LETTER TO MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000200410026-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 29, 1979
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2010/04/29: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200410026-0
i The Director of Central Intelligence
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29 August 1979
Dear Marshall,
I was quite distressed when I read your article in The Washington
.Post 19 August. While I am sure that it was editorial bias of the
Post that led to the title "The CIA Goof," I am not sure I understand
the arguments you adduced to show the "...shakiness of the CIA estimates."
It seemed to me we went through this same material two years ago
together.
If I understand the points you made, they are as follows:
(1) That the statistics on Soviet production this spring
were not as bad,as they might have been. This, of course, is
not a matter of major import. In fact, we have consistently
predicte-d that Soviet production would peak around 1980.
(2) That the Soviets have vast sedimentary basins which
-have-important potential for the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Again, this seems irrelevant to our argument, which is that
the Soviets will become net importers in the early 1980s.
(3) That water injection has had a serious impact in the
West Siberian fields and that this has a major bearing on our
prediction that the Soviets will become net importers--true,
and we agree.
(4). That our 1977 prediction may be a self-defeating
prophecy because the Soviets will react as a result thereof.,.
Even if true, it seems unlikely that these efforts are going
to have a sufficient impact within the next two-three years
to invalidate the basic hypothesis. The time it will require
the Soviets to procure a new drill bit factory andImake it
productive, for instance, would seem to be somewhat longer.
(5) That the Soviets and East Europeans cannot afford
three and one-half to four.and one-half million barrels a day
of imports. We did go over this at lunch in 1977. Our
original study did not actually say that they were going to
import this much petroleum; it indicated that there would be
a de.iand for this much importation. We acknowledged, however,
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that we did not make that distinction as clearly as we
should have in our study and regretted it. We also
certainly acknowledged to you that the foreign exchange
problem would be a real one and that they might have to
accept alternatives such as slowing their economic growth
or reducing their exports to Eastern Europe in lieu of
importing. All of this was presented in our paper on
Soviet economic problems and prospects which was released
later in 1977, when I sent you a copy.
(6) That the Soviets will avoid importing by a combination
of switching to other types of energy and increased conservation.
We certainly agree that they are going to attempt to do these
things and have already shown evidence of that. However, as
you are well aware, the opportunities for conservation in the
Soviet Union are far less than in the United States, and they
are not likely to solve their problem by bringing on great
quantities of natural gas within the next two or three years.
By coincidence, the day after your article appeared we released
in unclassified form our update on the 1977 world energy study. I
understand a copy was sent to you. It's a shame this didn't reach you
prior to your authoring this article that apparently was still based
on misunderstandings of our 1977 study which I thought we had cleared
up with you.
Yours,
STANSFIELD TURNER
Professor Marshall I. Goldman
Russian Research Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Prepared by 0/DCI
Per ES, Copies Furnished; l
DDCI
DD/NFA
D/OER/NFA
D/PA
1.-DCI
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Approved For Release 2010/04/29: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200410026-0