PARAGUAY: POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS TO STROESSNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000100150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Seffe4-
Intelligence
Paraguay: Potential
Successors To Stroessner
Seer
et
CR 85-14144
ALA 85-10082
August 1985
Copy 373
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 Directorate of --S" "t-
Intelligence
Paraguay: Potential
Successors To Stroessner
of Central Reference,
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Branch, Office
Office of Central Reference,
This paper was prepared by
CR 85-14144
ALA 85-10082
August 1985
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Paraguay: Potential
Successors to Stroessner 25X1
Summary Although 72-year-old President Alfred Stroessner is not expected to leave
Information available office anytime soon, political infighting is intensifying. The power struggle
as of 15 July 1985
was used in this report. within Stroessner's Colorado Party pits those who unreservedly endorse his
authoritarian policies against those who appear to favor a limited opening
of the political system. The latter group, known as the traditionalist
faction, has been gaining ground. Its leaders, along with several influential
military officers, are likely to play key roles in the transition if Stroessner
leaves office within the next few years.
The Constitution sets forth a formal succession process involving congres-
sional action and national elections. We believe, however, that the
succession will be shaped through negotiation among Colorado and
military powerbrokers. We expect this process to select a president with
relatively broad popular support.
Leading contenders, in our judgment, include Supreme Court Chief Justice
and traditionalist Colorado politician Luis Argana; veteran traditionalist
Colorado leaders Edgar Insfran and Juan Manuel Frutos; the Defense
Minister, Maj. Gen. Gaspar Martinez; and a respected senior military
officer, Gen. Gerardo Johannsen
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Any of these men would be likely to maintain Paraguay's pro-West foreign
policy. They probably would respond to Western and regional pressure for
a more democratic political system by easing controls on elections. We do
not believe they would establish a full-fledged democracy, however.F 25X1
A likely key powerbroker during a transition would be Maj. Gen. Andres
Rodriguez, an Army corps commander whose power is second only to -IF
Stroessner's.
Because of his notoriety, we believe he would operate behind
the scenes in a transition, rather than seek the presidency. Nonetheless, a
protracted power struggle resulting in a paralyzed government and civil
disorders might lead Rodriguez to seize power and impose a tough
authoritarian government. Relations between such a regime and the
United States would probably be subject to strains over human rights and
drug trafficking.
iii Secret
CR 85-14144
ALA 85-10082
August 1985
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Using an alternative method of analysis,
that applies cost benefit and social choice theory to political issues, we
tested the validity of our more conventional approach. The results support
our analysis that Stroessner's successor would be selected by a brokered
process-perhaps endowed with a facade of openness-in which the actual
choice would be made behind the scenes.
the military would prevail over the Colorado traditionalists in any dispute
over the succession. The complete findings are in the
appendix.
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Colorado Party 2
The Military 5
Selecting a Consensus Candidate 11 25X1
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would affect Paraguay's political course or stability.
Scope Note This research paper discusses the political elite, powerbrokers, and presi-
dential aspirants who will figure in the political transition that will follow
President Stroessner's eventual departure from power. It also speculates on
the succession process. It assumes that the wider political climate will
remain sufficiently stable for the dominant political elite to impose its will
on the populace at large. This paper does not predict how a transition
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Paraguay: Potential
Successors to Stroessner
each other.
President Alfredo Stroessner, the longest serving head
of government in the Western hemisphere, firmly
controls Paraguay. He has maintained power for more
than three decades through classic authoritarian
methods: rewriting the Constitution, controlling elec-
tions, restricting the opposition, building a solid base
for the ruling Colorado Party, curbing civil liberties
and using state-of-siege powers, restricting union and
university activities, and using the armed forces to
impose his will. In the process, Stroessner has brought
his previously strife-torn country prolonged political
stability and significant-if skewed-economic devel-
opment. He also has responded to the Paraguayans'
strong sense of national unity-forged through a
history of armed conflict with neighbors-by main-
taining a measure of regional independence and play-
ing more powerful Brazil and Argentina off against
There is little evidence that Stroessner will leave
office anytime soon. The President, now 72, is occa-
sionally rumored to have health problems, however,
and he has indicated that he might retire when his
term ends in 1988. The prospect of his departure-
especially if it occurs suddenly-raises questions
about how and by whom Paraguay will be governed.
Since seizing control over 30 years ago following a
period of severe political instability, Stroessner has
concentrated power and has taken no steps to groom a
successor or prepare for an orderly transition. F
political infighting has increased within the
regime between those who hope for some degree of
political reform after Stroessner's departure and those
who favor continued authoritarian rule. We believe
this struggle will intensify, especially if the President
continues to avoid planning for the succession.
In recent years,
The pillars of Stroessner's regime are the President's
Colorado Party and the armed forces. The party
administers the government and marshals popular
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support for the regime, while the military provides the
muscle to maintain domestic stability. Opposition
parties are weak and fragmented,
Colorado Party
The Colorado Party has been Paraguay's dominant
political group since it emerged as the winner in the
civil strife of the late 1940s and early 1950s. The
party is strongly anti-Communist but otherwise non-
ideological. Mass based and well organized, it has
considerable grassroots support and a foothold in most
segments of society. All armed forces personnel and
government employees are required to belong to the
party.
Given the party's dominance, the Colorados are virtu-
ally certain to play a key role in shaping the eventual
transition. Two main groups within the party have
long vied for control,
and their influence in a transition probably will be
relative to their power within the party. Although the
two factions are based to a considerable degree on
personal ties among their members, there are also
discernible substantive differences between them. One
has been described as a
hardline-or "palace"-faction that unreservedly en-
dorses Stroessner's authoritarian approach, while the
other has been portrayed as a relatively moderate
grouping that favors a more open system.
The hardliners tend to have closer personal ties to the
President. The more moderate group, known as the
traditionalist faction, is led by men whose families
have played major roles in the party for the past four
decades.
During most of the Stroessner era the hardliners have
generally been the more powerful group, but their
dominance has never been absolute, and in recent
years it has eroded. The traditionalists now hold a
commanding majority in the party's governing junta,
a group of senior Colorado officials responsible for
electing party officers. We agree with the US Embas-
sy's analysis that the growing strength of the more
moderate faction stems mainly from economic devel-
opment and expanding ties with the outside world.
Modern transportation and communications have cre-
ated a new middle class that desires a more responsive
political system.
Divisions between the two factions have increasingly
surfaced during the past year. Last fall the tradition-
alists demonstrated their strength by successfully
pressuring the hardliners-and Stroessner-to aban-
don efforts to appoint the President's hardline private
secretary, Mario Abdo Benitez, to a senior party post.
(This was one of the first disputes within Stroessner's
ruling party to make the press.) More recently, a
struggle between the two groups within the party's
university wing has intensified and has received grow-
ing attention in the Paraguayan press.
The Traditionalists. We think the traditionalists will
have the edge in any succession. Although the power
of the hardliners stems largely from their relationship
with Stroessner, the traditionalists have wider power
bases in the party and enjoy greater popularity in the
country, according to Embassy reporting.
Three popular traditionalist leaders are likely to play
important roles in the post-Stroessner era, according
to US Embassy reporting. All are possible successors
to Stroessner, in our judgment. The three are long-
time party stalwarts Luis Argana, the chief justice of
the Supreme Court; Edgar Insfran, former Minister
of Interior; and Juan Manuel Frutos, a senior party
leader.
Of the three, Luis Argana, a 53-year-old, veteran
Colorado politician with a reputation for reform-
mindedness and relative honesty, appears to have the
edge. Argana is experienced, tough, and capable, and
he enjoys wide support among senior military officers,
We believe this support
is attributable in part to his ability to avoid antagoniz-
ing military leaders as he has risen in the party ranks.
When he was named Chief Justice by Stroessner in
1984, Argana was directed to clean up the image of
the judicial system, but not to exceed his mandate. He
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has proven adept at maneuvering a tricky course-
reforming the judiciary while supporting the govern-
ment's authoritarian approach in politically sensitive
cases. His actions-he has removed several judges for
corruption-have won him esteem among younger
Colorado politicians,
His reputation for honesty, however, may not be
deserved-Embassy sources have linked him in the
past with Army strongman Maj. Gen. Andres Rodri-
guez
Paraguayan politicians have voiced a range of opin-
ions about Argana to US Embassy officials. Some in
his own party say he is highly opinionated
For example, as Colorado
majority leader in the Chamber of Deputies during
the early 1980s, he was disliked by some of his party's
legislators because of his autocratic methods. Never-
theless, according to Embassy reporting, Colorado
legislators under his leadership sometimes were able
to block, delay, or modify legislation presented by the
executive branch. Moreover, Argana was respected by
the opposition, which viewed him as an honest, inde-
pendent politician.
Edgar Insfran was a leading figure in the early years
of the Stroessner regime. Forced out of politics by
Stroessner in the mid-1960s, he is edging back. He
has lived quietly in Asuncion and has maintained
close relationships with various party activists and
Cabinet ministers. In April 1985 Insfran told US
Embassy officers that he sensed growing support for
himself among the population. He said high-ranking
Colorado Party and government officials have asked
him to help them reestablish discipline and unity
within the party.
Stroessner may soon appoint Insfran to replace octo-
genarian Colorado Party president Juan Ramon Cha-
vez, a move that Stroessner has resisted in the past.
As Minister of Interior (1956-66), Insfran
helped the President consolidate his rule. He
orchestrated a harsh crackdown on antigovernment
violence and, because of his reputation for forceful-
ness, was able to build a large following in the ruling
party. US Embassy officials say that the 64-year-old
Insfran is still widely regarded as one of the few
Paraguayans of presidential stature. They consider
him to be articulate and competent and to have a good
understanding of international affairs. He is highly
ambitious and energetic and has a keen political
acumen.
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Juan Manuel Frutos, 62, is a popular senator. The
son of a former President of Paraguay, he is a
longtime leader of the traditionalist faction and is
chief of the powerful Rural Welfare Institute (former-
ly the Land Reform Agency). He was one of the
party's three vice presidents from 1969 until late
1984. He lost his post as a result of party maneuvering
in the same leadership shuffle in which his opponent,
hardliner Abdo Benitez, was also denied a vice-
presidential seat.
US Embassy officials describe Frutos as
shrewd, articulate, and tenaciously anti-Communist.
He is wary of all outside influence, even that of the
United States. Embassy officials add that Frutos
wants to prevent another military figure like Stroess-
ner from co-opting the party.
Octogenarian Juan Ramon Chavez, because of his
age and lack of a power base-would make an ideal
interim president. A widely respected member of an
old-line Colorado Party family, he is President of the
Senate and of the Colorado Party. We think his main
role is to lend a facade of legitimacy to Stroessner's
authoritarian government. At 82, he is unlikely to
remain president of the party much longer-a factor
that has fueled the jockeying for position among
leaders of the two Colorado factions. US Embassy
officials say Stroessner has long regarded Chavez-a
member of the party's inner circle for more than 30
years-as unthreatening
The Palace Faction. The most prominent leader of the
hardline or palace group, Mario Abdo Benitez, is the
only hardliner with any potential for influence in the
post-Stroessner period. Several other hardline faction
leaders hold significant government posts, but they
derive their power solely from Stroessner and, unlike
Abdo Benitez, have no independent support within the
party.
We agree with US diplomats that Abdo Benitez's
influence is based on political cunning, hard work,
and his long, close association with Stroessner; he has
been the President's private secretary for over 20
years. He has built a power base in Colorado youth
organizations and has placed his supporters in posi-
tions of influence elsewhere in the regime, according
to US Embassy reporting. He tours the country
incessantly, speaking and handing out favors. The
Embassy also reports, however, that he does not have
much support in the military, even though many
officers probably share his authoritarian attitudes. In
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General Rodriguez
fact, he is disliked by key military figures, including
according to Embassy reporting.
and they are trying to curtail this support,
Benitez as the President's lackey
Abdo Benitez, 57, is one of three secretaries of the
ruling party and chairman of one of the Colorado
governing junta's key committees. Although he failed
to win a party vice-presidential post last year, he
salvaged some of his political strength because of his
support among party youth. This strength has con-
cerned traditionalist party members, who view Abdo
power in the early 1950s
His reputation has made Abdo Benitez the
object of numerous political jokes, even among chil-
dren. US Embassy officials say that he is highly
ambitious, that he has acquired a wide range of
business interests and
that he has frequently been Stroessner's frontman in
business deals. The son of immigrant Lebanese shop-
keepers, Abdo Benitez has no formal education and
was virtually unknown before Stroessner's rise to
The Military
Besides the Colorado Party, the other major pillar of
the Stroessner regime is the 16,000-man armed forces.
The military, with its long history of involvement in
politics, is virtually certain to play a central role along
with the Colorados in the post-Stroessner era.
The military is dominated by senior officers who are
widely believed to hold their positions because of their
loyalty to the President. We believe that the primary
objective of most of these officers in a political
transition will be the establishment of a government
that will allow them to continue engaging in lucrative
ventures,
Some middle-grade officers are dissatisfied with the
we do not expect this grumbling to force a change of
leadership, we believe that in a post-Stroessner transi-
tion some of the younger officers may side with those
Colorado politicians and other civilians who seek a
more open system of government.
The three most influential figures in the military are
those we regard as most likely to play key roles in a
transition as well. They are Maj. Gen. Andres Rodri-
guez, commander of the Army's important 1st Corps;
Maj. Gen. Gaspar Martinez, the Minister of Defense;
and Gen. Gerardo Johannsen, the chief of military
training.'
Andres Rodriguez, 62, is likely to be a key figure in
any transition. He is the most powerful military
officer and the second most influential person in the
country after Stroessner.
Rodriguez maintains his power through
intimidation, according to US Embassy reporting.
Although we believe he will be an important power-
broker in the post-Stroessner era, his notoriety proba-
bly will compel him to work behind the scenes rather
than to try to succeed Stroessner himself.
Rodriguez is the commander of Paraguay's best
trained and equipped Army division. He has used his
military command positions and ties to Stroessner
Stroessner, has been mentioned as a possible successor,
he has neither the desire nor the military
support.
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both to enrich himself and to consolidate his domina-
tion over much of the armed forces. He has expanded
his control by assigning his own men as commanders
of major units, while transferring rivals to remote
diplomatic posts.
We believe Rodriguez's main support comes from
fellow senior officers and members of the Colorado
Party who have profited from his business
operations. For example, he is a close friend and
business associate of Defense Minister Martinez and
evidently also has ties to Frutos, the influential Colo-
rado head of the Rural Welfare Institute. The US
Embassy reports that the institute has given him large
tracts of land. Rodriguez also enjoys important ties in
Asuncion's tightly knit society. He is related to the
President through his daughter's marriage to one of
Stroessner's sons. To enhance his credentials as a
loyal member of the Colorado Party, he frequently
appears at party functions in civilian clothes and sits
with the party's civilian hierarchy.
At the same time, because of Rodriguez's reputation
he is disliked by many Paraguayans,
including traditionalist Colorados. His involvement in
narcotics trafficking since the early 1970s is well
publicized. Paraguayan narcotics authorities have told
the US Embassy that his ranch in the Chaco region is
used as a base for smuggling and drug trafficking. His
home in Asuncion is a gaudy, sprawling chateau.
Gen. Gerardo Johannsen, 58, is a popular officer with
a reputation for relative honesty and competence.
Embassy officials say that he is much preferred over
Rodriguez by traditionalist Colorados, younger mili-
tary officers, and opposition politicians and that he
could emerge as Stroessner's successor. Although
Johannsen, as chief of training, is less powerful than
Rodriguez, he is close to Stroessner and serves as the
President's special appointee for international intelli-
gence matters. He appears to be one of the few senior
military officers who has not used his position for
excessive personal profit.
he openly acknowledges and
discusses smuggling and corruption, and he is open to
possible solutions. He is a serious and independent
leader who is highly respected by his fellow officers.
Although he respects, admires, and wants closer ties
with the United States, he believes this country has
been unnecessarily critical of Paraguay.
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seniority and his influence in the military.
Defense Minister Gaspar Martinez is likely to be
another important powerbroker in the post-Stroessner
era, and, in our judgment, he could emerge as a
compromise candidate acceptable to both the military
and the Colorado Party. Over the past decade he has
been active in the Colorado Party and has bolstered
his public image by spearheading a number of civic
construction projects. The 61-year-old Martinez has
close ties to Rodriguez dating from their school days
and has been a close associate of Stroessner for at
least two decades. According to the US Embassy,
Martinez lacks presidential ambitions. Nonetheless,
his support would help any contender because of his
People who have met Martinez have characterized
him as smooth, intelligent, In 1983 the
Embassy reported that he had amassed large sums of
If Stroessner leaves office within the next few years,
we believe the succession will be shaped through a
process of negotiation among military and Colorado
The Constitution's succession procedure has never
been used. In the event of the president's death,
resignation, or incapacitation, Article 179 provides
for convocation of the national legislature and the
Council of State-comprised of the cabinet, military
representatives, and certain private citizens-within
24 hours to designate a provisional president. LI two
years of the presidential term have elapsed, the
provisional president serves out his predecessor's
term. If less than two years have elapsed, elections
are to be held within three months to determine a
presidential successor. The president must be a Para-
guayan citizen, at least 40 years old, and a Roman
Catholic.
Party Leaders. analysis suggests a similar
conclusion.) 2 Constitutional procedures for designat-
ing a successor are likely to be manipulated by
military and Colorado powerbrokers behind the
scenes. This process, in our view, will probably result
in the selection of someone, such as Argana, who
enjoys relatively broad acceptability within the Colo-
rado Party and the armed forces.
In our judgment, a government headed by one of the
traditionalist Colorado leaders would almost certainly
maintain Paraguay's pro-West foreign policy. We
believe such a leader would move toward a somewhat
more open political system in response to middle-class
aspirations and Western pressure-for example, by
easing controls on elections. We do not believe a
traditionalist leader would establish a full-fledged
multiparty democracy, however. Members of this
segment of the party, like many other Paraguayans,
recall the instability and violence of the more politi-
cally competitive era of the late 1940s and early
1950s. Moreover, many senior military and civilian
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Because of the government's authoritarian tactics,
opposition political parties-both legal and illegal-
are weak and divided,
We believe that the opposition may be
permitted a somewhat more active role during a
transition but that these parties will lack the strength
and opportunity to gain major influence. Some of the
opposition parties may align with moderates in the
Colorado Party.
The opposition includes two legal parties that partici-
pate in the Stroessner regime's controlled elections,
several illegal parties, and one legal party that is
allied with some of the illegal parties and does not
take part in elections. Except for the tiny, divided-
and illegal-Communist Party, none of the opposi-
tion groups has a well-defined ideology or program.
Most of them vaguely advocate a more open and
honest political system.
The Liberal Party and the Radical Liberal Party are
legal and participate in elections. According to the
US Embassy, neither has the organization, finances,
or manpower to effectively oppose the Colorado
Party.
The National Accord is an umbrella grouping of four
small opposition parties that remain outside the
electoral process. Three of these groups-including
the Christian Democratic Party, the Authentic Radi-
cal Liberal Party, and the Popular Colorado Move-
ment (MOPOCO)-are illegal. The fourth-the Rev-
leaders are likely to press for a system in which they
are assured of enough leverage to block any chal-
lenges to their lucrativ businesses.
Another possible outcome would be a direct power
grab by an authoritarian military figure-most likely
General Rodriguez, who, we believe, commands the
necessary troop strength. He probably would choose
to operate behind the scenes, using his military power
olutionary Febrerista Party (PRF)-is legally recog-
nized by the Paraguayan Government.
Among the opposition groups, the Stroessner regime
has a particular aversion to MOPOCO
MOPOCO was founded by a
in Argentina.
group of Colorado politicians who left the ruling
party after losing out to Stroessner in power struggles
during the 1950s. Most of these people went into exile
Following the inauguration in December 1983 of
Argentina's civilian President, Rafil Alfonsin,
Stroessner permitted many political exiles to return
to Paraguay as a gesture to the new Argentine leader,
Subsequently, however,
he reverted to his longstanding policy of harassing
The banned Communist Party has only a few hun-
dred members, It
is divided into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions,
but most of the membership is in exile in Communist
countries or neighboring Argentina.
the USSR and Argentina's Moscow-
oriented Communist Party provide financial and lo-
gistic support to the pro-Soviet Paraguayan Commu-
nists, and the pro-Chinese group has received similar
support from Beijing.
to protect his I business ventures while
supporting Argana or some other contender. Nonethe-
less, a protracted power struggle, resulting in a para-
lyzed government and perhaps accompanied by civil
disorders, might lead Rodriguez to seize power and
impose an authoritarian government under his direct
control. Relations between such a regime and the
United States would probably be subject to strains
over human rights and drug trafficking.
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unacceptable to most military and party leaders.
Under another scenario, Stroessner at some point
might designate Abdo Benitez as his successor. We
think this is highly unlikely, however, as Stroessner
almost certainly recognizes that such a move would be
Communists and other political groups
In our judgment, the far left in Paraguay, consisting
essentially of the small, divided Communist Party,
does not have much chance of wielding significant
influence in the post-Stroessner period. Our evidence
indicates that the Communists have been kept weak
by years of repression under the Stroessner regime.
The party appears to lack popular support, and we
have seen little evidence of relationships between the
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Appendix
a Consensus Candidate
approach applies cost benefit analysis and social
choice theory to the analysis of political issues and
political stability. provides a
tested and systematic way to use country specialists'
judgments about the relative strength of political
actors, the outcomes those actors prefer, and the
importance of an issue to each actor to make infer-
ences about policy outcomes, the dynamics of the
resolution of the issue, and other possible scenarios.
the scenes.
Selecting
President Stroess-
ner's successor will be selected by a brokered process.
This process may be endowed with a facade of
openness, but the actual choice would be made behind
opposes it.
The military probably has the most influence in
deciding how Stroessner's successor will be chosen. In
fact, the predicted outcome is very close, if not
identical, to what the military wants. The traditional-
ist faction of the Colorado Party probably will have
less influence than the military in determining how
the successor will be selected. The traditionalists
could push for greater political participation, perhaps
following constitutional guidelines. They might even
advocate elections from a list of candidates restricted
to Colorado leaders. However, the traditionalists lack
the clout to impose such an outcome if the military
The Colorado traditionalists may think that they
could successfully challenge the military in Stroess-
ner's absence. Given the projected configuration of
political forces, the traditionalists would not be able to
do so. The military would probably see any tradition-
alist demands or threats as mere posturing. Continued
attempts by the traditionalists to get their way could
bring a strong response from the military
Even so, once the military became embroiled with the
traditionalists, other groups would be encouraged to
resist the military's demands. In these circumstances,
the military might make minor concessions, but not
enough to significantly change the outcome.
Stroessner's Role
The President's unwillingness to groom a successor
indicates that he does not want to be involved in the
process. Nevertheless, as the succession issue moves
toward the top of Paraguay's political agenda,
Stroessner will come under pressure to play a role.
If the President continues to stand on the sidelines, he
probably will face considerable pressure from the
Colorado traditionalists, the military, General Rodri-
guez, and Colorado youth to support their respective
positions. He may see taking a strong stand on the
issue-probably by selecting his replacement, albeit
behind a facade of openness-as a way to dominate
the issue and obviate the attempts of others to influ-
ence him. Such efforts, however, would be only
partially successful. The military, including General
25X1
25X1
Rodriguez, would force him to consider the views of 25X1
the powerbrokers.
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