NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 95A; GUYANA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070006-2
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

SECRET
95A /GS /GP
AU uyana
June 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS
The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is not t
published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per-
ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters-- Co()ntry
Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Gaog-
raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and
Intell +genre and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters,
particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent t
all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only
minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into
one volume.
Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact
book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta-
tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook
omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence
and security organizations.
Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS
Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre-
viously produced wi!! continue to be available as long as the major
portion of the study is considered valid.
A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory
of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent
classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and
number and includes classificurion and date of issue; it thus facilitates the
ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.
Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate
chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through
liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Gereral Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction
of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi-
nated by the Central Intelligence Agency.
WAR \I \G
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI-
CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES
5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
.q
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

WARNING
The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re-
leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern-
ment or international body except by specific authorization
of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with
the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 1.
For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the
portions so marked may bes made available for official pur-
poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel
provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or
the National Intelligence Survey.
Subsections and graphics are individually classified
according to content. Classification /control designa-
tions are:
(U/OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use. Only
(C) Confidential
(S) Secret
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by January 1973.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

p l m
CONTENTS
This chapter supersedes the political coc-
eragc in the General f uroey dated July 1969.
A. Introduction
1
Evolution of the political processes; British in-
fluence on political structure; political bifurca-
tion along racial lines; governmental goals; racial
tension:
B. Structure and functioning of the government
2
Constitutional system.
1. Executive
3
Structure of the executive branch; ministries.
2. Legislative
4
Stricture and powers of the National As-
sembly.
3. Judicial
5
Court system; right of appeal.
SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

Page
4. Local government 5
Administrative districts; Local Government
Board; Unions of Local Authorities.
C. Political dynamics
7
Major aspects of Guyanese political history; bi-
furcation along political lines; PNC and OF
coalition.
1. Major parties
8
a. People's National Congress PNC)
8
Party organization; racial composition and
attitudes; major problems encountered in
retaining government control; inermri-
25
ence and unreliability of administrators.
b. People's Progressive Party PPP)
10
Major historical aspects; power stru�gl�
between Burnham and Jagan; problems
encountered with the PPP in offia,; sus-
pension of the Constitution; PPP out of
office; Jagan placed under restriction by
Bridsh; Jagan in total control of party;
PPP publicly enrolled in World Commu-
nist Movement; party organization and
makeup.
2. Minor parties
12
a. United Force (UF)
12
Composition; historical aspects; OF and
PNC coalition; sources of discord and fric-
tion within the coalition; diminishing ef-
fectiveness; party organization.
b. Guyana National Liberation Front
(GNLF)
13
Small, newly formed underground move-
ment building up cadre for guerrilla war-
fare.
c. People's Democratic Movement (PDM)
13
Small, newly formed political party.
3. Pressure groups
13
Effectiveness of interest groups insignificant
because of bifurcation of political parties
along racial lines.
4. Electoral laws and practices
14
Citizenship qualification; registration and
voting procedures; mechanics of elections.
D. National policies
16
1. Domestic policies
16
Major goals of the Burnham administration.
a. Race relations
16
Conciliatory policies of the government;
policies toward the Amerindians.
b. Economic development
17
Governmental attempts to solve economic
problems; development plans; emphasis
on economic nationalism; monetary and
fiscal policies; foreign trade policies.
ii
Page
c. The role of cooperatives 19
The "co- operative movement govern-
mental control over the economy.
d. Labor relations 20
Arbitration tribunals; worker's benefits;
inflation checks.
2. Foreign policies 20
a. Relations ith other countries 20
Diplomatic relations with other countries;
proposals for economic and political inte-
gration of Caribbean states; expanded con-
tacts with other Latin American states;
U.N. activities.
b. Boundary disputes 21
'territorial disputes with Venezuela and
Surinam.
E. Threats to government stability 23
1. Discontent and dissidence
23
Distrust and suspicion between the two
dominant racial groups based on political, so-
cial, and economic factors; racial tensions.
2. Subversion
24
a. Amerindians and white ranchers
24
Venezuela's clandestine campaign to foment
subversive acts.
b. Jagan and his followers
25
Subversive possibilities within the PPP.
c. Non Communist subversive groups
25
Black powz -r movement; potential disrup-
tive groups; nondisruptive aspects of
youth groups.
F. Maintenance of Internal security 26
1. Police 26
Development of the Guyana Defense Force;
strength; morale.
2. intelligence and security services 27
The Special Branch, its functions and re-
sponsibilities.
3. Countersubversive and counterinsur-
gency measures and capabilities 28
Responsibilities of the CDF and police force
for counterintelligence and counterinsurgency
activities.
G. Selected bibliography 28
Chronology 29
Glossary 31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1 Structure of government (chart) 3
Fig. 2 Electoral vote and parliamentary
representation chart) 8
Fig. 3 Linden Forbes Burnham, Prime Min-
ister, !Fader of the PNC photo) 9
Page
Fig. 4 Cheddi Jagan, leader of the PPP
(photo) 10
Fig. 5 Janet Jagan, secretary for interna-
tional affairs of the PPP (photo) 10
Fig. 6 Territorial claims and boundary dis-
putes with Venezuela and Sarinam
(map) 22
iii
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

Government and Politics
A. Introduction (C)
Guyana, known its British (:(iaua (a :rc,wrt
Colon\) until it bccunrc independent on 26 \l;tv 19(j(j,
has it parlianuentan fora) of gov- rnmcrtt. 'I'll(- :\frican-
It'd adininistraticm currently ill p mer Professes to be
working toward it multiracial detn,oc�rac% under
contitiuiug African Ivadcrship. It is c�omiitted to
improving the living standards of the people I,s
devvioping a nixed (,c�ouon)v it, Which the role of
private enterprise weilld be wduced in favor of state
ownership and control of basic industry alric�h i
C'tvarra could extend as tar as retail sides. Guyana's
Politics hate become increasingly polarized, and racial
tensions hit\(, become more' pronounced bchvecn the
?ast Indians and the Africans and \Iixed, %%bo
comprise 51 ci itnd 4 S`i of the pop(rlatiou.
respec�tivel. This has been particularly true since the
1968 general elections.
(;t"'anese political parties have bevii organized
largely along racial lines since 1955 tvh (,n Linden
Forbes Burnham, the present Prime Minister tvho ryas
also the co-founder of the NT. and his :lfrican
followers challenge(I Chcddi jagan. the East Indian
)nununist leader of the Peoples Progressive fart\
(1'PP), tyhic�h tt,.s then both African and fast ludian.
Burnham founded the Peoples National Congress
(PNC) in 19:r shortly after !easing the I'Pp. Ile
gained power in the 196 -1 (,Icc�tiolls and has sill(.(,
controlled the country's politics. Bec�acrse of tic racial
tensions and th(, antilgOttisnt between Burnimin and
jagart �and d(,spite the Guyanese respect for British
institutions �the concept of' if emistmetive parliamcn-
lary opposition has failed to d(,y(,lop. "I'hc pPN has not
Cooperated with the Bimiliam government to any
significant cxtcnt but instead has tried to thwart it at
every opportunity.
I'lie institutions provided I)y lilt British mule good
government possible, and in the clays before self
govcrimient th(, colony was fairly and honestly
administered by its British overseers. Most of tb(,
people were loyal to the British Crown, and if coherent
and popular sentiment for full indepcndctrc( %sits l
in cl (,velol)ing. In the rneantinic racial t(,nsiolls began
to surface ,t, I bx 1955 the society had polarized into
hostile car, of :kf'ricans aml 1� :ast ludi.ccts. "1'be
scspic�ions and periodic ()if( breaks o1' violence bet\%eeu
the two racial groups kept the colons in it state of
tettsioo and prevented the dl-\vlopnu�nl of national
rntit\. "I'he political parties. which b\ nosy %tore
engaged in it bitter sln fur cold rn,l. there
pre uc�cupiecl tyith their rivalry rather than working for
th(, good of the colcnry. No compromise betttec�rt the
two major parties was possible. and when the British
fivallt grunted iudeper:denc�e. the guyernnu�ut to
"lliclt they passed political putter nits if c�oalitiou lecl
by the 1'N(: aucl sripporled by t;u� United Force (L'I
it small wtiltirac�ial parh Mliclt had the h ��,�king of
consertative�s and the :kmerindiims.
During the first sears of inel(,peude nee Burnham
headed au rntstead\ parliamentary coalition with the
UF. tvbicb Itad formed after lie December 1961
ale- _tic,ll largely to keel) jagan (Mt of power.
I c�onflic�ls beltveert l'F leader Peter
I uiit r and Brrrnlarn led Burnham to become
antagonistic toward the coalition. I) :lguiar hit ;erly
opposed Burnham' electoral legislation and. %%!I( .i
Burnham disregarded his tvisbes. I)' .\guiar resigned
front the coalition in October 1965. largely because of
thlegislation is le and fraudulent procedures. Burnham
\vela un to \tilt it majority ill the lwis elec�lion and
formed the goverimient without the need for
coalition.
Burnham's part% tvou 5(i`( of the seats ill the
National :ssetnbly and c�onseyneutl control of� the
colour\ for the next 5 gars. 13timban) claimed that his
vic�tort was i t racial brvakibrougb and that the Fast
Indians could no longer be considcrcd the properh of
the I'I'I'. Ilowever. (chile there are indications that
Burnbarn gained sonic I�:ast Indian support.
particularly among the \11tslints, the inroads into the
Fast Indian Note \sere not as impwssive as the election
results might seem to indicate. "I'll( racial basis of
Gcryanese politics hail not been c�hallged signific,oitlt
and jagan still retained the support of most of the just
Indians. Burnhanr'r, impressive electoral margin ryas
core largel\ to voting regulations and ln-wi inert' which
favored the MC. and to a political campaign which
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

fur exceeded thee combined efforts Of the I'I'I' and the
L F. Burnham sought t cl(�I)icl his v ictor\ as u
s inclirttion of the moderate and progressicr policies of
his administration.
B(nhan has sill(�(� tuainlaiued his deternination to
cxclude jagan front per( and retain control of the
government. In spite of the elec�lor:d mai ilmlalion.
however, basic political freedons and it desux�ralic�
form of govenum�nt at the national level, for the ;nost
part. have been utaintained. liurnhatu has sludioctsly
sought to avoid antagonizisl, the Fast Indian
poptL�ction and has presented hinself as it ualional
rather than it racial leader Neverthcless. the high lust
Indian birth rate and the persistent tendenc\ Of most
l� :ast Indians and Africans to rote ruc�iall\ and the fears
of each group that the Other is determined to
enutsc�ulatc it pOlilically h,,\ continual to keep racial
and political tensions high.
In September 1969 Burnh:un ant( moved lar,, ^I\
as ;t sv tnbolic gesture to increa national self- rc�hauc�e
and ac�hie\ e econulltic deg elopnu�nt through the
intw(Itiction of sone socialist measures �the creation
of the Cooperative Republic of Gusuna. B\ I ebruar
19 Ctts.tua had x�( its ties with the British
Crown and becanic the first Caribbean tnentberof the
:osts,�nssrallh to become it republic. As clec�ted
President replaced the GO erns General as titular
head of State �f,ut the change was more s\ ntbolic�
than sttbstanti\ c. 1'he Constitulimm of 1970 pro\ ided
for it republican form of gmernment and the
appointment of it President elec�le�I b\' it simple
nuijorit\ vote of the elected nu�ntbers of the National
:lssentbl\. Burnh:un then sought to clarify (Imnestic�
policies aisu�d at the econont and
b(tilding "a ne\t soc�i economic stntcture free of
foreign influc ace, one that was neither cOnununist nor
c Burnham attacked foreign aid. including
sOn}e limited United Slates assistance. and strongl\
Criticized private fOreigu investment and banks. He
demanded al least 51 e(Ittil\ participations in future
foreign i(n�cstment projects ill forests and ntinerals�
this \\'as later expanded to include Other industries.
I'he next step in secttrisit, greater g0vvrnntent
control Over the econc,m\ \\'as to impose c ontrols on
imports and "similar transactions" and to establish
cooperatives ill the insttram- fi.!(I. 'I'hc governsu�nl
also Ordered all Official (economic entities to deal
exclusivvIv through tlu� National Cooperative Bank.
This stm"c etas to be ex,mildcd with the aim Of
niniatttrizin, hrcign banks and staking the
Cooperative Bunk dominant in the sociel\.
The gOvernment's efforts to expand its role in the
ecOnunM hay e ne�t \eith mixed success. Most sectors of
I
the lum. been lOrcal to accept iuereased
regulalOr\ decree ;lit(] foresee nose stringent conlr,ls
in the hotline. Objections to Ili� i4merntncids demmid
lOr increased control in the (lug to -day operations Of
the Dellit�rara Bauxfle COntpan\. it subsidiary of it
Canadian firth, providcd the Ostensible rasun fur its
lakeOver Im the gmenuseut in 1971. Nationalization
Of other foreign firsts will follrnt. Nationalization ail
its attendant problems of ntatn;tgentent b\ it relati\el\
inexperienced bureatcrac�\ lime added to the
goveruuenl's basic ec�ouuntic� difficulties. Transpurt;t-
lion and pimer facilities renutin illade(Iuale fur
groMli. The countrc is still heav il\ dependent upon a
relativel\ fe\c exports netinl bauxite. sugar. ;otd
rice. the latter t\\o being especi:tll\ subject tO c\orld
market 11uc�lu;(tiuns. Ne\\ foreign inveslnu�nt in
Guiana has dropped signific�antl\ and the econonM
has stugnatel. The serious unentplO nu nl problem
bas not been reduced, and labor unrest. fueled in part
bs the rising cost of liVing. continues. The population
is increasing at ,it annu;tl average rate Of 2. adding
to the (trgenc\ of snc�h problems as creating ness jobs
and providing more hOusiug aid facilities. Racial
tensions A limes ha\e it serious negative elfecl un
producliVit\
Popular acceptance(� Of the Burnham adntinistrclion
renntins c�IOCtded Im the c�uttntr\ 's racial dig ision. The
tnajorit\ Of .\fric�ans continue to support Burnham and
his policies and rcadil\ indentil'\ \\ith hill because he
is black. Some of the more radical and militant blacks
believe that he is nu,ving loo slo \%k. and the\ lime
withdrawn their support front his gosrnunc�nt. The
I�:ast Indians generally view Burnham \citlt indif-
ference or resentment. largel\ because he is not one of
theist. ;Otd because the\ bavc little� or no \oie�e ill the
making Of gmc�nunenl policies. It appears that at least
sonic vast Indians. frustrated \\ith being out 01' p(mer
for so long and disc�OUraged orr the prospcc�ls of
regaining their former role in the government through
the electoral process. net\ he grayitaling toward
evcntually resorting to violence. 'thus Burnham nta\
fin(I it (liffie�(t(t to continue� to giwern b\ (ICHIOCralic
nu ells and may adopt extraleg:d measures to assure
survival Of his go(rtnnu�nt and his black rule.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (U /OU)
Guan:t gainc(I independence on 26 \lu\ 1956 and
bec�anu� it republic within the British Commonwealth
on 23 February 1970. It has a parliamentun fottn Of
government� patterned ;,;ter that of the United
Kingdom� cOntpose(I Of a unicasu�ral legislature and
4
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

it 5:1- nit -mber \atioual t l a liani�nt 1. Tht
(:ollstitutinu. \c hick taunt� hilt, (41 �t on illdepcildvilc
da). !nadv pro\ision for the \;Ititmal It,
((�elan� th(� country it r(�lruili(�. ill %\hidi line� Ihr
British Monarch ;u h( I(I of Ntatc and Iol�;rlk
r(�prvwnted h\ the (;m(�rnor (:cneral tca, replaced h\
it Presidcnl (�I(�c�tvd he it ,iinple ntajoriI gate of tie
\Iti()n ;l :\�,cutil\ (I`il;IIrr I). Tllu (:on,tilnlioll
pro\ ides for an appointed jntlic�iar\ ;Ind a unicanu�r if
Ivilklature elected ht .(�c�rt�t iallot under it ,\,Ieul of
priy,rtional reprvwnlation: the ntini1twin wlilll; ate
is 2I war>. Thv major burden of t;o\ ernni�nt is earrie(I
k the (:otiiwil fit Minister or (:aiinet. llm,ided (,\,�r
l) the I'rinie Minister. \\ho,e ewculite Niip �ntac\ is
nn(lueaiotu(1 ,u lomg :i, h(� n�tain a Iuai(Irit\ in the
assenll,lc. The 0)IIStit(Ition (.ontain it Kill of Kidht,.
chieh vinimenttes in detail if citizen', ritlits to
v(ItialiI\. permnnal fn�edonl. and property. The
constitution recognizes th(� role of the Leader of the
Opposition and pro\ides forc-onsullation c\ith Ili ill h\
the I'riine \linister in it clumher of iitipirt inatlers.
Provision fs al u, made for ;fit lae(tiou (:onuni
\(hich has responsiiilih for the w of Doter�
and IFte conduct of the elections. "111e (:onstitution can
he amended b\ i t siniply ntaiorih vale of th(� a senlbl\
t ((l,t Ior oni� intltorlant luoci,ion \chi(�h rt�(luir(' ;t
I 1( 1, \t it, or. i ,ouu :r�t a ro�It retidtlIli.
I. 1� \cculive
"I I'rt� (,I (:o\:tn ;l act, its lilttlal chid of
I;Itc. 1� \t�(�Iitl \t to i\% r Iic \ciIII Iliv I'rini' '\IiIIi r a,
Head of (:opt rnntrul. Thu I'n��itleid i cicctt (I to it
ear t(�nn Its the \;itiou ;tl \Ilh(iligh
it( Irt oIk ;I fi1;IIrt�Ilea(I. IIit I'I-(�si (If �nt foriIialI\
itI)p )it t-, the I'rini� \liIIi,ter. the Leader of I 1
Oppq )sit itill and the OIIIiII(kill;tll. "I�he,e ;tl,l,,)inle
ho,\\(�\t�r. Inn be indi\idiiak tcio wt tt ;tll\ eonunand
the ippwt of Ili� n lit jttriI\ oof tit� III(�tltht 1 of the
\.,l i n i f eIIIIif\ and the iippo,ilion. r(,lI(�cli\�.'I.
Ilu\\( ;I in the Britkh parhanivntar\ "tent. if it
niot( (,f the a pa ��s a Ito lolnfi(!vII(�t�
inolinn. the I'rini� Mini must either r( ur
adki the President. \thc, nI ;I r(�\okv the al pohit-
nient of the Prime \1inister. "I'he I'r(�,id(�nt max
di ,md\e the asm -nthlt lthns (or(�iim ne\c elvOWn'. I. if
the affil�(� of I'rilne \Iinister i \;((ant or held i\ an
lIldi\idual \t ho hats received if rote o1 nu- eonfidenee
turd there k no I/ro,lx�(�t of finding lu�rson aho (-;Ili
(�onuuand the ipport of the Inajoril\ of the depities
\tithin ;I reasonable amount of tittle. lu all other
PRESIDENT
Leader of the PRIME MINISTER Ombudsman SUPREME
Opposition COURT
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY Court
53 Members of Appeals
5 Years t
COMMI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
High Court
Elections
Ministers
Ministers selected
Public Service
selected by
from outside
Judicial Service
Prime Minister
National Assembly
Police Service
from
(maximum 5)
Amerindians Land
National Assembly
Attorney General
Appointment upon advice of the
Appointment Prime Minister (and for judges,
the Judicial Service Commission)
0 Dissolution after consultation
with Prime Minister
FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U /OU)
.0-- App
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

irt�tallue" III \t,%c�r. Iht, I'rc.ult,nl 11111%1 lirl 1 1laiit tbc
ifppriI%;d of Ihl. 1'rirnc \linis(l.r ur mic ul oil
dcsigliall-d minister 1white aclimt
;viivral direction amt contra! of tilt- i,mcrimiciii
rc�t %sill) tilt Cminc�il ()I \l ini�tt,r.! cchicli is diructl\
re- -pon,iblc t() Ili(- it Till. cotnicil is conllnlad
of tilt- \Ihirtiv\ Gviivial mid ninish�r� alI)inf��d b\
Ibc Prc.idcnl. actin%; lit acconlaucc %%jilt Ihc adk ict, of
tilt, I'rimv \linish�r \111.4 ()1 Ihc� nllmlivrs :irt� dr .mii
(ron %hl- Inaiurih parts iri the .1 Tilt, Iniui�tc�r�
are alrloinit,d frmit Ihc� ciccicd mi-ml wrs of Ihc�
��c ntbl or ()rods ct Flo .4 rc 4piali lied to Ic� cicclt,d as
.rcb nivildwr� "fill- mitidi rr t I mitiklcrs \cho art- nut
n(Intbcr� of tfv a wml)lc ma\ nut I- \c�c�cl lour.
mini.tcr� thus allitiintc�(I .Ito- tit lit cutiIIV mc�tnbc�r� Hit.
114 (wneraI. till- principal It,t,.il .ill%i'4�r to Ihc�
i;o%!�ritnl-nl. is alInlntled b\ till- Pre
In addition 'o Ilit I'd fill \linislcr mid Ihc \tt()rn4 N.
(atcr.il.
tilt (:onncil of \lini�lvr� is cunilnsl-(1 ,I
lit-ads 4'i Ibc lollm%Iint till ri.0ril-
Coo1wrativcs and Community Development
Ih�fcn.c
Economic Development
Education
Finance and Trade
Foreign Affairs
I fealth
Ilona� Affair.
Ilousine
Infornatiott, Culture and Youth
Labor and Smial Security
Local Cowrtunent
Mines and Forests
,National Development and Acricultun�
Public Affairs
Works and Communications
11a included :Irc \linislt,rs ()f ~talc for \t;ricullim
anti for I'll IAiv St,r\ice mid it \li lister Witb11nt
I'ortfolin Since 1966 till Prime \lini bas rulaincd
for biiii-wIf tot, p of Delcnsc
The (:on.titntion sla�cifics that till- 1'rimv \lini.ler
must cmititllt with Ibc Ivader of tilt (11ppo sili()II on
iinl)ortaiit m :ttIvrs such as ct,rlain scnior appoinl-
nn�n1s. bill this is it pro forma declaration of intent b\
Ihc Prirnc \1inistvr stud (Ines not iillph ilm
delibcratio,I- rcic� or %clo pfmcr f()r Ibc I)Ilto�
I.vader. 'I'll(- 1'rinic \lini�lvr is rv(piirvd In adtist, tot,
I'residew ()n tot� appoiutincnt ill .u (hnbwlsntan wb()
serves for .t I \car It and rata\ be rea1)p init,d. Tbis
official. ;I v4 it Iit;un� in Scmidin;t\ian t;mcm-
ntcnls. has jnri�di(tion (o imcstii!alc actiom taken b%
For a 4 urn td 11 41f 1.vt L41� rnn1, rat Ih, 1.11' ,.n.ult ('lord, of
Stato. arul l'alnrirt \(rrribrr4 ill Fnrr"n Gat cmrncnl i I I1.1hh4'4I
nr1nIIII\ 114 flit I)1 r� to )1.11 ,d Int, 1h.. n� 1111.11 tilt, 111.4 n, 4
\V4'nr4
i, .ICilhorilil-s. c�illic�r on his (mll i11ili;l1kc or
itlnlu rccck lilt ;c conildaint Iron, ill, ,1t! l-(I
illiki(In.il ()I fnnn ant nit�11ibl.r of Ilcc� \.1tional
\�sl-tubk 'fill- I)nibudsnuut is 11411 4-1111( m l.rl.d to
crilic�i /c (olio but ()ill\ facills in adniiiiislralimi a11d is
n�slrivied Irfim ilvidim! \\itli such imiller ;IS iimicmul
cic�Ic iiw. If)rc�it;ti refill if ()r I lit lsc casl.s \\iIIfiIf Ihv
coiuln�Il-ncl- 1 i (ilt� c4mrts ()r Ipiasi- iudicial Im(lic�..
The (1im icellia ul Ihc� I:mirt ()f \I peal ;Ind till.
(:bill (if%(ict Iry iip1wiuled b'\ Ihl- I'residc11l acliut,
ii on Ihc� rcc tit the I'rimc� \linistcr. aftvr
c()nl \citb Ibl- I.radcr(if Ih( ,Oplositioii. \111
,tlItui fit munk in tin� incliciim. Iht, Ixllice. i f Ihl- tic it
l :ire� madc in accimlancc scith Ihc� ad\icv ()f the
J n(lit %il Scr\ ice. hilice tit,r icv�. ;n d Public til-r icc
onunissions. ncl,llccti\ck. which. an speuilil-d ill Ihl.
:omlitittiou. :Iry to by in(lrltc idviii. Deslile chano;
be both Jiit;wi mid Bimiham that racial prcimhcl.s
11,1\ I- hand( cd t;u\vrnnivul lmii;iarns. till. civil
scro,wc. which isa ppro\im ;ilck 65', lifrica it imd:ia',
I:al Indian. bill t;cncrall\ maitatainl-d a Iroll.ssioiial
if )it lloliIicad stTitus, ifppru\i mat iniz Ilit liriIkb
Ir.idilion. Bclatimil hchti�cn memhcrs of the tcco mcl-1,
h;i%c c,cncrall\ bccn t,00tl 011 11im�I\ c k it l ice kmvs.
.�nd .1 I.iirl\ hivh esprit dl- cnrll hill, bccn m;cintuincd.
'I'bc� liar Intblcm of the burcauc�mc\ hail not bv
iiep)til I)arlisandiil. or dislo\;ill%. but r.ithcr it low
14.\ 1-1 0l adrtiiuistr'OkI. anti I4-cl11tical (.4mi l-tellcl duv
to inadt,tluatc cdiwalion. Irainine. Taal c\ltvricn(c.
Legislative
Member of till- 5: \alionad \..cmbl\ arc
vlected to ;I 5 car term hick can be shortl.r if till.
,lsscnibl\ is Ilis�obcd, ('mididalcs ary clech�cl under if
l of Iwimoiottal wpi 'I'hc ii,wmI)lc
ittaf, c\pand its meml,crl,hilt bl-cond 5:3 and mop ails()
4 b.ucta the %\Acm ill prop4)rtion ;41 reprcl to
Cliff' in wbicb ,()fill- call arc filled on ;4 conl,titucnc\
basis :Ind Ihc remaii0cr b\ allocation Itct-,\cc�n p.irh
lists in l it \%air Ihatt till- mcraill coniltol of lilt
\illinnal is in prcll11rtion till- uh s cast in
Lwir 441 the resll-cli v lists. Oiialificiitions In rim
Inclndc Ifni mimcallIf cili /vii residc�ncc in
:n\an :i duriiw, Ibc prc%inus \v.ir. at IvivI 21 \cars of
.it;t,. abilih to silt ill :ind read I�:11>dkli. and cerlain
refli6rem �nts of lo\;dI\ and Irobil.
In addition t() its rei;nlar legida(kv pmcrs lhl-
issl-nt)lx cart \()1t, if stall- ()I cmvrgvnc�\ whl-rvb\ the
itmeritmcnt rcc(-i%v% the aulh()rih t() detilin. willimit
trial or cbarev. arts per in bow frec(lont is decined
Inimical 141 Ibc bcst intervAs o1 Iht, c�onntr tate of
vincri4enc is lintitt,d to 6 tnontlts 41111c" 4�\Icndcd b\ it
resolntion of the asscnbl\. 'I�hl. caul- 11f .Ins perm
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

(I(-taincd uIIder crt It rg(-nc nu�asures is anlonraticall\
re\im%ed b\ an intlr,11tial tri )tit fill after the st ;,l(� 0f
cnu�rgcr(�\ 1111( eyi1�( 1&
"I'hc assenIbl\ can i I I I Ic I the cmIstitIItion h\ a
nmjoril\ \olc� 1(F all its nrc�nlbcrs. \nwII(fr1( �1Its of
provisions cleating \\i111 the I"III Irn(�nlal rights and
fr(�v )IIIs 0f tII(� iII(Ii\i(lual. citiicnsIIip, ;1(,(I
qualifications for (-Icc�tors a0cl Inc u(h(�rs of th(�
assen11) l\ require (�ither it l\\o- thirds vote of all the
asscrubl\ menlhers or approval k majorit\ vole in ;r
refcrcnd((nr after a n( ajorit Not(- of the Is11( I d The
provisiotrs defining the c�onslitution as the s11prenu�
!a\\ outlining the territorial hounclarics of the
c�ountr\, and declari(1g it to Ilea sovereign, democratic
state are amendab1c 0nl\ b\ r(-f(-rcn(Iun1 after passag(-
b\ the asscutbly.
I'hc
ilss(' is also given certain lur\vers to
regIIlalc judicial 1)roc(-(IIIres. SI(-c�ific�ally. it (an
regulate the making of iI catioII t lh(- courts and
the procedure of the courts \\h(-rt determining
constitutional (joestio0s th:(t are related to fundarlcn-
tal rights and clec�lions :111(1 to the ntcnlhcrship of the
National \sscmhl\.
:3. Judicial
La\\ in (;Mara. both civil and criminal, is based
nturinl\ 011 tit(- conlnlou :out statute la%\ of the lit (-d
Kingdom- 'I'll(- princ�ipics of' Homan I)111e11 lav\ it
heritage from th(- pre British period �have been
retained, however. with respect to the registration.
c0n\e\ancc, and nlortkaging of' land. TIIere is
ahsolrltc cgrtalitY of the secs before tit(- la\\ in all
natters. including divorce. property. and inhcrilance.
The constitution provides fora Court of \ppeal and
if High Court. \vhic�h together constitute the S;rprenu�
Court of Judicature of Guyana. The Court of \ppcal
consists of the Cltanc�ellor. who presides: t 1 (thief
Justice of the high Court: and such other justices as
the National \ssembl\ prescribes� presentl lhrev.
The high Court consists of the Chief Justice anc. as
prescribed b\ the iss(.nrf)l\. nine :(d(litioual jr(li (vs.
The Chance and Chief Justice arc appointed on
the recommendatim, 0f the I'rinic Minister: the other
judges of bode courts are appointed in accordance
with the iId%ic�(� of the 6 -e1an Judicial Service
COnuilissi0n, hid includes the Chancellor, th(- Chief
Justice. and tit(- Ch of the Public Service
Commission. OIICV appoinl(-(I. iIidg(-s serve until
reti re! u�nt at age 65 i1( the (�a se of the (:h ;Incel to r, the
CIIicf Justice. ;11I(I the justices of the Court of \11)(-,11:
a age 62 in the case of* the jrclges of the I ligh Court.
Ilowever, the Jrt(licial Scrvice Commission n,,I\
pernrit the Litter to continue ill olli(v until :1,�,c 65. \o
judge caul be rcnro\ed In)III office c\ccpl for iIlabilil\
to I)vrI rI!I the fIIIIcIloII of 11i,, oflic�c or inr
nri,,con(IIIcI. ;411(1 Ihc�n onl\ IItcr ;c tri!,nlud has
rcconnncndc(I reference to tic lu(lici ;d Conrt41ittcc of
the Pri\\ Council in I.orOou ;111(1 Ihal conuuittcc ha,,
,((lv iu�d rem( id.
1ppc ;(I 1('a\ he made front the IIivlr COUrt to the
(.curt of :\pp(-;d and from the japer (o the Britkh
Monarch i1( (:mmc�iI Prix (:ouuc�il) it case, relalinl
to the cidorcenlcut of fundamen1:11 nigh(,, or the
interprctalicnr of the t 11 ioO. \1!1,( it \v a,,
aliticipalccl that this rigll( of app- \\111(1(1 he (-hancd
hell ;11\mia bccan1( a rcnuhlic because it its
con,,idcrvd all ifiidcsir; colonial \e,,ligc. the
Burnham admini ,,lratiou �idcd i1( (arl\ I!) O to
retain it. 'I'll( Suprcnu Court of 1ttdic;llurc ha,,
unlirlitccl jllrisdic�lion in civil mattcrs, \\ilic�11 arc trial
Iry a ,,irgh jmlgc \vithout ;t jute. V irtue Has jurisdiction
i1( criminal n fit tl( r IrolrgIIt before i( I iIidic�tIIwiIt.
\Iagistral (-s hold c(II of sun11n;11 jIIrisclic�tiou
tIf roifaII IIt the (ornlr\ and nulkc I,rclinlivan
inquiries info in(liviahlc (-vases. 'I'll(- rules of proc�c(lurc
i1( all courh are suhslantiall\ the sank ;t in their
British counterpart \n (Acc�lllive official. the Director
of Pnhlic� I'roscculiou. is rc for institotinsg,
dircc�ting, and disc�ontirl Ili n criminal proccc(ling,,.
4. Local government
1 of local gmernntcrlt Ira,, bcvii in c\islenc�c for
nver a centrn in (;u\ana. 'I'll(- prescnl of lm- it
government is lart(-ek confined t( the coo"tal pl ;tin
:lid. duspit(- the large nrrnlhcr of kcal grncrnnucnt
bo(lies. Icss than half of the popolaliou is rcachcd b\
the local m1horitic
101 the Imi -Im,,c of local government Cmima is
divided into nine a(lntinislrali\c dktrict (three
int(-rior .411(1 si\ c(asl;rl in hich there are if number of
to\\n and village and c�omitr\ districts: ;111 I)ut t\\o of
the to\%II and other c�alegoric arc in t 11 (�oast ,1l
administrative (listric�ts. I�:acl1 of the nine adntiIli (I-a-
Ii\e (list ric�ts is hcadvd b\ it I)isti-ict Con41ni ,,ioncr.
\Iajor changes in Cu\ :1na s local gmvniment s\,tcm
\\ere introduced (Irving 1970 un(I(-r the go el11l1 cnl
local government reform progn41n based maim 011 t 1
NIC0111111CIl(atlons of Dr. A. II. Marshall to British
consultant). The c�hangc,, im')ked lhc c\tcrsior of the
boundaries of the evil\ of CeOrget(m if amt tltc to\\ 11 of'
\vw \nlster(lafit and the crc :rI i )II 0f ne\\ to\\rt
district councils. art(1 illuges.
The 1,c\\ twits comprise larger gcogrophical ar(-as.
in 111,111 c�as(-s old ill,19c districts \\erc merged to form
m
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

the new units. chile sugar estates and man other
areas came under local government for the first tuna�.
about S i of the astr poptilaliou has been brought
within the ambit of local govenument. In addition, the
electoral s%sten %%its changed from %yard representa-
tion to one of proportional representation on the basis
of universal adult suffrage. Elcetions tinder the new
systen sore held for else first time in 1970. After these
changes. there arc, apart from the c�itx of Ceorgetoscn
and the town of New Amsterdam, three to\tns. 0
district councils, village councils and one country
authority. The re�veuue of the loc;)l unit is derived
muainly from it rate levied on the appraised value of
property x\ithin its boundaries. The responsibilities in
addition to the nuun;agcncnt of local affairs ge nerdy,
include the provision and maintenance of roads (other
than public roads). the operation of markets, abattoirs
and cemeteries. environmental sanitation, and cvrlain
internal drainage and irrigation works.
The Minister of Local Government is the central
authority with respect to the city of Georgetown. the
town of New Amsterdan, other towns. and district
councils. I le is enpowercd to establish to\%us nd
district councils, approve the annual budgets of such
councils (exc�cpt Georgetown and N(-\y Amsterdam
auth:lrize councils to borro\s mane\. approve b I;�� s
made by councils, make 4ttaanc�ial regulations for
councils, and order an inquiry into the functioning of
it council where it is felt that it has abused its p(mers or
defaulted in the perfornutince of its duties.
Tll( Local Government Board is th� c�cntral
authority with rest t to village and country districts.
It is it corporate body and cmnpriscs 10 nu�mbers�
threc cx- of fic�io and seven appointed by the
government. N- lembers hold office for gars but are
eligible for reappoh0ment. Tbc� Local Government
3oard exercises general supervision over the operations
of village eenmrc�ils and country authorities, and among
its functions is the approval of the annual budgets.
Voluntary associations have been formed by local
authorities within each coastal administrative dis'ric�t.
These voluntary org anizations, called Unions of I. cal
Authorities, nneet quarterly to discuss matters of
c�ommor, interest and to decide on means of improving
conditions in the towns, local govcrnnu�nt districts,
and villages. The District Commissioners attend and
address these meetings, reviewing the main events of
the preceding quarter, and cotamenting generally on
current aff airs and plans for the future. In the last few
gars, there have been guest speakers, including
ministers of the government and specialist officers in
the public service. 'I'll(- voluntary Guyana Association
of Local Authorities, which originated in 1905 as the
6
Village Chairmen* Conteremce, serves to coordinate
the interests of the local private associations and
public authorities.
The capital c�il\ of Georgetown, \\hose boundaries
were extended in 1970 from an area of about to
about 15 square miles, is aebuimistered b\ it corporate
bode, 'I'be Nlavor and Councillors of the Cite of
Georgetu.vn. "Phis body is ;tutouotnoets. apart from
certain matters cchich require the approval of the
Minister of Local Governnu�nl. The basis for its
selec�tiom was broadened raider the tomcr ntnends local
governnu�nl reform program, which abolished the
former \\ard system of representation in favor of it
systc�nn of proportional representation on thr basis of
adult suffrage. In elections under the new system in
Jtine 1970 for ?5 seats. the Peoples National Congress
(I' NC) gained 21. the People's 1'rogressive Partx (I'I'I')
three. and the United Forcc (C F one. The ne\y system
proyidcd for tricrtttial elections for councilors
bcgiuning in I)ec�entber 197?. :1 nnayor ;utcl depnt\
nztyor are elected anu lit lly front anurug the
c�ounc�ilors. The m�venue of the council is derived from
it general rate and a water rate levied on the assessed
anneal rental valuation of property syilhin the cotimc�il
are and from market and other fees.
The to\yn of Nesc Aunstcrdamn, whose boundaries
acre extended from 1'^ square Writes to 16 square
moles in 1970, is administered by it similar corporate
body. In the June 1970 elections for 12 seals the I'NC
gained nine seats. the I'I'I' two, and the UF one. The
tei\yu of I,inelem, also ill the district of Demerara \yith
an area of approximuatcI\ 55 square miles, was
transformed from it village district into it town in :April
1970. Its corporate bode, clec�ted in June 1970. has 15
councilors of the I'\(:, wlw were unopposed. The
towil of Bose Ilall (in thc district of l3crbicc), fornu�rly
u village district, was established in Septcnber 1970.
Its corporate bode has 12 councilors, all of the I'NC.
rlcc�tccl ill December 1970. The toxs n of Corriverton
(also in Berbice) ryas transformed fron it village
district into it to\yn ill September 1970. In the first
elections in Dec�cinber 1970, 15 councilors Al of the
PNC were une'pposcd.
lu the coasta! areas there are six administrative
districts: East Berbic�c, West Berbice. I ?ast Demerara.
West Denm�rara, Essequibo Islands and Essequibo. In
each district there is it district commissioner whose
principal duties are to coordinate the activities of the
various govc�rnmtenl departments and to provide
advice and a.sistancc to the village comntimilies. The
bulk of the c�ottntn*s population lives in the coastal
districts in towns. local government districts, and
villages with inhabitants numbering between 15.000
to ,30.000.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

interior districts of the North, West, Mazartuti-
Potarc, and Iltptuttnti cover :tit area of some T0,000
square miles with it Population of tinder -10.000. Fac�h
of these districts has a section of the international
frontier as part of its boundary. "They are administered
b\ the Ministry of Local Government through a
commissioner with it senior staff of three district
commissioners and six assistant district contutissioncrs.
The overall commissioner is also responsible for the
administration of ;kinerindian affairs: the Amerindian
communities are scattered over ac very %tide area ill it
great many "districts� and "reservatio its. A
parliamenlar\ secretary was appointed for the first
time ill IN- (-�ember 1911 1 to be ill chargeof;lnu rindian
a ffairs.
C. Political dynamics
As self government was gradually extended to
British G,ciaaut along with other British colonies in tIv
late 19.10'x. aspiring Guianese political leaders started
searching for it suitable platform f"rotn wlich to
expound their proindependenc�e yi(-\ys :aid ntuhilizc-
popular stcpport. 'I'll(- PPP, forne�d in 1950 by Cheddi
japan and Forbes Burnham, was organized to provide
such it platform. Ideologically, the PPP platform was
intended to appeal to both of the major racial groups
in the country by stressing nationalism and socialism.
In 1953, after the British had suspended tit(-
constitution, Burnham became concerned that the
increasing) radical tone of' jagan's pronounc�cinents
Might be seized upon by the British its an excuse to
proscribe the party and dctcy the colony its
independence. By 1955 Bit rn [tit ill's own misgivings
over jagan's policie, and his desire fur party leadership
caused hint to break with japan. Wlwn Burnham left
the PPP to found the PNC in 1957, hc�claimcd thatt he
had deposed japan as party leader and took most of
his fellow Africims with hint. The hulk of the E ast
Indians remained in the party with japan, tilts
narking tit(- bifurcation along racial lines of domestic�
political life. Otter political tics have since emerged.
bnt in ['lost cases they have been organized to promote
the interests of various cccial or religious groups rather
than offering tIt(- voters it genuine� choice on
ideological grounds. Racial hatreds have often flared
into open violence. In 1962, 1963, and 196 -1 the
nucchinations of political leaders, principally F ast
Indians, led to serous rioting in which tnanv lives were
lost and notch property was destroyed. The scars from
these three upheavals have becu slow to heal and have
done much to prevent it rapprochement between the
two major political parties. (C)
:kftcr 000 her 1962 (;tn:u:,'s pulitie�al history
revolved arooaul the constitutional conferences held
by the British in London ill their attempt to pave lhc-
s\ay for independence by working, out a constitution
acceptable to all political parties. Tics(- c�oid'erenc�es
reflected the inability of the PPP and the PNC to
compromise or to agree to :uty arrang(-nu�lit wlieh
night put one or the other in power oil independence
clay. From time to time efforts were made to hri,,g the
two parties together in it coalition government, imt the
racial split, the mutually antagoni-!ic� persun:,litie" .4
their leaders, and the Marxist character of' the PPP.
made joint rill(- imp)ssible. "I'll( British concept of it
loyal opposition was not well formed. "I'll(- PNC
achieved power large) bec�:acse the� British. after a
series of haul vxperivnces with PPP gov(-rntuents.
decided to give the PNC it chance. The electoral
systen based on proportional repre�scnt, (-ion \%hiCI1
allowed the PAC to come to power with the help of it
snail third part, was imposed by the British after it
typically stalemated c�onstit itio 'l�' c�onfercnce in
196.13. The PPP in the last preindependence election in
196 -1 gained -161(' of tit(' vote, bolt it boycotted the 1965
constitutional conference. N(yertheless. the PPP
participated ill the government, despite its reservations
about the constitution. "Thus, when the British granted
irtdepertdenc�e to Guyana on 26 `lay 1966. political
life in tit(- forne�r colony had already become polarized
along racial lines.
In the gars since independence tit(- polarization of
Guyanese so(�i(-ty along racial lines has also been
reflcc�tcd in the n:ction's political .c. with the African
co Ill Ill unity. wIt ic�It has larger been urban.
represented by the� PNC led by Ill miliaill, \Rile the
great majority of lit(- Elast Indians from the largely
rural areas have supported the PPI' led by jaga'l.
Together these two parties have never ;tolled less than
5.1 of the vote in 1968 about 92`i (Fieure 2). A
third party, the United Forc�e (U has drawn its major
support from the white� conmunity� parlie�ularly
those of Portuguese ancestry. This party has also
attracted substantial :1nerindian support and, in
addition, has appealed to those E ast Indians who did
not approve of jitgan's Communist ideology !)tit
would not vole fur Burnham. While the UP never Lyon
more than 1 :3 r of the parliamentary scats or neon-
than I(iS(' of tit(. vote, it suddenly found itself in a
pivotal role in 196 -1 when neither the PPP nor the PNC
\yon it parliamentary majority. Ideological considera-
tions, particularly opposition to the Communist -led
PPP, prompted the OF to joie: with the PNC to form it
coalition government. "Though this coalition lasted
until the eve of the 1968 elec�tioe,, the U F's power and
a
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2

Votes Rncelved
217.8 336.8 312.4 In Thousands
10FJ,
0.3 DUMP
1.4 7.4 .4 OF
16.0 4 12.4 7
36.S
43.0 36 45.8 24
I 41.0 II 4os 22 ss.e 130 FNC
o wtlonal
AssM+wr
S"tswon
1961 1964 1968
"Others 0.97
"*Under a proportioned representational system
FIGURE 2. Electoral vote and parliamentary
representation (U /OU)
prestige were illusory. Bttrnhani hardy concealed his
distaste for the coalition: it was never more than an
uneasy marriage of conv(nienc�e front which he was
prepared to seek a divorce at the earliest possible elate.
One factor it personality conflict with the former
ieader I titer D'Agttiar, it wealthy businessman and
chief spokesman for Guyana's conservative c�onuner-
cial class. In additioni, both the PPP and tit(- I)NC
tended to regard the UP as soinewhat of an anomaly
in Guyanese politics, its shallow political bus( destined
to be eroded by tat( larger parties. The 1965 elcc�tion
confirmed the basic two party structure of the
Guyanese political system and highlighted the
weakness of the UI which obtained only 5`(' of the
vote. It has since dec�lincd ill importance. Following
the� resignation of D'Aguiar in 1969, the U F has been
led by Marcellus Ficiclen Singh. (C)
In addition to the probiem of racial di\ision, tit('
two parties are divided over ideological issues. Thus,
while Burnhan, is a nationalist M:tr\ist, jagan is an
avowed orthodox Communist who has Ion, advocated
radical changes in tit(- political and economic systems
and an abrupt turn toward it pro- Soviet position in
foreign policy. jagan headed the government on two
occasions during the preindependence period, but he
was unable to remain in office of London's
fears of it possible C:onununist takeover and civil strife.
The first jagan government was installed after the PPP
4
wan the 1953 election, but his Conlnluuisl
prunuuucenu�nts alarmed the British, who suspended
the c�oastilutiun 111d s(nl in troops. During jag;ul's
s(c�oud attvnipt to ,ovcrn-- Il(i1- 19(61 �lbc culon
\\:ts rcek(d by blood\ rioting and general ,trikcs
occ�asiun(d 1111611!\ b\ his policies. cspcci11l\ state
control oI. truck unions. (C)
The British in the pr(indcpendence period. and
Burnlann since then. have becu an\ious to keel jagan
nut of power. This nut\ Iru\c inc�rc�;tsingl\ difficult
because the t ?asl Indians arc not only the largest racial
grotty but also have the highest rate of natural
increase. The principal d(yice 11,ccl to prc\enl the I'I'I'
fronn ,\inning control of the Nation \ssvinbl, has
been the rc\isiou of electoral ret41lations. The s\st(1l1
of the single- nn�rnber constitiw:w\. in effect Ihclore
19(i;i, henefitcd the PPI' bec�au its,tlpportcrs. 11111ikc
those of the l)NC. were not c�oncenlrated in rlrb.m
area. In !9(il jagan won only -1:3 of the \ote ;tgainst
Wi for the I)NC and 16'1 for the l'F. but his part\
held 571 of the 11,seinbl\ seats. In 196 -1. after the
British had replaced that s\stenn with one based on
proportional representation, the PPP parliana�ntar\
strength dropped to -15`, of the total seats, bringing
the party's seats in line with its proportion of tit( Note.
In 1968 Burnham adroitl\ timed the elections to
enable the I)NC to benefit front the cicc�toral
regulations ,chich pro\idcd for \otirng !t, (;mane,(
living abroad and the increased use of pro\i(s. ((:I
The next general election Host be held be'ore
March 197-1 but nut\ be called earlier. In nid -192
there was little doulti that Burnh:uu \could remmin in
power. The fast Indian leadership, had
bc�eol1W increasingly pessimistic about its c�h;ucc�e of
success b\ peac�(ful electoral nu�an 'finis grotting
frustration may increase the tcmptution to initiate it
progrun of ornn�d struggle. hich jag ;tn ha stated is
histuricall\ ine\itable in Gu\;cna. I-.ast Indian
insurgency is rnnlikcl\, ho%e\er, in \ie\\ of the
possibility that the Fast Indians world be deleated in
an\ such ((fort. (C
1. Major parties (C)
a. Peoplt :s National Congress WNC)
Though 11t3niliam (Figure split \cith lie PIT in
early 1955, it was not until after the 1957 election that
all pretense of PPP affiliation \\as ahaudoned and he
fornall, founded tie P\(:. Although Ile I)NC
controls tit(- government. it rc�nains it minority part\
%lose main aim is to perpetuate its role and (Ien\ tae
PPP and OF it role in the gov(rnnnent. The I)NC
generally espoll,e, a nnoderate socialism. N%hile
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

r
FIGURE 3. Linden Forbes Burnham, Prime
Minister, leader of the PNC (U/OU)
uppr(ru�hing national problems pragnutticall\. 'I'11c
I'N( organisation. while looser than 111,1t of the I'I'I'.
is controlled by liurnhani its the hart% lea(f.�r.
l3urnh,1ni has tightened 11is personal cnntrol of the
part, \\I:ilc at the same title lr\ing io c\tend its
organization throtit!hout Ilic ccnntrv The annu;tl
P \C c(mgre -s serves less :ts it decision nnakitit lm&
t11an us it vehicle for nietnbers front outsi(Ic
(:eori:c tux\ n
to) nicet the national leadership and to
voice cotnplairits. The clec�ted hart\ leadership
inchides the part\ leader. c11airtnan. t\\o \ice
ch;iirinen. gcnend :uul assistant scc,ct,1ri(�s, and
tre ,1swer. 'these officials, joined k area and
functional group n�pn�senlati\es. form the general
(�onnc�il.
L'n(Icr the part% organization the co(intr\ is divided
into II areas. each v\ilh at least one regional
represenIati\ e, v\ ho often rec�ei\es no sit litr\ Iwca(ise of
it lack of part\ funds but is given it created
government job in the district in \\hick tic serves.
'I'hcre arc 171 local groups, hilt some, partic�tilarl\ in
the interior, are \er\ loosely organ a
ized \\itli s fe\\ as
Ill people. The PNC 11as it li\ -(�Iv widli grin �the
young Socialist N1o\enient �;110 it \\cinen s aii\ifiar\.
I'he part\'s official nc\\spaper is the .Fete Nation.
'111c \fric�ans have strongly snitporte(I Hurnhani.
v\hotn th(�\ regard as their c�hanpion. 'I'hc\ have
tended to rcg :ircl his ictur\ ;is divirs :111(1 to delmin(I
spoils Irunnt dic piing :ind the government. lorco\er.
liunthunn has felt Iiinnself constrained (o re\\ard Irn;nl
p :u�tc nu�nnbers ;lit(] ret :tin the enlhusiustic support
the \fric;ui connnunit\. Hel'we the 1968 clecliou. the
part% nuidc serious efforts to \\oo traditional folluv\ers
of the 14' and lhc� I'I'I'. Il 11,1(1 suhstunlial success in
\%inning over the ('I's nni\c(I \fric�an follu\\ing and
c\en sonnc of t{u (:u\anese- Porlugucsc. It appireritl\
As() attr i(�t(-(l sonic of the \\e;dt11\ iii-kin 1 ?ast Indians
ho \ulc(I for IIt(� I'F in Iwi.l. H�nrn lit lit 11as
AtcriiWed to na inroad, into J.igan's 1� :ast Indian
support b\ lasing to dri\e it \\edge het\\ecn Iliudci
Mid \Itt,lim. Ilo\\c\er, while some of the ,lushit,
Iv,id �rs ha\e bcc it altracted IO t11c Burnhann carnnp. t11c
in:tjorit\ of lo\\er class NInslims, particularl\ those in
the rand areas. ha\ c�ontinu(�ct t share \\ith other
I�:ast In(liuus it deep (list nisi of tIt(� prcdontinantI
\frican 1'NC and have continued to vote for the PIT.
\s it nnAtcr of policy, the P\(: pa\s lilt service to
nnillinu�ictlisni in go\ernmenl. bit in r(� ilih :\fric.ins
:i re given prefcn ice over 1 ?ast Iit (lhills in a nuijnrik of
citses. \\11ct11cr it be for jobs, 11ottsing, or public
u�rviccs. This appar(�nll\ is perpetuated in hurt
bcc�acis(� cf liurnhain's pi(ltc n\er t1w criticismn bis
policies have been receiving front the various
opposition sectors. Ile Ims staled that 11c does not
intend to tolerate siich opposition an(I has begun to
;inpose harsh controls upon sonic of 11is most
ontslanding critics. The nost \oc�al of these 11a\e been
the opposition newspapers which havc found it
difficult to t;et perinils to innporl ncwsprint. Some
11a\c ceuse(I scrvic�e. 13,,i It liurn11ant and the
go\ernnu�nl have filed l ;r\\ suits u\er some of the
criticism. The repressive nu�asures niiiy cause serious
problems for all the parties and could be it nmitir
lactor in the upcoming election.
Mirnh;un rviniiins genenill\ optimistic that the PNC
\\ill he returned to office after the next genc�rid
election. \%hick must be held b\ M.irc�h 197-1. Some of
Ili supporters, ho\\c\er. have c\pressed c�onc�ern that
the PNC is in trouble bec�iinsc of the persistent
nn(�ctplo\tu�nt, the serious shortage of 11ousing. and
111e sluggish economy. \nothcr factor is the rapid
growth of the I :list Indian conun(inil\, %\bleb is n()\\
larger than the other ethnic� groups c�onnbiled.
More(wer, liurnhani's attack upon 1?usi K avana.
hack radical leader of the ;kfric�iin Society for Cultural
lichitions with Independent \fric�a \SCHI; Ims
produced scriotis c�onc�ern in t11c P \C that h\\
;lit(] Iris follo\\(�rs \\ill not vote for the I' \C, thus
re(Incing the thin margin of black votes the purtN
holds over t11c PIT and its I 'last Indian supporters.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

Should the \omw M ac k, that fullocc I: cc:I :Ina
\cithh(dd their poles Im the P \C: ;Inc nl;ulil)uLllious
III \'tilt' eUllnlltl .Dell as (Icctil red ill tllc 196'6 clectioll,
%\MIld Ile e\rll Moore c�\idenl.
The I'\(: is 11la"'uecl \cith Inllraincd adlflill
:Inc( some 1)uorlc (lualifiecl n illisters to st;lff the
mernnrcrll. It is q)lit Ilelc\eell )ntit. radicals Intl
older rlrOtlerates. B111 is therefore Im to ul ::ke
host of the nlalur dcckiolls in bolll L;m(-rnnu'nl and
part% acli\ities. Ile \corks 16- to 20- IIOIn in the
Relief Mutt he must he (mink uttic a\ ;Iilalrl( to Acl) in
Intl sole earn the si Ili pIcst 11robletils. 'There Ire ten
fey\ I' tnenlhel that 13111 call rely lip n1. and
he ul)11a' (loos not entirel\ lr(I t :ulcouc. Ile is
ccnc�ernccl for hi t ;uul often ch:ull.s
s II resicleII s III t notice. "I he oulc nl:ul ill
the cabinet ..ho allluars t(1 hate :u: inllul.nce ulnnl
I IIrnllcllII is SIIridatll S. I(anllllla1 \li 1ister of I ur( II
Affairs ;Intl attorne\ Generid. Ili info I( e r-
lias declined since he has ol)1xlse(I I number of
[ill nlhanl podic�ics. Si mi l li 1-111,,, lea\e the scene.
l)oliti( %lI iIIfithtill" ccoul(1 ensue inunec1i :ltcic. incc no
heirallpawnt has been nauu�cl. I)c 1nll\ I'rinu \lillister
Reid clues not appear to he c�apahlc of conlnlalldillt;
the respect of the Inaioritx of tirn ernmc,,t official" aml
of controllin>; the more militant element, i ti
Sociel\.
r
h. Peoples Pro ressit�r Parn (PIT
he I'I'I'. the o4lesl lr,Irt. hall cunsi�tell recl.iced
a l)lnralitc of the elec�loral cute until I96S. "I'II 1)arl
tr:lc�es its liI11i1c t1 the I'oliticaI AIIairs )Ili Inittee.
the 1'ir I si"niIic�:ult lit)IiticaI organization It ill
B ritish (:uialia. 'this i lum Ili ,t l to liIical e(luc;lIioII
grout) Ica, formed in 19 16 1 (:hedcli JaLgaII c F igure 1
and Ili" AI n�rican \c ife..1mIct tiee li( 1sclIhcr' 1 I figure
5 he it ill I c) 1 \c hen he N% ;I detilal strldetit
in (:hicag atill she %\a" a student II I II act ice in lelIist
circles aml rel)ortcdI\ a number of the bung
(.:M"Illtnlist I,vagne. In order to gi\c Ili group it mass
II(m( r Imm'. Jagan bl.c�anle act i\ 'e in I III(ltitig the
of the sit! ;rl \\orke rs.:I n( l c\ilh their sti I)p)rt cc ;I.
electcd to the I,egisl;l(k( (:millc�il in 191 Ill JaIIII ;lrn
195(. loiIIII itIt I� lit IrnhaIII I)I(�si(lenl of the
British Cuimi ;1 Labor I'nion. the Iagarls I'( )I the
Its Imwrinl of inrine(liate reform, its abiIil to
unite the mra Fasl Inchafis and the urban \corking
class blacks- ;lit(] the nr, talents of Janet
J:Igall soon Ina(le it the most p(m erfnl lu)lilic�al force in
the colon.
Shorn\ after the I'I'I's founding, a 1rn\ -key p(mer
�,trtiggle broke out bctm-crl I?)nnb.tnt and Jagan. tit
first because of Mirnhalu asl)iratious for leadership
and later hecanse Btirnb:tln belic\cd that Jaigalt
increasing inmolc'e)nent c\ith international (:mmmmist
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2
FIGURE 5. Janet Jagan, Secretary for Inter-
national affairs of the PPP (U /OU)
FIGURE 4. Cheddi Jagan, leader of
the PPP (U /OU)

circles might be seized upon b% lbe British as it reaunt
for proscribing the partN. The leadership fight did n
become public. huwexcr. and the parh grey% in
nu�nuhership. inning the 195:1 election with 51'i of
the yule.
OIce in office, the NT rejected tln� existing
constitution as an i tit deeluate instrument fur
ac�hitying independent government .uud atteruple I
instead it intplentcul its 11 1),dicies (,f accelerated
progress toward full self government aueef the
establishment of it Marxist state. The part% crindians, among whom there are various tribal
groupings with profound diversities in cui:um and
social organization, but who nonetheless tend to ac�t
politically as one tlentnl. Although accounting for
only about -1`(' of the population, the \tnerindimtsare
it pa\yn in lht :uyana \'enezuela b(rOcr dispute
(discussed below tinder Foreign Policies). In addition,
given the delic�:(te balance of Guvanesc politics, clue
;\merindian vote of about 1(1,11(1(1 assttntes c�onsidcr-
ahlc significance. While in the past the OF has had
the greatest success in attracting the Amerindian vote,
both the I'1'I' and the I'NC have been increasingly
seeking it. Pursuant to i t (Itcisiun malt at the 1965
Constitutional Conference in I.un(lon that the
Amerindians should be granted Icgal ownership or
r; 'its of oc�c�up, Bey in areas where they are wdinarily
resident tit \mcrin(lian Lands Commission was set
tip to ime0i9ate and rec�untmertd the awarding of
suc�In lam(ls to individuals, families, village councils, or
tribal groups. commission ryas also empowered to
rec�omnu�n(I limits on the antnttnt of lun(I to be
assigned to all individual or tribe, whether such title
wmdd include subsoil rights, and ho\%. subscclutnt salts
should be regulated in order to protect the Itss
sophisticated Amerindians from unprincipled land
speculators. No information is available concerning
the conclusions reached by the c�ommjlission.
I'll( govertnu�nds polic,\ lo%%ard the \meriudians is
relatively culiglitcued, dressing improvcntc�ul c,f their
material and social \cclfarc and their ,gradual
integration into :u\aliese soc�iely. Innplentcn tit ti( u of
this polic�\ has snffcrcd front ad ministrative
dcfici(�II"'ics aucl. in the 196.1 6S peric,cl, front
(I ifferviwes d ol)ittiou \%ithiit the parties of the
goven ting coalition. 'I'ltcrs. \%Idle the l'F has (tphcld
the rights of the \itwrindiaits as the original
inhabitants, the I'N(: has tended to be more
cuncemed \\ith promoting the rights of the \fric�ans:
Bunnham has also tonsiclered Ile idea of settling the
interior \\ith blacks from the eastern Caribbean islau(!s
as one \1av of tuaintaining the balance beh
.\fric�atns and baud Indians. While the l'F supports the
:\nntrindiau claim to all the lands the\ have�
traditionally oc�c�upie(1, including mineral rights.
Burnham has tended to prefer a legalistic interpreta-
tion that the interior is all :ro\yu laud. lit the�
government s yie\y, the :Xmcrindians o\yu only those
lands to which they were granted title by the Cru\yn�
a relatively small portion of the area to \yhic h the
\mcrilldiacns claim ownership. The Burnhann
administration has yet to recouc�ile its advoc�ac�y of
integrating the \nu�rindian con"nnunily into the larger
Guyanese society \yitln the \nterindians� (Icterttina-
lion to remain on large rescryations spcc�ific�aII\
designed to sustain it pntrcl\ \mtcriudian \\;ty of life'.
'I'll( \merindicnn question is tied to the large p>roblcn
of settling aid dcycloping the interior� inc�Imding the
(puestions of" the number of settlers to admit and llm�
terms under which they should accpuirc land.
h. Economic der elopment
1 major goal of the Burnham administration is to
promote Guyana's cc�uuontic dcyelopment and raise
the standard of living- although the cstablislntuent ()1'a
socialist stale clontinates the ccunonty. In the
prreindependence period runny :u\ancse began to
yitW c�olouialism is the root cause of all national
problems and iiidepcndcuc�e acs a panacea yhicln
would !c'ad inuucdiately to at new prosperit\ for all.
Beset by racial and i(leolugical tensions and \yith fey
loyal and talented men available for gover incnl
service. it fell to Burnham to seek to satisfy the inflated
expectations of the ncwly in(Iepmaleut Guyanese.
Political instability had eroded investor confidenc�c-
while the lax stntc�ture proved to be an additi
impediment to business and investment. G,nana's
infrastructure had been neglected� roads required
rttaintenalice, sea defenses were in disrepair, the
international airport was badly it, need of
reconditioning, and the conmrtrtnic�ations and pmver
IN
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2

networks %%vrc� years behind in expansion programs.
Urban imemplo%uu�nl %%as high a rural couditic,us
primitive. In addition, sugar and rice, the maiuslays of
the agricuIttiraI sector, were prof iud list rics. \\'arid
sugar prices Wert- below the cost of prod(Ic�tion in
Gcyana. and lilt- inchutry depended upon preferential
markets tm survival. The rice industry was int-ffic�ieut.
Plagued b\ low yields and poor (Iualitx, and had been
distorted by Ja,g;uCs pulic\ of inflating I>rict-s to
growers.
From the beginning. lilt- administration sought to
disc�uurage the unrealistic popnlarasstunption that the
irmernment co(Ild inusediatek solve all problems ur
that I'mvign assistance would obviate the need for
sacrifice al home. Instvad. the goyenunenl stressed
that independence brought \\ith it greater resp m-
sibilities and that tlt!�re w as no substitute forsclf -help.
Though under no ill(tsions concerning the tittle and
investment which would be re(li ired to (levelly the
c�ouutry, tilt- Mintham administration quickly took
charge and enjoyed some varly success. Btrnhant's
moderate tone and pro Western orientation slitim-
lated international confidence and helped to attract
foreign aid and investment. while his success ill ending
the violence and lowering the It-yel c,f racial tensions
helped to reverse the cc�onomic� dmvnturn of 19(i�i and
196 -I
Although economic problems had previouslx
received systenut!ie slrldy and analysis, tilt- 13unhant
administration, with u.\. tvc�hnical assistance, drew
Ill) it Seven fear Development flan 1966 -72), calling
for better utilization of natural resources: increased
agricultural and industrial productivity: development
of ut-%y industries and additional agricultural exports:
and construction proje such as sc�a cleft-nses, dams,
private and offici;tl housing, schools, hospitals, roads,
and facilities for air transport and for storage. Other
goals inc�ludcd development of additional coastal fare
acreage, provision of hydroelectric� power for an
expanded alumimun industry, and improved access to
the interior. The c�onstriwtion projects were expected
to aid the campaign to reduce unemployment. This
plan dropped before completion and the
government is preparing it new 15 -year plan for 1972
86, including an operational 5 -year plan for 1972-
I'olicytnakers accorded the highest priority to
agriculture in the developntc�nt program, with
t-rnphasis ou expanding sugar production atd
improving rice cultivation and marketing. Other plans
included diversification to re(luc�e dependence on
imports of agricultural conunodities and to increase
exports to the countries of the Caribbean Frce Trade
Association ::1111F Dcvclopneml policy also
IS
encourages nulling, espec�iall\ bauxite. Scant-� gold aucl
diconoucf delmsih art also being exploited, 111( a
lf,v( l()gic�al survey has indicated that deposits of other
nu.�tals and minerals ()f c�onunerc�ial value nl;ty be
present.
The gc,yenttu�rtt has iulroduccd changes in the lax
system designed to stimulate sayings and investment
and to enc�oumge priyatc enterprise. Other fiscal
policies have sought to restrict nouessential inports,
euc�ourage the (IM elopnu�ut of local industries,
)it rticII!.I rl\ food processing, and improve the foreign
each ;uge position. Ilowcycr, the limited sire of the
(Imiwstic narkel prevents the dcyelopnt-ul of se11'-
srtf7ic�ienc�y in a wide range of nanufactured goods.
:1lthough the goyernntt-nt is moderately socialist.
prior to 1970 the regime had (,fficially fa%wed a mixed
econ(uny \yilh private enterprise playing;u important
role it, national deyelc,pttettl. In reality the
g(wvnimenl did little to attract significant foreign
investment, even though a fesc approved c�ontpauies
Wert- provided I,\ the gmernment with tax holidays
and investment guarantees. It 19 government
policies took it narked turn to the left in order to gain
greater control mer the "commanding heights" of the
t-cononty. :1 major action was the nalionalizatiou,
with contpt-nsalion. ill Jule 1971 of the Demerara
I1a11xitc (m.. it subsidiary of the MIIIIiuun Co. of
Canada. The government has also indicated that it
may be forced to nationalize the l'.S. -mvned Reynolds
Guyana `lines, because the c�ontpany has expressed a
desire to cut back operations which would result in
laying off nearly ?5` of the cotnpany's work force.
The c�otnpan\ Mantes the cutback on the depressed
world market for ulu it iuu it t. 1'risu� Minister
Burnham. meanwhile, claims that politic;d considera-
tions do not alloy hint to permit the company to
proceed with its plan, and he may have to take (wer
the comtpan\ in order to prevent the layoffs.
;uruhani announced in 1970 that in any future
deyclopt lent ventures f,y foreign owned firsts,
majority control in basic industries would have to rest
with the Guyanese Government or the cooperatives.
lie added that while there remains it place in thee
economy for foreign investment, success in developing
G(tvana will be neasurcd by what the Guyanese can
do for themselves. Foreign investment, he said, Can
only be ;ancillary since it is controlled by external
elenenls not necessarily influenced by what is best for
Guyana.
In line with its eutphasis oil economic nationalism.
the government has also imposed restrictions on
foreign -owned firsts and their right to repatriate
profits from Guyana. In +9 It-gislation was enacted
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

requiring foreign instirance conpauies to reinvest 95;
of their profits in Guyana. Prime Minister Burnham in
1972 disclosed a ut-\y polio under which all Guyanese
pension foods presently invested abroad will be
returned to Guyana and all future funds are to remain
within the� 'I'll( government lilts opened
discussions with various firsts at:d cooperatives
operating pensio schemes, in order to snake these
funds available for investment in various development
sectors.
In addition, the government \vas instrunental in
tilt- formation of the National Cooperative Bank with
the ultimate intention of' reducing tit,- influence of
foreign barks making the Cooperative Bank
dominant. This effort is being aided government
pressure ot depositors to shift accounts from tot- five
foreign banks to the National Cooperative Bank. This
bank is curre estimated to bold about 7 of'
commercial bank deposits.
The governinvids monetary and fiscal policies have
been directed toward encouraging savings, facilitating
noninflationary financing of government deficits, n td
stimulating economic growth. Public savings and
investment have increased steadily; public invest-
ment, including that financed through external grants
and loans, now account for about one -third of total
investment. N -lost of this public investment has been
channeled into projects to improve and expand the
infrastructure. At the same tine, tbere has been a
decline in foreign investment resulting from the
government's moves against foreign firms operating in
Guyana. together with it flight of capital oil i t modest
scale.
Guyana's foreign trade is of crucial importance to
the cottntry's economic well being. Its most hill tat
trading partners are the United States, the United
Kirtgdont, and Canada, and to it lesser extent the
regional members of CARIFTA. Guyana bas also
sought to expand its trade with the countries of
Eastern Europe, Cuba, and, most recently, with East
Germany and the Peoples liepublic of (:hina.
Guyana's exchange and trade controls are somewhat
less restrictive than those of the other Latin American
countries.
Government controls on imports and exports were
tightened in 1970 when the External Trade Bureau
(E,TB) was created. Despite its name the ETB is not
limited to foreign trade matters. The ETB became the
sole importing agency for a wide range of imported
foodstuffs auc] drugs, and 100 items have subsequently
been banned from the country. In creating the ET13,
the government hopes to reduce prices while lit the
same tints eliminating the private distributive chain.
Hostility from tit(- business community lilts grown
substantially since the� introdete�tion of the� ETB.
He�tailers complain (flat prices have risen since the
ETB took over and that savings, if anv. have not been
Passed o to t c�onsurner. !n addition, shortages of'
c'e'rtain foodstuffs, cement, and vital drugs have
occurred. "Tile ETB has also been criticized by some
members of CARIFTA which claim that the ETB
discriminates against CARIFTA- manufacttired goods
Ly subjecting theta to '*tit(- maladies of price control�
distribution costs. profit margin dictates, etc. A
related charge is that Guyanese manufacturers are
privileged in hone markets where they do not have to
distribute their products through Ills F.TB and are
allowed free ac'ce'ss to other CARIFTA markets.
c. The role of cooperatives
Prints Minister Burnham has placed increasing
emphasis on the co- operative movement" as the
prinrry mechanisn for increasing the governments
control over tits economy. In Burtharn's view, the
cooperatives are to be the instrument for restructuring
the economy and increasing the role of Guyanese in
economic development. Unlike the consumer and
producer cooperatives which developed it, Europe and
the United States, the Guyanese cooperatives are
under the direct control of the government. In theory,
the cooperative sector is to coexist with the private and
public sectors, but in reality the distinction between
the public and cooperative sectors is becoming
increasingly artificial because most cooperatives are
government sponsored rather than voluntary.
Government sponsorship of the cooperatives is deenm�d
necessary because the Guyanese population lacks the
skills and funds to establish anything m complex
than small community services or self -help groups.
Originall\. the cooperatives were to be involved
primarily in the agricultural anel manufacturing areas,
as well as to provide the investment nuchauisnt to
Mobilize Guyanese savings for national development.
In early 1912 the government announced plans to
eventually expand the cooperatives into virtually
every area of economic octivity. 'Tariff protection.
monopole }privileges, and subsidies are to be used to
make the cooperatives dominant. Two of the more
important and successful cooperatives arc the
Cooperative Bank and the Wholesale- Retail Coopera-
tive, which was organized in 1972 with plans to
operate nearly 100 cooperative supermarkets.
Although members of the business comintinity are
hostile to the cooperative movement because it is
aimed at them, they have not given up or lost hope
that they can hold on.
UG
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

d. Labor relations
Lab,rr I: :rest 1) r( to Iry an important ingredient
in the 1) re; idepen (It ncc disorders it d, indeed. %%zis a
tool used by political leaders, principally Fast Indiaut,
ill racial and polilic�al antagonisms into several violent
confrontations. \\'bile the level of political and racial
tension (I in) inisluvd alter 1966, substantial labor unrest
remained. Tlic Burnham administration lilts sought to
case labor management tension by proposing
arbitration tribunals to be used after normal
conciliation and mediation procedures liavr failed.
policies to assist labor include support of the principle
of closed or union shops and conrperlsory union dues,
as well as the adoption of tilt National Insurance and
Social Security Scheme to provide at wide range of
workers benefits, including medical insurance and it
pension program: this plan was approved by the
c�abinct in October 1965 and passed the National
:\ssenrbl\ in 1969. I'ulicics to protect the \%�orkcrs' real
wages and cheek inflation include it system of price
controls instituted ill 1961 over such basic
commodities its rice, sugar, floor, cooking oil, salted
fish, milk, and butler. The Burnham administration
lilts added such items as agricultural natchinen and
tools, fertilizers, building materials, and drugs.
2. Foreign policies
a. Relations with other countries
Preoccupied largely with domestic issues, the
government's concern in foreign affairs bus focused
primarily on the promotion of Caribbean regionalism
and on problems arising from border disputes with
Venezucllt and Surinam. Because of the c�ountr\*s
slender economic resources the sc�opc of its diplomatic
activities has been limited. in the United
Nations. however, enables Guyana to maintain
Contact "ith many states, especially those in which
Guyana cannot afford to maintain diplomatic
missions. Guyana's major diplomatic tics are with the
United States, the United Kingdom, Cautada,
Venezuela, Brazil, and the Caribbean Commonwealth
countries. Guyana lilts diplomatic and commercial tics
with the larger trading nations of Western Europe,
and more limited relations with the South and Central
\rncrican stales and few nations in Asia and Africa.
Guyana signed a trade agree nwnt with the I'cople's
Republic of China in November 1971. harly in 1972
Peking established it seven -mall mission in Guyana
and extended interest free credit of $26 million for
industrial projects. Full diplomatic relations were
established with the People's Republic of China on 27
june 1972. Diplomatic relations with till. Soviet Union
20
m-re established in Dccendwr 1971. Imt Burnham diet
uol all(m till. Soy icts to open a resident mission
Iwcar(sc of sec((rit\ considerations :aid bccausc he felt
that the Soviets \could increase their aid to jagan. lu
Mardi 197 i, ho\\c\cr, Bimiliam agreed to all(m the
Soviets to establish it sur.tll embassy in :ccrrgcicn%u.
This agreement made after Buntham had 1wen
assured that the t'. S. S. B. \%oi(Id (Iisc�orrtinnc (Iirec�t
(I caIiugs witb jagan and \\ouIll c� ill uucl future
assist it c�c tIIrcrc it! h the (:(mink.- Govcrnnu�nt instead.
Ilya na also has diI>lonmIic relations ith Yugoslavia.
although ucithcr country has eslablidied a resident
mission: a number of other Eastern I�:uropean amt
Asian nations have cspressed iutcrest in cithcr track or
diplomatic eXclranges.
Fornu:; diplomatic relations \%crc cstablisbcd \%itb
Cuba in I)eccnrbcr 1972. Burnham has tried to
crrharrce his standing ill the 'I'bird World by
establishing ties with the :as Iro gO crnmenl.
Burnham's iutcrest in contacts itli 'Third \eorld
countries was indicated b\ his busting the \oualigncd
Foreign MiniNtvrs* Conference ill \ngnst 1972. Mc\icu
and Guyana established diplmnatic� relations ill
Fcbnrary !971. Guyana bus been the urrl\ country ern
the :1rnc ricun Continent with hich Mcxic�o bus not
had .rip onialic relations.
friendly to lftc l'nited States. Burnham bas
described Guyanese foreign ;,topic y as one cif
nonalignment. On I�:ust- 'es t i Gu :utat lilts
generally adopted a pro Weston orientation. despile
efforts by japan to have Guyana support anti l'.S. and
pro- Cmimumist positions. In direct contradiction to
the government positio tlw I'PP lilts c�orrdcntned the
U.S. involycment in \'ietnam. srcpported the Soyiet-
Icd invasion of CzccltosImakia. and favored the \rab
position in the diddle East. :\Ithongb the I'I'I' has
failed in its major crbjec�tivc of eroding U.S.- Guyaucu�
relations. it lilts succ�ecdcd in tempering Guyana's pro
Western orientation.
Proposals fur the ccononric� a political integration
of the Caribbean states appeal to the Burnham
government because of the prospcc�ts of larger markets,
enhanced bargaining powcr and increased foreign aid.
The obstacles are I*wmidably. however, in view cif the
wide1v varying size, population. wealth, and level of
development of till- various states. In addition. there
are ni nrcrous impediments resulting front pe
political rivalries. relatively undvalevelopml trade and
communications, and ec�unomies that are far more
competitive than complementary �all cif which have
hampered efforts to promote closer regional
cooperation and integration. BUrrlham has also
pushed regional cooperation for purely foreign polic�\
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2

re iIm)II, �to ease :u%;u lit 's political isolation alien gain
stronger Conuuon\\eaIth Caribbca n support against
Venezuela's ct'fort, ti, keep (:u\;uia oil of hennispherie
olganizalions. T1iIis. mu I No\ennber 19; 1 tIic�
:,IYanc�sc� Coverunncinl proposed an ambitious
undertaking. the so- called IA�claration of Grenada
\\hieh called fur it l()nse� federation oI \\ith the�
British \ssocialed SL�otes of \nguilla. tit. :hrislopher-
Ne\�is, Dmidnica, St. Lucia, tit. Vincent. and Grenada.
\ntigua as rininterested. I'lans to establish the
federation \\ere developed under the aegis of
Burnhann, \vhc, pictured himself as the leader of it
unified eastern Caribbean with Georgeto\vn as the
capital. 'I'll(- smaller states \%ere under the
uni sit pprchensioln that mice the agreement its
reached, other independent states in the region
Trinidad and T(d)ago and Barbados� \vuuld decide to
join, thus offsetting dmnninance by Gclvana. The
schcnu� lost its initial numu�nt[lnn after "Trinidad and
"Tobago. Barbados, and Jamaica deckled not to join.
Most of the smaller islands have now \vithdra\\n their
support for the inmement. This effort. like that of the
West Indies Federation (1955 -62), \vas doomed 1
the outset because of the insular attitncles and p t
jealmelsies of the indlividrlal island leaders.
Some progress. Iwwv\cr. has been made toward
regional cooperation. III 1965 Gdlvana signed an
agreem ent it It tigua andl Barbados setting up
(:A111FT:1 it It its secretariat in Georgctm\vn. By
august 1968 the original signers \were joined by
Trinidad and 'Tobago. the West Indies :lssocialed
States of St. Vincent. St. Fitts Nevis- \nguilla,
I)unlinica, St. Lucia, and Grenada. and finally by
Jamucica. The Guyanese Goycrnmu�nt hoped that
C,- WlFT,\ \%mild provide it larger market fur local
prodrlc�ts. but thus far the liberalized trade
arrnngcnu�nts have not spurred the deyel( )mvilt
locally ol light nuunufacturing industries to suppI% the
C. market. In January 1970 Guyana also had
it leading role in founding the Caribbean Develop-
nu�nt Baulk (CI)B), the first international institention of
its kind in the region. T11V (:I)B consists oI' four
regional states (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana, and Barbados), 12 Caribbean territories, and
t uunregionad nations (Cana(1 a and the l`niled
hingdurn). The (:I)B Is initially c�apitalizcdl at
L'SS50 million. Of the total capital, $20 million \vacs
subscribed in equal shares by Canada and the United
Kill
gdonn and the remaining 530 million by the
regional members. 'I'll( United States is not a nnennber,
bolt has Houle it loan to the Bank. Guyana has not
drawn upon its ac�connt.
\Ito migli Gmalca (.1 -est cmntac�ls tr:ulitionalk
ha\c been \\ith its English- speaking Caribbean
n,�i,ghlmrs. siIICV independence the� Burllnunl
aclnninistration hies dc\olccl c�omsiderablc attention to
OW \fro :\si:In nations through CdI\aua's reprc�u�ul-
ali\es at the� United Nations. Gu%aile. e allentivencss
to these nations derives from both the gi illg impular
interest among (;u\auu's i'ric�ans and Fast Indians in
hat \\ere once their ancestral homelands and the
desire to identif\ \\ith other developing states. Even
greater efforts have been nlacle to cod Guyana's
i.olation from Latin :1nu�ric�11. Gdnvana, hu\vcvcr. is
barred front nnennIership in the Organization of
:1nu�rican States (O \S) uulil the boundary dispntc
ith Vcroezrncla has been ended. Guyana \vas extended
permanent nbscrv�er status by the Permanent
Council of tFle O: \S in February 19;�2 and has
expadIulecl sonu�\vhat its c'ontac'ts \cit other Latin
11neric�an states. Ouc notable tri occurred in
19(i8 \when a Guvancsc \vas clec�ted president of the
Latin :\nlerican t�.N. Group and as srlc�c�cssfulIv
sponsored b\ the Latin :1lncric�an stales for tine
election to tit(- vice presidcrlc�v of the U.N. General
lsscnnbly in that year. Venezuela, lim%ever. has used
its inllcnence to innpede closer relations bctvvecn
Cln:cna and the Latin \nu�ric�an states. "There has.
ho\vk ver, been it temporary relaxation of tension ill
Guyana's relations With Venezuela and Surinam.
dcspitc c�ontinuillg border disputes \vith both
countries. The Governcncnt of Guv:uut takes its
membership in the UnitvJ Nations very seriously and
considers the United Nations it an important if not
crucial factor in 01yan:t's security. The guyernment
regards the l nitccl Nations as the principal forum in
vchic�h it can international synnpathy and support
in its territorial dispute's. and it counts hcalyily on U.N.
pressures to deter Venezuela 1�rom militar action.
Belated to this yic\ypoint is it keen interest in the
U.N. role ill pcac�e- keeping and disarmament. The
Goycrnment of Guyana is also active in Sc\ v ral
specializeel agenc'ie's and attaches p,e Iocular
importance to those U.N. ac�li\itics which bear un
deyelopnnent problems. Guyana has had it strong U.N.
dclegation, considering the linnited size� and
inexperience of its cliplonnatic corps.
b. Boundary disputes
Upon independence Cnyana inherited boundar
disputes with both Venczucla and Surinam. By far the
more serious is the quarrel with \'enczucfa, \yhich has
advanced claims to five- eighths of Goy territory.
Surinam claims an additional 5.50(, square miles of
Guyana's territory.
21
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

'I'll( Venezuelan claim to 55,0II0 s(luarc� miles %%(-sl
of the I�:ssequilm 11ker (I igurc 6) is based ou the
c�outcntion that an international arhilncliou lrihuual
imard in I899 \%as Mused through hrih(-n I)% the
British of the liussiau chairman. 'I'll(- issue rt-mained
relativel, quiet until the late 1960l's. In I chnrarc 1966,
as Tina. preparations %%ere undema\ I'm Cu\:u,a
independence, the l nited Kingdon), British Guiama.
and Venezuela agreed to the cstahlidiment ()I' the
Venezuelan� C,naursc \liscd (:onuuis,ion to discuss
disputes arising out of the Venezraelan c�lain,s. 'I'hc
conunission had little scac�c�ess. and Venezuela
provoked se\eral incidents- including the seizure ill
1966 of lnkoko Island. a strategic border island. half
of which is claimed b ;n\m a. 'I'hronghurat 1967 and
1968 Venezuela cuuduc�ted a semicial,destinc
campaign to sulmcrt the .\mvrindians, in addition to
encouraging the abmtke uprising in Jammr\ 1969 of
white ranchers '.i the ttupummi District (see I:.
I�l,reats to (;mcr;imcnt Stability� undcrSuh\er,i(nW.
Although Burnham spoke out sharply against this
1
COLOMBIA
II O 5
STATUTE MILFS
prm(wation, he has treated the general i �ue
circ un),pect.l. Brtzil appe to he mpathetic to the
;u\ane(� position. parll\ to counter \cnczucla'
Imtcutial cconon,ic iriflueuc�(. ill the Ci,i:u,a, and
parll\ to keel) dorma nt the hi,toric� i,sucs \\ith respect
io its (mn I)ordcrs. \e\crlhcle,,. Brazil ,eem an\ious
to a\oid direct hmikement. nearly I \cars o1
Imillcss ncgotiati(us the co mm-,ioii \%a, su,i)c,'d(-d.
and I)s prior agreement the to
settle the question h\ one of the mean, prm ided ill the
('sited Nations harter. In June 1970, home\er.
rcpreseulati\es of the t\\o uatious aunt ()f the Hired
Kingdom met iu 'Frinidad. at hich time Venezuela
pledged not to assert its claim for a period of 1? \ear,.
aid the parties concerned agreed to the c,,U!blishu,eut
of a commission to c�vuniuc u Iva u� of a\ �i(IiIit!
potential future border incidents. 'Phis akrcenwnt ha
bec�onrc kmmn as the'�h -of -~pain Protocol...
C,nana's harder dispntc +ith Surinam ha, hcconu
entined in the kwai ;)ofitics of Imth -mintrie� mud i
an impedinient to muluai c(m,peration. '1 h, dispute
C. I AW1 t V 11:'.1
Caracas
Boundary in dispute
,.1 /!,1' /?C rx1.
VENEZUELA
Ankoko Isldtd
ti
Rm i
BRAZIL
FIGURE 6. Territorial claims and boundary disputes with Venezuela and Surinam (U/OU)
as
Georgetown
Springlands
GUYANA
SURINAM
Rupununi
District
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

has its origins in the colonial period %%lie�n nvitlu r lliv
British nor the Mad agreed on it formal delineation
of the boundary beh%eem the two c�olonics and instead
accepted the left hank of the :ounutyu(' {liver as the
frontier. The two colonial po%%ers agreed on the riser
boundary as early ;.s I TW), bolt the difficulty arose
because the cxac�t Iocatiom of the Courant n(' \%its
I ewer established. It is fairly \y ('II del i Ica led forseycral
hundred miles from tit(- :ktlantic Occim, but them
divides into N tributaries �the Ne\y 11ker and the
Upper Courantyne River. The latter is called the
Coerueni River ill Surinam. and farther south it is
known as the kiitari. For many years the Kutari \\its
generally bclieyed to be the hea(kitters of the
Coolruthne and thus the boundary. but xyitlt the
discover\ of lbe Nei% River in 15; 1, the Dutch began
to argue that it, rather than the Knlari. %was the
principal tributary and should be the boundary. The
British refused to concede the point and continued to
oc�c�up\ and exercise jurisdiction over the disputed
region hehy('en the Kuturi and \('.y rivers. In 1939 the
United Kingdom and the Netherland negotiated a
treaty which \+ould have resolved the dispute in tb('
former's favor. I tm\ever. the treaty x% it ne\er signed
because of the outbreak of World War I1. Foll(ming
the \y;.r, the Netherlands refused to accept the trc;,ty
in-cause of opposition b\ Surinam. l'util Guyana
independence the situation had r ('stained relatively
quiescent. but in December 1967, elcnu�nls of the
Guyana Police Force ejected it tc�an of Surimmmtese
ftydrographic engineers from the contested area. joh;tn
Pengel, who ryas Surinam's Minister President at the
tune, threatened drastic reprisals but mvrvly expelled it
small number of Guyanese from Surinam and
established it couple of police posts in the disported
region. Bentham, in turn, ordered his militan force, to
move against the Surinamese police forcing their
withdrawal from one key post follo\ying an anned
clash. Tile situation was calmed after the l'nited
States, the United Kingdom, mud the Netherlands
urged both parties to exercise restraint. :though
several border confrontations have aggravated tit(
issue, the amicable discussions held in June and
November 1970 behyeen lbe Prime \linisters of both
;,mtions appear to bavc eased tensions and paved the
way for an eventual settlement. Ml Surinamese forces
have been removed from the region as it result of these
talks, and Guyana bills retained �'adnimislrativv'
control over the area. For lbe present, howc�yer.
mchieyement of it final settlement of the border
disputes is expected to be difficult.
Guyana is also engaged in a controversy with
Surinam over the ownership of possible .)ffsltor( oil
deposits at lbc muntth of tit,- Cou,,,ntyne. Surinam has
cmIt('mded that Gncana's uffsIIrc rights om the
contiucntal shelf should rum More or less straight out
I rom the coas :l to\%n of Springlands. \%I iIv the
;uvant-se maintain that. in ac�c�ordamc�c with gc�rtenlly
recognized tnodent methods of such calculations. the
line should be equidistant from the nearest point in
both countries; the disputed area is, tlm�ref'orc�, a
triangle of coastal \emtcr "ith the ap('x al
Sprimglands.
:k simtilar qu arre I Wenczucla oyv pc :tend ;l
offshore oil deposits renwims unsettled and irt\olyes
\\alcrs off the disputed Fssceletib(i Icrrilorn. Whide
there is eto definite cyidenc�c of oil. cmezuela has
staled thu, any oil b('longs to it. an(I any coolcessiom
'ranted by ana \\ill not be respected.
In lime \\itb its professed desire to pursue ;t
nonaligned foreign policy. Gmana has refrained front
becoming it part\ to major treaties or aj;rvcments of it
strat('gic nature either bilateral or nultilateraI. In
('arl\ 197_�, bo\y eyer. Guiana ;utd the l'oited Stales
signed an agreement that permits the t ailed State to
overfly Git\ ill lit and utilize Ti Inchri InternaIi( maI
airfield (formerly atkittson Ficld) fur the purpose of
assuring lbc defense of the Western Ilcnispherc and
t lit int IitIing intematiuual peace and sect riI\ "ithim
lbe fratn('\york of tho (:Itarter of the ('nilcd \atioms.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
'I'hc most serious threat to Gu\au(a's political and
social order lies in the deep distrust and suspicion
%yhicb bay(' historically divided the country's t\yo
dominant racial groups �t{ie :lfric;uts aut(1 tit(' 1�;ast
Indians. Tllc dispute is esSentiall'\ political and
ec�ononic. and focus('s ()It such basic issu('s as \ybicb
group \\ill \yi('Id political p(mer at:d hick \\ill have
preferred access to the limited number of ('nplo\ ntcnt
opportunities. B\ the time Guyana ac�biey('d
independence in 1966 tbcre had dcy('loped wbal is
essentially hyo -part) system polarized along racial
lines. The black c�onummity has been represented by
the PNC led b\ I'ritme Minister Bttrnitaut. Mille the
great majority of' F,ast Indians have supported the
NT. it Conntunist part\ forn('d by Buridmi Cheddi
jagan, and his ;\nt('ric�an burn \yife. The PPI'
leadership, frustrated by its failure to gain control of
the goyentnaenl despite ih(' parl\ 's clec�toral strength,
bas been nn(ler pressure b\ extremists in its ranks to
raise tit(' bann of revolution, employ terrorism. and
resort to strikes, economic bmc�olts and similar tactics
23
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

;IS it Iueaus of gaining control. TIIcre is. II(mv\cr.
idespread disagreement \sithin the ITI' over the
isdonl of such tactics. perhaps reflecting the
indecision Of the jagans thenlsekes as to Mlether the�
part\ should seek to gm ern through the c�\istiug
nutc�hinen o1- 1,1(l a revolutiuu. I'olrthernulre. all
pulitic�al fac�timis rec ()gnize that disorder and turnw;l
nlighl encourage Venezuela to assert its territorial
c�laitns more vigorousiv.
'I'll(- future prospects fur Stability in (;u*\:uu! yill be
determined to a cunsWerahle extent b\ whether the
government a ill be able to meet the expectations of its
citizens for a better life. The key to achieving this goal
lies in acceleraliug the pace of ec�o11ontic develupnn�nl.
but this III!tst he clone in the face of serious h:uldic�apS
such as it narro\y resource hose. a Shortage of
iuyestment capital, a lack of skilled nuutp(mer� and
political pressure for nationalization of fore IgII
enterprises that lends. at least ill d:: short run. to limit
output and discourage Vital investnu�nt from abroad.
Mso. the high rates of uItcII11) 111e11 1 and
undereol!ployn let t cvmpoolnd the problems. \bout
20t7i of the population is mwmployed: the problem is
most acute ill the major urban ce11lers \yhere it
shortage of I()\v -cost housing and poor liyiug
c�o11ditions ten(I to exacerbate the sitolatioll. The
goyeronuvnt is keenly a\\ are (if' the needs of the people.
but the lack ()f funds raises duolbts as to \yhetIIcr aIty
significant progress c�au be made in the foreseeable
future. Burnham apparentl\ believes his self -help
sc�hentc to feed. clothe. and house every Gu\anese
\yithin the next 5 scars is the answer to the festering
i,roblcm.
I)espitc the potential for political, so)ci,d� and
economic instabilit\ extremist vicinc11ts enjoy little
influence at present, either \yithin the two major
political p�rt.ics or ill the country as a whole. 'There are
shall groups Of extrcmists ranging from extreluc�
leftist factions rec�eiviItg support from (:Mina to black
p()wer advocate �hut they are ineffectual and do nut
present a g
direct threat t() overm, ill stability at this
tiItU�. ;011mIgh elen!ents \yithi11 llle opposition ITI
advocate violence as the only \yuy to achieve poser.
the part\ capacity to momit guerrilla operations is
virtually nonexistent.
While the Burnham govenimenl's policies have
done little to retn:wv or assuage the root causes Of
Guyana's deep- scaled racial animosities� there has
I een nothing approaching it rec'urrenc'e of the 1962 -1
c�iyil strife. and cunseyolently the level of racial and
political tensions has becu sonu�what lowervd. "There
are inclic�ations, however, that such tensions are on the
ir�crease. It appears that the governnu�nt has (lec�ided
o_I
to dcliberatck harass the I11eliau ()rgaoliz:llio11s \\I!ie�li
oppose so11le of its policies. 'There is also e�\ idc IIcc� that
fiolrnhanl is gnmiug \\c m Of the collst�u1t c�rilic�istu of
gOvernment policies and Ina\ take steps to press the
Opp()siliou to reduce its criticism :uul opposition h\
inlinlidlali()n andl \(ithholding v\ vii more jOb
oppurtonfties. I.ip scrvicv has I wc I I paid to e�el!!al
upportuuilics for all races, boll prefereue�es are� gkell to
the blacks in I Ica rl\ ever\ case iIt sehic�h the
g()ver11ItU�nt has cmitrol. "There apparently is ace clear-
cut c�unrsc Of action c�o11templated by th'� upposiliou.
and the extent of disunity it nong the� diycrgent
factions and groups Ina kes it unlikely that serious
yiole11c�e ill develop in the� short 1
2. Subversion
a. Amerindians and while ranchers
The governinvids concern about subversion has
related primard\ to the threat poised b Ve11ezolela's
alleItlpts to uelyuuce its c�IaiIt1 to all 011yanese territory
\yest of the Fsseyuilm Inver (disc�olssed above� mid er
I ureini P(licies). enezolela's sentic�landestille
c�anlpai,gII to \din the I( ill y of the GnyaItese
\umrindians. especially those li%ing near the disputed
border led to the expulsion of it Veuezueian diploItlat
in early I96T The efforts of the VcIlez,Ielan
(:ewcr11ntent to persuade the \ItU�riII(Iia11s that ,hey
could exp,c�t better Ireatnlent from Venezuela have
c�ontintu.�d. \'enc�zIlela helped) to establish. fin:utce.
au(I direct a small bolt 11o\\ discredited \merindian
political party the Guyana \ational fart\ \1').
I'he Venezuelans ills() (listributed free books. food. and
other gifts: tried to teach the :tinw rindians Spanish:
extended iuyilalious for then) to yisil Venezuela: and
initiated parantililary training of several hundwd
tribesmen. :\Ithough little was ac�contplished. these
efforts \yere aided by the fact that the \mvrindians
ignore national boundaries and haye always Illmed
freer bclween the two c�oolntries.
'Pensions heightened in janu 1969 \yhe11 a stnall-
scale insurmc�tion broke ()lit in the Soulllwestern area
knuyn as the liuptimmi District, inhabited b
\nucrindians and it small group Of cattle ranchers of
mixed S and U.S. origin. 'These independenl-
ntinde(1 ranchers, fearing it challenge from the
government ill (:eorgelo\yn conce land to which
lh(�y have Ito title. have alv.ays tended to have
separatist Ica IliItgs. After recciyiItg Venezuelan
encouragenu uL lrainiug� and arms, the runc�hers and
some of their Amerindian encplo\ees, \\-h() were for the
most part pawns, launched it surprise attack and
momentarily seized the to\yn Of I,elhenl. the
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

acbl)iuislratiye (�ester of the 11itp(tnnni District.
I':Ienu�Its of the (:uy:ulit Defense Force, h( \\c\ r, \cere
cluic�kl\ flo� n to the area, the hard-core relic Is fled,
and the troops razed their ranches. M ost of the
ranchers and souse Anwrindians fled to Brazil and
Venezuela. Venezuela denied Guyanese charges of
responsibilih and did not respond to rebel Calls for
help, but it offered theta sanctuary and fin:utCial aid.
Although the Burnham government spoke out sharpy
against the rebels and their foreign supporters, it
avoided staking it cause c cic bre of the issue. Guyana
sought instead, within its listitvd resources, to
strengthen the artned forces and to improve the
capability of forces in the border area. luformatios is
not available on the (current situation in the border
aiea, particularly with respect to subversive activity
there.
b. fat;an and his followers
Ched(Ii Jagatu�s PPP is the only political
organization with a potential for undermining the
government, but a, long as the PPP remains
committed to achieving power by legal nicans the
part) is unlikely to c�onstitiae a serious threat to
political stability 'I'll(- PPI' drays its principal support
from the larg; l ?list Indiall Col)ul)unity. most of Whortt
are not Communist in orientation. The top leadership
of the part, however, invariably follows the Soviet
line and Jagan has publicly proClaisu�d his and tla�
PPP's allegiance to 'Moscow. I'll( 1 enu�rgenc�e as
the country's largest part\ �even before iudepencl-
cnec� buo�,ed the leadership, and it has been farther
encouraaged b\ the rapid growth of the East Indian
c�onul)usity which has established itself as the largest
ethnic group in Guyana. TIIc party leadership,
therefore. has been disposed to follmy the electoral
path to power. It has, however, I)CCosu� inc�reasisgl\
pessi mist ic� about the possibility of achieving power b\
peaceful means, and increasingly suspicious that
Burnham woul(1 neither conduct honest elections nor
surrender power to a (1(rly elected PPI' government.
111 party has charged that the British delayed
granting the colony indepCl)denc�e, and altered the
electoral system, in order to ensure that the 1 would
not be in power at the time of independence. They
contend further that Burnham has contin(red this
policy, prevented a PPP victory in the 1968 election
and, indeed, caused the party to fall below the PNC is
electoral strength. "I'hcy accuse hint of nrutipululing
the electoral regulations and rigging the election. 'I'll(-
PPP's poor showing in 1965 was to some degree clue,
however, to the part's dispirited campaign and
Jagan's defeatist attitude.
he gro%\ing frustration ill lltc� PPP nuay itic�rease the
temptation of extremists to initiate it program of
anued stnrggly, \%hick lagan has stated is historic ally
inevitable for Cii\ana. Althoogh there are so clear
indications that the part\ has made plans to take slich
a COIIrsc of Ic�tiou, exlrel)tists within the party
reportedly have stressed the need to train and arm PPP
members for "the c�omiug conflict. Iic part\ 's
capacity to moue( g(rc�rrilla opesatiuns is extremely
limited. :1llhough behyeen 30 to 50 members of the
PPP reportedly have received guerrilla tr:aiuiug ill
(:ttba, and there have been reports of classes ill
guerrilla tactics. the party lacks the uec�essim weapons
and supplies to support it guerrilla mo \cnu�ul.
c�. Non Communist subrersire groups
The small bu', grow rag black power mm ena�ut
presents a potential threat to (:uyatsa's iulernal
security. The larger and uu,re it c�tiye Iditck poker
group, the afric�ait Soc�iely for 'Jilt oral Relations \citIt
ludependest :\fric�a (AS(:RIA), wits forsted in 196
prismril\ to emphasize the Afric�au heritage of I�lack
Guyanese b\ developing educational progr:uns related
to African histon, (culture. and language. In addition.
there are programs for providing free ecluc�alion al
Courses for some of AS( 'nvmbers :utcl promoting
instruction in Swahili. :1SCI1I:\ present ac�knmyl-
edgcd membership is about 2 200. but it is probably
(considerably larger, and it has several thousand
sympathizers. ASCRIAVs membership to sonic cxteut
overlaps with that of othergroups: some I' :officials.
for example, are mported to be members of. or to he its
sympatb \pith. ASCRIr'.. Some of Buruhasi's
supporters participate in blaCk power
activities. Stich as special social evenings and lectures.
Sil)c�c 1968 :1SCIII. Vs founder and present leader.
Sydney King, who has taken the :\frican uanu� of F,usi
K\\ayana. has tried to reorient the organization
toward al) aggressive racist position, kith the avm %ed
goal of destroying white iufluesce in the c�ouutry. I IC
also takes a \Marxist line uu intentational and
economic matters. Kwayu lit s former position as
c�hainnar, of the Guyana Marketing Corporation
gave hill) significant influence within the
MC. Prime N-linisler Buntharn believed that it was
good politics to have the popular Kwayaua in the
administration, but only as long its he was able to
maintain the tipper hand over the militant leader.
This relationship had become strained by mid-1971.
Burnham apparently becanu� annoyed with Kwaya-
sa's sharp criticism of the goyernnunl, parlicul:uly
his (charges of corruption in high places iu the ad-
ministration. Kwayauaa�s insistence that 13tn
?5
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200070006 -2

draw up a code of bt-hayior for public officials appears
to bast- been tilt- last stray and led to it contplelt-
rupture of the once close relationship. Burnhamt is
determint-d not to allow K%%ayatue to hold it position in
either the PN(: or tilt- government and he I is moved
to strip Kx %a%ana and ASCR1:k of .:II influence.
Kwayatilt's popularity %%ilh the younger %fricans�
nuuy of %%bom comprise an important part of
Burnham's electoral support �could become it serious
threat to continued PNC rule should they withhold
their support for Burnham at the pulls.
Another small black Po%yc�r group Is led b% Brindley
Iforatio Benn. it Negro Ito served as chairman of the
PPP for IO years until he fell out %%ith jagan in 1965.
Betty has visited Peking and re�portedl% has received
financial aid from the Chinese Communists. B and
his handfcl of followers, ho%%ever� are only it nuisance
factor and have not developed significant support. In
October 1965, Beim founded the Afro- Asian- American
Association (AAAA as it new Marxist Leninist front to
demonstrate to jagan that ht- had all independent
bast- of support and thus was it force to be reckoned
with. Bens also registered !ht- National Union of
%Yorkers composed of' it few workers in diverse trades i
Georgetown. (An% group of seven caul legally be
registered as a union. 'I'll( two organizations are
minuscule and serve primarily as political vehicles for
Beim. In December 1968, Bonn announced the
formaHon of ��Gnyana first Communist part%. to be
based upon the black poker principles of Stokely
Carmichael and to be called the� Working Peopit-'s
Vanguard Party. This also is an iit significa- I
organization and probable represents an effort by
Benn to obtain more funds from Peking.
During 1970 it spate of potentially disruptive
groups vinerged, especially the Guyana :1nti-
Discrimination Movement (GADM Fundamental
Rights Action Committee (1 RA(:), Movement Against
Oppression N.W), and the Patriots. MI four groups
represent themselves as apolitical and dedicated to
preservation of democratic processes and safeguards.
"Their avowed purpose is to awaken and mobilize
public opinion on current issues. Although these
groups do not pose it threat to the government at the
present time, they are disruptive and one or more
probable hope to develop into political parties. Thus
the government must devote some time and emerge to
monitor their activities. GADM, composed mostly of
East Indian doctors and lawyers, is n�garded by many
as a potential East Indian equivalent of AS(:IIA,
which is purely African. GADM began its activities in
November 1970 and is still bi ile.ling its organization. It
may in time try to become it political party. CADM
26
le aders have rebuffed PPP efforts to draw them into an
alliance with jag,et. F11,-X it smaller group, but
ill till iracial in character. %vas launched in December
19711 and reportedl\ intends to become� it civil lihc rocs
champion. MAO appeared in January 1971 and is
probabh the most daugeronts of (it(- four. M.U) was
inspired in part b\ radical university professors
affiliated with an older dissident group knuien as
Ratoort. (Ruloun. it local terns for the sharp stump left
after sugarcane has bt-en Colt. was adopted as the
synbol of GmaniCs exploitation by foreign economic
iterests.) Hatoun appears to be \v r\ mot(-It alive: the
Marxist orientation of the organization is reinforced
I,\ its militant opposition to the government and .uiti-
L .S. stand. \lAO is it peculiar aniahgant of uniyersit
radicals and a number of toughs and kno%\ it crrintimals
from the notorious "Tiger Bad shunt. Both the PPP and
the PNC hays indicated publicly their interest in and
concern for the welfare of m embers of AO. possible
because they recognize MAO's potential for vioiviwe.
'I'll(- Patriots is the ne\%est of the four groups, and
appears to be thy personal vehicle of it prominent local
lawyer and \%ritcr� Clcvcland Ifanillon. Ilamtilton bas
stated that the organization \%ill "contribute to the
creation and mainic�nanc�e of it strung bode of public
opinion, and undertake Icy various means some
responsihihily for pnhlic education." Of" the four
grenps. the Patriots probable has the least chance to
deyeic,p into it significant force. :111 four evidently
have it small membership and nininal organization.
and for the near future, no mass bast-�. :111 call be
expected to attack tie gmernment and any other
element of the society that opposes their goals.
Young people are not it major political ordismpliye
force in Guyana al this time. Although each political
part has it youth ann, the youth are not wt-ll
organized ;utd del not generally play it separate role in
political affairs. In part this is prubahl\ clue to the fact
that Guyana has o very young population. and its
leadership is also notstly quite young. Moremer,
govern:� iii leaders have bt-eu i the forefront of
efforts to accomplish radical change. Guyanese youth.
therefore. do not in general feel alienated from their
national leaders and the "establisltnwnt."
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
1. Police
Tlty Guyana Police Force, established in 18:39, is
charged with responsibility for the maintt-nance of lacy
and order, the� prevention and detection of crime, the
repression of internal (listurbanc�es, the protection of
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2
25X1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2
25X1

Chronology (u/ou)
1.198
Columbus sails along; coast of present -day Guyana (luring last
of his three voyages.
1616
Dutch expedition establishes settlement on island in Es-
sequibo River.
1621
Colony placed under direction of the Dutch '1Vest Indian
Company.
1814
Three Dutch settlements of Demerara, Essequibo, and
Berbice are ceded to the United Kingdom following Congress
of Vienna.
1831
The three settlements unite to become the colony of British
Guiana with administration centered in Georgetown.
1838
Emancipation of slaves sets off large -scale immigration of
indentured East Indians.
1928
Full crown colony government is introduced, and women
acquire the vote.
1950
January
Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham organize the People's
Progressive Party (PPP).
1953
April
PPP wins overwhelming majority in general elections.
1955
February
Burnham breaks with Jagan and forms the PPP(B)
1957
August
PPP(.I), Jagan's faction of the party, wins eneral election.
October
Burnham drops pretense of PPP affiliation and forms the
People's Nation.l Congress (PNC).
1961
August
PPP wins general elections; Jagan becomes Premier.
1962
February
A general strike degenerates into bloody racial rioting as the
opposition tries to bring down the Jagan government.
1963
April �July
General strike accompanied by violence paralyzes economy;
state of emergency is declared; k uba aids Jagaeu financially
to prevent his fall from power.
1964
May
Increasing Moodshed and racial violence cause Q'.K. Gov-
ernor to actiume emergency powers.
December
PPP gains slim plurality in elections, but Burnham takes
over as Premier by forming it coalition with the smaller United
Force party and gaining it parliamentary majority.
1966
February
Venezuelan claim to territory west of Essequibo River is
submitted to a commission established to reach it settlement
within �1 years.
May
British Guiana becomes independent state of Guyana with
Burnham as Prime Minister.
New constitution establishes an appointed judiciary and an
elected unicameral legislature.
September
Guyana becomes a member of the United Nations, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
1968
December
Prime Minister Burnham's PNC gains parliamentary
majority in general election.
1969
January
Small -scale insurrection, encouraged by Venezuela, breaks
out in southwestern area and is suppressed by the Guyana
Defense Force.
March
Defense force becomes exclusively Guyanese when Col. Pope,
British adviser, departs on 27 March.
29
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

April �June
Venezuela renews and intensifies campaign to regain the
Essequibo, raisin,,'Guyanese fears that Venezuela eventually
intends to use force to recover the disputed area.
July
Cheddi Jagzsn publicly enrolls the PPP in the World Com-
munist INIovement at the Rlosoew Conference of Worldwide
Communist Parties.
August
Guyana Defense Force drives small contingent of Surinamese
police from disputed border area.
1970
January
Border tensions rise as both Venezuela and Guyana con-
centrate troops on the border.
February
Guyana becomes a republic but remains within the Common-
wealth (first Caribbean member of the Commonwealth to do
so); officially known as the Cooperative Republic of Guyana.
1971
January
Government alarms business community by imposing un-
expectedly sharp tax increases and foreign exchange restric-
tions. Outflow of funds of foreign firms also restricted.
April
Prime Minister announces new economic program with a
strong nationalistic and socialistic bent.
May
Government moves to extend its control over existing foreign
investments. Demands at least 51% equity participation in
future concessions that exploit the nation's natural resources.
June
Venezuela and Guyana sign the "Port -of -Spain Protocol" for
a 12 -year moratorium on the dispute.
Surinam and Guyana agree to shelve their longstanding
border dispute and promote better relations. Guyana retains
"administrative control" of the disputed region.
30
July
PNC sweeps local elections, captures SO of the 97 council
seats contested. Opposition boycot -fn electic::s and Vharrg('s
fraud.
Government establishes the External 'Trade Bureau F.TB
to serve as the sole importer of goods frone Communist
countries, later expanded to handle all imports and experts.
Government nationalizes the Demerara Bauxite Co.
(DEbIBA), a subsidiary of a Canadian firm, after nearly
months of bitter negotiations; company renamed the Guyana
Bauxite Company (GUYBAU).
November
People's Republic of China and Guyana sign trade agreement.
December
Soviet Union and Guyana establish "non resident" diplo-
matic relations.
1972
January
Economic difficulties, attributable in part to world over-
supply of bauxite and alumina, intensified by recent "Guyani-
zation" measures by the government.
"Permanent observer" status extended to Guyana by the-
Permanent Council of the OAS.
March
Peking establishes seven -nurn trade mission in Guyana and
extends S26- million interest -free credit for industrial projects.
April
Burnham pushes for increased government controls over the
economy and reiterates intention to strengthen the coopera-
tive movement.
June
People's Republic of China and Guyana establish resident
diplomatic relations.
Government -owned alumina plant temporarily closes because
of the depressed international market for aluminum.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2

Glossary Wou)
ABBREVIATION
ENGLISH
AAAA...........
Afro Asian American Association
ASCRIA.........
African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa
CARIFTA.......
Caribbean Free Trade Association
CDB............
Caribbean Development Bank
DEMBA........
Demerara Bauxite Company
ETB............
External Trade Bureau
FRAC...........
Fundamental Rights Action Committee
GADXI..........
Guyana Anti- Discrimination Movement
GAWV..........
Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union
GAY............
Guyana Assembly of Youth
GCC............
Guyana Credit Corporation
GDC............
Guyana Development Corporation
GDF.
Guyana Defense Force
GIMPEX........
Guyana Import- Export Co., Ltd.
GIS
Guyana Information Service
GMC...........
Guyana Marketing Corporation
GNP............
Guyana National Party
GTUC..........
Guyana Trades Union Council
DUMP..........
Guyana United Muslim Party
GUYS...........
Guyana United Youth Service
MAO............
Movement Against Oppression
MPCA..........
Manpower Citizens' Association
NACCIE........
National Association of Clerical, Commercial, and Industrial Employees
NU W
National Union of Workers
OAS............
Organization of American States
PNC............
People's Nations. Congress
PPP............
People's Progressive Party
PY 0............
Progressive Youth Organization
RDC............
Rice Development Corporation
RMB...........
Rice Marketing Board
RWU...........
Rice Workers' Union
UF
United Force
WPO............
Women's Progressive Organization
WPVP..........
Working People's Vanguard Party
YD
Young Democrats
Places and features referred to in this Chapter (u /ou)
COORDINATES
SF.CHET
V'O F'OHEIG.A' DISSE.11
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2
o I N.
1 11'.
Ankoko Island k 'island)
6 33
61 08
Coeroeni Rivier, Surinam (stream)
3 23
57 36
Corriver ton
5 52
57 10
Courantyne River (stream)
5 57
57 06
Cuyuni River (stream)
6 23
58 41
Essequibo River (stream)
6 59
58 23
Georgetown
6 38
58 10
Kutari River (stream
2 22
56 52
Lethem
3 23
59 48
Mackenzie
6 00
58 17
Jlatthews Ridge
7 30
60 10
New Amsterdam
6 15
57 31
New River (stream)
3 23
57 36
Port -of- Spain, Trinidad
10 39
61 31
Rose Hall
6 16
57 23
Rupununi District
3 00
59 00
Rupununi River (stream)
4 03
58 34
Springlands
5 54
57 09
SF.CHET
V'O F'OHEIG.A' DISSE.11
31
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200070006 -2