ZAIRE: BACKGROUND TO THE STRUGGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Zaire: Background to the Struggle
When the Congo: became independent in 1960, the country
had no national political institutions, no national leader-
ship, and very few people with experience'in running either the
government or the economy. Independence'was followed by an army
mutiny, debilitating political infighting, fragmentation of
the country along ethnic lines, and several regional secessions--
the most important of which involved Katanga, now Shaba.
Although the uprisings were largely, suppressed by late 1965,
the competition for political primary between the forces of
President Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe brought the government
to a standstill.
In November 1965, then Lieutenant General Joseph Mobutu
seized control, dismissed Kasavubu and installed himself as
President. With the support of the military and selected
civilian political allies, Mobutu replaced the disorganized
parliamentary system with centralized autocratic rule. Despite
the trappings of constitutional representative government,
Mobutu continues to rule in a highly personal, authoritarian
manner. Although he rules with an iron fist, he is not unduly
cruel. He has shown some concern for the'US position on human
rights.
The forty-eight year old Mobutu has brought a modicum
of stability to Zaire. The political and economic challenges
that have beset the country could easily have overwhelmed half
a dozen presidents. with lesser staying power. Mobutu has
attempte t create and maintain a sense'of national unity in
an under ?rd`country the size of the US east of the Mississippi
River., whose mostly illiterate 25 million inhabitants comprise
over 200 tribes using 700 languages and dialects. He has
survived Congolese blood politics and has repelled challenges
over the years with little on his side except the army--the
base of his power--and his own intelligence and craftiness.
After several years of apparent progress in political and
economic development, conditions began deteriorating about
four years ago with increasing speed. Economic reversals and
the rekindling of the country's divisive ethnic and regional
sentiments have combined to threaten Mobutu's rule and jeopardize
Zaire's future. Some of the country's problems--such as the
drastic fall in copper prices--have been beyond Mobutu's
power to control. F77 I
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In viewing the country's rapid recovery shortly after
Mobutu came to power, observers--perhaps including Mobutu
himself--probably believed that a recurrence'of the total
chaos and rampant incoherence of the early 1960's would not
be possible. If the present trends toward complete economic
and political decay are not reversed,, however, Mobutu's self-
described "miracle" could end in the darkness in which it
began. Mobutu is facing his most serious crisis as Zaire's
"President-Founder."
Mobutu's economic and political problems have been brought
to a head by the recent invasion of Shaba Region by ex-Katangan
gendarmes. Shaba, formerly Katanga Province, is the richest
of Zaire's nine regions, and without Shaba's wealth Zaire
would not be a viable entity.
After the Congo's independence in 1960, secessionists
proclaimed the short-lived Republic of Katanga and organized
a 12,000-man police force. Several thousand of these poftwee
went into exile in Angola after Mobutu seized power. Recently,
the term "Katangan" has been applied generally to anti-Mobutu
exiles in Angola--including tribal relatives recruited by the
original exiles, other political dissidents and military
deserters from Zaire, and probably some vagrant Angolans.
The Katangan leadership calls itself thCongolese National
Liberation Front (FNLC). The Organization is led by "General"
Nathaniel Mbumba a Luanda tribesman from Shaba who fled to
Angola in 1967.'FNLC touts a socialist line, but rank and
file members probably are primarily motivated by their opposi-
tion to Mobutu, an attitude exacerbated by traditional mis-
trust and by adverse personal or tribal experiences under
Mobutu's rule. Shaba, and oth r Zairian regions, have
legitimate grievances against ' obutu'X government. The
residents of the aggrieved regions are not, however,
particularly receptive to socialist ideology. The FNLC has
representatives abroad and claims to have a wide range of
support in Zaire that cuts across tribal and regional lines.
The organization's basic support rests, however, with the
Luanda tribesmen who reside in Shaba region and in contiguous
parts of Angola and Zambia. The rebels acceptance of'Angolan
and Cuban support is probably a marriage of convenience
Other dissident groups exist, although they pose no great
threat to Mobutu. The rising tide'of popular discontent will
probably increase,, however.
Mobutu is Western-oriented and sees himself asa moderate
elder stateman holding the line against Communist encroachment
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in Africa. He has maintained close relations with the US and
receives US aid and some military assistance. Mobutu believes,
however, that the West--mainly the `US--is abandoning Zaire and
other moderate African states. He is concerned and jealous
that Nigeria may be replacing his country as Washington's
major interest in Africa.
Last year in order to obtain foreign support to repulse
an incursion of rebels into Shaba, Mobutu portrayed the
attack as a massive foreign invasion led by Cubans. France
mobilized a coalition of foreign supporters to intervene on
Zaire's behalf. A similar scenario may be repeated this
year. Unless he can obtain substantial foreign military and
economic assistance, Mobutu may not survive.
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