COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000300340002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 27, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTRY Czechoslovakia
SUBJECT Collectivization of Agriculture
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
REPORT NO.
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DATE DISTR. 27 April 1954
NO. OF PAGES 6
REFERENCES:
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SOURCE
1. The agricultural cooperatives in Czechoslovakia before World War II
were small "common-aid" organizations Which were set up by the farmers
of their .own accord; no one was forced to join. The cooperatives
were started for various reasons. Some. vq:it irigaged in purdhaingsr.e,d.
and fodder, etc0 for members as well as selling agriculture products.
Some cooperatives handled the purchase and allotment of machinery for
member$. Others took care of the electrification of the villages.
Still other cooperatives-fielped the private farmers with the culti-
vation or special products such as hope, potatoes, or cereal grains.
There were cooperatives dealing with pastures. Others handled"
processing of milk. These pre-World War II cooperatives were not
collective farms, where the land: was worked commUnally and livestock
and machines pooed for common use.
2. The Czechoslovak government, through the Ministry of Agriculture,
assisted these agricultural cooperatives. The budget of the Ministry
always included special allotments for the cooperatives and for speci-
fic purposes, seg? hop production, which might go to the individual
farmers. The government Spent billions of crowns in the form of
subsidies, loans without interest, and completely covered expenses
incurred by whole communities, individual farmers, or cooperatives in
order to improve and modernize farMAO$Aethods,Atinc,zechbislovakia.
(As late as 1951, the Ministry of Agriculture cancelled outstanding
debts amounting' to hundreds of millions of crowns which were the
result of pre.-World-war-II loans to communities and cooperatives.)
The government assisted the agricultural cooperatives because they
were pioneers in modern methods of agriculture resulting in more
advantageous and cheaper means of rafting.
3. The first collective farms (still officially termed "uniform coopera-
tives" 27ednotne zemedelske druzstvo - JZ2.7 to avoid the stigma of
any form of the word collectivization) were set up in Czechoslovakia
shortly. after WOrld War II under the auspices of the Communist Party.
However, they were not successful and were soon dissolved. In 1946,
governmental aid to Czechoslovak agriculture and methods of allotting
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this aid, as it was known prior to World War II, gradually changed;
the Ministry of Agriculture allotted subsidies to the national
committees which had to guarantee that the funds would be used only
for cooperatives and other communal agricultural needs. Aid to the
individual farmers decreased more and more. Further, the Ministry
delegated authority to the Czech Farmers' Union (Jednotny svaz
Seskych zemedelcu JSCZ) and to the Slovak Farmers' Union to deal
directly with the individual farmers and cooperatives. (These two
unions were liquidated in 1952 and their property and activities
transferred to the regional national committees and the district
national committees.) These unions - for the Ministry - distributed
the subsidies and loans to the cooperatives and individual farmers.
This procedure conformed to the general policy decentralization
of government activities. The Ministry of Agriculture aimed its
policies toward the gradual collectivization of agriculture. (It was
a great advantage for the Communists that the Minister of Agriculture
was, from 1945, a Communist, DURIS, who had several aides who were
zealous Communists.)
4. After 1945 the efforts of the Communists to establish collective
farms were intensified. In the beginning, however, propaganda was
the only means used to convince farmers of the advantages of a communal
solution of their problems and of the advantages to be derived from
united labors. The efforts were directed toward implementing the
provisions of the "Dune Agriculture Acts".
There were four different types of "uniform cooperatives" in Czecho-
slovakia; each type represented a step toward the complete collectivi-
zation of agriculture. In the first type, a preparatory committee,
the forerunner of a future, full-scale collective farm, was established
and mutual assistance between farmers was initiated. In the second
type, some of the boundaries between the fields of individual members
were dissolved and common work in these fields was introduced. Animals,
buildings, machinery, and tools (animate and inanimate inventory) still
remained private property. The crop, which was harvested in common,
was divided-among the individual members in proportion to the land
they had contributed to the cooperative. In the third type, almost
all of the animate and inanimate inventory and all of the land was
common property. From 10 - 20% of the profits resulting from common
work was divided between the individual members in proportion to the
land they contributed to the cooperative, While the remaining 50-90%
of the profits was divided between the individual members in proportion
to the work performed. In the fourth type all of the animate and
inanimate inventory was common propertyp as well as the land, and the
profits from common work were divided between the individual members
in proportion to the work they had done regardless of the quantity
of land they had contributed to the cooperative. From the Communist
coup in 1945 until the Communist Congress in May 1949, about 1,900
collective farms were established, some of which were made up from the
old cooperatives. Out of this total, about 200 collective farms were
of the second and third type and the remaining 1,700 were of the first
type.
6. The collective farms were entirely different from, the cooperatives
as known in Czeolloslovakia until 1946. The collective farm was the
servant of the regime and had to obey the regime implicitly, mainly
because of the fact that the members were not actually owners of the
collective farm but only workmet paid in wages. Condominium in this
case did not presuppose rights of actual ownership.
7. The CP Congress in May 1949 was a decisive step toward the collecti-
vization of, agriculture. This congresa proclaimed unequivocally
that the regime planned to collectivize all arable land. It was
made known that land could no longer be privately owned in a state
where industry as a whole was socialized, which, of course, meant a
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fOrced;tranktforMatiOn of CZechoslovak agriculture, which had been
based on small ?d medium-Sized farms (2-20 hectares), into a system
where farming was done on a large scale either by the collective farms
or by "state farms". In general, the collective farm was more advah--
tageous to the government because the responsibility for the farming
was in. the hands of the members, while the losses incurred by the
state farms were borne by the treasury. The reaction of the people
to this CP program, as proclaimed in the congress, was, for the most
part, negativei,necessitating governmental pressure to enforce the
program.
8. It was the respOnsib4ity of the Ministry of Agriculture to see that
collectivization was carried out, The Ministry utilized the "action
committees% some of the members of the national committees, as well
as the-CF machinery to enforce the establishment of collective farms.
Measures were taken against private farmers who resisted collectivi-
zation. These farmers were called "village well-to-do's" (vesnicti
bohaci)441t1i. ' . Members of theformer
cooperatives were told to change the cooperatives into collective
-farms. 'Steps were also taken against those members of collective
farms who agreed withthe aim of the prograM but did not agree with
the Methods and procedure. Individual farmers or members of collec-
tive farms ho personallydid not agree with CP functionaries were
also affected. Those farmers whose property appeared attractive to
the CP members oe its officials were Also put under pressure.
The more important measures used to force the farmers to follow the
dictates pf the regime took the following forms:; The private farmer
was allotted an insufficient quantity of seeds, plants., or fertilizer
and did not have any choice as to quality. Often, it was made very
difficult for him to buy necessary agricultural equipment. He was
the last to receive aid from the tractor and machinery pools, although
he had been forced to contribute his machinery to the pools; sometimes
he was not allowed its use at all. Also, the fee to the machinery
pools for the use of the machinery, and the people to operate it was
made very high. The private farmer could not hire labor and was
entirely dependent on 'the members of his family.. Practically all of
the young persons left the farm for industry. Only long-time farmers
and old people remained On the farms. Children of private farmers
were not allowed to obtain higher education. The regime in some cases
proolaimed7the private farmers to be enemies of the working class and
thus in effect deprived them of equal treatment by government func-
tionaries. The quota of agriculture products which the farmers had
to turn over for distribution was intentionally placed too high for
the average private farmer. Some of the farmers bought. products (as
much as they could afford) on the free market - whenever available -
in order to make up their quota. In this way, the farmers quickly
spent their savings. Non-fulfillment of quotas resulted in heavy fines
so that some of the farmers preferred to go to prison instead.
10. The farmers Who after the above still opposed collectivization were
charged with sabotage and brought before the National Committee or
Court Where a part or all of their property was seized, especially
agricultural machines and equipment which were then allotted to a
tractor and machinery pool. Further, all of the property of the farmer
was confiscated and he was transferred to another farm; very often to
one in the unoccupied border areas from which the Germans had been
expelled. Those farmers who opposed most strongly were imprisoned in
forced labor camps. Those farmers, already members of a collective
farm, who were opposed to the 'procedure and methods applied by the
r?gime were fired from the collective farms, their property was
confiscated, and they were tranisferred.to other collective farms
especially in the border areas. Others were imprisoned in forced
labor camps.
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11. While applying all of these measures against farMetS who opposed
Collectivization, the regime supported in every possible way the
collective farms. The Ministry spent large sums of Money on publica-
tions, motion pictures, and on radio to convince the farmers of-the
advantages of collectivization. Further, the national committees'
arranged for the farmers to visit the best collective farms. As soon
as a collective farm was organized, it was supported by the authorities
in its effort to acquire adequate means for production such as horses,
barns, machinery, etc., as well as living units. These were very
often obtained by confiscation from private farmers who did not join.
The collective farms were allotted the necessary seeds, plants, ferti-
lizers, and fodder. The collective farms were the first to be served
by the tractor and machinery pools and were provided by the Ministry
with plans for construction and with building materials. The 'collec-
tive farms were enabled to obtain credit, and debts dating from the
time before the farmers joined the collective farm were Cancelled.
Outstanding workers of the collective farms were rewarded, monetarily
or otherwiss,-by the regime; also the collective farm, as a unit, re-
ceived a reward. The Ministry, assisted by the Revolutionary Trade
Union, organized a recreation program for "good" collective farmers..
For instance, they were given trips to Prague as guests of the Minis-
try. In order to help the collective farmers during the harvesting
seaso%the authorities organized labor brigades from the employees of
industry. During the planting and harvesting seasons officials of
the Ministry were sent to the regional and district tational Committees,
who were authorized to take whatever steps were necessary in order to
help the collective farms. These officials made reports to the-Minis-
try after they completed their mission. The Ministry paid for veteri-
nary aid required by the collective farms as well as insecticides.
The Ministry also trained specialists, i.e., tractor operators, book-
keepers, and supervisory employees for the cooperatives.
12. In spite of all this, the majority of the Czechoslovak farmers
still opposed collectivization and it became clear that collectiviza-
tion would not succeed. At the beginning of 1953, 90 of industry
and commerce in Czechoslovakia was socialized, but only 45% of the
farm lands was collectivized. Out of this 45%, from 10-15% were state
farms and the remaining 30% were collective farms. The total number
of collective farms of the 3rd and 4th type, mentioned above, was
about 6,800 only; and not all of these were operating profitably.
Most of the metberisiof the collective farms were dissatisfied; they
were not interested in their work; their wages were low. The collec-
tive farms in the border areas were forced to cultivate also "reserve"
land - land which had not been cultivated since 191.1.5 because of lack
of labor. This reserve land amounted to 150,000 hectares. The help
of the labor brigades was needed for the harvest. These brigades,
however, were opposed by the industrial workers and office employees
because they were deprived of their free time. It very often happened
that the crop rotted in the field; this was especially true of the
beet and potato crops. The state farms were also inefficient. The
production costs on the state farms were too high. They suffered
from lack of labor'- especially young people - and from low labor
morale. There was also a great lack of specialists and supervisory
employees, most of whom had been fired as disloyal to the r4gime.
The whole farming industry suffered from the lack of qualified
personnel in spite of efforts made by the Ministry of Agriculture,
the Ministry of State Farms, and the Ministry for Purchase of Agri-
culture Products. Confidential reports, written by government employees
and Party functionaries as the result of meetings with the farmers
which reached the Ministry, showed that without the private farmer
there would be a catastrophic shortage of agricultural products.
Similar reports were sent to the Ministry by its special officials
who were sent to the farming areas during planting and harvesting
time as mentioned above. Not only the Ministry of Agriculture, but
the government as a whole was gravely concerned; early in 1953,
special commissions were set up including representatives of the
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Government Presidium, the ministries concerned@and the Communist
Party. These commissions were to establish the causes of the failures
in agricultural production. The results of the work of these commissions
were elaborated into extensive reports classified confidential; A
series of speeches apparently based on these reports by various high-
ranking political officials followed in May and June of 1953. All of
the speeches revealed the failures in agriculture, specifically failures
in procedure and methods of establishing collective farms. It was
understood from the speeches that the speed toward collectivization
had to be slowed down. In a speech in the summer of 1953, President
ZAPOTOCKY not only revealed the failures in collectivization but also
Said that the members of collective farms could leave the farms and
start farming again on a private basis. The speech expressed the hope,
however, that all those who took this step would return to the collec-
tive farm after they recognized that colleotivization was the proper
way to farm. Naturally, the farmers reacted to ZAPOTOCKY's speech.
Many delegations of peasants went to the Ministry of Agriculture to
complain about conditions and ask the Minister to take steps to carry
out the promises made in the speech; they complained that they were
prevented, by local authorities, from leaving the collective farms.
These delegations varied in size from 2 to 10 persons, and included
both Party members and those who were not. The delegations were
usually received politely, listened to, asked to think the situation
over, and, if they persisted in their decision, they were referred to
the regulations of the collective farms which did not allow them to
quit before or during the spring work in the fields or before harvest
time. I do not know whether or not the CP functionaries or the regional
zational ,ommittees received any directives to this effect. I do not
know how many farmers were allowed to leave the collective farms in
the months which followed, but the farmers dissolved most of the
collective farms it the Presov and Kolice regions after ZAPOTOCKY's
speech. Not only were collective farms dissolved in these regions, but
many of the local regional committees broke up because no one wanted to
serve on the committees. The government had to send special emissaries
to govern the villages. (It is my opinion, though I have no concrete
evidence to support it, that ZAPOTOCKY had not really intended by
his very vague and general speech as many concessions as were later
read into it by an impatient peasantry and, therefore, the immediate
reaction to the speech caught the government by surprise.)
13. Further results of the official reports on agriculturegiragraph
were as follows. The Ministry of Agriculture, along wi the Revolu-
tionary Trade Union and the Ministry of Labor, secured 50,000 boys
and girls, who were leaving school, for permanent work in agriculture
to alleviate the shortage of labor. Another result was an effort to
increase the population in the border areas and to cultivate the '
reserve grounds, which was intensified in the summer of 1953. This
action originated at the end of 1952 when the government set aside
900,000,000 crowns (pre-currency reform) to cultivate reserve grounds.
The local national committees were authorized to buy tools, seeds, and
to pay for necessary repairs of buildings, and to hire farm labor.
Weyer, by August 1953 only about 120,000,000 crowns had been 41s-
bursed. Lack of labor was the main reason for the failure to bring
More than a small part of this unused land into use. Still another
result was that confidential instructions were given to the CP func-
tionaries to lower the quota of agricultural products which the private
farmers had to turn over for distribution. As another step, it was
planned to increase the price paid for agricultural products. 2Thi8
Step was actually taken according to Government Bulletin #24, dated
l954 which Source saw after his arrival in the West2 In addition,
at the time I left, it was planned not only to grant loans to collec-
tive farms, but to the private farmers as well. /!his measure was
put into effect according to Government Bulletin 19, 19574.A
revision of the agricultural tax was in preparation as another step.
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Finally, it was planned to lower the fee which private farmers and
colleative farms had to pay to tractor and machinery pools for assis-
tance. All of these measures proved that the government was well
aware of the situation in agriculture and of the overwhelming diffi-
culties involving collectivization. he speech of Minister DURIS on
50X1 the Czechoslovak budget for 1954 gave a clear picture of the situation
in agriculturej
14.
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this slowdown in collectivization of agricul-
ture was only a temporary measure and that the government will resume
a more severe policy as soon as the time is ripe. It will depend on the
food supply in Czechoslovakia, i.e., how long the existence of private
farmers is necessary to the government. However, a switch toward a
more severe policy in collectivization will meet still heavier resis-
tance than after 1949 because the farmers have become aware of their
importance to the regime, the slowdown measures
which have been taken since the secona nail. of 1953 came too late
and that it is no longer possible for the rggime to reconcile the
farmers.
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