AGENDA FOR 15 DECEMBER 1982 MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00569R000100070029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 13, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 December 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: History Advisory Board
FROM: J. Kenneth McDonald
Executive Secretary, History Advisory Board
SUBJECT: Agenda for 15 December 1982 Meeting
REFERENCE: HN 1-187 dated 25 January 1982,
"CIA History Staff
The Chairman of the History Advisory Board will convene its
first meeting at 10:00 a.m. Wednesday, 15 December 1982, in the
DCI Conference Room. On the agenda are the following four
matters:
Consideration of approval for a proposed
History Staff study of "Congress and the
CIA." for which a .prospectus by Dr.
is attached.
a staff historian,
2. Guidance on the feasibility of the History
Staff undertaking a historical study of
CIA's role in overhead reconnaissance up
to about 1970.
3. Progress report on the three DCI studies
(for Helms, Schlesinger and Colby) now
underway, and notification of Mr. Casey's
request that the History Staff now
organize similar studies for DCIs McCone,
Raborn, Bush and Turner.
4. Arrangements for History Staff access to
records and personnel in all four
Directorates as provided in reference,
the History Staff charter.
J. Kenneth McDonald
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PROSPECTUS
CONGRESS AND THE CIA:
The Dilemma of a Secret Agency in an Open. Society
The American attitude towards government has not tradi-
tionally provided an atmosphere hospitable to a secret intelli-
gence service, for our constitutional system presupposes
widely-dispersed power and open debate. Distrustful of cen-
tralized power, Americans have generally believed that govern-
mental probity is best assured by each of the three branches of
government exercising checks on the other two. But the Central
Intelligence Agency poses a special problem for this type of
arrangement, since many of its activities must be secret and
thus, outside the normal supervisory mechanisms. Not surpris-,
ingly, such a situation has evoked congressional suspicion,
criticism, and outright hostility from time to time.
But this recounts only half the story. Congress has also
turned repeatedly to the CIA for assistance, and the Agency has
exerted an important influence in shaping key national security
legislation over the past three decades. The relationship
between the two is considerably more complicated than simply
that of overseer to ward. Through congressional briefings and
the dissemination of its intelligence, the CIA has substantively
enhanced defense and foreign policy debates, and therefore
deserves wider recognition as a prominent contributor to the
policy making process.
Seeking to explain this paradoxical conjunction of
suspicion and partnership, we propose a study of the relation-
ship between Congress and the CIA since the Agency's creation.
An inquiry of this sort will aid in clarifying issues and spot-
lighting special areas of achievement, controversy, and potential
hazard. Numerous questions suggest themselves for consideration.
In what ways has the CIA made its voice heard in Congress? How
has it successfully competed with other organizations for
influence or funds? What role has the Agency played during the
past generation in the public debates over important defense
issues--the bomber and missile "gaps," Soviet technological
capabilities, Cuba, Vietnam, SALT I and II? Has wider dissem-
ination of classified information created significant security
problems, and how have Agency officials balanced the demands
of security with the desirability of a forthright response to.
legislative requests? To what extent have individual Presidents
influenced the tone of congressional-Agency relations? How
might the CIA, given the fragmented, undisciplined, partisan
nature of Congress, protect itself from irresponsible or
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ill-informed attacks? To what extent have relations with
Congress been captive to forces beyond the Agency's control;
to what extent can the CIA shape the relationship? And certainly
not least in importance, how successfully has the CIA reconciled
the anomaly of a secret agency in an open society? These are
not merely abstract questions; their answers possess obvious
contemporary relevance as well.
This study is designed not for the academic specialist but
for the CIA manager or other Agency officer seeking historical
perspective and reliable background data. Our intentions are
to cover developments through 1977 and the establishment of the
two Permanent Select Committees, with a brief epilogue summarizing
the period since then. Sources for this investigation will
include Agency correspondence, memoranda, and briefing papers;
congressional hearings, reports, and debates; and relevant
secondary materials to provide context. In addition, interviews
with key Agency personnel and others in both the executive and
legislative branches will supplement the written record.
Congress played a central role in the creation of the
CIA. The landmark National Security Act of 1947 transformed
the inadequate Central Intelligence Group into a Central
Intelligence Agency, responsible to the President through the
National Security Council. Its primary purposes were to
coordinate the intelligence activities of the United States and
to advise the NSC in matters relating to intelligence and
national security.
Two years later, the Congress passed the equally important
Central Intelligence Agency Act, which established many of the
subsequently controversial practices followed by the Agency
over the next twenty-five years. Under its provisions the
CIA gained exemption from any federal law that required dis-
closure of the organization, functions, names, titles, salaries,
or numbers of its employees. In addition, the Agency was author-
ized to bury its annual appropriations within the budgets of
other departments, to transfer funds from other government
agencies, and to disregard numerous provisions of statutory law
respecting the expenditure and accounting of public monies.
The methods followed by the Congress in passing this bill were
just as striking. Both Armed Services Committees held hearings
in executive session and released only fragmentary reports,
noting that much of the testimony they had heard was too sensi-
tive to share with their colleagues and asking Congress to vote
on faith for the creation of an agency with unprecedented and
largely unsupervised peacetime powers. With the passage of
this act in 1949, the basic framework of the CIA was complete.
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For the next twenty or so years, most Americans, including
most congressmen, possessed few clear ideas about what. the Agency
was actually supposed to do, and not many asserted a right to
know in detail about this aspect of America's national security
apparatus. Legislative oversight of the CIA, when it occurred
at all, was informal and nominal. The Congress, like the rest
of the nation, was gripped by a set of cold war assumptions that
seldom questioned the need for an active and relatively unsuper-
vised central intelligence organization. Impressive CIA triumphs
in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala a year later easily smothered what
little inclination existed to monitor the operations of the Agency.
During appropriations time, the principal concern on Capitol
Hill was insuring that the Director had as much money as he
required.
Until 1956, the only mechanism for congressional oversight
consisted of small ad hoc groups of senior congressmen who
received annual briefings on CIA activities. No formal review
process existed; the exchanges which did take place were charac-
terized more by mutual congratulations and self-satisfied expres-
sions of good will than by any real desire to share the responsi-
bility of supervising the country's intelligence community.
Beginning in 1956, the Appropriations and Armed Services committees
of each House did establish formal CIA subcommittees, but the tone
of the relationship between Congress and the Agency remained one
of camaraderie and understanding. Significantly, CIA appearances
before the oversight subcommittees were usually called "briefings"
rather than "hearings." The nomenclature is revealing. Critics
even suggested that far from serving as an instrument of legis-
lative control over the intelligence agency, the system which
gradually evolved during the 1950s and 1960s actually acted to
shield the organization from effective congressional scrutiny.
But then, most legislators saw little need to pry into
CIA operations, for from their perspective the Agency was
performing admirably in providing significant services to the
nation, and to Congress as well. DCI W. Bedell Smith and his
successors, particularly Allen Dulles, realized the importance
of staunch congressional allies, and each was careful to insure
that the appropriate members received timely briefings on
potentially sensitive matters. In the mid-1950s, for instance,
the CIA's Office of National Estimates, by successfully challenging
the Air Force's alarmist assessments of Soviet long-range bomber
capabilities, dissuaded Congress from allocating huge sums on
unnecessary countermeasures. On a more frequent if less dramatic
basis, the Agency often briefed congressmen preparing to travel
abroad and solicited their observations upon their return.
CIA efforts to cultivate friendly relations with the
legislators were centered in the office of General Counsel or,
after 1961, in a separate Office of Legislative Counsel. For
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most of the Agency's initial two decades, liaison with Congress
was the special province first of Walter Pforzheimer and then
of John Warner. The CIA repeatedly benefited from the continuity
Pforzheimer and Warner represented, for this allowed time for
the development of intimate ties with influential figures on
the Hill such as Richard Russell, Carl Hayden, and Carl Vinson.
OGC and OLC staff members coordinated all Agency contacts with
congressmen and senators, planned briefings, arranged for visits
to Agency facilities by key legislators, and responded to congress-
ional inquiries. Occasionally they prepared committee reports
and speeches for congressional supporters as well. One parti-
cularly demanding activity for the OLC was an item-by-item
review of each measure introduced in Congress and of all reports
resulting from legislative and investigative hearings, to insure
that nothing inimical to Agency interests accidentally slipped by.
In 1966, for example, OLC staffers analyzed 10,000 bills, 1,900
reports, and 34,000 pages of the Congressional Record. Finally,
the OLC assumed primary responsibility for drawing up legislation
to meet the Agency's needs, and then for shepherding it through
Congress.
More often than not during the CIA's first quarter century,
such attention to detail paid dividends in the form of'favorable
congressional action on matters affecting the Agency. Following
passage of the National Security Act in 1947 and the Central
Intelligence Agency Act two years later, the CIA required
relatively little in the way of additional legislation from
Congress. From time to time, however, the Agency did carry
requests.to Capitol Hill. Matters relating to the CIA retire-
ment system have arisen periodically. Agency employment of
military personnel and foreign' service officers has also necess-
itated congressional action on several occasions. Other legis-
lative activity has been called for as a result of proposed
measures applicable to all government agencies, but from which
the CIA wished special exemption. Bills pertaining to employee
benefits and civil service regulations have comprised the most
frequent types in this category. In recent years the successive
versions of the Freedom of Information Act have created a great
deal of time-consuming work for legislative liaison staffers.
Finally, the Agency desire to build a new headquarters in Langley
demanded close cooperation over a lengthy, period of time with
various congressional committees.
Congress also demonstrated its receptivity to the parti-
cular requirements of the CIA during the annual appropriations
process. Usually the Director appeared before the special CIA
subcommittees of the two Appropriations committees with budget
requests for the coming year broken down into general functional
categories. After cursory examination and a few unfocused
questions about Agency activities, the subcommittees invariably
endorsed the DCA's figures, which were then carefully concealed
in the budgets of other departments. Neither public disclosure
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nor floor debate of these requests was permitted, despite the
fact that such secrecy made it impossible to determine. if Agency
expenditures were in compliance with the law. Similarly, even
those congressmen charged by their colleagues with oversight
responsibilities were not always allowed access to these figures
by the subcommittee chairmen, thereby precluding any attempt to
compare CIA spending with that of other agencies or to analyze
the internal ordering of CIA priorities. On the other hand, this
tight-lipped approach did satisfy Agency security needs and
corresponded closely to its preference for minimal outside
interference in CIA affairs. That the congressional leadership
acceded to--indeed, promoted--these procedures year after year
illustrates the high regard with which the Agency was held upon
the Hill, as well as the cozy nature of the ties between the
intelligence organization and senior legislators.
The esteem with which most congressmen viewed the CIA
also served to protect it from the worst ravages of McCarthyism.
Of all the agencies within the federal government attacked by
the Wisconsin senator, the CIA was virtually the only one to
resist his assaults successfully. Allen Dulles openly defied
McCarthy's slurs, had Senate subpoenas quashed, and mobilized
congressional supporters, ultimately forcing McCarthy to back
down. Dulles' integrity and courage won him and the Agency still
greater respect from the large number of senators made uncomfort-
able by at least the more reckless accusations of their flamboyant
colleague.
For almost a quarter century, then, the CIA enjoyed a
tolerance and freedom from restraint bred of congressional
confidence in the Agency's leadership and product, which in turn
stemmed in large measure from the basic foreign policy consensus
which prevailed throughout these years. Longtime CIA officials
would later look back upon this period as a golden era--and in
a sense it was. Secure in the public's confidence, exempt from
standard disclosure and accounting regulations, the Central
Intelligence Agency remained remarkably free from the checks the
legislative branch normally places on operations of the executive.
But a price accompanied this independence. Undoubtedly
Agency officials found their wide latitude for action convenient;
few recognized that it also harbored the potential for serious
trouble. The possession of power sufficient to achieve great
purposes meant that the CIA also wielded enough power to damage
seriously the prestige and interests of the United States.
Such a state of affairs, especially in light of the traditional
American suspicion of power exercised in secret, was not
conducive to permanent legislative complacency. Nor was being
expected to vote large sums of money blindly calculated to soothe
congressional concerns. Inevitably, proud sensibilities became
ruffled, and few within the Congress had enough knowledge to
deflect criticism of the Agency or refute erroneous accusations.
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When senior members of the House Armed Services Committee pleaded
ignorance even of the existence of a CIA subcommittee, confidence
in the current oversight procedures was further eroded. In
effect, the Agency, in circumventing the customary system of
checks, had rendered itself vulnerable to criticism without
arming its would-be defenders with enough information to-offer
convincing rebuttals. That such a situation eventually raised
congressional ire is hardly surprising.
Moreover, a new mood of skepticism and self-assertiveness
pervaded Congress by the second half of the 1960s. These years
witnessed the collapse of the consensus which had undergirded
America's cold war policies for two decades. A partial if
halting rapprochement with the Soviet Union, growing domestic
opposition to the war in Vietnam, incontrovertible evidence
of a far-reaching split in the global communist movement, and
a rising dissatisfaction with the results of twenty years of
interventionism all coalesced to challenge the assumptions which
had dominated foreign policy debates since the end of World
War II. And as an important instrument of the orthodoxy now
being questioned, the CIA naturally attracted new interest.
Institutional issues also intruded to undermine the
privileged position the Agency had traditionally enjoyed.
Until the late 1960s, a small group of committee chairmen
ruled Congress with virtually unchallengeable authority. Often
holding "safe" seats in the one-party South, individuals such
as Representatives Vinson, Cannon, and Rivers, and Senators Russell
and Hayden gradually built up seniority and came to possess an
almost feudal suzerainty over their colleagues. Ensconced in
the strategic Armed Services and Appropriations committees, these
men were astutely cultivated by a succession of DCIs, and it was
their indulgence which allowed the CIA to escape close legisla-
tive scrutiny for two decades. But by 1969, Russell, Hayden,
Vinson, and Cannon had all departed, and their successors found
it impossible to ignore the demands for congressional reform
voiced by those resentful of the arbitrary power the old chair-
men had wielded. Over the next few years both Houses adopted
new rules, including a number making it much more difficult for
a handful of senior figures to shield the CIA as Russell and
the others had done.
To complicate matters further, the Agency also found itself
the inadvertent victim of a bitter quarrel between Congress and
the White House over the rightful division of powers in foreign
affairs. As the cold war consensus fragmented, Congress moved
to regain many of the responsibilities it had abdicated to the
executive branch since Franklin Roosevelt's day. Voicing fears
of an "imperial Presidency," the lawmakers sought to legislate
limits to the President's freedom of action in world affairs
in a variety of ways. In June 1970, for instance, 58 Senators
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voted in favor of the Cooper-Church amendment, which sharply
restricted White House ability to fund military action-in
Cambodia. Three months later, a switch of only nine votes would
have resulted in a Senate prohibition against the use of public
monies to keep American troops in Vietnam beyond 1971. Both
these'actions, and others akin to them, reflected a congressional
conviction that a grave imbalance between executive and legis-
lative powers had developed over the preceding generation.
As a consequence, moves to require a more rigorous
scrutiny of CIA activities must be seen as part of this broader
attempt to reverse presidential "encroachment" upon congressional
prerogatives. Pressure from the lawmakers, for instance, forced
the Nixon administration in 1971 to terminate covert CIA funding
for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In the Senate, William
Fulbright and Eugene McCarthy led efforts to expand the existing
oversight subcommittees so as to include members of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. The persistent calls for the creation of
a joint CIA watchdog committee garnered wider support in both
Houses. Not all suggestions for a joint committee were hostile;
some congressmen viewed such a body as a means to defend the
CIA from unwarranted attacks and to stave off bothersome
questions from unwitting or unfriendly colleagues. On the whole,
however, these legislative initiatives indicated that relations
between Congress and the Agency had entered a more troubled
period.
Hoping to maintain the substance of their independence,
CIA officials responded to these altered circumstances with
only limited countermeasures. Noting that even staunch
congressional friends were leaning toward a more narrow concept
of the Agency's mission, the OLC annual report for 1972 conceded
the necessity of giving tactical ground in order to forestall
restrictive legislation. In retrospect, however, Agency actions
appear circumscribed and unimaginative. It initiated a pro-
grammed effort to brief all new members of Congress. Senior
officials and OLC staffers expanded the number of their formal
appearances on Capitol Hill. The Agency disseminated its reports
and estimates to a wider audience. But in the main, the Legis-
lative Counsel concluded early in 1973, "we must rely on the
professionalism of our operations, on the integrity of our
product, and on our responsiveness to the legitimate interests
and demands of both the Legislative and the Executive Branches
to see us through [this] patch of political turbulence."
Unfortunately for the Agency, a series of spectacular
revelations and accusations between 1973 and 1976 dramatically
demonstrated the inadequacy of these CIA defense measures.
Even earlier, a widely publicized Ramparts story disclosing
that the CIA had systematically financed a domestic student
organization for nearly fifteen years had stirred congressional
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concern. Public discussion a short time later of the Agency's
role in building up an army of Meo tribesmen in Laos as part of
the American war effort in Southeast Asia added to the growing
anxieties of those who worried that perhaps the CIA had gotten
out of control. And then, in rapid succession, came allegations
that the Agency had been implicated in the Watergate break-in
and cover-up, that it had been deeply involved in the overthrow
and subsequent death of Chilean President Allende, and that it
had organized and run an extensive program of domestic surveil-
lance in blatant disregard of statutory prohibitions forbidding
such activity. Stunned by these charges, both Houses of
Congress moved to establish select committees with broad mandates
to determine whether the CIA and the nation's other intelligence
agencies had been involved in improper or illegal activities.
The subsequent investigations by the Church and Pike
Committees mark the nadir in the history of congressional-Agency
relations. Lurid accounts of assassination attempts, drug
testing, mail openings, and other abuses fostered the impression
that the CIA had engaged in a systematic and widespread pattern
of unlawful and immoral practices over many years. Many Congress-
men--indeed, many Americans--were only too ready to believe the
worst. As President Nixon's arbitrary abuses of authority and
his resort to secretive methods of governing became common
knowledge in the wake of the Watergate hearings, many found it
logical to suspect that vast misdeeds had occurred in that most
secret of agencies, the CIA, as well. Moreover, those who
opposed administration policy in Southeast Asia feared that the
White House was misusing the Agency's unique position to circum-
vent Congress' will. Amidst this general atmosphere of distrust,
few heeded the findings of the Pike Committee, which though
condemnatory of the CIA in many respects, nonetheless concluded,
"All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out
of control, has been utterly responsive to the President and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."
Congress responded to these sensational disclosures with
the 1974 enactment of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, designed to
provide closer oversight over Agency covert operations. This
legislation directed that the CIA could expend funds overseas
only for intelligence-gathering purposes, unless the President
found that other tasks were important to American national
security and reported to Congress "in a timely fashion" the
description and scope of each such assignment. Almost immediately
a half dozen or more congressional committees claimed the right
to be so informed, creating a situation one former ranking Agency
officer termed "absurd," and leading him to write in 1976 that
this provision had resulted in "almost every important project
so briefed leaking to the public immediately and being dropped."
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The legislators also took steps to increase their authority
over Agency appropriations and spending. In 1973, following
DCI Colby's admission that disclosure of the aggregate CIA
budget figure would not create a security problem, Senator
William Proxmire introduced legislation which would have required
the Agency to publish its annual budget. The Senate defeated
this proposal, but Senator John McClellan, chairman of the
Appropriations Committee and hardly a radical, then proceeded
to offer the specifics of the CIA budget to any member who
desired them. By 1975, the claims advanced by the four oversight
subcommittees to exclusive knowledge of the Agency's budget had
been summarily pushed aside, although a detailed breakdown of
its annual appropriations was not yet routinely made available
to all congressmen.
Seeking a more powerful voice in CIA affairs, and determined
that the abuses of the past--real and alleged--not be repeated,
the Senate in 1976 created a permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to monitor the intelligence-related activities of
the government. In July 1977, the House followed suit. Many CIA
officials, bitter over the sometimes unfair accusations of
congressional critics, and skeptical of any legislative body's
ability to understand the particular problems of an intelligence
organization, greeted the establishment of these two committees
with suspicion and at times outright.hostility. Gradually, .
however, the relationship between the Agency and the oversight
committees has matured and become easier for both parties. It
appears clear, though, that there will be no return to the
former system of congressional neglect and a largely unrestricted
existence for the CIA. The first era in the Agency's dealings
with the outside world has come to an end.
There exists, however, a certain paradox to the sweeping
criticism of these years. At the same time that many in the
Congress gave indications of accepting the allegations of
improper CIA behavior, the Agency also faced new calls for wider
circulation of its intelligence product. Presumably this
indicated continuing respect for the quality of CIA work. In
1974, the DDI found it necessary to set up a special Congressional
Support Staff to handle this flood of requests. Agency officials,
ever mindful of Congress' reputation as a sieve, worried about
the security implications of such exchanges, but at the same
time recognized that the arcane nature of much of the information
needed by the legislators in considering esoteric questions of
weaponry performance and verification procedures assured their
organization a substantial role in the policy making process. _
In 1979, for example, the CIA was drawn into the very center of
the SALT II debate, particularly regarding questions about the
U.S. capability to monitor Soviet compliance with treaty pro-
visions. Currently, numerous inquiries about and requests for
briefings on Lebanon illustrate Congress' continuing reliance
on Agency expertise.
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Clearly, then, a study such as the one we propose will
combine elements of both partnership and conflict. The latter
is the better known, but the former may be the more significant.
At a minimum, our inquiry may suggest means to augment the
cooperation and lessen the friction endemic to congressional-
Agency relations. As long as defining the exact role Congress
should play in CIA affairs remains an ongoing process, such
knowledge will have a more than theoretical utility.
A brief outline of the chapter headings follows.
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CONGRESS AND THE CIA:
The Dilemma of a Secret Agency in an Open Society
Introduction: Patterns of Executive-Legislative Rivalry
I. Creation of the Agency: 1940-49
A. Background
B. National Security Act of 1947
C. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
D. Initial congressional ideas regarding oversight
II. Setting Patterns: 1949-55
A. Establishment and operation of legislative liaison branch,
OGC
B. Legislative concerns
C. Patterns of congressional oversight--covert operations,
the budgetary process
D. Agency contributions to national security debates
E. Smith and Dulles confirmation hearings
F. Dulles and Congress: the personal equation
G. McCarthyism ,
III. Relative Tranquility:
A. Hoover Commission--Clark Task Force--Doolittle Commission
B. Calls for more formalized oversight--Mansfield Resolution,
creation of CIA subcommittees, McCarthy Resolution
C. New headquarters
D. IG study and creation of OLC
E. Other legislative concerns
F. Intelligence controversies--"bomber gap," Sputnik,
U-2, Bay of Pigs, Cuban missile crisis
G. McCone and Raborn confirmation hearings
IV. Seeds of Discord: 1966-72
A. Helms confirmation hearings
B. The new assertiveness in Congress
C. Breakdown of the foreign policy consensus
D. Ramparts disclosures
E. Lao "secret army"
F. Tentative efforts to monitor CIA activities
G. Agency defense measures
H. Involvement in national security debates--ABM, SALT I
I. Other legislative concerns
J. The price of autonomy
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V. The Agency Under Siege: 1972-77
A. Watergate
B. Schlesinger and Colby confirmation hearings
C. Chile
D. Domestic surveillance activities
E. Church and Pike Committee investigations
F. Monitoring of covert activities--Hughes-Ryan Amendment
G. Financial oversight
H. Creation of Permanent Select Committees
I. Bush confirmation hearings
J. Intelligence sharing--new roles for DDI and DDO
K. Continued centrality in policy making
L. Impact of investigations on Agency
M. Turner confirmation hearings
VI. Epilogue: Congress and the Agency since 1977
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