ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000300090019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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NOFORN/ORCON
NOCONTRACT
(See inside cover)
Angola: Short-Term Military and
.7'olitu~l Pror~ects
Secret
DCI/NIO 2498/75
26 November 1975
COPY N ~ 5 6
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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of E.O. 11b52, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
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SECRET
NOFUKN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
ANGOLA: Short-Term Military and Political Prospects**
The prospects for Angola are bleak. The fight-
ing shows every sign of continuing indefinitely.
Neither the Popular Movement for-the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) nor its adversaries -- the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) -- can hope to gain effective military con-
trol over all of Angola in the near term. Prospects
for a political solution are equally remote, since
at present there exists no basis for agreement among
the three movements for participation in a govern-
ment of national unity.
The military advantage in Angola already appears
to be shifting once again in favor of the MPLA, largely
owing to substantially increased foreign military as-
sistance. Angola's strong ethnic and regional divi-
sions, reflected in the three liberation movements
and reinforced by the fighting among them, will make
it exceedingly difficult for any one movement to gain
effective political and military control over the
entire country. Nevertheless, it may soon be pos-
sible for the MPLA to challenge the FNLA and UNITA
in their ethnic strongholds in the north and south
and to extend its military presence throughout
much of the territory. Even so, the MPLA would
continue to be threatened by serious political and
military opposition, and its Luanda-based regime
would be both politically and economically un-
stable, possibly for years to come.
~' This memorandum u~as drafted by CIA and u~as re-
vie2ved by representatives of State/INR, DIA, and
CIA .
'~~' See also Interagency Intelligence Memorandum:
The Short-Term Outlook for Angola, 3~ October
1975.
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Ideally, some kind of political solution could
be found in-which all three of Angola's liberation
groups could participate in a government of national
unity. The major obstacle to a government of national
unity is the MPLA, which has arrogated to itself the
role of Portugal's successor. It has been encouraged
to maintain an uncompromising stand toward its rivals
by the massive military and political support it is
receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba.
The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on
their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily
or politically, into accepting them into a govern-
ment of national unity. While this seems to be
UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that
the FNLA would even now be preparing to accept a
power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA. Their
ability to force a military stalemate depends in
part on their obtaining continued military assist-
ance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Mos-
cow and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA
strength is likely to erode gradually, leaving them
dependent on foreign political pressure to convince
the MPLA to agree to a coalition government.
Equally important is the ability of the two
movements, which have both suffered serious or-
ganizational weaknesses in the past, to survive
the likely intensification of MPLA military pres-
sure. Moreover, given the undercurrent of mistrust
and suspicion that still exists between the FNLA
and UNITA, their continued political and military
cooperation cannot be counted as certain.
The MPLA's political dominance is by no means
assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted
a campaign to reverse the Organization of African
Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola
and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA. The longer
the fighting continues without a political solu-
tion in sight the greater will be the pressure
within the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA
in order to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate
over the Angola problem, which has already placed
severe strains on African unity.
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Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize
either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in
Angola influenced many non-African countries to re-
main neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and
"radical" African pressure on the OAU 'to recognize
the MPLA continue, however. If Lisbon and the OAU,
or even significant numbers of OAU members, recog=
nize the MPLA regime, there will be little reason
for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon
refuses to extend recognition, its position eventually
will become irrelevent -- if it hasn't already --
and more countries will look to the OAU for guidance
on recognition.
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The Military Situation
1. The current level of fighting is being sus-
tained by foreign involvement with the seesaw pattern
of military successes achieved by the warring sides a
reflection of the level of foreign assistance. Prior
to and after liberation on 11 November, the FNLA/UNITA
side had made important advances at the expense of the
Popular Movement. The tide has now turned with the
MPLA moving on the offensive in a number of fronts.
2. The MPLA's improving military position is
the result of a massive resupply effort by the Soviet
Union, the presence of Saviet technicians and advisers,
and several thousand professional Cuban troops within
the Popular Movement's military forces. So far both
Moscow and Havana have shown a willingness to continue
their support at whatever level is necessary to en-
able the MPLA to prevail in the military struggle,
i.e., more than to match any external assistance given
the MPLA's opponents. It is possible, however, that
Moscow -- in response to strong diplomatic pressure
from Washington or a sharp reversal in the MPLA's mili-
tary fortunes -- might encourage the formation of an
MPLA-dominated coalition government or at least ini-
tiate discussions toward some other compromise ar-
rangement such as federation.
3. The FNLA and UNITA cannot hope to match these
levels of assistance from any of its African supporters.
Pretoria will undoubtedly continue to provide material
assistance even though it may withdraw its troops, but
cannot hope to match the amount of Soviet and Cuban
support for the MPLA. Zaire, the other major sup-
porter of the FNLA and UNITA, is undergoing a severe
financial crisis which will act as a steady drain
on the resources in both men and material that it can
provide. China, once a major source of material sup-
port for the FNLA, has backed away from any direct
assistance in order not to jeopardize its good stand-
ing in the broader African community.
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4. The MPLA had fallen back about as far as it
could afford to and with the unprecedented assistance
of the Soviets and Cubans has launched a counterof-
fensive, which has blunted its rivals` advance on the
capital. Employing 122-mm rockets manned by Cubans,
the Popular Movement has stopped the FNLA's advance
on Luanda, once within ten miles of the city. The
MPLA captured the FNLA stronghold of Caxito, some
40 miles from Luanda and may push the FNLA back-even
further. The FNLA has established a defensive line
at the Lifune River, which could be overrun at any
time, despite substantial Zairian backing with men
and equipment.
5. Thus far, Cabinda and its oil wealth re-
main firmly under MPLA control. A Zairian-led
effort by the Front for the Liberation of the
Enclave of Cabinda in early November failed. An-
other attempt is virtually certain but even with a
substantially increased Zairian effort, the like-
lihood of success is problematic. The recent pat-
tern of FNLA and UNITA reversals has given their
supporters new grounds for concern over this sup-
port -- which is vital if the FNLA and UNITA are
to have any prospect of success against the Popular
Front.
6. The success of the drive from the south
along Angola's coast by the FNLA and UNITA to a
point about 100 miles from Luanda can be attributed
to the participation of several hundred South African
and a few Portuguese professional soldiers who under-
stand the tactics and logistics of such a campaign.
Until recently, the campaign was also helped some-
what by the tendency of the MPLA to give ground
rather than sustain heavy losses.
7. The intense publicity focused on South
Africa's role in Angola has already jeopardized
Pretoria's carefully nurtured policy of detente with
black Africa and is forcing South Africa to recon-
sider its involvement. The South African govern-
ment has implied that it will withdraw its forces
rather than risk them in heavy fighting so far north,
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where the presence of South African troops cannot
be justified to black African nations on Pretoria's
pretext that South Africa is protecting its own
interests along the Angola-Namibia border. Without
South African participation, the FNLA and UNITA
cannot sustain their northward advance and may not
be able to hold the territory they now have in the
face of heavy Soviet weapons manned by Cuban troops.
8. Charges of massive South African involvement
are being widely disseminated by the MPLA and its
African supporters. In African eyes, the presence
of significant numbers of white troops discredits
the FNLA and UNITA by lending credence to charges
that they are dominated and manipulated by for-
eigners. Although some African states have been
willing to tolerate South African participation
so long as it was nominal and reasonably well
concealed, they cannot justify open 5auth African
participation and may be forced to denounce it.
9. Nigeria, for example, recently recognized
the MPLA regime. The Nigerian decision to reverse
its position of neutrality toward Angola's libera-
tion groups was taken principally because of the
growing attention being given to the presence of
South African forces in Angola. Although the
Nigerians have serious misgivings about Soviet
support for the MPLA as well, and hope the MPLA
will not become a puppet of Moscow, those mis-
givings pale in relation to Nigeria's antipathy
toward the white minority regime in Pretoria and
its intervention in Angola.
The Political Situation
10. At the present time the MPLA's political
future is by no means assured, at least over the
short term. It has not been able to gain over-
whelming international recognition of its self-pro-
claimed government. The surge of recognitions from
Communist, Third World, and African countries seems
to have peaked for the time being, with only 27
countries, including 11 African, recognizing the
Neto government as of 25 November. Nigeria's
decision on 25 November to abandon its policy of
neutrality and recognize the MPLA "government" may,
however, be a turning point in the MPLA's favor.
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11. If the FNLA and UNITA cannot maintain their
military effectiveness, they can only hope that in-
ternational opinion will uphold their right to par-
ticipate in an independent Angolan government and
convince the MPLA to accept a political compromise.
The danger for the FNLA and UNITA is that their mili-
tary credibility will erode to the point that the MPLA
regime will attract broad international recognition
as the sovereign power in Angola. This would put
the FNLA and UNITA in a position of rebellion against
universally recognized authority and make it extremely
difficult for them to attract foreign military or po-
litical support.
12. Most countries outside Africa are ill-
inforraed on the situation in Angola and they will
maintain a wait-and-see policy regarding recognition.
Many governments were strongly influenced by Portu-
gal's position when it relinquished sovereignty to
the "Angola people," and decided not to recognize
either of the "governments" established by the lib-
eration groups.
13. Most African states are supporting the policy
of neutrality called for by the Organization of African
Unity. At the same time, a drive is underway to win
OAU endorsement of the MPLA's regime. Somalia, which
has recognized the MPLA, has called for an OAU emer-
gency summit meeting to discuss Angola. The MPLA's
African. supporters are in the forefront of the drive
for the summit and they apparently see a good chance
to gain official OAU endorsement of the Popular Move-
ment's regime as the sole legitimate government in
Angola. If the drive continues to gain momentum, the
summit could be held within a week or so.
14. Many countries fear the effect of airing
African differences at a summit, however, and their
desire for a Foreign Ministers meeting instead may
prevail. In either case, an OAU meeting may not re-
sult in an agreed African position. If it fails to
do so ,. some African countries will continue to wait
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for the situation inside Angola to be clarified and
the MPLA is likely to be the main beneficiary.
Others may feel at liberty to recognize one of the
contending regimes.
15. In summary, the prognosis is not good for
Angola. Even if the MPLA cannot eliminate the FNLA
and UNITA, their influence as a strong force will be
diminished in the face of continued MPLA pressure,
backed by substantial material and political sup-
port from the Soviets' and the latter's allies.
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Secret
Secret
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