LETTER TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS FROM G.H. ECKERT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R002100010005-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

Approve MERICANa~OCIETY8OF MILITARYB GOMPTR~LLERS10005-7
P. o. eox~ 2069
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
On behalf of the Washington Chapter of the American Society of Military
Comptrollers, I wish to thank you for your fine address given at our
November 19 luncheon meeting. Many of our members have made a special
point of calling to tell me how much they enjoyed your talk.
Your message on the need for a strong intelligence network came through
loud and clear, and your candid comments and frank responses to our
questions were particularly appreciated.
Again, thank you. You can count on the support of the military financial
management community.
G. H. ECKERT
Captain, SC, USN
Chapter President
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AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MILITARY COMPTROLLERS
P. o. eox ~~~ 2069
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
November 11, 1975
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Our members are looking forward to your appearance at the November 19
luncheon meeting of the Washington Chapter of the American Society of
Military Comptrollers. In order to give our junior members an opportunity
to mix more with our flag rank members, we do not use a formal head tabl
at our meetings. However, I thought you might like to know a bit about
several of the people who will be seated at your table during lunch.
Captain Andy Giordano, SC, USN, who is our Chapter Navy Vice President
in addition to being Deputy Commander f.or Financial Management and
Comptroller of the Naval Supply Systems Command,. will introduce you.
Also at your table will be Mr. Joe Welsch, our National President and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Management Systems); Mr. Gary
Penisten, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management); and
Brigadier General John Blount, USA, our National Army Vice President
and Director of the Operations and Maintenance, Army Appropriation.
Please have someone call me at OX7-3355 if you have any special requirements
for your speech or if I can provide you with transportation to the meeting.
G. H. ECKERT
Captain, SC, USN
Chapter President
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 ApproAMERICANeSOCIETY00F81VliLITARY BGOMPTROLL-ERS010005-7
P. o. sox ~~ 2 0 6 9
ARLINGTON. VIRGINIA 22202
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
The Washington Chapter of the American Society of Military
Comptrollers is looking forward to your appearance at our
November 19 meeting. As truly effective financial man-
agers must be much broader individuals than mere baokkeepers~
we have been seeking speakers from varied backgrounds who
can expand our perspectives; sa we are particularly pleased
to have you join us. Recent speakers have included
Dr. David Potter, Under Secretary of the Navy, and Mr.
Joseph Welsch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense CManage~
ment Systems).
I have enclosed some background on our chapterr and, of
course, I will be Happy to send you any additi_ana.l infor-
mation you may require. If I can provide you with
transportation to the Club or if you have any questions
about our organization, please have someone call me at
OX7-3355.
Sincerely,
G. H. ECKERT
Captain, SC, USN
Chapter President
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BACKGROUND FOR APPEARANCE BY GENERAL WALTERS
AT AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MILITARY COMPTROLLERS
Wednesday, l9 November 1975
Cocktails 11:30 - Lunch 12:00
Speech following Lunch
Place: Fort Myer Officers' Club - Koran Room
r4enu: Turkey Divan, Tossed Salad, Rolls,
Beverage, Ice Cream
Organization: Washington Chapter, American Society of
Military Comptrollers. An association
of the professional financial managers
of the Department of Defense and the
Coast Guard, its purpose is to increase
professionalism in the military comp-
troller community.
Audience: Generally, about 200 of the Chapter's
600 members attend. Majority of audience
is 0-4 to O-6 and GS-12 to GS-15. How-
ever, many junior and senior individuals
attend, including most of the senior
military financial managers in the
Washington area.
Chapter Officers: See attached list.
National Officers:
President - Joseph P. Welsch, OSD
Vice Presidents - John R. Quetsch, OSD
BG John B. Blount, USA
RADM W. McHenry, Jr., USN
BG Bobby W. Pressley, USAF
Edmond T. Comstock, USMC
RADM Robert A. Duin, USCG
Secretary - LTC R. H. Marshall, USA
Treasurer - LTC Ernest R. Bull, USAF
General Counsel - Calvin M. Vos, OSD
Contact Point: Chapter President CAPT George Eckert, SC,
USN, phone OX7-3355/6
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 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MILITARY COMPTROLLERS
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P. O. eox I~ 206g
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
1875-76 CHAPTER OFFICERS
PRESIDENT -
VICE PRES. - ARMY
VICE PRES. - NAVY
VICE PRES. - AIR FORCE
VICE PRES. - MARINE CORPS
VICE PRES, - COAST GUARD
VICE PRES. - OSD
TREASURER
SECRETARY
ASST. SECTY - ARMY
I
ASST, SECTY - NAVY
ASST. SECTY - AIR FORCE
ASST. SECTY - MARINE CORPS
ASST. SECTY - COAST GUARD
DEPUTY COMMANDER, NAVY ACCOUNTING
AND FINANCE CENTER
MR, DOUGLAS J. BLATT 0X7-5661
CHIEF, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
CAPT. A. A. GIORDANO, SC, usN 0X5-55+5
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
COMPTROLLER, NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND
COL. W, D, JENKINS, USAF - g~1-2231
DIRECTOR OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, HEADQUARTERS,
AfR FORCE, SYSTEMS COMMAND
MAJ. DONALD B. H I RSCH, USMC OX1F-82141E
BUDGET BRANCH, FISCAL DIVISION,
HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
LT, JOSEPH F, OLIVO, USCG I 1426-2097
CHIEF, PERSONAL SUPPORT DIVISION,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE COAST GUARD
MS. JOANNE D. SHUCK 0X7-+352
PROGRAM ANALYST, DASD COMPTROLLER MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS} DIRECTORATE FOR PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS
MR. LISLE C. UPDIKE 0X5)-~+8t5
MANAGEMENT REVIEW BRANCH, PLANNING DIVISION,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY
MR, ROBERT MADISON 0X7-3356
FISCAL ACCOUNTING ASSISTANT,
NAVY ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE CENTER
MS. CHARLOTTE CAMPBELL 0X5-+525
BUDGET ANALYST, OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
LCDR. EDWARD M. STRAW, SC, USN 0X5-1.4568
HEAD, NAVY STOCK FUND APA OPERATIONS
BRANCH, NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND
MS. BARBARA RIZ2UTO 0X7-60143
COST ANALYST, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE
MAJ. JOHN A. HADLEY, USMC 0X14-12$g
HEAD, AUDIT BRANCH, INSPECTION DIVISION,
HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS
MR. WILLIAM LEWIS 755'1993
SYSTEMS ACCOUNTANT, PERSONAL SUPPORT DIVISION,
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE COAST GUARD
MR. GEORGE J. {CO BACK ~ 0X7-u352
PROGRAM ANALYST, DASD COMPTROLLER MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS}, DIRECTORATE OF PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS
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r
P. o. sox ~ 2069
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
12 September 1975
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
I was extremely pleased to receive your letter of August 27, 1975 in
which you agreed to speak at the Novegnber 19 luncheon meeting of the
Washington Chapter of the American Society of Military Camptrollers.
You may find the enclosed recent copy of our magazine, Armed Forces
Canptroller, of interest; it reproduces some of the presentations
given at our May National 5ymposiwn. As November 19 draws nearer,
I will be sending you sane background information on our Chapter and
your aud].enCe.
We are looking forward to meeting with you.
G. H.
Captain, SC, USN
Chapter President
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~~
ARMED FORCES COMPTROLLER
Volume 20, No 3 July 197
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8002100010005-7
National President Joseph P Welsch, OSD
Vlce Presidents John R Quetsch, OSD
BG John B Blount, USA
RADM W McHenry, Jr, USN
BG Bobby W Presley, USAF
Edmond T Comstock, USMC
RADM Robert A Duin, USCG
~~I~ FIR3T ~
n
U
Gl D
It is with a great deal of humility mixed with pride that I assume the
office of President of the American Society of Military Comptrollers.
As the first civilian President in our 27 year history, I am particularly
pleased that the professional respect our military and civilian comp-
troller people have for one another has made this possible. I will do
my best to fulfill my responsibilities to all members of the Society
and, in fact, all personnel in the comptroller field.
As members of ASMC, we have a responsibility, if not a
commitment, to foster and assist all comptroller personnel to main-
tain, develop and improve their professional competence. Through
these efforts, we can improve individuals' abilities to develop and
broaden their career opportunities, as well as their efficiency and
effectiveness, which in turn will enhance their organization. We can
and will continue to move forward by improving our capabilities,
and through these efforts, improve performance in the Defense
Department..All of this activity is aimed at maximizing available
resources.
Our efforts this year will focus on working with all of the various
comptroller career fields. It is essential that we work not only
through our Society's organizations and activities, but also with the
existing Training, Personnel, Manpower and related functions to
provide maximum professional career development opportunities.
There is much we can do together to increase productive utilization
of available resources. Our Financial Management leadership
groups -have been and will continue to develop and implement
improved military and civilian career opportunity procedures. We
should all encourage and foster the use of these procedures, as well
as the development of new and improved techniques.
Our basic challenge is to achieve progress in a function
characterized by diversity. Common core activities in the comp-
troller/financial management community continue to be financial
management, budgeting, accounting, and auditing. In addition,
while practice is not uniform, we must also include such important
career fields as automatic data processing, management analysis,
program analysis, management information systems, cost analysis,
and operations analysis. Obviously, we must go beyond the common
core fields to make a significant contribution.
I look Forward to talking with as many of you as possible during the
coming year, and would be most happy to hear from you. I welcome
suggestions for improving our Society and our Defense comptroller
activities.
Secretary LTC R H Marshall, USA
Treasurer LTC Ernest R Bull, USAF
General Counsel Calvin M Vos, OSD
Exec Director Irving Z Sigele
Joseph P Welsch
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Management Systems)
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ARMED FORCE
COMPTROLLER
THE QUARTERLY PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MILITARY COMPTROLLERS
Volume 20, Number 3 July 1975
Editor: Laurence E Olewine
Copy Editor: Mary Ann McCrea
Editorial Board:
Brig Gen E C Heffelfinger, USA
Brig Gen Bobby W Presley, USAF
Lt Col Joseph A McHugh, USAF
An interdependent world demands
that our focus remains global
We must not only look ahead
but also at incentives
We should meet new people
and ask meaningful questions
Eroding purchasing power
calls for longer range plans
Organizations evolve
they don't hatch
Anew organization
in a new environment
Perhaps we should assume
that it's impossible
The key is people
not systems and techniques
Goals should be based on
timeliness and meaningfulness
4
10
1~
za
26
~~
~~
McClary on
THE KEYNOTE
Jones on
CONTROL
Olewine on
PARTICIPATION
Sullivan on
PLANNING
Cooke on
ORGANIZATION
Rivlin on
THE CBO
Winslow on
COMMUNICATION
Kelley on
DECISION MAKING
Kennevan on
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Opinions of contributors do not necessarily
represent official positions of DoD or ASMC
Our cover, courtesy of the National Gallery of Art, features The Quarrel
painted about 1705 by Donato Creti, an artist of the Bolognese School. It is
described as a graphic memoir of a turning point in Creti's youth when an
angry threat by his father drove him from home. Depicted is an event in the
life of Alexander the Great as recorded by Plutarch: The wedding feast of his
father, King Philip of Macedon. to his second and much younger wife. In an
inspired speech, the bride's uncle proposed an heir to the throne from the
union. As lawful heir by Philip's first marriage, Alexander rose to his feet and
hurled a goblet of wine at the uncle, whereupon Philip drew his sword,
threatening his son with violence. The message is apropos to our gatherings as
a reminder to avoid actions generated by anger. Food for thought?
2 Symposium Summary
19 ASMC 1975 Awards
24 CBICA
25 Book Look
IDENTIFICATION STATEMENT
T{rr ARMED FORCES COMP-
TROLLER is published quarterly.
Subscription price is $7.00 per year
in the US and possessions, $8.00
elsewhere. Annual membership
dues of $10.00 includes $5.00 for
member's subscriptions. Office of
publication is 206 James Thurber
Court. Falls Church. Virginia
22046. Second class postage paid at
Falls Church, Virginia.
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 AS(Yl~ 1975
Honorable Terence E :NcClary
Assistant Secretary of Defense
!,Comptroller)
General Uavid Jones
Chief o1.` Staff
United States Air Force
Law?ence E Olewine
Special Assistant for Education
OASD (Comptroller)
Honorable Leonard Sullivan, Jr
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis & Evaluation)
Professor Walter J Kennevan
Program Director, MIS
'fhe American University
Financial Management was the dorninant subject .,( thr Pentago,a City
Quality Inn on Friday May 23. This was the memur_~bie ~~:ay of ou~:r 1975
ASMC' National Symposium. 'hhe day was memorable rs the Symposium has
been hailed as the tinest in the memory of those who } ave altended previous
programs. It was also memorable as the day that ASMC members and other
professionals in the Defense financial management c .~ntm__nity almost ex-
ceeded physical limitations of the facility selected fur the ~~~mposium.
Uuring preliminary planning activity, Tom Comstocr~~~ anri his outstanding
Symposium Committee hoped for a registration appn~achirg the 20(.1 level.
As George Koback initiated contacts with speakers for the p-ogram, and the
array of talent started being discussed by potential artende~~s, early indica-
tions were that 200 participants seemed to be a sure =hing_ There was even
some thinking that attendance might reach 250. And ~.>f cc.~-trse, the eternal
optimists felt that contingency planning better be re:+Eh~ for 300, just to be
sure of sufticicnt space and services.
About two weeks prior to the big day, word was recely~-ri from the North that
Charles Brannan would be leading a group of iif==-v delegates from the
Chesapeake Chapter, who would be traveling by govf~rnmrnt bus to defray
krave( costs. This message, as would be expected, turn~?d on 'lashing lights at
Symposium Central. They all of a sudden realized a n=~N~ and unprecedented
problem for ASMC symposium planners: More pco,~lc ref,istering for the
symposium than had been planned, and much more ses-u~us .. perhaps mere
people showing up than the selected facility could ,u ?nmrrENTIAL
DEFENSE POSTURE CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED ON A CONTINU-
OUSLY DECLINING "REAL PRO-
GRAM" BUDGET. Allied and US
active and reserve force levels and
deployments are dictated primarily by
the Soviet threat. The Soviets em-
barked on a long-range plan for the
expansion of their military capabilities
over twenty years ago. They have
probably been outspending us now far
several years. We know their armed
forces are almost twice as large as
ours -and we know they are out-
producing both us and the free world
put together in most military equip-
ment. The momentum of their
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military growth ha:s proceeded una-
bated, with an estimated funding in-
crease of about 3% a year.
Forthe past
several years, we have submitted to the
Congress budgets which were irzteraded
to provide positive real program
growth of between one and two per-
cent per year. However, as a result of
THE SOVIETS I'sMBARKED ON
A LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR
EXPANSION OF THEIR CAPA-
BILITIES OVER TWENTY
YEARS AGO. .
inflation and congressional cuts,
our real program growth has been de-
clini~zg at more than 1% per year. In
fact, we are the only NATO nation
with several straight years of declining
real program value for defense.
Each
recent President has submitted to the
Congress the minimum essential
defense budgets to keep America
strong. But what we have gotten back is
not enough to insure that strength
over the long haul..
Over the past five
years our defense needs have been un-
intentionally understated by more
than $l9 billion. Congress has yet to
reinstate .any significant amount of
that shortfall.
Additionally, Congres-
sional cuts have deleted another $24
billion from the President's defense
budget requests -- mostly from the
modernization accounts. During the
same five years, incidentally, $34
billionhas been added to other seg-
ments of federal spending crhove the
President's budgets.
But these defense
cuts, when added to inflation short-
falls, total $43 billion. If we had
chosen to keep pace with the Soviets
five years ago, we would have
rrtcreused our real defense spending
over the same five year time period by
$45 billion instead. No skeptic could
reasonably asserR that there has been
$43 billion in "fat" in the last five
defense budget requests.
At any rate, it
is clear that the spending trend to
keep America strong, and the
spending to keep the Soviet Union
strong have probably clivc~r~u?d by
almost $90 billion over the past tive
years. The time has come to arrest
that widening divergence. We cannot
keep America strong enough in the
face of continuously declining defense
budgets.
If Congress wishes us to defer
some expenditures for a single year
they must tell us so, and let us restore
those funds in the following years. If
they do not intend to provide some
positive real growth in the Defense
Department's toplinc over the long
run, then we must change our own
internal planning considerably. We
must begin to plan for deliberate
weakness.
I-lowcvcr, if we receive no
substantive guidance from the Con-
gress, then we will be forced to make
minor and less visible compromises in
each area each year. /1 few less forces,
a little less readiness, a little less capa-
bility to take on the enemy. The
cumulative effects over several years
will be to slowly slip into a position of
unintentional weakness. We will not
maintain a balance of force with the
Soviets. There will be less and less
basis for negotiation, and eventually
by default, Number Two will become
Number One -and Number Two is
not on our side.
In short, we now
believe that to keep our defense
strength adequate, we will need a
positive growth in real program value
of a modest 2?h annually. This would
still be less than the growth we see on
the Soviet side. It would still assure
that we would consume a smaller and
smaller fraction of the Gross National
Product, and of federal revenues.
Surely, that should be considered a
bargain - and a tough one for us to
live within. But I believe we can do it,
and that the nation can afford it.
5. OUR DEFENSE EXPENDI-
TURES ARE NOT READILY CON-
TROLLABLE ON A SINGLE-FIS-
CAL-YEAR BASIS. It is particularly
difficult to achieve large outlay reduc-
tions within a given tiscal year - to
offset inflation or a large budget
deticit, for instance. As a matter of
realistic fact, less than $60 billion of
our outlays in FY 76 will stem from
FY 76 appropriations, and less than
$20 billion of those FY 76 outlays arc
"controllable" at all. A $S billion out-
lay reduction would be very serious
indeed. I would like to give ya?u two
examples of this.
If the Congress stop-
ped all research and development on
the MX and D5 missiles or on our
cruise missile programs, if they elimi-
nated our antiballistic missile research
programs and stretched out our
"1?rident buy, if they cancelled the B-I,
the AWACS, the SAM-D, the XM-I
lank development - altogethf;r they
could not save $1 billion in FY 76 out-
lays in that year. "Che money spends
too slowly.
At the other end of the
spectrum, if they were to try to save $I
billion in FY 76 outlays this year
through reductions in Defense person-
nel, we would have to lay off well over
PRODUCTION RATE
ESTIMATES
(1972-74 AVERAGES)
Although it cannot be proven, we
are convinced the Soviets have: been
outspending us for some years. As
shown by the statistics below, there
is no question but they have been
outproducing us in the standard
weapons of war.
US USSR
~~ 462 3,000
~ 860 4,400
170 1,200
920 710
~_ 540 930
~^~..~ 0 10
.,~,.~ 3 5
~?~. 11 39
S cQMPTROLI_ER 13
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GENERAL & FLAG OFflCERS
PER 100,000 SERVICEMEN
RALY
AUSTRIA
BRITAIN
S AFRICA
CANADA
BELGIUM
GREECE
SPAIN
NORWAY
NETHERLANDS
DENMARK
USSR
PORTUGAL
achieve greater
efficiency, the
number of Flag
~ billets has been
~ reduced. This por-
~ trayal indicates that
FRANCE ~
TURKEY se
US s ~
SWEDEN as
W GERMANY +z
-~
_~ As
_~ part of
_ Defense's
-~ continuing
attempts to
to terms of Generals
and Admirals per
100,000 servicemen.
we have one of the
most efficient
forces in the world.
300,000 people. That $1 billion would
provide employment for only 125,000
people in the civil sector and that
would not make much sense to me.
M orc-
over, an unpremeditated reduction of
even 150,000 military and civilian
personnel from the Defense Depart-
ment over a period of six months
would have a truly traumatic impact
on the entire defense strucrirre.Such a
cut would come close to bringing the
entire organization to a halt -and its
military readiness would collapse.
And the maximum outlay savings in
FY 76 would amount to half a billion
Ot' less.
Thus virtually all of the "fast-
spending" $37 billion in the personnel
outlays account is "uncontrollable"
within the fiscal year in which unpro-
grammed reductions are made. "The
"fast-spending" FY 76 outlays for
purchases arc related to the nutin-
tenance and operation of our forces in
being: these cannot be "controlled"
without seriously interferring with
readiness and operations. Finally, the
"slow-spending" FY 76 investment
funds really don't pt?oduce outlays in
FY 76 at all.
6. WE UNQUESTIONABLY HAVE
"1'}IE BEST AND TIGHTEST EIVE-
YEAR PLAN IN THE TOWN OF
WASHINGTON, D.C. Surely we can
offset some funding deficiencies and
costs through improvements in our
own efficiency. Of course we can -
and we do every year. We have cut our
personnel by 173,000 in three years by
proper preplanning. We have reduced
the number of senior military officers.
We have reduced pilot and other
expensive training. We have gone to
mot?c selective payment of incentive
bonuses. We arc converting spaces
from 16 major headquarters into com-
bat units. We have closed a number of
bases. We have reduced fuel con-
sumption by 20-25?Io.
We arc buying a
high-low cost mix of aircraft and
ships. We are consolidating some of
our airlift assets. We are reducing the
bomber/tanker strategic alert rate,
and transferring tankers to the
reserves. We have and arc still
reducing CONUS air defense missiles
and aircraft. We arc increasing per-
sonnel tour lengths. We are reducing
officer graduate education. We have
cut down our major weapon system
overruns -though not enough. We
have improved the officer/enlisted
ratio, and so on. "The net result:
annual savings in cost avoidance on
the order of one-half to one percent of
our total budget. Our planning
assumes that we will continue-some-
how-to find more improvements.
After all, that's one of my jobs.
On the
other side, however, Executive policies
sometimes run counter to sound
planning. Until recently, we were not
even permitted by OMB to allow fully
for urrricipurc~cl inflation in our pro-
curement accounts. Consequently, we
have a backlog of uncompensated
accounts-primarily in the shipbuild-
ing area-where we simply cannot
build the ships authorized by the
Congress back in '71 through '74 with-
out amajor inflation payback. This,
in turn, appears to add "growth" to
the FY 76 budget. Moreover, we are
still proscribed by OMB from inflating
the nonpersonnel half of our O&M
account. We at?e supposed to absorb
that inflation tht?ough "management
improvements." With 10?/, inflation,
thet?c is no way to do that. The
consequcncc'? A gradual decline in the
condition of our "roadbed."
National
policy decisions also impact on out?
budget. These are things we do not
initiate but to which we L~yally
respond when so directed. Let m give
you a few current examples: We are
being asked as part of our national
energy crisis to pay about $400 million
for the exploitation of some of our oil
reserves. We will soon spend $500-600
million annually to pcrrticrlh~ comply
with "Title VIII nuclear propulsion for
ships. We already spend over $200
million annually on environmental
programs. We arc now required 'to pay
$150 million annual rent on our
buildings to GSA, and we now pay the
Postal System $1,30 million annually
for our franked mail. We are now
paying perhaps $50 million annually
to comply internally with the require-
ments of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. We pay about $500
million annually to support the "Buy
American" act, and about $100
million to comply with single-year pro-
cut?ements. Another $200 million is
required to comply with the Monroney
Amendment and new five-step wage
scales.
"There is perhaps too little
Dcl-ease resistance to these changes.
We cannot forecast these things, and
when they come into being, they cost
us money -money which makes it
appear that the Defense budget is
"growing," but from which we 'get no
added defense capability. They
constitute one more reason, however,
why we can't live with level ot?
declining funding -and why our self-
initiated efficiencies do not show.
In view of all the foregoing, then, let
me summarize my message:
? A strong defense posture is
essential.
? Maintaining a strong ready
defense establishment is a big,
dynamic operation.
? We cannot measure trends in our
defense strength by looking only
at the current 'fiscal year.
? We cannot maintain our required
dclensc strength on a continuously
declining real program budget.
? We cannot save much money on a
one-year, one-shot basis.
? And lastly. we are rr~t the big
w~~sters so many people think, but
our ycarl_y improvements in ef-
ticicnc_y am largely offset by in-
creased costs of~ national policy
decisions.
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While America has been searching
for elusive "peace dividends," and
searching for economic solutions to in-
flation and unemployment, our
defense posture has taken the burden
of the cuts. The Soviets have had no
similar problems; no search for peace
dividends, no inflation, no recession
and no change in their national resolve.
The Soviets have not even had an oil
shortage since they are an oil exporter.
Their advantage has been significant -
and they have used it well. "1'he time
has come to realize that the
world-wide military balance is begin-
ning to deteriorate, and that a posture
of unintentional weakness is as bad-
if not worse-than ' a posture of
deliberate weakness under these
circumstances. The time has also
come to realize that we cannot achieve
our ambitious hopes for domestic
programs at the expense of our
nation's strength. Ii: is not only an un-
wise course, it is an impossible course-
we can do by talking to each other. We have to
get out and talk to people other than our friends,
and maybe even talk to our own children about
the fact that the Defense Department is not the
monster it is claimed to bc. 1 honestly do feel
that the new young Congress can be reached,
and they can understand the problem if we can
gel the message to them.
Q. Do you ever foresee a five-year
appropriation?
A. 1 think it is a possibility. We have an inicrest-
ing sihtation with the House Seapowcr Subcom-
mittee. hhcy fully intend to try and get ship-
building back on a five-year basis, and I am in
the peculiar position of having to resist that. I
resist it because I don't sec any way to promise
Congress to poi a lixed amount of money into
shipbuilding it they don't tell us how much
money we can have for an Air Farce or an Army.
But the trend is in the right direction, and I
would like to capitalize on that momentum to
suggest that they request Live-year plans in other
large spending areas at the same time.
Q. Mr Sullivan, as I listen to you, I try to project
the Secretary of IIealth, Education and Welfare
making a similar speech. He could easily paint
an almost identical picture. He could say that
there are nine and a half million people
unemployed. Ile could say that wages of
military and DOD civilian employees exceed
those of a lot of people in this country. He could
say that there arc twenty-eight million people
below the poverty line. Ilow would you debate
your cause agains- the HEW Secretary?
A. Lr the tu~st place. 1 would start out an a
statistical basis. Certainly his position for the
Q. Do you foresee any continuity coming out of
the new Congressional Budget Office, or have
we created another monster?
A, We've created a sort of a furry little thing.
ancf we don't know what it's going to be when it
grows up. The basic problem is that the House
Budget Committee decided that it would never
get to he more than four years old-by rotating
its membership every four years. We are going
to be dependent again on the input of the staff
u> that committee. rather than the competency
ol'the individual members. On the other hand.
the Senate Budget Committee hasn't done that.
and there is every indication that under the
Icacfership o1' Senator Muskie. they arc going to
uy and cto responsible things.
1 base the job of being OSD contact with the
Budget Committees. and I find that in the main
they arc made up of excellent people. 1 have
been u~ying to attract their utrention away From
their first start. which was to rule on the size of
the Fcdcral dciicit for FY 76.1 don't blame
them fiir looking in that direction lust; it was
certainty the most current problem that they
could address. But eventually they have to start
looking at alive-year plan. ~l he Chairman of the
I{ausc Budget Committee has told me he
intends to begin looking into the five-year pro-
jections of all Federal spending within Che next
six nr eight weeks. It is the first positive indica-
tion I have had that they will move in that
direction.
iVir Sullivan responded to
the following questions:
Q. Did you see any sign that the new Congres-
sional Budget Office will open the vision of
Congress to some of our problems?
A. No. We have no indication of that so far, but
we hope they will try to take on a job that.is not
being performed by existing committees. 1 hope
they will spend consideratble time addressing the
problems of where this country is going within
the next five to ten years. 1 think they will
become very seriously alarmed by what they
find.
Q. You imply that the Defense Department
believes that Congress must address Defense
spending as a five-year problem. Do you really
d
last ten or tiilcen years has been one of rapidly
expanding Fcdcral expenditures, compared to
the shrinkage in our area. In fact. the counh'y
has changed its priorities enormously, and the
Fraction of Fcdcral expenditures going into
Ucfense has dropped greatly the last few years.
think you also have to recognize that the
Fcdcral goccrnmcnt is solely responsible for the
raising of our Armies, while it is the combined
ctTorts of Fcdcral, state and local spending
which arc responsible for social welfare and
many aspects of education. 1 honestly believe
the most important clement of our social welfare
is freedom of our country. 1 must question
whether we can satisfy the social appetites of the
o counU~y b Federal spending .rather than by
think that it's practicable to get Congress to
this and what will it ta~prOVed For Releas~eti2tQ0~/?8/Of~id~t(IIIA~DIR80'F~0~"P$1 R
A. well, it's going to take a very, very great citizen. So I would debate bun ymte openly on
change in the approach of the Congress. They the fact that he is getting more money every
arc eoint: to be asked to address things which vear, while .ce arc getting less. It really comes
The Editor Comments:
Mr Sullivan was most helpful in
providing AFC with some visual
material to supplement hisexcel-
lent presentation. This ad di s, an
additional dimension to the
story. For more information on
his concepts of defense planning
we suggest reading his April 14
statement to the House Armed
Services Committee, which was
reprinted in the Congressional
Record. Your local Congressman
can help here.
Mr Sullivan brings a unique
Oal~~lf~0ap~aH~ to his current
position: Two years in the
Marine Corps' enlisted ranks
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ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVE... they don't hitch
I would like to discuss with you the
latest thinking on organizational
development, recent innovations in
organizational design, and some of the
practical short cuts which managers
can use to build a vibrant, effective
organization. Unfortunately, I won't
be able to do 1:hat. The last 30 years
have produced little more than
cosmetic changes to organizational
theory-and if any of you have found a
quick, easy w;zy to build a vibrant,
effective organization, please tell me
about it. Organizations evolve--they
do not hatch.
I am sure that each of you
has attended as many seminars, read
as many books, listened to as many
presentations, and been exposed to as
many day-to-day problems regarding
the development and management of
organizations as I have. Reflection on
what were, at the time, some of my
more exciting discoveries regarding
management organizational principles
brings to mind such earthshaking
axioms as:
? For an organizational role to exist
and to be meaningful to people, it
must incorporate a clear concept of
the major functions or activities
involved.
? There is a. limit to the number of
subordinates a manager can effectively
supervise, but the exact number will
depend upon underlying factors.
? Before taking any action to intro-
duce or implement a change, manage-
ment should allocate some time for
analysis and planning.
? It is necessary that an organiza-
tion's objectives, policies, structures
and methods of operation be con-
sistent to achieve and maintain
efficient operation and vitality.
At the risk of overwhelming you, I
could go on indefinitely. But don't
panic-enough is enough.
Let me quote
Hugh Prather, a contemporary author
who, even though he leans to the
literary, has an excellent grasp of the
world around him.
Ideas urr~ clean. Thew sour i,r
laud me do~rn nc~~ xurro~~~
irur. /1 ,rd in the morning
!he-~ ure there. Ideus ure
struigh!-13rvt rlre irorld is
round, ar,d a m(ssV nrorlnl is
nrv ./rieud. -Come r~~alk
with ?te i,r !hc ntud. .
Ladies and Gentlemen, make no
mistake, we are all slogging along up
to our hips.
Why do we organize? Or,
more importantly, why do we re-
organize? Ican assure you that every
reorganization in which I have partici-
pated was done in the name of
efticicncy, economy and effectiveness.
But let's be honest, reorganizations
are nothing more than reactions to a
wide variety of stimuli or pressures.
Some
of the strongest int7uences over
Defense organizational decisions are
external. They come from the
Congress, the White House, the
public, and the press. From the enact-
ment of the National Security Act in
1947 to the currently proposed bill for
"Government in the Sunshine," the
Congress is a driving Force behind us
and every other Federal Agency. It
affects our organization structure as
evidenced in part by the statutory
existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, and the Assistant
Secretaries of the Military Depart-
ments for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs. It affects our force structure
and military posture by exerting
significant pressure on such activities
as our Base Closure program.
The direc-
tion and intensity of our program
emphasis are influenced by legislation
not directed at Defense such as the
Freedom of Information and the
Privacy Acts. As a result of these
relatively new laws, organizations have
been restructured, staffs have ex-
panded, and functions have been re-
distributed-at present we can only
speculate on the total impact over the
long haul.
Another ever present influ-
ence over Defense organization is, of
the serene su~rernal. 1 can
course, the
White
House. On
juke them out a,td look at
November 5,
1971
a
Presidential
chem. they /ir ire honks, ihcw
memorandum
was
issued which,
David O Cooke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Administration)
among other decisions on the Federal
intelligence community, directed con-
solidation of DoD mapping, charting,
and geodetic activities--hence the
establishment of the Defense Mapping
Agency.
Never underestimate the power
of the public and the press when
examining the Defense decision-
rnaking process. Admittedly, these
pressures usually emerge through in-
direct channels and the process is
normally evolutionary, rather than
revolutionary, but many a program or
activity can trace its survival or demise
to public opinion. For example,
creation of an All Volunteer Force,
which, as you know, looks as if it is
going to make it, was due in large part
to public discontent with the
inequities of the draft system.
Another
cause for reorganization, in and out of
the Government, even though we
don't like to admit it, is people
problems. When confronts?d with such
a situation, the reaction of too many
managers is to reorganize-not
massive reorganization-but just
enough to take care of the problem. It
would be interesting ta~ know the
number of "Deputies For," "Special
Assistants," "Assistants To," and
fragmented functions that we have
throughout the Department as a result
of such actions.
Finally, we are subject
to a multitude of internal int7uences,
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not the least of whie:h is the personal
philosopy and management style of the
Secretary of Defense;.
When Mr McNamara
became Secretary of Defense in 1961,
he stated that:
Either o/two broad philoso-
phies of management could
be.%ollowed by a Secretary of
DeJense...a passive role or
an active role, one of
questioning, suggesting al-
ternatives, proposing objec-
tives, and stimulating
progress.
He made it quite clear during his
tenure that he would take the latter
course.
Secretary McNamara focused on
issues. He would make relatively inde-
pendent analysis of the facts, and
move out quickly. The decision-
making process was centralized and
speedy-there was no doubt where
final authority rested. He made
internal management reforms which,
in general, accomplished his objectives
without resorting to burdensome
legislative proposals.
Secretary Laird was
oriented to people and their effective
utilization. He had the ability to
resolve complex problems and achieve
seemingly impossible objectives with a
minimum amount of turmoil. He
could take an issue, talk about it,
bounce it around a bit and, before
anyone realized what had happened,
the issue had disappeared. Many of
you will recall Mr Laird's efforts at
participatory management and a
decentralization of the decision-
making process-he wanted the
benefit of every available point of view
before moving ahead on major efforts.
However, he made it clear that
participatory management was not to
be contused with participatory deci-
sion making. His management philos-
ophy is graphically capsulized by his
statement that:
It is east/ to centralize the
poe~~er to make decisions urrd
the power to spar action at
the top q/' a large organiza-
tion urrd, !ra the process to
sti/Tc the hright ideas and
restless enc~rlw ul~ people
down the line. You must
huve people you curt (rust....
It is sintplv_(oolhurdv not to
nruke maximum use q!' the
grout talc nt, wisdorn and ex-
perierrce avuikrble through
the JCS and within the
Services.
To date, Secretary Schlesinger
appears to have brought yet another
management style to the Department.
He represents a strong, central figure
who has a knack for taking an issue,
blowing away the smoke and red tape,
and presenting the facts in clear, un-
complicated terms. His honesty in
discussing national security is refresh-
ing. And I am convinced that over the
long haul, it will reap tremendous divi-
dends for the Department and the
Nation.
Each of these Secretaries,
although different in personality and
management style, has had a signifi-
cant impact on DoD programs and
organization. For example, Mr
McNamara, recognizing a need for
stronger resource management, insti-
tuted our Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System and established the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis). Mr Laird
ended three decades of military con-
scription in this country by establish-
ing the All Volunteer Force. And Mr
Schlesinger has devoted a considerable
amount of his time and effort to con-
verting headquarters and support
resources to combat capability. Un-
questionably, these and other contri-
butions will constitute a legacy im-
pacting on the Department for years
to come.
Interestingly enough, and
probably more by chance than design,
each of these three men brought to the
job his unique blend of capabilities
and management temperament which,
because of the posture of the Depart-
ment and the climate of the Nation,
enabled him to do an effective job at
the particular time he took office.
Now
that I've had the opportunity to reflect
on organizational influences and poke
a little fun at the theorists I'd like to
dwell for a few minutes on five simple,
but what I consider to be indis-
pensable, principles for the effective
manager:
First, always keep sight of your basic
mission. Uon't clutter up your organi-
zation with superfluous activities
which, over a period of time, can
swallow up valuable resources, and
even total programs. Dedicate the
bulk ol'your resources to the job which
has to be done effectively in order to
keep you from getting fired. There is a
tine line between shifting program
emphasis to keep up with changing
times and cluttering up your organiza-
tion with a lot of unnecessary frills.
There is no greater waste of time than
expending a great deal of energy to do
an outstanding job that really didn't
need doing in the first place.
Second, keep organization arrange-
ments simple. Leave no doubt as to
who is responsible for doing what job.
And, most important, don't mess up
the structure with "staff advisors" and
"special assistants" to keep busy by
meddling in everyone else's business.
If you're going to take care of a per-
sonnel problem, don't do it at someone
else's expense.
Third, work closely with your key
people. Don't play a guessing game
with them. Keep them informed and
let them know where you stand on
issues. Deal direct and use inter-
mediaries as little as possible. They
garble or distort your guidance and,
normally, each intermediary shortens
original deadlines by at ]east one day.
Fourth, don't be afraid to delegate-
overmanagementbreeds incompetence
and ineffectiveness. A system of
checks and balances can strengthen
controls but, if overdone, it can also
destroy initiative, creativity, and
responsiveness. Accept a well-inten-
tioned mistake once in awhile-it
builds confidence in subordinates.
Normally, the manager who refuses to
delegate is insecure. You should be
dependent on your staff-not vice
versa.
And last, even if you choose 1:o ignore
my first four principles, whai:ever you
do, staff your organization with "good.
people." "Good people" does not
necessarily mean experienced people,
nor highly educated people, nor well
trained people. To me, good people
means perceptive, intelligent, in-
dustrious, honorable people who have
common sense and the ability to get
along with superiors, peers, and sub-
ordinates-additional qualifications
in the way of education and experience
are icing on the cake.
Good people arc not easy to come
by, but a handful of them will make
an organization hum. Observe them
closely because, in a short time, they
will build an informal organization
which reflects the channels oi'
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communications, work processes, and
procedures that are required for an
effective operation.. A good manager
will then adjust his formal organiza-
tion accordingly.
As Peter Druckt?r observes:
Organization is a means to
un end rather than an end it-
self. Sound structure is a
prerequisite to organiza-
tional health; but it is not
health itself: The test of a
healthy activity is not the
beauty, clarity, or perfection
ol? its organizational struc-
ture. It is the per/ormance of
people.
He then goes ort to comment, "Re-
organization is a form of surgery; and
even minor surgery has risks."
"this is
not an original observation, however,
Petronius Arbiter, a Roman author
who some 2,000 years ago wrote:
We trained hard... but it
seemed that every time we
were beginning to form up
into teams, we would be re-
organized. I was to learn
later in life that we tend to
meet any new situation by
reorganizing: and a wonder-
ful method it can be -for
creating the illusion of
progress while producing
cotiJiesion, inef/iciency and
demoralization.
Mr Cooke responded to
the following questions:
Q. Would you address changes being proposed
by the Dcfcnsc Manpower Commission?
A. The Defense Manpower Commission was
established by Congress and given an impossible
charter to determine what great and sweeping
Manpower etliciencics could be made across the
board. It is headed by Curtis Tarr, former
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Man-
power and Kcservc Afi'airs. They did not move
out to a fast start acrd have come under sonic
criticism from the Hill for the slowness under
which they've been moving.
"fhc technique o1' the commission was to
examine a wide range of problems ranging from
computation of pay to organization. "their ap-
proach is to look at all the issues, and then
hopefully, in the months to come, focus on some
of the issues o1' major substance. 1 think it is
impossible to speculate precisely what will come
out of their dclibcrations. "I-here may be recom-
mendations for changing the role of Service
Secretaries. 'ihcy took a hard look at the
University of Health Sciences, which is just in
the process of coming under way. 'I-hey may
lake a run at pay recomputation.
Based on previous history of similar
endeavors, 1 don't look for major changes being
implemented as a result of the Commission's
recommendations, whatever they may be.
Q. Do you foresee any major organizational
changes coming up in Defense?
A. I would think not in the immediate future. If
you look at past history, major changes in
Defense usually occur with the change of an
administration, or shortly thereafter. And
generally speaking, major changes occur at the
start ot~ a new administration. For instance,
there is usually a period of 6 to 12 months where
a +vindo+v opens and major changes can be put
into effect by a nex~ Sccrctary of Defense.
Conversely. at the end of an administration or
on the completion of the tenure of a Secretary of
Dcfcnsc, it is much more difficult to make
major changes.
there have been, and l am sure there will
continue to be modifications in our Unified
Command plan. Among more recent examples
of this sort is the discstablishmcnt of the
Alaskan Corronand. There may be minor
readjustments of functional responsibilities
assigned to Military Departments and the
Dcfcnsc Agencies. However, 1 don't fbresec
major organizational changes between now and
let's say 1977.
Q. Would you think Mr McNamara's manage-
ment style would be effective in today's political
arena? Also, would you give us a brief compar-
ison of his style to that of Mr Laird and Mr
Schlesinger?
A. 1 don't think the management style of a
secretary is the determining factor in our
relationship with the Hill. 1 think problems on
the Hill arc essentially those of allocation o1'
resources, such as between social programs and
Dcfcnsc.
fl:oing said that, 1 would observe that Mr
McN:un:u?a's style, at Icast until the acceleration
of Vicunun in 196$, worked well with the
Congress. He ahvays said no man should hold
the Ollice of Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc for more than
four yr:u~s. llad he Icft in 1964, he would have
departed with an unblemished track record.
He's the one who initiated the now well-known
rather detailed Posture Statement. As you
know, Mr McNamara revelled in facts and
figures, anct had personal capacity for infinite
detail. And this was apparent in his annual
Posture Statement.
Mr Laircf presented a completely different
picture. He was a politician, and really, a
crcaun~c of the Catgress. He often said the
greatest years of his life were spent on the Hill.
For instance, while in the Pentagon, he would
get his hair cut at the House Barber Shop,
where he could talk with, and get the feel of
individual members of Congress. He had strong
tics to the leadership group, both on the
majority and the minority side. And he used
those tics. So you can see that his operation
projected a different figure than Bob
McNamara. And. both were effective.
Kight nou~. Jim Schlesinger, with his carefully
reasoned analysis, particularly in the area of
tirrcc sU-ucturc ;rod strategic requirements, has
a great cleat of appeal to the younger members
of the Congress who arc not loo familiar with
Dcfcnsc operations.
Any Sccrctary of Dcfcnsc brings his own style
to the joh and has Ut interact with current
political issues of the time-
Q. Da you feel the Department of Defense is
adequately organized to accomplish its, function
at this time? The reason I raise this question is
that during both the Korean and Vietnam
conflict, we had to establish new organizations
in order to accomplish our mission.
A. lluring the Vietnam era, we had no major
changes as a result of the conflict itself. There
were some new Defense Agencies developed. but
not as a result of the war in Southeast Asia.
War, of course. is a business frought with
uncertainty. No war or major military campaign
proceeds precisely as anticipated in operational
plans. Now, having said that, yes. 1 believe the
Department of Defense is +cell organized to
accomplish its mission. With no changes or
provisions for change, we would be a dead or
declining organization, something like Forest
Lax'n in Los Angeles. We are constantly
experiencing management or organizational
shirts at one level or another. It should remain
that +vay.
General Lincoln was llirector of the Office of
f:mergency Planning for about three years. In
that capacity, he had to deal across the board
with all executive departments and agencies.
Lvcn discounting his own parochial pride in the
military, he said that in his judgement Defense
was the best organized, the most responsive of
any of the executive agencies. And as a result of
my owro interagency dealings. 1 can only confirm
General Lincoln's views.
Q. Do you feel that the many major
reorganizations of the Department of Defense
have solved your problems?
A. Let me give you a short answer: NO!
Now, let me elaborate. I think there is a
tendency in both government and industry to
say, "...when in doubt, reorganize." Somehow,
we feel that we can solve substantive problems
by changing the wiring diagrams. 1 don't believe
thafs true. As a matter of fact. I sometimes
argue that the thing that holds the Pentagon
together is the continuity of its problems. For
instance, you can read the cost overrun report of
the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee issued
in 1969 by a Texas Senator named Lyndon
Johnson, and it sounds remarkably current. Sa
at best a good organization may facilitate the
solving or dealing with substantive problems, a
poor organization may impede such action.
One last comment: We in the United States
tend to pose things in terms of problems. We
are an optimistic people, and if you :ouch con-
ditions in terms of a problem that means the
condition can be solved. Once you find the
solution, the problem goes away. 1'd suggest
that in many of the things we're wrestling with,
such things as acquisition of major weapon
systems and allocation of scarce resources, are
not problems in the sense that we're going to
find the holy grail and they'll go away. They are
conditions under which we do our work, and we
will have to stay alert for the best solution at
the time.
The Editor Comments (briefly):
Mr Cooke did his usual :superb
job. His credentials on DoD
organization are impeccable,
having worked closely witFt every
SecDef since Mr McElroy.
18 ARMED 1=0RCES COMPTROLLER July 1975
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 Approved For Release 2003/08/08 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8002100010005-7
1975 ASMC AWARD PROGRAM
AFC is pr~.~ud to recognise the winner in l1SMC's fifth Financial
Management Awards Program. We also wish to congratulate all of
the many nominees whose names came Crom the entire defense
establishment, on a world-wide basis. Colonel Joseph l~ McHugh,
1975 ASMIC Awards Chairman, reports that final selections were
difficult, since so many top-Hight nominations ~~ere submitted.
While the system precludes alt nominees being selected as winners,
AFC salutes both winners and nominees. Both categories denum-
strate the nigha;t degree of professionalism. And don't forget, there
will be another A~+~~rrds Prul;ram in 1976.
WINNERS BASED ON NOMINATIONS FROM THE FIELD
Accounting: Laurence Moults
Hqs, US Coast Guard
LNashington, DC
Auditing: L_ieufenant Terrell W Hatfield
s,ir Force Audit Agency
t=glin Air Force Base, Florida
Budgeting: Commander J F McCarton
Navy Recruiting Command
Arlington, Virginia
Data Processing:
Economic Analysis:
Finance:
~Agmt Analysis:
Mgrnt Information:
Young Person:
Specialist Jeff D Vowell
tJS Army Intelligence Center
t=ort Huachu~a, Arizona
Captain Donald D Graham, USAF
Dc~tense Electronics Supply Ctr
Dayton, C)hio
Captain r~ichard B Granger
82nd Airborne Division
Ft~rt Bragg, North Carolina
Robert H Jameson
1tgs, Arrr7y Materiel Command
Alexandra, Virginia
Captain Lloyd D Borchert
1 r,t Corps Support Command
F nrt Bragg. North Carolina
William N I-logan
laF~fense Mapping Agency
`t Louis, Missouri
Dr Geur~c S Odionre rcreii~-, the Aurhrv~~ A~~c~rtl
ti-um Genertl Searti i~ rrr~ii~nirion u( his rscellent
h~,uk ,ti1~i~~u~rrn r~~! :; ~~. ~ rAr -~ ~Iteitl' Y~rz~~,. Sec ,~1 /~.(.
1;1Sn~il ?~) fits a n~~~n~~z ,~r ~h~~. tine puhlicutum-
General Scarti an~Kra~ulates General John A KjcIR-
srrum un receiving; ih- Auth~~~~s Ax~urd tar his Af~C
article. "Goalti anti C!~~jectiv~?, as Cumr~u~uller of the
Army" 11975 Winn-r suel
Mr Gilherr Kamu~. Ire~rdeiu of The CnUlise Chapter
ikt Huachuca. Arn~~nai. r ceices the Chitvcualinh
(7xi~urrAirur~/ inn i,rm~al Sears. Sec~~n~l place
~~enl h+ Vcmur,i ~cir' I ,~s ;~~ ~t?clcs lini~~hui~ tliinl.
d)r Brenda Furman. ui Ini~ -national Atlain S(x~cial
6t it] the C)f rll'l' fit t'r A VVi Ont Srl rCl alA t~~ r)C tCIISC
ilS;Al. rcccSccs Ilir ~ ~~J~ ~ ~ .~ln~,u~! 'nnn t ~rm~r.il
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