AGENDA FOR 'RETREAT' AT(Sanitized), 18-19 MAY 1979 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000500040009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 10, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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10 May 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Comptroller
Inspector General
Legislative Counsel
Director of Public Affairs
Director, Equal Employment Opportunity
FROM: Special Assistant to the Director
25X1A SUBJECT: Agenda for "Retreat" at E 18-19 May 1979 (U)
25X1A
1. The DCI.appreciated your various suggestions for discussion
topics and drew from them in designing the agenda. For Friday evening,
the plan is to have cocktails from 1800 to 1845, dinner from 1900 to 2030,
and discussions from about 2045 until 2300. (U)
2. The Friday evening discussions will be devoted to the general
subject, "Where is the Agency Headed?". will introduce
this topic and will focus in part on the following specific aspect
of the problem:
"At issue is whether we can reestablish a climate within which
we can effectively conduct secret intelligence collection and
operations. Alternatively, should we accept the nature of the
public and political climate and decide how to properly redefine
our mission within it? A key factor is the nature of the SALT
debate and the role of intelligence in monitoring international
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agreements. Is it possible to maintain secrecy in public
debates on proposed agreements or in carrying out related
monitoring activities that are inherently open to public
scrutiny?"
Jim's presentation will take up about half an hour. Afterwards,
the general subject of "whither the Agency" will be open to all
participants for comments and observations. You may wish to follow
up on some of the ideas which Jim advances, or you may want to pursue
other aspects of the problem which you regard as significant. (C)
25X1A 3. On Saturday morning, discussions will begin at 0800 with
introducing the topic, "The Bureaucratization of the
CIA--Its Impact on Morale and Efficiency, and What Can Be Done About
It?". (C)
25X1A 4. At 0900, will lead off with a ten-minute presentation
on the topic, "R&D in the CIA--Problems and Prospects." The balance of
the hour will then be devoted to general group discussion of this
subject. (C)
25X1A
25X1A
5. From 1000 to 1100, will lead discussion of the
subject, "Synchronization of Agency Objectives with Agency Resources."
An outline is attached. (U)
6. Finally, from 1100 to 1200, the subject will be "Anticipating
the Next Iran." The DDCI will lead off with a brief status report on
the proceedings of the interagency working group in which he has been
participating. (C)
7. We are still working out the details of the wives program.
Information on this subject will be circulated on 14 May. (U)
Attachment a/s
cc: SA/DDCI
ET
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SECRET,
27 April 1979
SUBJECT: Synchronization of Agency Objectives with Agency
Resources
Inspections during the past two years have revealed several
problems which can be traced to straightened resources -- money,
manpower and facilities -- unmatched by compensatory adjustments
in mission and objectives. While the fast decline of covert action
in recent years has justified reductions in manpower and budgets,
it is our opinion that CIA's mission/resource equation may need
further adjustment. The health of the Agency will ultimately de-
pend upon its professional effectiveness. Its effectiveness will
depend on a realistic definition of mission and on objectives
which fit the capacity of the resources allotted to the job.
Philosophically, it is preferable for CIA to do fewer things very
well rather than more things less well. The following are some
symptoms, possibly indicating a stretching of resources:
A. Headquarters staffing is thin, in places,
giving rise to bare spots and churning. Headquarters
staffing, particularly in the DO, is characterized by
rapid turnover and ofttimes green incumbents. NFAC,
as pointed out by a recent inspection report, is thin
on expertness in some areas of critical importance to
U.S. policy makers.
B. Manpower commitments are excessive to the
product obtained. A possible example of this can be
seen in the collection of information on drug traf-
ficking. While drug-related intelligence is excellent,
there is doubt as to DEA's ability to use it to good
advantage in reducing trafficking to the U.S.
C. Inadequate manpower commitments to vital
programs. The shortage of Headquarters personnel has
cut into important training and rotational assignments.
There is, for example, a serious shortage of Agency
linguists, yet the language-training resources are not
kept busy because officers cannot be spared for language
instruction. Rotational assignments designed to broaden
potential supergrades or to provide qualified instructors
on rotational assignments for training facilities are be-
coming more difficult to make.
. ISECRETI
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D. The Staff structures in the Agency may be
too large in comparison to the line components they
serve.
DISCUSSION
If Agency resources -- people, money, facilities -- are
inadequate to perform all the assigned missions effectively,
there would appear to be three theoretical courses of action
available:
-- Seek and obtain additional resources
adequate to the task.
-- Scale down the task so that the available
resources are adequate to it.
-- Satisfy ourselves with doing more things
less well.
Realistically, only the first two options are acceptable.
On the one hand, a comprehensive case can be made for the minimum
adequate resources implied by present and emerging missions.
While this resource package would be demonstrably austere, it
might also be adequate. On the other hand, a strategy for elim-
ination of certain mission elements could be prepared, with each
element costed out so that the resource impact of its deletion
could be readily appreciated.
The preferred solution, obviously, is acquisition of sup-
plemental resources adequate to permit the full range of tasks
to be performed at minimally acceptable levels. The case for
this would take into account the increasing intelligence require-
ments of Agency customers, the heightened appreciation of the im-
portance of intelligence as a result of recent international deve-
lopments, the increasingly challenging target environment, new
pressures for covert action to cope with global trouble spots,
inflation and other external factors which serve to exacerbate
the effects of already declining resources. This case is a
strong and factual one, beyond the control of Agency managers,
and can be made without apology.
Should this strategy be unrealistic at a time of govern-
ment-wide cutbacks in budget, then Agency management would be
impelled to propose to the NSC and the President implementation
of the alternative, which is to scale the mission down to accord
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with the resources available, pending some future period in
which more adequate resources might be provided. Such scaling
down involves establishing priorities, themselves the product
of hard choices. More importantly, it involves living with
and accepting the consequences of those choices and priorities.
Perhaps two key points should be emphasized:
-- To pretend that we can do an adequate
job of fulfilling the full range of assigned
tasks, when in our professional judgement we
know that this is not possible, in view of de-
clining resources, would be both misleading and
likely to bring about even further criticism of
the Agency's performance when inevitably we fall
short in a critical area due to lack of the neces-
sary wherewithal. The result would be erosion of
our professional reputation and institutional
morale, which should not be permitted.
-- The strategy for decrementing the mission
must be very well done, so that the remaining tasks
constitute those which are the core of the Agency's
unique capabilities and reason for being, that is
the capability for clandestine activities and for
production of accurate finished intelligence.
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