be considered for promotion.
However, the personnel who were demobilized in 1953 had a completely '
lifferent attitude toward promotion. Most Of them were industrious and-hard-
rorking up to within three or four months before demobilization in hope of' '
eing promoted- However, when the rumor of extensions of terms of Service
or NCO's began to circulate in 1954, dissatisfaction with promotion policies
isappeared.6
Extended-tour EM may have been dissatisfied with promotion policies
pplicable to them in other units. Of these, Source had no knowledge. In
Is unitothere was no dissatisfaction to Source's knowledge among the career
CO's relative'to premotiops; there were Only 12 of them and they were all
ither Sr Sgts or Vsgts, (
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Source had heard officers voice their dissatisfactionsdthofficers'
promotion policy because of tho criteria used to determine whether or not
an officer was qualified. Source had been told by officers in conversations
that an officer was considered for promotion not upon his own knowledge and
ability but on the abilities, moraleland performance of his subordinated.
Most officers believed that With the extremely low enlisted morale stemming
from the living conditions and lack of freedom in the Soviet Army for EM,
a command position was a poor place for an ambitious officer. In a command
assignment, the officer in charge was constantly held accountable for his
EM, who were abused under the Soviet Army.system without the officer having
any power to improve conditions and morale. Thussit was considered by the
officers that a nice, soft staff assignmentaras by far preferable for
promotion potential than a line assignment.jc
Prior to his induction into the Soviet Army, Source had listened
o the Voice Of America in MOSCOW and was under the.impression-thatall of
he defectors mentioned were civilians who for one reason or another had fled'
o the West. Source further claimed that he had often listened to the VOA
'ith his own private radio in the barracks in GOETZENDORF and had heard no
ention of military deserters. He believed that this omission was unfortunate.
. FRATERNIZATION WITH, THE LOCAL POPULATION
The official SovietlArmy attitude toward fraternization in Austria as
eflec ted in his own unit was described by Source as being best represented
y the ancient pagan god,"dvulik i Yanus")who possessed two faces, '
coling in the opposite direction from each other. The troops were constantly
rged towards closer cooperation and peaceful relations with the Austrian:
opulation andeat the same time,they were even forbidden to exchange a
riendly greeting with Austrians. The degrees of opportunity to visit .
ivilian communities was roughly divided into three categories; the officers,
ne ended-tour enlisted personnel (sverkberochniki)fand the obligatory.
Dur Mrs and privates. Each made up.a class, with separate rules and
Dportunities governing them.*
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1. Officers
Of the three groups, Source believed the officers had the greatest
latitude in associations with the Austrians. He did not believe that
officers in his unit actually had Austrian friends in the fullest sense of
the word. Some officers in his unit visited civilian communities to drink
and meet "willing" young women, but this did not mean that every officer
had the same opportunity. An officeesi, privilege of going to town depended
upon his battalion CO's permissionl and what Aorould be forgiven to one
officer would cause another to be subject to a court-martial. Thus, the
opportunity for officers to visit Austrian communities largely depended on
how the officer stood with the battalion CO..
3. 9-941=L.ti
The third group, the obligatory tour NCO's and privates in Source's
battalion'were absolutely prohibited from visiting civilian establishments
cr residences. Only those EM who had official business in a civilian
community were able to leave the garrison.
Source was able to travel to VIENNA regularly to plox up ana de1iver the
battalion mail. Other obligatory tour EM spent their entire tour with their
assigned unit and never had the opportunity to vidit any of the Austria:4
;owns except in an AWOL statue.
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While traveling to and from VIENNA, Source was able to meet quite
a number of obligatory tour gm from Other units who apparently had passes. to
go to the city from their respective CO's for recreational purposes. These
nen were from the 15th Ode Med Tk Regt stationed in BRUCK, Austria,and an
unidentified rifle battalion serving as Komendatura., troops in VIENNA.
These EM possessed a four to five-hour pass to visit the Soviet sector of
VIENNA "for pleasure". Source believed that this practice was started only
pfter the implementation of an order from the Ministry of Defense in the
'all of 1953, which was intended to ease the conditions of Soviet Army
personnel in Austria. This order was the one that first permitted the
lependents of officers and extended-tour EM to come to Austria. (See section
.,1 of this report.) There was, however, no apparent relaxing of restrictions
.n his own unit.
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4. Enforcement of Polax
Source stated that the main controls for preventing fraternizatiOn
ested in the hands of unit commanders. They were responsible for the behavior,
4. their subordinates and devised whatever restrictions they deemed necessary
o enforce the general non-fraternization policy.
Source believed that the Austrian police had no authority whatsoever
ver the actions of Soviet military personnel. He did not believe that
hey had any mission of reporting on the whereabouts or activities of person-
el who were visiting Austrian communities whether with or without permission.
e believed that dependable party members of the local population may have
een working in cooperation with Kamendatura patrols in reporting violators
f the non-fraternization policyobut was not sure.
a. Military Police Enforcement
The non-fraternization policy was principally enforced by
Korendatura patrols, who were authorized to arrest any Soviet military
r6onnel without passes. Source was only stopped twice by these patrols
.aring il:Ls many trips to VIENNA and other acRA,as:the.battalion mail
lerk. Both times it was ror violat1OnS ,-OgliP,atanding,orders and
ot for being in town alone.
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The first time0ource was stopped because he was out of uniform.
He had had his tunic destroyed in a tire and was wearing a "bushlat" (4
(quilted short jacket) which was not permitted for off-duty or out-of-garrison
wear. Upon explaining to the two 4mendatura men his circumstances he was
Permitted to go on..
The second time,he was stopped for entering.the VIENNA military
sales stores during hours when It was open only to officers and their
dependents. This violation was reported. to his CO through channels after
'checking in at the 4th Komendaturk headquarters. A delinquency report was
pent to the battalion CO., who called $91;rolLiti and .reprimanded him for not
observing the sign at the sales 5-lore,PrOhlbitIng entrance to gm during week
days: Source received no punishment although the delinquency report directed
the battalion CO to take punitive'measuresin keeping with the violation.
b. Enforcement by Other Soviet Units
Source had never heard of MVD, UKR, ?KR, "SASH", or
district MOB units being concerned with controlling fraternization of Soviet
military personnel with foreign personnel while serving abroad.
C. PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL MATTERS 8
1. 0fioer- Political lations
Source believed that political officers had amicable official
relationships with other officers in the Soviet Army. He thought that,
general*, political officers were disliked socially by the others and
that normally the two groups stayed apart. However, he felt that there
no wide gulf or serious friction between the two groups.
2. Relations Among Armed Services' Components
was
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AIL
Force and Armored units had such bad feelkng about each other that consider-
able bloodshed and violence, even to the employment of tanks to shoot up .
the airstrip, resUlteC, He had. never heard of any other bad relationships
of this kind.
3. Literary Propaganda
The media employed to indoctrinate Soviet troops politically known.
to Source, were magazines, newspapers, radio broadcasts, motion pictures,
and political lectures and meetings. Magazines cited as examples by Source
were:2E2E11S (Little Flame),'Krokodil, Fizkul'tura -1,Sport(Physical Culture
and St-56-effiT, Voyennyy Vestnik (The Military Herald), Tankist (The Tanker), '
iony?pga_Eal,(Military Thought), and Propagandist I Agitator. Newspapers
Ziiown to Source weretLitiraturna a Gazeta (Literary dazette), Sovetsk S ort,
?ravda, Izvestiya, Komsomo s aye Prayda1 Krasnaya Zvesda (Red tar , an
F,a, Chest' Rod iny (The CO' newspaper, For the Honor of the Motherland 0
4. Organization
The Zam olit in a Soviet military unit was the deputy of the CO on
all matters dea _ng with political affairs. Source believed that he was
.ctually the direct superior of all personnel of a unit except the CO.
The informer system among members of unit Party and Komsomol
-rganizations was the keystone of the Zampolit's power:within the unit.
t was each member's sacred duty to inform on any Soviet personnel who
ommitted major or minor violations of established orders. The Zampolit,
lthough hot-in position, by the nature: of his assignment, to mete out
unishment to violators, always top* it upon himaelf.to recommend the degree
f punishment which he felt was wartanted to the CO. The CO normally found
t impossible to, ignore this recommendation because he himself was always
member of the Communist Party, Thus,,any degree.of noncooperation on
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the part of the CO with the desires of the Zampolit would reflect adversely
on him in Communist Party circles. The Zampolit reported directly.to the
Zampolit of the next higher headquarters an. could4thus4influence the party
Career of any Communist.
In party meetings of members of a military organization, there was
no rank and all members were addressed as comrades. Thus, partywise, the
Zampolit was in a position of higher authority than his Commanding officer,
being an active party worker. Furthermore, it was. theoretically possible
for a Zampolit to.undermine a CO's Authority, within his own unit by influen-
cing all the members of the staff, who were generally.: party members and were
jointly responsible to their CO and to their Counterparts in 'a higher head-
quarters in addition to their responsibility throUgh party channels. Thus,
Source stated, party rule is first, last, and foremost in the Soviet Army.
5. Personalities
Background information on political officers, commanders, and staff
officers has been published (Soviet Standard Brief No 9).
, 6, axaslaslaal.Arlart
Source had no information on security measures relating to psycholog-
ical warfare.
7. _a_AlLas_ia...s.Aait_LProa)stDereation
Measures employed to prevent Soviet soldiers from deserting or
surrendering are atrocity tales of the fates of personnel who have fallen
into US or Allied hands and the threat of executing defectors upon their.
Teturn to the USSR.
8. Effects of US and Western Pro a anda
Source stated that it was not necessary for the Soviet Army to employ
nountermeasures to US and Allied propaganda since such propaganda very
rarely reached the Soviet serviceman. On the occasions when propaganda did
each Soviet military personnel, it was not understood by most of them mainly
Decause of,the ideologies expressed; terms employed had either no meaning for
:he recipients or not the same meaningthey had to the broadcaster.
An example of this was the Voice of AmericaloroadoaSt of President
:.isenhower's statement that the democratic and free world was solidly united
-ehind some (unknown) project. The Soviet serviceman had previously been
nformed again and again that the Soviet sphere of influence was the "demo-
ratio and free world'. In this mannerAhe was confused as to what was meant
zr these terms in the broadcast.
9. Effects of Soviet Propaganda
Soviet troops could not help but be receptive to their own propaganda
ince they were forced to attend classes and study, read, discuss,and answer
.aestions on all political themes in such a manner as to parrot the Communist
arty line.
A. concrete example of the efficiency of the Soviet Army propaganda
is given by Source. He asked a reserve officer-candidate trainee in the
:h Plat of his old company why Soviet labor was not permitted to strike when
:s position was undesirable economically. The trainee replied that LENIN
.d said/that this was not feasible as the worker has his own government in
.e USSR. Striking against this government wouldsthereforetbe seneieless,.
NIN argued o as this would, in fact, be.t.strike against themselves!
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Troops believedalmOet to,wman that the USSR
was basically the only nation in the worldtoclay that w*evetruggling for
peace in spite of some of the failings Of the Soviet)Oyetem. In spite of
this belief, however, almost all of the en realized that 4 certain amount
of the political propaganda handed ta,t1,07141kObviously eoMposed,of,lies.
For example, they.all'*neWfthat the patter:abut,,the good life," improvements
in the Soviet standard of living, the'succeit of,five-year plans, and other
such phahtasies were presented through political propaganda. However, the
troops "insisted on deceiving themselves and Acetified these lies to them-
selves becauselbasically,they were,proud of-being mentors of the first
communist government in the history of the ,WOrlcU"
10. Dissent Among Soviet Troops 50X1
a. Arguing Against ?arty Line'
Often in political stUdy,periods,' certain indiViduals would
indicate their basic resentment over the lot of the Soviet eitisen, through
arguments with the political instructor.. Theo, arguments'usuallyfollowed
such a theme as that the were not interested in:the p4Mber or bushels of
wheat harvested in some distant Oblast lb Eastern Siberia but would be
much happier If their own food rations would be ,lmprOved 'for the next meal.,
Some EM got away with arguing with the PolitiPaa,finstructor because they
were so limited'in,intelligente and edutation.thet the finer points of
political propaganda passed completely:Over?their heads,
Other soldiers who were better edutated.and obvitusly.fairly.intelligent
stood a good chance orgetting intO,qeriOUs trOUble',f0r. 13,12Oh-de*iat4Oniat
arguments. Source was once sent to thei:Battalien co fpr'argitg with the
instructor in political study class. As this wasa. falrly minor"disagree-
ment, he got off with only a harsh reprimand.
566
br. Littening tti Western proadcasts
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On variouevt,tcasiona,he and
ersenne w o shared the barratks.rooM with hiM.had'listened to the
Voice of America after midnight (Moscow Time). Although there were 22 EM
quart .'ed in the same room, no one reported this breach Of ,discipline.- He,
distinctly remembered one; broadcast that described .in; detail the miserable,
slovenly 'existence of the averageSovietworker; .t4e:Occasion1there
was no discussion'oroOmment on the:broadcast,aMont:thetroops except that.
one unknown soldier said, "Give it to them" (Meanint-th0A.k.iwa,e:gOod to
hear the truth). Source stated that on most occasions the' progreMs were'''
effectively Aammed by the Soviets. 50X1
, A.t.was possible to make out what waS said tnte in rare
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qf 3)v ?O
Summary of Unidentified ?oviet Ministry of Defense Order
4 ' ?
b
Source stated that although he had never. seeh this particular order, it
was a constant topic of conversation among the EM and officers stnce the
changes or previous regulations in it were very extebeive.
order were as follows!
1. Officers and extended-tour EM (Overkhsrochniki) were permitted to
bring their families to Austria. Source had never heard of any families of
BM in cnoupied areas.
2. The same personnel were allegedly permitted to wear civilian clothing
off duty. Source had again never seen or heard of extended-tour EM wearing
civilian clothes.
3. Officers were permitted to visit VIENNA on the strength of their
identification card and the verbal permission of their unit 00,1. Source
had seen officers traveling on the train to VIENNA accompanied by their
wives.
The agreed-on conditions of the
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4. Extended-tour EM were permitted to visit VIENNA with a special pass 50X1
.signed by the unit CO. Source had seen these personnel and some obligatory-
tour EM of other units traveling to VIENNA by train on recreational passes.
6. Officers and extended-tour EM were permitted to visit Austrian
,estaurants, of the first class type only, and Austrian movies.
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