RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL
?
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the ffsplonage Laws. Title 18. U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorised person is prohibited
by law.
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
USSR
Resistance Potential in the Soviet
Union
50X1
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
VOIMISMINIsommmos
RD
50X1
10 September 1954
4
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
ME APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY $IE REVERSE)
50X1
LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES
3-0270406
173.3
76i .1
CONFIDENT/AL
9/54
STATE ARMY 146. I NAVY likri_j_w_
NOTE. Washington distribution indicated by "ri Flold distribsdlon by "?.)
50X1
'a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26:
CONFIDENTIAL
CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
REPORT NO.
50X1
50X1
COUNTRY USSR
DATE DISTR. 13 August 1954
SUBJECT Resistance
Potential in the Soviet
Union NO. OF PAGES 3
DATE OF INFORMATION
50X1
REFERENCES:
PLACE ACQUIRED
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
50X1
50:0 l what peroentage of the Soviet Army and MVD troops
50:0 would, support the regime in case of future con-
flict. He stated that it would depend on the type of war. If
HITLER's policies were repeated -- embodying slave labor, concen-
tration camps and mass terrorism -- the Soviet Army would support
the local regime despite their dislike for it.
50:0 the local familiar brand of Communism would be preferred to
foreign enslavement. However, "An army which had .a humane
program - a program of freedom a would be another story."
2. Further, if such an army had as an adjunct some type of emigre
government or organization including an all-Russian army, then
both Soviet Army and MVD1 troops would follow it rather than the
Soviet government. The army would not have to be large so long
as it embraced all Soviet peoples - Russians, Ukrainians, etc.
50X1
50X1
vne correotive lacor camps lean
army of a strength of up to 15 million. The collective farmers -
more than 50% of the population - would, in many places, immediately
4drive out, fight with, and otherwise harass the heads of their
respective collective farms, the Party and Komsomol organizers,
(eto)."
CONFIDENTIAL
50X1
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
ucmrIDBBTIAL owc"
- 2 -
mx1 5, even now an uprising in the labor camps, for
instance, might well bring in the local population and military
5oxi r_rri_!sons on the side of the rebels. When reminded
that this had sometimes happened during the collecylvlzation
period without success, it was impossible to 50:00
Compare those days with the present. The people then did not under-
stand the true nature of collectivization. Before the war, opposi-
tion could not be expected, but after the war the people expected
ail manner of improvements. I nthe lot of the 50:00
aolleotive farmers at the present time cannot be borne under pre-
sent circumstances." He said that the people could not endure it,
and whether it wants to or not, the Soviet government at do some-
thing about the situation.
6. insisted that the series of price outs since the
war had done little to improve conditions, since they were largely
theoretical. Items were not available at any price or were priced
beyond reach, regardless of the number of reductions. The average
worker's salary was about 400 rubles per month, while a man's
suit of good quality cost 1,500-2,000 rubles.
case, despite his comparatively good salary, he could not buy eggs,
butter .(40 rubles a pound), or meat for his family, because such
items were rarely available at any price.
7. He insisted that in spite of price reductions and all other govern-
ment efforts, the material status of the people was very low; the
ov nil; majority of the population was half-starved. To test
50X1 saction, pointed out an apparent thee-
50X1 Sflo$l mathematiot4 puronasing advantage given by price reductions.
50X1 ihouted "Well, they were hungry and they are still
ungry. Suppose they can buy three kilos of bread for the former
price of two; they still cannot get enough." He branded the govern-
ment price-lowering measures as deceit and fantasy (obman I. fanta-
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
9.
50X1 10.
that even the low ppewar living standard had not been
ectiv,ten asked if it was a case of insufficient quantities
of consumer goods, he laughed and said, "It wasn't a case of in-
sufficiency, it was a case of non-existence. In many large cities
Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov - one cannot buy meat, butter, sugar, or
even kerosene."
any attempt by the West to sell products of any
morv vo Ins soviet government as stupidity. He believed that
NUM= was considerably weaker than STALIN and was attempting
to consolidate his position by such measures as buying badly needed
goods from Western sources.
never heard of a special NOB medal which was allegedly
established in 1950-1952 for activity against "banditism". He
said that even if such a medal was proposed it was never issued. 4.
He. said that acquaintances of his who had been decorated for
activities against nbanditise had received regular military
decorations such as the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner,
etc. Gs
CONFIDENTIAL
50X1
npriaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26 CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2
CONFIDENTIAL 50X1
-3-
11. When asked to describe the term "banditism",
it was the term used to describe the struggle against the will,
influence, and violence of the Soviet government, against the
Party, and against collectivization. He described such "bandits"
as patriots, and made it clear that they were not professional
criminals but rather political offenders.
50X1 1.
50X1 2.
C mment: Pictures of the proposed medal were actually
publishedn the Soviet press in 1950-1952.
CONFIDENTIAL
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400130001-2