CUBANS IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: BRIEF

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I. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a few remarks
about the nature and scale of the Cuban involvement
in Angola. It is, after all, this massive presence
that enables the Cubans to support rebel groups
such as the ex-Katangans who have invaded Zaire
twice in the last 14 months.
II. The Cubans are playing a critical military role
in countering the continuing opposition to the
Neto regime. They also provide technical ex-.
pertise that is vital to the Angolan government
and economy.
A. We estimate that there are 19,000 to 20,000
Cuban soldiers and about 5,000 civilian
advisers in Angola. Another 5,000 advisers--
mostly teachers and construction workers--
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 are expected by the end of this year. Recent
reporting suggests that the number of Cuban
soldiers in Angola may also be increased
shortly.
III. In the civilian sector, Cuban advisers fill
much of the vacuum created by the departure
A. They are developing a national education
system, running the public health service,
assisting in the coffee and sugar harvests,
and reconstructing roads and bridges destroyed
during the civil war. Along with about 1,000
S~vk'et advisers, they are virtually running
some government ministries including the
Ministries of Construction and Housing,
Defense, Education, Health, Finance, Transport,
and Foreign Trade.
IV. The Neto regime would probably fall if it were
not for the Cuban military presence.
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 A. The Cubans provide critical training, air,
artillery, and logistical support to the
Angolan military. Although the Cubans
usually operate alongside the Angolans
in fighting the insurgents, they also mount
independent--and on occasion fairly substantial--
operations against the guerrillas.
B. We believe that more than 1,000 Cubans
have been killed in Angola since the
civil war. Since last fall, Cuban casualties
have increased markedly because of an intensi-
fication in the fighting and because Cuban
soldiers have become the insurgents' highest
priority target.
V. In addition, the substantial Cuban presence has
become a major source of friction with the Angolan
people.
A. Difficulties involving civilian advisers
have been resolved fairly easily when top
political leaders are called in, but
antipathy toward the Cubans in the military
is likely to become an increasingly serious
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 problem. Morale is low, some Cuban units
have refused combat assignments, and there
have been occasional reports that fights
between Cuban and Angolan soldiers have
resulted in casualties.
B. Neto probably would like to reduce the Cuban
presence somewhat. Given the immensity and
immediacy of his problems, however, he has
little choice but to seek more foreign troops
and advisers.
VI. In addition to their other activities in Angola,
the Cubans provide training for ZAPU, SWAPO, and
Katangan guerrillas based in southern and eastern
Angola. We believe there are about 2,000 ZAPU,
4,000 SWAPO, and 5,000 Katangan guerrillas in
Angola.
CUBAN AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR KATANGAN INSURGENTS
I. Mr. Chairman, for the remainder of this briefing,
I would like to outline for you the evidence that
has led us to the conclude:
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 A. That the Cubans have been involved in
training and advising the Katangans since 1975.
B. That the Soviets-and Cubans have supplied
the Katangans with weapons and equipment.
--That the Cuban and Soviet involvement was
going strong right up until May 13 when the
most recent attack on Katanga occurred.
--That the Cubans, at least, -foreknowledge
II. Let me take, first, the Cuban denials of involve-
A. Most of these points have been made in private
by Cuban officials and by the Cuban Vice Presi-
dent at the UN earlier this week. They were,
however, made most fully by Fidel Castro to
the US Interests Section in Havana on 17
May. Be said:
1. There are no Cubans with the Katangan
forces in Shaba.
2. Cuba has not participated either directly
or indirectly in the Shaba affair.
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3. Cuba has provided no weapons or other
material to the Katangan forces.
4. Cuba has not trained the Katangan forces.
5. Cuba has not had any contact with the
Katangans for at least two years.
B. Our evidence shows that all of these asser-
tions are false except the first one. We
have not been able to confirm reports that
Cuban personnel actually entered Zaire and
III. Virtually all of the evidence we have on Cuban'
and Soviet involvement with the Katangans comes
from clandestine reporting. The reporting is
particularly convincing because it represents
a wide variety of sources--many of them extremely
sensitive--and because it is consistent. In
reaching our conclusions, we have discounted
all reports from Zairian sources, given the
high probability of bias.
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ILLEGIB
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25X1
25X1
Let me detail the evidence on the Cuban role
with the Katangans.
25X1 B.
25X1 C.
Iwas told during extensive
conversations with two Katangan prisoners
that two Cuban and six Angolan advisers
accompanied the rebels when they started
moving out of Angola in early May. The
prisoners added that Katangan "political
commissars," who had been trained in
Angola by Cubans and East Germans, were
assigned to each group of 50 rebels.
official stating in early May that Cuban,
Soviet, and East German personnel were
training Katangan rebels in Angola.
reports a Cuban
ILLEGIB
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 Approved For Release 2003/
D. In October 1977,
learned from Angolan military officers that
1,500 Katangan recruits in Angola had just
completed their training and were under the
control of Cuban and East German instructors.
In August 1977,
had said that the-Cubans were training
some 2,000 Katangans in northeastern Angola.
have reported that
Soviet and East German advisers have been
training Katangan guerrillas for one year
and possibly longer. Most of this instruction
reportedly takes place in northeastern Angola
where large Cuban and Angolan military camps
are also located.
V. Another body of evidence strongly supports the
case that the Cubans were involved with the
Katangans prior to the first Shaba invasion
in March 1977.
A. For example,
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ILLEGI
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 have reported that
the Angolan army and its Cuban military ad-
visers helped train the insurgents and coordi-
nated closely in the planning of the invasion.
B. We also know that Castro told
at a meeting in Moscow in April 1977 that
Cuba was helping the Katangan nationalists
because once Katanga fell, Zaire would fall
like a house of cards.
VI. It is clear that the Cubans knew about the most
-recent invasion before it occurred,
ficial commented
that an increase in military action by
the Katangan rebels might be anticipated
in the near future.
B. Castro himself told the Chief of the
US Interests Section in Havana on 17
May that Cuba had received reports
that the Katangans were preparing for
another incursion.
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 C. The question of the extent to which the Cubans
or others have control over Katangan activities
is more difficult. The Katangans probably
have some freedom of action on tactics, local
objectives, and timing of specific operations.
Nevertheless, we believe that the support
provided the insurgents by Cuba, Angola, and
the Soviet Union gives these countries veto
power over any major Katangan operations.
VII. Based on a limited number of reports--but from
we believe the Ka-
tangans have received arms and equipment from
the Soviet Union, Cuba, and possibly other Com-
munist countries.
reported that
two "Cuban or Soviet" ships unloaded
weapons--mostly small arms and ammunition--
in Luanda harbor in early October 1977, and
that these were destined for the sole use
of the Katangans. We know that several
Cuban and Soviet ships were anchored in Luanda
harbor at about that time.
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that a rew Cubans did accor-o-.ny Lhc ,
invaders ;,? o Zaire,
3. We cann,;- ruul.c out the poe-,i)ilityp h;
VIII. As I ;noted .:cliez, we -annot: ;nf _i_In to,-
.tual
presence o `',;::,ans in Zaire c,,r 21u the fighting.
A. We do r.,__ ;)c, 1. '.eve Havana would hd Ie :.y'. ~d
to be i evcl w,-ed in actual coy ibat in cc.
The ri sl 1' Cubans being captured or_ and thus providing concret* p.roo;_
involvei - it.- -would imply" too
Y
1. The credible report of this: ':o
date-- -.,1es from a
citizen
trapped iii Kolwezi at the time of
invasion. lie claims that ho LVa ,, rid
only after conversing in Spanish w;:'1
core Cubans ,
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C. Cuban advisf'rs probably did at least accompany
the rebels to the border.
5X1
25X1
before the invasion
that Cuban personel were organizing a large
number of Katangan troops and that Cuban ad-
visers were moving with the troops toward
the Zambian border.
2. This report is corroborated by the
statements of two Katangan prisoners
to
wnich I mentioned
earlier. The Katangans said that Cuban
and Angolan advisers were with them when
they started to move in early May.
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 Cuban Sensitivity About Shaba
US accusations that Cuba has been involved with the
FNLC have provoked a strong and emotional reaction from the
Castro regime for at least two reasons.
--First, if a convincing case is made that Havana
backed the FNLC, Havana's credibility as a responsible actor
on the African continent would be seriously undermined.
Havana has repeatedly justified its interventions in Angola
and Ethiopia by arguing that it was coming to the defense
of established governments. In the case of Zaire, however,
the Castro regime will be open to the charge that it abetted
attempts to subvert a legitimate black African government.
The Cubans have defended their intervention in Ethiopia on
the grounds that they were helping the Mengistu government
maintain its territorial integrity. In Zaire, however, the
Cubans will be shown to have supported efforts to dismember
an African state.
--Secondly, Cuba has been concerned that outside powers
aligned with MObia'd , ,: 4jat ld~sjd evidence of Cuban involvement
with the FNLC as a justification for a strike into Angola.
Havana's concern on this point probably was considerably heightened
by the South A:Drican raid into Angolan territory on May 4 as
well as the rapid Western response to the conflict in Zaire.
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Reasons for Castro's Personal Involvement
--Fear that charges of Cuban involvement (if left
unchallenged) would provide Western forces with
excuse for retaliation against Angola.
--Corollary concern that rapid escalation of the
conflict would cause it to spill over into
Angola and lead to involvement of Cuban forces there.
--Concern that international acceptance of allegations
CuN li ke -1-4?e cases o44 004CAClw cA~aQ E'4,.op i a. )
of Cuban involvement would leave Havana open to
charges of dismembering an African state. &hriQ
Bt episa._
--Castro realizes that concrete proof of Cuban involvement
will be difficult to obtain as long as Cuban personnel
do not accompany the Katangans across the border.
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