NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 50E; GUINEA; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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• Collection: NIS
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SECRET
50E /GS /GP
Guinea.
May 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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This chapter was written for the NIS by the Central
Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially
completed by March 1973.
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S
11h n f4 r f
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y
,at 1
Guinea
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
July 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
A. Summary and background
B. Structure and functioning of the government
1. Constitution
2. Central government
a. President
b. Legislature
c. judiciary
3. Regional and local government
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4. Civil service 5
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FIGURES
Page
Page
Page
C. Political drisunles
8
E. Threats to government stAft
21
1. Sekou 'foure
8
1. Discontent and dissidence
21
a. Biographic sketch
8
Visit of U.N. Special Committee on
b. Philosophy
7
1 Subversion
23
2. Democratic Party of Cuinea
7
a. Permanent "imperialist" plot
23
a. Origin
7
b. Communist- inspired subversion
24
b. Organization
7
c. Affiliates
9
F. Maintenance of internal security
25
3. Electoral system
11
1. Police
13. National policies
11
1 Intelligence and sceurity services
27
1. Themes and goals
11
3. Coun'.ersubversive measures and
2. Aftermath of 1970 invasion
12
capabilities
28
3. Domestic policies
13
G. Seketed bib
bibliography
28
4. Foreign policies
15
a. Relations with African states
15
Chronology
Q,g
b. Relations with Communist states
18
c. Relations with Western states
19
Glossary
30
FIGURES
Page
Page
Fig. 1 Structure of ruvernment
Fig. 4
PDG youth photos)
10
chart) faces 1
Fig. 5
PDG women photo)
10
Fig. 2 President Sekou Toure in milita.-y
Fig. 8
Visit of U.N. Special Committee on
uniform photo) 8
Decolonization photos)
17
Fig. 3 PDG electoral system chart) 8
Fig. 7
Display of captured weapons photo)
23
ii
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Sekou Tour*
President, Secretory*~' d
of the POG, "Supr
leads, of the Re. .cation"
PARTY EXECUTME LEGISLATra JUDICIAL
National
I 7�Man wftfw l Nmlaial
Pon! ilureau
7- Domain Mk *W$ Assembly 3 Miglw Cows
ss�M.b.r
Central Comminee
4 Ministers
Delegate
a sion 1
30 Federation 29 Regional 29 Regional
SswNOrMs Governors AssembNes
I
209 Section 209 30 lower Courts
C mmandonts Arrondissement
etea ds
Local 1
About 8.000 lose Committees
(Perform all party, governmental, and
judicial functions at the local level)
FIGURE 1. Structure of government. The parallel systems of party and government
converge at both ends of the structure. At the top, authority centers on Sekou Toure;
at the bottoti, the local party cells constitute the local government. (U /OU)
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Government and Politics
A. -Summary and background (S)
The anoa of west Africa which now comprises the
Republic of Guinea was the object of French military
penetration and colonialization in the middle of the
19th century, but it was not until almost the 20th
century that French colonial rule was consolidated. An
event predating French rule, however, and one .which
has had an important long -term influence on Guinea s
political development, was the Fulani conquest of the
area in the 18th century. From their stronghold in the
Fouta Djallon mountains in Movenne- Guinee
(Middle Guinea), the Fulani exercised feudal
dominion over most other tribal groups, bringing
Islam it their wake. Although internal rivalries
progressively weakened their control, the Fulani
aristocracy continued to furnish the countrv's elite
during all but the final years of French rule, .which
lasted from 1891 to 1958. In Guinea, the Fulani
remain the stronghold of Islam, through which they
continue to exercise considerable, if subtle, influence
on the predominantly Muslim population.
Between 1945 and 1956 political strength among
Guinea's African population shifted dramatically from
the Fulani aristocrats �who cooperated with and in
tarn were supported by the French �to i t ne%w party,
the Democratic Party of Guinea (PD(;). After securing
control of the territory in 1937 under the autonomy
provisions of the French Loi Cadre Framework Laic
of 1956, which put France's African colonies
irrevocably on the path to independence, the PDG led
Guinea to independence in 1958, as the population
voted overwhelmingly against membership in De
Gattlle's French Community in a constitutional
referendum held on 28 September 19,58. France
responded by immediately pulling out its administra-
tive -nd technical personnel, supplies, and records,
withdrawing all financial support, and cutting off
trade. Although the French departure left economic
chaos, a well -knit political party organization under
the leadership of Ahmed Sekou '1'oure was already in
place and assumed control of the country.
Since independence, Sekou Toure and the PDG
have sought to achieve an extensive social and
politieJ revolution aimed at transforming Guinea
from a traditional, tribalired African society into a
unified modern state led by a socialist government.
The regime's successes have been uneven and
concentrated in the political and social sph �res. The
cost has been increasing restrictions on individual
freedoms, creation of a heavily bureaucratic system,
and economic stagnation.
As the only political party, the PDG has absorbed
almost the entire adult population and is the key
organization in Guinea. Its leaders hold all the
positions of power in the government, and state police
is made by party and government bodies almost
interchangeably. Although the PDG has successfully
supplanted the traditional elite as the primary force in
Guinean society and has made some progress in
inculcating a sense of nationhood among the country *s
diverse ethnic groups, over 13 years of part
indoctrination and unkept promises have also
produced considerable apathy and disillusionment
among the populace, even on issues which the public
tends to favor, such as the Presidents attempts to deal
with corruption. All this makes it increasingly difficult
for the regime to marshal popular enthusiasm for its
policies and tends to make the Guinean revolution
more a matter of words than of substance for the mass
Of subsistence farmers and it growing numbc�rof better
educated citizens.
A major contributing factor to popular disillusion-
ment is the government's inabilith. to deal with
economic problems. The country continues to suffer
from administrative deficiencies fostered in part by an
ideological commitment to socialist policies which are
not responsive to its problems. In their rhetoric, Toure
and other leaders of the regime hold to the goal of
establishing it socialist and egalitarian state. The
pressure of events, however, is forcing the leadership
increasingly to choose between adopting more rational
economic policies or continuing on the road to an ever
harsher authoritarianism in order to prevent the rise of
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dissent at home and the exploitation of popular
discontent by regime opponents within Guinea and
abroad.
The events of November 1970 �when Portuguese
forces and Guinean dissidents launched un armed
attack on Conakry �were a traumatic experience for
Toure and have strengths -ned measurably the trend
toward authoritarianism. Portugal. angered by Toure's
support of insurgents fighting in Portuguese Guinea,
aided dissident Guineans in organizing the attack for
the purposes of freeing Portuguese prisoners held in
Guinean jails, of striking at the rebel headquarters,
and, hopefully, of toppling Toure. Tours survived,
countered with an extensive political purge, and
merged more solidly in control than ever.
During the next fey years Tourc faces the
increasingly difficult problem of reconciling the
conflicting demands of ideological commitment and
harsh economic reality. He must try to strike a balance
between his unique brand of socialism with its siege
mentality and the pressing need to proceed with
rational economic development in order to give some
substance to the promises he has made t., the people.
Reliance on foreign aid and private foreign investment
in the mineral extraction industry has so far been the
answer. Foreign aid has helped Toure maintain the
system of tight control over the highly bureaucratic
and inefficient domestic economy, as well as to
postpone needed economic reforms. But pressures for
reform are almost certain to continue to grow, and it
remains to be seen whether the nationalistic Toure will
wish to remain dependent on so unreliable a base as
the aid and investment of foreign governments.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government
I. Constitution (C)
A constitution providing for a strongly centralized
presidential system, guaranteeing an extensive list of
civil rights, -ind providing for a possible future
delegation of sovereignty to a supranational African
organization was au.pted at independence in 19:38
and has never been abrogated.
From the outset, however, the constitution has been
more honored in _hc breach than the observance and
has not restrained President Sekou Toure from ruling
exactly as he pleases. He promulgates laws as he sees
fit, and he changes the structure or composition of the
government at will. Toure's use o' an extensive
political purge and organizational changes during
1971 and 1972 ostensibly to protect his regime from
0 1
subversion amply demonstrated this point. 'I'll(- most
dramatic change, announces) at the extraordinary
National Congress of the PDG in April 1972. was
Toure's naming his chief lieutenant to tits newly
eceated post of Prime Minister. None of the changes
over the past 2 years has altered the concentration of
political power in the hands of President 'Toure or
greatly affected the way the government is run.
Under Guinean law the constitution can be
amended by a two thirds vote of the National
Assembly or by referendum, initiated either by the
President or by the National Assembly. In pr.etice,
however, this is an empty provision, since all political
power is in the hands of 'Toure, who determines the
role of the assembly in the political process and
manipulates public opinion to suit his own purposes.
2. Central government
a. President (U /OU)
The President of the Republic stands at the apex of
the structure of government (Figure I He is elected
fora 7 -year term by universal adult suffrage and can
be reelected. The minimum age is :33. There is no
specific provision for succession, but in case the
presidency becomes vacant the Cabinet continues to
conduct state business until a new election is held.
Ahmed Sekou Toure has been President since 1938,
when Guinea became independent.
Constitutional provisions plus evolution of the
Guinean system have concentrated broad power in the
hands of the President. He is Chief of State and
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; he
exercises the administrative powers of governrnc.t.
assisted by a Cabinet which he appoints; he makes all
major appointments to the armed forces and the
public administration; and he conducts foreign policy.
The President appoints the governors o,' the 29
administrative regions and, through them, is
responsible for local law enforcement and public
security. Although any draft laws submitted by the
President are assured of passage by as compliant
assembly, the bulk of ;:uinca's lawmaking is done by
executive decree or administrative fiat. President
Toure is able to govern in this manner because of his
Great prestige as the leader of Guinca's independence
movement and his dual position as President and head
of the only political party. '['his convergence of powers
gives him control over all major instruments of
authority. In the lower echelons the juxtaposition of
government administrators and party officials is such
that 'Toure can use the party and the burc: to
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watch each other and can bolster the p(me�r of either
b snit his current polio-,.
Membership in the top level of the l-xc ;utive
hrtnch �the (:ahinet �has since the late I9(i( t's
paralleled membership in the party's top hods, the
seven -man National Political Bureau. Cabinet
ministries ct rrenlly form seven domains' O f
responsibility: the Presidential I)omain; the Prime
Minister's Domain, and domains for Finance and
Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Interior a and Sl-c�urity.
Conurierc and Culture and Education. In addition,
there are four ministers delegate, each responsible for
l-conontic� clevelopntent in one of the four geographic
regions of Guinea. A nunther of other officials echo
were elevated from "Secretary of State to minister�
plus the governor of the Central Bank, were listed as
Cabinet members following it Jun(- 1972 Cabinet
shuffle.' Despite their titles, th occupy I lower level
within the hierarchy and do not have (-elual status -with
till- heads of domains. These second- echeiOn officials
administer policies in specific fields related to their
respective domains. For instance, within the Office of
the Prime Minister are four subordinate ministers�
one responsible for financial control, another for the
people's army, a third for plans, and a fourth for
foreign affairs.
Theorcticalk, head of domains supervise�
government operations and make policy decisions. In
practice, however. all important d ecisions art- made
within the framework of tit(- party organizatiol,
specifically the National Political Bureau� and
executed through the Cabinet's administrative system.
Ministers are not responsible to till- National
Assemble, they must not be assembly deputies, and
the election of it n l-w assCIIIIAy has little if any
relationship to the composition of the Capin
Ministers are appointed by the President and serve at
4iis pleasure.
b. Legislature (U /OU)
The legislature consists of a single house, the
National Assemble, whose membership is elected at
one time for a 5-year term. Since 196..3 its membership
has heen set at 73. The part controls the assembly,
which is viewed as the collective emanation of the will
of the people rather than as an assembly of
tepresentatives from different regions. The National
Assemble is supposed to meet in two short regular
sessions each year, in March at,(] Octoher. Special
'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
sessions nta\ be hl-ld ;t ;its% time at the meluest of the
President of t1w I{-public Or after a No-thirds vote of
the dctmties. Actually, the assembly has not stet
n�gul:u i)
A Permanent Commission :111(1 a It)- member bureau
are elected at the beginning Of each legislative teen to
deliberate on goverw.��nt actions which take place
heiween regular sessions of the assentb;.. although
such deliberations in fact have no effect on police
decisions. Fach commission se for the full 5- year
term of that assentfly.
In practice. the assenibly acts as an appendapt. Of
the part\ and is ratifying body for PDG polic�ie iy
meaningful discussion of proposed legislation takes
place within the party organization, following which
tile proposal is submitted to tit(- National Assembly for
perfunctory approval. The PDG also determines till-
composition of the assembly by drawing up ie list of
3 candidates which it presents to the ,cation for
election. The President retains the right to veto the
"()Initiation of any cmididate. Of the deputies elected
to the assembly in 1965, 32 were members of the
(ventral Committee of the PDG, while six and seven
were members of the bureau~ c hc� parh�-
affiliated labor ai,.r youth organizations, respectiy. ly.
Twenty deputies were women
c. Judiciary (U /OU)
PD(: theory recognizes no separation of powers. and
judicial poarr ultimately rests with tit(- party. Along
with the rest of the grn (-rnnu tit, the judiciary is
expectl-d to uphold till- will Of the people as expressed
by lilt- party and he subject to party disc�ipli
Ohl- of Toure's early accomplishments was the
abolition of c�ustonwry tribal courts and their
replacement by PD(:- operated Popular Tribunals.
which decide minor disputes at the village level. All
legal costs are borne by till- state. All judges,
magistrates, and lawyers (including defense attorneys)
are civil servants, and as salaried officials they are not
expected to accept fees. There is it serious shortage of
Gohicans with legal training.
lu its formal aspects, Guinea's judicial system has
been carried over from the French. 'I'll(- court syste�m
has ;I simple structure. At the lowest level, 25 of tiiv 29
administrative regions have a Justice of tit(- Peace
court. Of the other four regions� three have one Court
of First Instance, while Conakry has two. The Courts
of First Instance have a presiding judge, plus official
pr osecution and defense attorneys, and their
jurisdiction runs the gamut of civil and criminal cas
There are three higher courts, one of which is the
Court of General Sessions in Conakry. This court has
3
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uHKin:d critosial juriwliviic,n in vaw�% onoskitig nlitjf)r
oo(frtiw�.. 11% 11"idittg 111411tt- 1% dt�44ig1t:tt-41 li% the
per44ich�tt fi( the (:taut oil Aplso -iok aiml it ha44 1%ov
111tcliti111kt1 jiftlit 44111141 ff)ut la% it�w�.w 1144 4�114nt�11 [nine a
lI%I prrililrrrl Its Iltr r(mt�rnttn�nl. ;lippoietletnml. ter Iht-
(:eurl 411 Griletill SM44111% ion� fist I ltl�ar
Aentlier hither a old. Iles� C411111 fif 1111111-ilk in
Citnakn. Inw '.'11net al� fnlm lln� lowt-r 4.111d% in bf)ih
44lt11 Went rrimitkd co %m. II has if pn��idt-nl and it
noml/rr of jenletr.. all apllotimetl b% pre%itlemial
dm-e�. lit we eve iwlattc�e�.. apprid nu% Ise nksde !nine
1144 dr449i111% 14, the tiultrrntr t antrt u! .1ign�ak
Tin� thin) Nether 4'4141rt. tilt- Stipn�mr 0stur1 411
Alliteul�. ha� fill- mrmloe�r% aemi is hrade4l I/% a
ptr.idrut. %tat i% A%%W �d 11% four 4rn.nw�14/n !"till the
a141r1 tf Aplr�1d� "Pile funeti4gt o! Ihi% c�etsri is Inch 1%
141 clllrif% life tau ilnd in�ur4� 44rn�cnr.. 4j
interpn4111h111: it it" 1111 ndr 41n the L14�h in is raw�. It
hewn apprah front all lower court..
A w�ilurulr stitch 0 .�f jimi a lien itiawdr Ili,-
n�etulur jmli4ial %Weed .still hit juriwtiction f)nh filter
miners again.! the �tale: Ihrn� i. list a /twill front
clrclsiott44. I1� memlwAip croteprSm till- prr.itte�nt sot
III� Nalhmul A44w�mi:h. w I,.t w�n4�. a� pn�.idenl fit list-
ctrttrl. flinv Calliw'. m;iti4em w-.1 there nn�tnlx�r� fif
the Nalifi4...! .wrenbl% "f i,t- stitch (stied st(ju.ticr ha.
Ioeen ttw�d total% tuicr. lie April Mal) it tried if getup fit
prewm aettiw�d tf phillinet at
successfully combined a popular awareness of the goal
of liberation from French rule with a highly effective
organization to achieve political independence. The
next step, says Toure, is it "qualitative" jump forward
toward realization of a tnly indigenous social
organization based on African, not foreign, values. It
was to make this "qualitative" adva -tee that the
Guinean cultural revolution was proclaimed. Its
methods are ideological education and increased
domestic militancy. These methods are often harshly
applied, however, and offer few material induce-
ments.
Other social policies are aimed at achieving
educational reforms, gaining literacy in an indigenous
language, eliminating the deprecattry attitude toward
manual labor, and bridging the gulf between urban
and less sophisticated aural inhabitants. Programs to
effect these changes have frequently aroused popular
discontent because of the emphasis on social control.
Educational reforms have entailed the i reposition of
government control over all schools and students,
revision of the curriculum to deemphasize classical
French training, awl rapid expansion of dcational
13
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facilities and enrollment. The ultimate goal is
establishment of Centers of Revolutionary Education
as self- sustaining in which agricult -+ral production
theoretically is combines with political indoctrina-
tion. Toure's preoccupation with ideological
indoctrination may, in the long run, make the schools
as unresponsive to Guinea's actual needs as they were
under the French system during the colonial era.
PDG policies aimed at eliminating tribal allegiances
include participation in governt,tent by individuals
from all major tribes and rotation of government
personnel outside their own tribal areas. The political
security of the leadership is another objective of the
rotations. The scheduling of important party meetings
in all parts of the country and frequent tours of interior
areas by national leaders are part of the effort to break
down tribal and regional parochialism and wipe out
attitudes associated with former hereditary tribal
aristocracies.
To further social equality the PUG encourages
members of those groups who have little status in the
traditional tribal system (youth, %women, unmarried
men, and those traditionallt associated with servant
classes) to participate in party affairs and rise through
the party structure by loyal performance. The goal is
to replace traditional groupings with party
organizations, thereby making the PDG the final
arbiter and sole sanctioning body for all important
.ac tivities. The PDG's substantial success in achieving
this goal confirms its claim to be a revoluti.nary leader
among African political parties. The party has
demonstrated its commitment to equal treatment of
all elements of the society by providing better
opportunities for women, ordering students and city
workers to the countryside to work on farms, and
compelling the military to participate in civic action
projects. Toure's determination to prevent the
emergence of special interest groups with loyalties
outside the party is evident in his harsh treatment of
the surviving remnants of the merchant class and in
the barrage of propaganda warning against the
emergenct of a bourgeoisie.
Guinea's economic goals include the creation of a
viable modern economy, improvement of living
standards, and control of all economic life by
Guineans. These goals are to be achieved via a
planned economy, but Guinea has never had n
effective national plan. In a kind of reverse Marxism,
Toure has declared that Guinea's economy must he
based on its politics, and he appears confident that
economic goals can be reached by taking correct
political decisions. Guinea has had two multiyear
economic plans, but these have been more
14
compendiums of hopes than effective instruments for
national planning. The development of a rtew 5 -year
plan is to be the sole item on the agenda at the 10th
PDG Congress, scheduled for late spring 1973.
Although Toure rants against capitalism and
foreign investment, Guinea's substantial mineral
resources arc being exploited in cooperation with large
foreign companies. Despite his revolutionary rhetoric,
Toure has largely fulfilled his promises to the private
investors. The government needs outside aid in
exploiting these resources because Guinea lacks the
required capital, market outlets, and expertise. The
earnings derived from the sale of the ores and metals
will continue to he the govemment's major soarce of
foreign exchange for some time to come.
Toure is counting heavily on returns from the
extraction of minerals to allow continuation of many
of his domestic experiments, such as his decision in
1960 to create an independent Guinea currency, �tow
called the syli. The government has repeatedly
asserted that earnings from bauxite deposits at Boke
will provide the required foreign exchange beginning
in 1973; that Soviet rights to bauxite deposits at
hindia will satisfy demands for payment of back debts
by the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies; and that
development of untapped iron ore deposits in
southeastern Guinea, when exploited, will insure
economic momentum through the 19$0'x. if the
benefit to the government of these mining enterprises
falls short of Toure's expectations, however, his
followers are likely to be even more disillusioned.
particularly if consumer shortages and demands for
economic sacrifices continue.
The government insists on strict concession
agreements with foreign developers allowed to operate
in Guinea. Most agreements provide for progressive
Guineanization of the work for r and for tight controls
on foreign exchange and on the repatriation of profits.
Although the structure of the economy is changing,
Guinea is still predominantly an agricultural country.
The regime has not been successful in its attempts to
collectivize agriculture, and subsistence farming
continues to provide the largest portion of the total
national output produced by the private sector.
Purchase of agricultural products is by state
monopolies. while distribution of consumer goods is
controlled by regional committees directly subordinate
to party federation officials. These controls, combined
with the chaotic management of the distribution
system and drastic restrictions against private traders,
contribute to the continuing shortage of consumer
goods. Furthermore, policies which make the Guinean
currency nonc�onvertible at the legal rate, plus serious
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domestic inflation, have led to extensive blacknrarket-
ing and smuggling. Although the citizenry has borne
such hardships stoically, the potential for an explosion
against the regime exists. Despite the economic
problems created for Guiuca by its withdrawal front
the French controlled African franc zone in 1960, the
regime defends the national currcncv as a symbol of
independence. It regards as not fully independent
those African countries which are unwilling lo pursue
independent monetary policies and whose currencies
are part of a larger currency area, such as the franc
�none.
4. Foreign policies (S)
Toure's ideological views place his government
alongside Communist nations on most international
issues. Nevertheless, the regime has reiterated and
frequently demonstrated by its actions its determina-
tion to avoid becoming dependent on any power.
Communist or otherwise, and to pursue its own
interests. These interests mainly are the security of
Cuinea and the long -range goals of national
development and African unity. Pursuit of these goals,
entwined as they are with sensitivities arising front it
recent colonial past, the search for an authentic
African identity, and the need for foreign economic
aid, has frequently resulted in tensions .which strain
Guinea's relations with its neighbors and other
nations. Toure is careful, however, to balance off
worsening relations with one major power by making
friendly moves toward a rival power. Shrewd
application of this technique since independence has
preserved considerable freedom of movement for
Toure and gained for Guinea substantial amounts of
foreign aid.
a. Relations with African states
Guinea's close ties with Communist states and
hostility toward Paris have caused some problems with
its moderate neighbors Senegal and Ivory Coast and
contributed to its political isolation. Conakry favors it
unified African military command and has
traditionally supported a much tougher position on
the question of the Portuguese territories than have
most other African governments. Another complicat-
ing factor has been Toure's practice of harboring
dissidents or exiles from other African countries. Most
notable among these was Ghana's late President
Kwame Nkrumah, who was granted asylum following
his ouster in 1966 and resided in Guinea until his
death in 1972. Withdrawal from the franc zone and
establishment of a national currency not backed by
gold have cut off mist legitimate regional trade.
Guinea took its first tentative step toward African
unity in 1958 when it joined Ghana in a "union" of
the two countries, which was expanded in 1960 to
include Mali. Few steps were ever taken to implement
the agreements, however, and it few years later the
union was declared defunct by Guinea.
In January 1961, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali joined
Morocco, tits United Arab Republic, and the
Provisional Governnnent of Algeria in forming the
Casablanca Group. '['his organization took a militant
stand oil African questions and set up an African Iligh
Command. The Casablanca Croup never functioned
effectively, however, and was finally dissolved in the
summer of 1963 on the grounds that it had been
overtaken by the formation of the Africa -wide
Organization of African Unity (OAU). Tours strongly
supported the establishnuCnt of the OAU, but since its
creation he has frequently expressed disappointment
over its lack of militancy and leadership in African
affairs.
The overthrow of two radical west African leaders
who generally shared Guinea's pan African, anti
colonial views� Kwarne Nkrumah in Ghana in
February 1966 and Modibo Keita in Mali in
November 1968 �also thwarted Guinea's African
policies. In recognition of their past association as
revolutionary brothers, Toure promptly gave
sanctuary to Nkrtunah and declared him a co-
President of Cuinea, but the title was strictly honorific.
Nkruntah's presence in Conakry ruled out it
reconciliation behveen 'Toure and the military junta
that ousted Nkrumah or %with the junta's civilian
successors, the Busia government.
Busia's overthrow in January 1972 and Nkrurnah's
death the following April opened the way for an
improvement in relations. Tourr's welers met with a
positive response in Accra, suggesting that both
countries desired an end to the %ears of hostility and
recrimination. Toure's move was part of a general
diplomatic offensive designed to improve Guinea's
relations with African states and to refurbish his
government's image in the wake of the unfavorable
publicity generated by the intensive domestic political
purges of 197 I. Relations with Ghana were
reestablished in February 1973.
Relations with neighboring Mali have had their ups
and clowns, reflecting for the most part Toure's
attitude toward its rulers. One immediate result of
Nkrumah's overthrow and Guinea's growing isolation
was Toure's decision in 1968 to establish even closer
ties with Modiho Keita in Mali. This trend was short
lived, however, because of an army coup in November
1968 which toppled Keita's leftist government.
Despite Toure's distrust of Mali*s new military rulers
13
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and his suspicions of French involvement in the coup.
he did not break diplomatic r.�lations and cautiously
avoided antagonizing the new regime. Relations
gradually wartned after an initial 1wriod of coolness,
and they were cordial in late 1972. Tonre particularly
uppreciated the Mali regime's immediate suplxrt
after the 194 invasion.
Relations with Lilwria and Sierra Leone are
genendly gourd, hilt there are occasional disputes over
trading concessions, tribal matters. lit(] illicit liorder
crossings. Lilm�rian President Tolbert has followed the
example of his predecessor, the late President
Tubman, in sparing no effort to maintain cordial
relations with Guinea and Toure. Tolbert visited
Conakry soon after succeeding to the presidency in
July 1971, and he took an active part in OAU efforts in
197.2 to mediate the Guinea- Senegal dispute. Tour�
reciprocated. and his only two journeys outside
Gnine, since I(fi(i wen� to Monrovia in mid -1972.
Guinea's relations with Sierra Leone have been very
close since Siaka Stevens became President in `lay
1968. Toure had provided a haven from which Stevens
plotted against the military regime in Freetown. Then
in March 1971. Toure dispatched Guinean troops to
help Stevens regain control. following an ineptly
staged comp by the Sierra Leone army commander. A
secret defense agreement was hastily signed, about 2W
Guinean troops were sent to Freetown. and (;uinean
MiG -17's buzzed the city in a show of suplxrt Toure),
help proved crucial, and a grateful Stevens energed
more s.lidl� in control than before. A contingent of
about :)1) Cninean troops was conhmnng to act as
Stevens' lxo yguard in early 1973.
Guin(.a's relations with Portuguese Guinea are
anigae because- of the anticolonial rebellion that has
been going oil there for almost a decade. Conakry is
the headquarters of the African Party for the
Independence of Portuguese Cuine�a and the Calm-
Verde Islands (PAICC), and is the lmrt of entry fur
most of the supplies being provided the insurgents by
Communist nations. The organization controls its own
transport for moving supplies from Conakry to bases
along Cuineu'+ northwest Imrder, and it olx�rates its
own hospital near Boke. Toure had 1wrmitted the
PAIGC considerable autonomy in nntning its
operation from Guinea, but following the assassina-
tion of PAIGC leader Amile ar Cabral in Co,aakry on
20 )ant ary 1973. 'Tonre began to assert more control
over the organization's activities in Gidnea. Tnure�'s
moves strained relations Im-tween the two, and in early
1973 relief combat troops stationed in Conakry Im -gall
relocating to the "Idwrated" territories. Only a small
headquarters staff remained in Conakry to handle
IR
incoming supplies. There are cennpelling reasons on
both sides to patc�l �i the quarrel, however, and no
significant diminution of Guinean help is expected.
The fact that Conakry w;as the location for a
meeting in April 1972 of the U.N. Special Committee
on Decohmization re%tdted in mocli favorable
publicity for the PAWL (Figure 6). 'Toure pushed
other African governments hard for more concrete
demonstrations of support for the anti Portuguese
struggle following the 1970 Portuguese -led attack on
Conakry, and ill 1971 the African Liberation
Committee cif the WU opened it subregional office in
Conakry. 'Toure believes that other African
governments are not doing enough to aid lbe
liberation movements, and he advocates a coordinated
African effort to oust Portugal front the continent. The
Guinean Parh Central Committee proposed to
Senegal in !ate 0et0bV, that both countries aid the
PAIGC militarily. Toure's desire to bracleo the
stntggle in Portuguese Guinea is motivated in part by
his fear that Guinea alone would bear the brunt of
future Portuguese retaliation, as it did in 1970. Toure,
who sees himself as it leader of the antic�olonial
struggle in Africa, also gives strong diplomatic and
propaganda support to other liberation movements
whose goal is the- ouster of the Portuguese from all of
Africa.
For some years Guinea's relations with Senegal and
Ivory Court have been seriously strained. Although
slm�cific incidents bave over the years produced acute
tensions, the continued poor relations result more� from
basic differences of philosophy and temperament
between President 'Toure on the one hand and
Presidents Senghor of Senegal and I louphouet- Boigny
of Ivory Coast on the other. Senghor and 1louphouet-
Boigm have advocated free enlerprise and close tics
with France and the West. while Toure has
emphasized socialism, close ties with Communist
governments, and Afric�anization. 'There list) are basic
difference in attihades toward South Africa. 'Toure
regards dialog with South Africa, as proposed by
Ilouphoucl- Boigny in 1971, as it betrayal of Africa's
interests.
Tensions among the three leaders also are increased
!y the fact that among the hundrecls of thousands of
Guineans who have fied to neighboring countries for
economic or political reasons, some arc� actively
working for 'I'nure's ovo�rthrow. In 1966 Cuincan exiles
in Abidjan formed, with help from the Ivory Coast
Covernmcnt, the Guinean National Liberation Front
in an attempt to unify all anti- Toetre exiles. The
refusal of authorities in 1)aakar and Abidjan to return
anti -Toure exiles to Guinea and to end completely the
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k.
F.-
FIGURE 6. The U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization
visits Guinea in April 1972. (top) Opening meeting of
the committee at the People's Palace. (center) Members
of the PAIGC in fatigues at the opening meeting.
(bottom) Committee members at a PAIGC school. (C)
activities of Liberation Front rnernbers on their soil has
not helped snooth relations with Conakry.
Relations between Guinea and Senegal wyere furehc�r
embittered by their dispute following the Portuguese-
led attack on Conakry in 1970. Senghor's unwilling-
ness to extradite Guinean exiles charged with
c�otnplicit' in the attack resulted in i t propaganda wy it
mud various retaliatory neasures im the diplorrratic� and
ec�ouotic fields, aucl it prornMed 'I'oure to c�ornplaiu
to the OAV. Aft( r several nu�diation efforts by it
sPeeial At' c�ounitlee of African leaders, it public
rec�omci hill iolt wyas reached in \Ionrovia just before the
1972 OAL' summit in Rabat. The exile elueslion
endoubtedly aas also discessecl at it ueetirg in
Guinea in July 1972 between 'I'oure and Ivory (:oast
President Ilouphouc't- Boigny. Althougl uco agree
ments were announce(l, the fact that the� meeting �the�
first fretwyeen the lwyo nu a in 9 gars took place at all
indicates a desire on both sides to seek improved
relations. \ny lasting reconciliation with either
tieghor or IIouphoeel- Boignx. however, depends on
their wyillingness to eliminate exile ac�tiyit w w�ithin their
countries.
Sekou 'I'oure's c�omcept of African unite allows for
regional organinc. ions. but oly if such groupings are
not vulnerable to pressure and nanipeI;etion by
foreign powyers. An example of one organization that
does not Ineet 'I'oure*s standards and is conscyuentIv
cordenned as an expression of neoco!onialisme is the
reach inspired :1fro \1ala, and Mauritian
(:onunon Organization. 'I'oure would partic darly like
to sec Africans exert more control over thei financial
affairs A common African currency not based or the
French friurc� or the 1�:nglish pound, for ex11111le.
wyoulcl not only be ideologic�.dl\ sound, according to
'I'oure. but would offer him i t politically uc�ceptablc
wyay to revamp Cuinea's financial structure. wyhic�h
no\y depends on the urbacked and virtually worthless
Guinean syli.
'forre favors it region;d grouping c�onbining both
French- and I ?rglish- speaking \frican countries and
he has supported noyes in that direction, notably at
disc�nssions in Monrovia in \pril 196' Ile supports the
idea for the sane reason that 1-'ranee opposes it:
because cc�onomically powycrf it states such as Nigeria
wyould overshadows France's main backers in Afri;�a
and probably diminisl French liegen anumg its
former colonies. \s wyitb all African groupings� the
crucial test for'I'otre is wyhetheran organization is free
from control, f or otherwise, by nom- Africans.
(:ninea has not taken it position on tile newly
funned Organization for the Developtrc'nt of the
Senegal Iliver composed of Scnegul. Mali, and
Vlaritania. For political reasons 'I'oure gave
rhetorical support to its predecessor organization, the
Organization of Senegal River States, which had the
same purpose and included Guinea. ''oure's dispute
with Senghor in 1971 forced the other three members
to regroup wyilhout Guinea in order to make ary
progress Io\yurd approving and implementing
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development plans. Mali and Mauritania were careful
not to exclude the possiLility of GtOnea's joining the
new organization in the future if it so wishes, however.
b. Relations with Communist states
Guinea has diplomatic relations with all Com-
munist countries, and most of them maintain
diplomatic missions in Conakry. The U.S.S.R., the
People's Republic of China, and Cuba support
significant military and economic assistance programs
in Guinea. Trade with Communist countries continues
to be fairly heavy. Several hundred Guineans are
studying in Communist countries, and well over a
thousand Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban technicians
work in Guinea.
The relatively close relations which Guinea
maintains with most Communist countries were
further strengthened in 1971 and 1972. Toure
rhetorically placed Guinea in the forefront, along with
the Comra(anist states, of the world socialist camp and
claimed an important role for Guinea in the fight
against world imperialism. Both the U.S.S.R. and
China renewed their political support of the Toure
regime during 1971, and Communist aid commit-
ments, physical presence, and role in Guinea's security
services were all expanded. Guinean delegations
visited the U.S.S.R., China, East Germany, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and Albania during 1971. The
Hungarian President visited Conakry in December
1971, a high -level delegation of the CPSU atl ^nded
the 25th anniversary of the PDG in May 1972, and
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro paid an official visit, also
in May. The Communist -front World Peace Council
awarded its 1971 peace prize to President "Toure. On
the economic side the U.S.S.R. began implementing
an agreement concluded in 1969 under which the
Soviets agreed to provide $92 million in aid as their
share of a joint project for exploiting the bauxite
deposits near Kindia.
The Communist states were the first nations to offer
aid and recognition when Guinea became independ-
ent in 1958. Since that time they have extended over
$300 million in economic aid to Guinea and Have
provided economic advisers as well. The raid on
Conakry and Portugal's role in the invasion were cited
4 Toure as conclusive "proof' that Guinea was the
target of a permanent imperialist plot. Toure bitterly
condemned not only Portugal but gradually extended
his condemnation to five major Western powers.,
including the United States. Expecting new attacks,
Toure turned to the U.S.S.R. and the other
Communist states for help, especially military aid.
The Soviets seized the opportunity and were able to
18
enlarge their foothold in Guinea at minimum risk and
cost. Sizable shipments of military supplies, including
additional MiG's, tanks, and radar controlled guns,
were sent to Toure, along with more Soviet technicians
to advise on radio operations, gunnery, and
construction of military fortifications. Moscow also
gave political and propaganda support to the Guinean
cause.
The 1970 raid on Conakry has worked to tle benefit
of th(, Communist nations particul Cuba and the
Soviet Union because it heightened Toure's security
fears and prompted him to establish closer relations
with these nations. Nevertheless, "Toure continues to
insist �and justifiably �that he is not a puppet.
Conakrv's relations with Moscow have not always
been entirely smooth, although Toure's ideological
proclivities and his need for Soviet aid have usually
prevented a scriou5 breach in relations. On two
occasions, in 1961 and 1969, Toure ordered the Soviet
ambassador to leave because of alleged involvement
with Guinean dissidents. In addition, it Soviet vice
consul was quietly expelled in January 1972, because
of Guinean suspicions about his local contacts.
The presenc of an almost permanent Soviet naval
patrol off the coast of Guinea since mid- December
1970 adds a new, important dimension to U.S.S.R.-
Guinea relations. 'The patrol, usially consisting of two
or three warships and it support vessel, was provided
by Moscow in answer to Toure's appeals for help after
the Portuguese attack. The Soviet ships have free
access to Conakry harbor and have broadened their
mission to include visits to other west African capitals.
China is the only major power which has had a
consistently good reputation with Guineans, who
admire the unobtrusive and hard working Chinese
technicians numbering some 500 -600 in late 1972.
The Chinese took advantage of it crisis in U.S.
Guinean relations in late 1966 to strengthen their
position. A climate of mutual trust has been created
over the years with the extension of unfettered aid on
generous terms. The Chinese have concentrated
mainly on agricultural and hydroelectric projects, but
thcv also built a cigarette and match factory and are
reported to have established it small arms repair
facility. Many Guineans, including President Toure,
are impress( by China's revolutionary ideology, the
apparent similarity of China's problems with those of
Guinea, and the exemplary behavior of Chinese
echnicianx. Moreover, China has thus far managed to
avoid the charge of attempting to subvert the Guinean
Governrn �a charge which Toure has leveled at
one time or another against every other major aid
donor. Peking responded to the 1970 invasion of
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Conakry with additional aid. An exchange of military
delegations in mid -1971 was followcd Iv small
Chinese shipments of military supplies to Guinea, but
the U.S.S.R. remains by far the major providerof arms
aid.
Guinea also maintains good relations with other
Communist countries. North Korea has given token
aid, and it military delegation visited Conakry in
X1141t eh 1971, although no aid agreement seems to have
beets signed. Guinea signed it cultural agreement with
North Vietnam in 1966, while proclaiming its support
for Vietnam's fight against U.S. imperialism.
Conakry's close contacts with the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam
constitute recognition in all but the formal sense.
Guinea hits relations with all Eastern European
nations, including East Germany, whose mission to
Conakry was raised to ambassadorial level in
September 1970. Almost all of the Communist stales
of Europe provide Guinea with sonic form of aid.
Cuba has good revolutionary credentials in the eyes
of the Guinean leaders, who view Fidel Castro as if
successful revolutionary. The visit of Fidel Castro to
Conakry in May 1972 highlighted the steadily
developing relations between the two countries. The
number of Cubans working in Guinea and the extent
of Havana's aid expanded in 1971 and 1972, probably
as a result of the events of November 1970 and Toure's
desire to keep the foreign aid program to Guinea as
broadly based as possible. Cuba provides some
military assistance and assigns advisers to train
Guinea's militia and security services. In 1972 the
Cubans constructed and began operating it special
militia training center north of Conakry in 1972 and
began work on improving Conakry airport. Militia
members also are sent to Cuba for training. Cuba is
believed to rank third, after the U.S.S.R. and China,
in the number of advisers and technicians assigned to
Guinea. In late 1972 there were an estimated 370
Cubans in Guinea, some of whom are connected with
Havana's support of the Conakry -basal PAIGC.
c. Relations with Western states
Guinea's relations with the West in general have
alternated between periods of cordiality and periods of
dramatic tensions. Basically, Guinea's leaders view
reliance on Western aid as a step backward toward
colonialism. Relations are further confused by the fact
that the regime's frequent public attacks on various
Western governments often coincide with private
assurances to those governments with which it still has
diplomatic ties that Guinea desires good relations.
These assurances are casually motivated b% purely
economic considerations, while Toure's Marxist
predilections account for his hostility to the capitalist
world. A complete break with the West is unlikely
because 'Toure still recognizes the need for Western
capital and echnical help and sees the West as a
useful counterbalance to the Communists. Shrewd
manipulation of East -West rivalries has brought
extensions of over $:4N) million in foreign aid to
Guinea since independence.
No period of tension has been more dramatic- than
that which foliowed the 1970 attack on Conakry. The
raid and its aftermath led to an erosion of the Western
position. The staff of the I'.S. mission was reduced
because of Guinean harassment, and tight restrictions
were imposed by Guinea on the activities of remaining
diplomats. As of early 197:3 the United States, Italy.
Belgium, and Switzerland were the only Western
governments operating embassies in Conakry.
Government dealings with Western nationals.
including representatives of Western nutting
concessions, were often arbitrary and harsh. Dozens of
foreigners, particularly German and French citizens.
were abruptly arrested or expelled. The U. N.
development program to Guinea was crippled by
expulsion of most of its personnel. Radio and press
denunciations of NATO, 1'.S. "imperialism."
capitalism, and neocolonialism were made almost
daily, beginning in July 1971, but by early 1972 overt
manifestations of the hostility, particularly the radio
denunciations, had subsided.
West Germany, whose standing in Conakry had
been deteriorating since earl\ 1970, was an early
casualh' of the November 1970 attack. Toure charged
Bonn's ambassador in Conakry with complicity in the
raid and the West German Government with
supplying arms and uniforms to the attackers. Toure
also claimed that Bcut had assumed control of the
anti "Toure exile movement following Conakry's
diplomatic break with Paris in 1965. Relations were
broken in January 1971, and all West German
nationals were ordered out of the country.
Economic self- interest has dictated the reestablish-
ment of normal relations with the l?nited Stator, and
this probably softened anti-L.T.S. actions taken during
the postinvasion period. Since the mid- 1960's. U.S.
aid, especially P. 1. 480 food, has been crucial to the
Guinean economy, and private U.S. investment is a
prime factor in developing Guinea's bauxite, on which
the regime pins its hopes for economic advancement in
the 1970's. Conakry's regular submission of its annual
1). L. .180 request in Decenber 1971 was ono of the
19
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early signs that, despite public attacks, Guinea wanted
economic cooperation with the United States to
continue.
U.S. Guinean relations had worsened steadily
during 1971, as Guinean charges of U.S. subversion
and meddling becante more explicit. U.S. membership
in NATO, Washington's refusal to condemn Portugal
in the United Nations, and Tome's conviction that the
United States, as an ally of Portugal in NATO, at least
had foreknowledge of the Portuguese plans �all
contributed to the strains. Virtually all imporhut
Guinean officials overly friendly to the United States
auul the West were among those arrested during the-
purge. The climate of suspicion made it impossible for
the small Peace Corps program to continue. At one
point the U.S. aid program was referred to as a cover
for U.S. intelligence activities.
U.S. protests of the allegations initially were met
with private assurances that these were not official
views but simply charges by individuals that required
further investigation. By this approach Toure
evidently_ hoped to keep his options open. This
ambiguity, which has characterized U.S. Guinean
relations almost since independence, results largely
from ideological factors. Close ties with the United
States do not easily harmonize with Guinea's Wore
militant revolutionary posture, and Sekou Toure is
careful that no one appears more militant than he.
The public denunciations satisfied the ideological
requirement that the United States he c�ondentned as
part of the "imperialist conspiracy," while the private
assurances were designed to salvage a basis for
continued cooperation.
Tours� has avoided staking his personal prestige on a
pro- or anti -U.S. policy, and on those occasions when
anti Americanism or suspicion of Westerners
stimulated by events �as in 1970 -71 �the Guinean
leadership has permitted and even encouraged the
expression of popular emotions. A crisis in 1966 led to
demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy and expulsion of
the Peace Corps. U.S. aid was reduced at that time
and now consists only of a small P.L. 480 program.
'rhe govc�rnit t s attitude toward France is
ambivalent. Cultural and language ties remain, but
emotions aroused in the preindependence political
campaigns and by France's brusque withdrawal after
the 1958 referendum aggravated anti French feelings.
The break in 1953 caused hostility on the French side
as well, and it was not until January 1959 that France
extended diplomatic recognition. Relations hit it low
point in the spring and summer of 1960, when Guinea
created its own currency free from ties with the French
franc. Guinean charges of French complicity in a plot
20
to overthrow the government further aggravated
relations and delayed the exchange of ambassadors
until April 1961.
'I'll(- Guinean Government made if concerted effort
to strenglheu tics with France in the wake of charges
by Totre in late 1961 that Soviet representatives were
engaged in subversive activity. Guinea was interested
in finding ne%y sources of foreign aid, both to make up
for anticipated Soviet cutbacks and to assert its
independence of Communist countries. Toure� has
frequently employed this tactic whenever Cuinea's
relations with one or another major aid clonor have
soured.
Basic suspicions between Prance and Guinea
remained, however, and their fragile relations were
again shattered in late 1965, when Toure accused
France and Ivory Coast of engineering and financing
a plot to overthrow his regime. Diplomatic ties were
broken and have not been reeshblished. Guinea made
overtures to France in late 1967, but the suspicion that
Paris was involved in the Mali coop of 1968 revived
old animosities. Frances pro- Biafra sentiments during
the Nigerian civil war also were viewed as evidence of
French neocolonialist deigns oil Africa.
The familiar pattern of Guinean overtures and
French caution, followed by a dramatic event
precluding reconciliation. was repeated in 1970. Talks
on longstanding financial differences were held early
in the year, touching off speculation about eventual
normalization of political ties. The Portuguese attack
on Conakry in November and subsequent Guinean
charges of French complicit dashed hopes for
progress toward better relations. French nationals
living in Guinea were a particular target of the 'I'oure
reginne during the 1971 purges. Some French nationals
were released from Guinean jails in December 1972.
however, and the time may he ripe for cautious
resumption of contacts with Paris.
Guinea retains diplomatic relations with a number
of other Western countries and is an active participant
in various international organizations. In line with its
anticolonial foreign policy and its solidarity with the
other African states, Guinea broke relations with the
United Kingdom in December 1965 over the Rhodesia
question. Unlike France, the United Kingdom
accepted 'roure's overtures in 1967 for better relations,
and diplomatic relations were: reestablished if year
later. As it member of the United Nations, Guinea is
primarily interested in colonial issues, particularly
Portuguese activities in Africa, and in the problems of
underdeveloped countries. Guinea began a 2 -year
term as one of the nonpermanent members of the
Securitv Council in 1972.
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E. 'Threats to government stability (S)
The hostility directed toward Guinea by France and
its African client states �loth at the time Guinea
,pted for independence and since�has induced
among Guinean leaders it profound sense of isolation
and suspicion that is oftt it described as paranoid by
outside observers. As far as Toure is concerned, foreign
subversion, particularly by the "imperialists," is a fact
of Guinean life. Portuguese involvement in the
November 1970 raid is seen by him as dramatic proof
of this view. The regime also has always had an
appreciation of the propaganda value of the charges of
alleged subversion and has employed them to explain
away regime failures and to justify Toure's constant
demands for more sacrifices and greater militancy.
This tactic has never been fully successful, however,
and there is considerable popular discontent with the
regime.
1. Discontent and dissidence
Popular dissatisfaction, focuses on the stagnant
economy and the burdensome measures imposed by
the government to promote its economic plans and
maintain tight political control. Economic stagnation
and economic difficulties are all the more glaring
because of the nation's large mineral reserves and its
agricultural land suitable for a variety of crops. The
popular reaction to the government's poor per-
formance has not been open hostility, the tight
political controls imposed by the regime inhibit the
development of an effective internal opposition. Some
disaffected Guineans leave the con:try illegally.
Others retreat to the interior or !o the family farm.
where government mismanagement and restrictions
on individual freedom have less impact. The
disaffection of young people and students appears to
have been a particular problern for Toure in the past
few years, calling into question the effectiveness of the
regimes pervasive indoctrination programs in the
schools.
Merchants in particular are dissatisfied with regitne
policies. Prior to November 1964 many merchants,
traders, and market women were active in party affairs
and won local election. to top offices. As the regime's
socialistic economic policies began to he implemented,
however, their disruptive effects on the economy
created popular dissatisfaction and growing demands
for reform. On the defensive, the regime singled out
the merchants as the scapegoats, and they became the
principal targets of the November 1964 anticorruption
drive and the first group against whom dismissal from
party membership was used as it punishment. Among
those merchants disciplined wire many of Lebanese
extraction. The small (about 1,000) Lebanese
community has newer been fully integrated into
Guinean life, and the Lebanese are regarded by the
regime as exemplifying the exploitative, boorgeois
mentality, although Toure probably does not feel thev
are a subversive. threat.
One of the n. st difficult and persistent problems
confronting Toure and the PDG is how to reconcile the
differences between the political leaders who have
risen through the party ranks and individuals, loosely
defined as technocrats, who have reached positions of
authority in the regime by virtue of their competence
in a particular area. Both groups are part members,
but the latter are generally less involved in party
affairs, favor more pragmatism in economic policies,
are more informed about the world outside Guinea,
favor closer ties with non Communist countries, and
are better educated than many PDG officials. The
politicians cling to Marxist slogans and emphasize
loyalty as the principal criterion for advancement.
They are distrustful of the outside world, favor curbing
foreign investment, and advocate a more militant line
for the party.
Toure tends to favor party regulars over the
technocrats, because he sees the latter as a potentially
antirevolutionary class of entrepreneurs whose
interests often coincide with those of foreign
capitalists. Frequent cases of corruption on the part of
heads of enterprises or technocrats who deal with
foreign firms have confirmed Toure's bias. In early
1969 a number of technically oriented middle -level
officials were removed from office during it general
purge. The finance and economic ministries were
hardest hit. According to "Toure, these elements
constituted a national bourgeoisie that syas helping
foreigiii imperialists undermine the revolution.
Appointments were henceforth to be made on the
basis of political reliability. 'The even wider purge of
1971 finished what the purge of 1969 left undone and
settled, at least for the time, the question of %which
group would prevail.
Despite Toure's success in maintaining tight
political controls, the basic economic dilemma
remains: how to revive Guinea's stagnant economy
and promote: rational economic development without
creating it favored group of technically skilled
individuals who would not be responsive to party
slogans and discipline. There have been many false
starts in the past, but finally in mid -1972 Toure
appeared to be sufficiently confident of his political
position to give serious attention to the economy. lie
announced that it was "time to build the material
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base for socialism in Guinea" and ordered the drafting
of a new 3 -year plan. In a speech to the diplomatic
corps Toure invited foreign help in achieving Guinea's
economic goals and did not appear embarrass --d by
the fact that only a few months earlier he had
described Western aid programs as vehicles for foreign
espionage. His apparent readiness to seek greater
foreign help in 1972 was tantamount to an admission
that the demands for belt tightening of the last decade
and a half had taxed the patience of the people and
risked the security of his regime.
Nevertheless, there are political dangers associated
with a serious effort to deal with the nation's economic
problems, since this would almost inevitably requir.
increased foreign aid and provision of individual
incentives to producers. This then would mean the
position of the moderates and the technocrats would
be strengthened and Toure would be vulnerable to
charges from party militants that greater foreign
involvement in the economy was a betraval of the
revolution. That charge was previously leveled at
Toure because of his decision to allow foreign investors
to provide some $230 million for the development of
Guinea's bauxite industry, one -half of which came
from U.S. sources. Toure is an accomplished politician
and manipulator of opinion, however, and he gives
every appearance of being able to prevent his critics
from coalescing into an organized opposition which
would threaten his continued domination of national
life.
In terms of power, the military is the greatest
potential threat to the security of the government.
Over the years the army ranks and the officer corps
have been demoralized by purges, by lack of material
and moral support from the government, and by
President Tovre's frequent insistence that professional
military duties give way to civic action projects �such
as roadbuilding �that are more befitting a "people's
army."
Toure has always been wary of the coup potential of
the armed forces. Following the army coup in Mali in
1968 he seemed particularly concerned about the
loyalty of his own forces and took additional steps to
subject them to party discipline. In early 1969 Toure
disclosed an alleged military plot and arrested the
deputy chief of staff of the army, the commanders of
the small air force and navy, and scores of lower
ranking personnel. Nine plotters were eventually
sentenced to death. These moves coincided with his
decision to upgrade the militant and more politically
reliable 8,000 -man militia, which was designated by
Toure as the "defender of the revolution." Toure
strengthened the militia further following the
22
November I970 raid, crediting that body with driving
out the attackers. lie was critical of the army's poor
showing and subsequently purged several ranking
army officers, including its commander. Militia
officers were even transferred into the regular army
officer corps. Together the 1969 and postinvasion
arrests represented a complete purge of the military
cYmmand staff. Toure also has tried to insure that the
other branches of the security service remain apart
from army influence and control. Despite these
provocations, the Guinean military shows no signs of
willingness to challenge the government, although it
still has the capability of being a threat to the regime.
Toure's precautionary moves have had the
predictable effect of creating jealousy among the
services and morale problems within the army.
Nevertheless, they also have prohibited the
concentration of military power in the hands of a
single establishment or the creation of an elitist
minded officer corps similar to those that have
intervened in the politics of mam� neighboring states.
There are almost no professional military cadres. The
principle of civilian control of the military is well
established, and military personnel are considered civil
servants.
Conflicts among other elements of the society
undoubtedly exist. Even revolutionary Guinea must
contend with divisions between youth and their elders,
wage earners and subsistence farmers, and recently
graduated students and older park- members with less
formal education. The conflicts are masked, however,
because of the pervasive organization of the party, and
Toure's tight control precludes popular expression of
opposition to regime policies.
Ethnic rivalries also are present, but the regime's
policy of absorbing ethnic leaders into the PDG and of
downplaying loyalties has reduced the subversive
threat from this factor. The political parties which
opposed the PDG in the 19:50's were constituted along
ethnic lines; the PDG's principal competitors were two
Fulani- backed parties. Because of the loss of their
former commanding position, the Fulani are suspected
by Toure of playing a prominent role in antiregime
activities. Ethnic loyalties among the population are
still strong, and PDG leaders closely monitor the
activities of Fulani and other tribal groups for any sign
of antigovernment activity. 'There is little likelihood
that any ethnic -based group within Guinea could
develop sufficient strength or popular support to
overthrow Toure in the foreseeable future.
The extent of popular discontent can be measured
by the number of Guineans who .ye fled the counts
since independence, most of them illegally. Estimates
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run as high is otte- sixth of dw population. Ironically,
emigration acts as it safety valve, removing the most
seriously dissuffected from the scene. Although
popular dissatisfaction is potentially dangerous, civil
(I isturhanees sufficient to threaten the reginu�'s
survival would probable occur only if there should
emerge tiff opposition leader with some visible support
within the anny, the police, or the militia. Ec�ononiic
hardship by itself has not been sufficient to provoke a
flash revolt, and the average Guinean prolmbly will
not act against the regime miless he sees it realistic
alternative to rule by Sekou Totire.
2. Subversion
a. Permanent "imperialist" plot
Sekou Totire equtites all those who question his
views, no mutter how slightly. with subversives. Ile is
continually off guard against all forms of plotting, but
because of past experiences with colonialism and his
general political outlook bis primary preoccupation is
with subversion from the "imperialists," partic�tdtirly
Portugal and France. Since independence five major
subversive plots �only one of them with Communist
links �have [)evil exposed. The four "imperialist�-
inspired plots arc considered by Totire to be episodes
in it continuous attempt to subvert his government.
vie most recent episode, which took pluc�e in
November 1970, was the most serious threat to date
and the onb one in which foreign military elements
participated directly. The shock waves were still being
felt in Conakry in lute 1972.
In the early morning hours of 22 November it
commando force of about 700 to 400 men, consisting
of Portuguese Arm\ and Nave regulars and it smaller
group of Guinean exiles, wits ferried ashore it Conakry
from unmarked Portuguese naval vey.,els clearly visible
from the port urea. Although the Portuguese and the
exiles acted together, each seemed to have different
objectives. The Portuguese forces, Gluck African
commandos most likely recruited origin illy to conbut
PRIGC, struck the Conakry headquarters of that rebel
movement. The attackers were unsuccessful in their
attempt to kill the rebel leader, hilt they did manage
to free several Portuguese prisoners hell in it Guinean
military camp. 'I'll(- Guinean exiles, on the other hand,
were out ti topple the regime, and they hoped that
their presence would spark it popular uprising uguinst
the President. Portugal supported the operation
because, in addition to striking at PAID(:� it offered it
chance to overthrow Totire, who allows PAI( to
operate from bases inside ;uinea.
'I'll(- Portuguese contingent handled its tasks
skillfully mid pnfessionally. The force and the resc�ned
prisoners had wilhdruwti to the w tiling ships less than
2 -1 hours after the landing. The exile contingent,
however, was rounded up To :re's sectirit Nr forces
after waiting in vain for an uprising. For ;bnost i year
the regime pressed a witch Inuit for subversives une)
suspected supporters of the invaders. Figure 7 shows it
display of urns captured from the invaders.
The exile contingent was recruited under the banner
of the Guinean Notional Liberation Front (I� I.N( It
looser' organized dissident grotip whose main centers
of activity are in Paris, DaUr, and Abidjan. 1' I N(
the ortly known organized opposiliou to Sekou Totire.
dr;tws its support from oolong the over half million
Guineans living outside the country. Its leadership
consists mostly of politicians who lost out to Totire in
the preindependence power struggic and of defectors
from the Totire government. FLNG insde its first
ptiblic� appearance in Abidj;u in March 1966. At Ihat
time it had the covert siipport of the French
;overnment and the open backing of the Ivory (:oast
Government. which was sharply it odds with Totire.
FLNG is it heterogeneous grouping beset by
perennial financial problens and by chronic disputes
over questions of tactics :aid leadership. 1'-ior to
November 1970. FLNG tactics centered nn
propaganda and occasional Infiltration efforts. ;oid
the front showed little capacity to affect events within
Cuine;t. Broke and ineffectual, FLNG turned for aid
in early 1970 to the Portuguese, who wanted to get
even with Sekou Totire for his mirestric�led aid to
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FIGURE 7. African leaders at OAU meeting in Lagos
inspecting arms captured from invaders in late WO (C)

PAIGC, the successful insurgent organization that
controlled it part of Portuguese Guinea. The
November raid was the result.
Since the attack, FLNG seems to have reverted to its
previous ineffective state. Lisbon, which suffered
politically from the raid, apparently has withdrawn it,
backing, although it probably maintains scnne
contacts with the exiles against the possibility of future
cooperation. 'rhe likelihood of such cooperation would
be increased if PAIGC scored significant military or
Political successes in its skirmishes with the
Portuguese. Continued lack of foreign backing
probably will force FLNG to revert to previous tactics,
including renewed efforts to assassinate Touere.
FLNG's leadership appeared to be in it state of flux in
mid -1972, as the various factions sought to shift the
blame for the failure of the raid and to reorganize the
movement. Moreover, 'rhe extensive arrests in Guinea
following the 1970 attack almost certainly destroyed
the bulk of FLNG's organizational assets wittin the
country. Whatever support FLNG has in Guinea rests
mainly on kinship solidarity. Bitterness on the part of
relatives of those purged following the 1970 raid may
have produced it number of silent symphathizers for
FLNG's cause.
The regime maintains that "imperialist" plotting
predates the raid on Conakry, and as proof the
government points to it series of incidents which
occurred in the middle and late 1960*s. An
assassination attempt in June 1969 while 'Toure was
riding in an open car with Zambian President Kaunda
was publicly attribnted to the "imperialists."
President Toure also linked "imperialists" (par-
ticularly France) with the military coup in Mali in
1968 and warned that their next target was Guinea.
In March 1969 an alleged conspiracy by army
officers to assassinate Toure resulted in it general purge
of military and government officials. President Toure
viewed the conspiracy as merely it continuation of the
abortive 196.5 plot allegedly engineered and
financed by Ivory Coast and France �to overthrow his
government. The 1965 conspirators counted oil
intervention by the army in support of it general
uprising against the government, but they were
arrested before the plans were put into action.
Government accounts of the 1965 plot hit hard at
the theme of ontside direction of counterrevolutionary
elements within Guinea �a theme: that Toure seized
upon in 1971 when he charged several Western
countries with conducting espionage operations in
Guinea, aided by opponents of the regime. The charge
of foreign direction was also leveled at the participants
in an anti Toure plot uncovered in April 1960, shc:iiy
2 -1
after Guineas creation of its own currency, a symbolic
last step ill the break with France. Anus caches %were
discovered in neighboring territories still under French
control, and 'Toure charged that the ain was to
foment a Fulani tribal uprising with cover French
aid.
In all these cases, the active plotters were few in
number, and personal ambition rather than
ideological issues played a large role. Most of the�
plotters appeared to favor dramatic actions that tile\
hoped wwAl trigger it general uprising or militant
intervention. In each case the regime exposed the plots
before they could achieve an\ results and meted out
harsh punishment. Although many Gnineans are
dissatisfied with the regime in varying degrees, titer(- is
little indication that the\ have any serions
organization or capability for overthrowing it.
However. an isolated, unpredictable event such as
assassination of Toure remains possible and could
spark it general nprising.
b. Communist- inspired subversion
Since independence Guinea has had extensive
political, economic, cultural, and educational contacts
with both European and Asian Communist countries,
and these ties generally have boosted the prestige of
those countries in Guinean eves. 'Toure has not given
the Communist nations carte blanche, however, as
was evident by his vigorous reaction to what he
believed were subversive contacts between certain
Guinean radicals and Soviet diplomats in the early
1960's. 'I'll(- representatives of the Communist states
probably have little incentive to engage in activities
which would risk jeopardizing their generally
favorable situation in Guinea.
"Toure keeps careful watch on Communist,
particularly Soviet, activities, and has reacted strongly
to any hint of unauthorized involvement in Guinea's
internal affairs. 'Toure has leveled charges of
subversion against the Soviets on at least three
occasions, although he has succeeded in linking them
directly with only one specific plot. In 1961, during it
period of popular discontent over poor economic
conditions, leftving leaders of the teachers union
publicly criticized the Toure govenuneat for failing to
improve conditions since coming to power. The
government reacted by arresting two top union
officials and five teachers. Secondary school students
in Conakry and in some interior towns then staged a
sympathy strike in support of their teachers. Fearing
the protest might spread, the government called out
tilt: militia, which was able to break the strike but only
by resorting to brutal measures. Convinced that the
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Soviet Union had aided and encouraged the strikers.
Toure expelled the Soviet Ambassador in Decentlier of
that year and curtailed Gnumunist propaganda
activity. "on-ever, full diplomatic tic's %Aen� s oxat
restored. In 19ti9 relations with Moscow again entered
a period of chill. Toure requested the withdrawal of
the Soviet Ambassador after he learned of contacts
between Soviet Embassy officials and individuals
involved in an attempt to assassinate the President. In
1972 a Soviet Vice Consul was ex under
circumstances which suggested he had been c'harge'd
with espionage and subversion.
The U.S.S.R. has provided credits and tec'hnic'al aid
in many fields, including educatio medicine, and
industry. Participation in the bauxite mining project
near Kindia also adds to long -term Soviet leverage. In
addition, the Soviet Union gives large amounts of
military aid to Guinea. The Eastern European
countries are active and influential in the fields of
labxr, education, information, and youth activities.
they also provide technical aid in various areas,
including civil aviation, mining, medicine, and
hydroelectric development. There are frequent
exchanges of delegations in these fields, and many
Guineans associated with them are trained in
Communist countries. All these activities present the
Communists with opportunities to cultivate it
susceptible cadre within the regime.
Several Communist -front and Third World
solidarity organizations arc active in Guinea, and
some have regional offices in Conakry. 'flee� regitne
does not permit Guinean organizations to belong to
the major Communist -front organizations such as the
World Federation of Democratic Youth or the World
Federation of Trade Unions, but it does send large
delegations to international meetings sponsored by
these groups. The main interest of the PDG is in
African and Third World affairs, and the PIX; is a
member of the Afro -Asian People's Solidarity
Organization and of the Afro -Asian and Latin
American Peoples Solidarity Organization. Guinea
disseminates their propaganda in its press and
radiobroadeasts.
China was slower than the European Communist
countries in offering aid to Guinea, but it has stepped
up its aid program since 1964 and has been improving
its political and propaganda position. Careful not to
leave themselves open to charges of subversion, the
Chinese have concentrated on technical aid programs,
especially in agriculture, where they fecal they have a
particular competence. The Chinese have sought to
influence Guinea's political direction by paying
special attention to the information media and the
youth organization. A pcrtion of Guinean youth is
particularly susceptible to the Maoist views on
militancy and revolutionary purity, perhaps finding
they have some relevancy in light of the malfeasance
and favoritism practiced b% many PDG section and
federation leaders.
Be'c'ause the Chinese have scrupulously refrained
from any actions Guinea might construe as
interference in its internal affairs, the regime probably
does not regard their activities as having a dangerous
subversive pxtential. Nevertheless, the ever- suspicious
gove'rnme'nt does monitor these activities. and should
the Chinese move two openly to establish their
influence particularly within the militia, which
"Toure views as a primary bulwark of his strength
they can expect the President to react as strongly as he
did against the Soviets in late 1961.
F. Maintenance of internal security (S)
Guinea is a police state ruled by a strongman whose
imsition depends largely on the effectiveness of his
disciplined political organization, on an extensive
network of private informers, and cn six separate
securit services, all of them are controlled by the
President. Two of the services, the police and the
gendarmerie, are formally assigned the major
responsibility for police duties, however, the rnilitarv,
the Republican Guard, and the militia have police
type dutie among the respomsibilities. In addition, a
special security organisation was formed in mid -1972
to prote'c't the President and act as a riot police force.
Most of the conditions traditionally associated with
a police state arc present in Guinea to varying degrees.
President Toure trusts no one and is read\ to believe
rumors of betrayal by subordinates whose los-alty had
previously been unquestioned. Consequently, the fear
of denunciation and arbitrary arrest is ever present
among the general populace and among those: nearest
Toure. Individuals and organizations vie to prove their
dedication to the revolution. Tight restrictions on
information and travel have been imposed, and there
is no truth but that which is expounded by tit(-
President.
Control of the population is facilitated by a
mandatory system of identity cards issued by the
National Police. Information contained on the cards
which often are required at checkpoints established
throughout the country, includes the individual's
home region, arrondissement, and local PUG
committee, his date and place of birth, his photograph
and fingerprints, and his signature. To obtain a card
the citizen must produce a birth certificate, it
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certificate of residence issued by his local party
committee, and a tax receipt. New national identity
cards were issued in April 1972.
Numerous changes in the lines of authority that
accompanied the political upheavals during 1971,
combined with the secretiveness of the Guinean
system, have severely limited the amount of current
information available on the organization of Guinea's
police: and security service. Hollowing the 1970 attack
on Conakry, responsibility for the direction of
Guinea's defense was placed in the hands of a newly
created High Command. A separate committee with
overlapping membership was created to coordinate
the orders of the High Command and the activities of
the various federation headquarters. The Ministry of
Interior arid Security was represented on the
Coordinating Committee, but apparently not on the
High Command. Subsequent reorganizations have
cast doubt as to the continued functioning of these
bodies. Most organizational changes since January
1969 have increased the directness of presidential
control, brought the regular military more firmly
under the umbrelia of the PDG, and augmented the
power of the paramilitary organization at the expense
of the regular army.
1. Police
The two organizations whose primary duties are
normally associated with a police force are the
National Police Force and the gendarmerie. The
police are responsible for maintaining law and order
and are most active in urban areas, particularly
Conakry. Their chain of command is not known
precisely. Presumably the police general staff still
exists, although it was not specifically mentioned in
the flurry of decrees issued immediately following the
1970 attack. The police arc responsible to the
Presi'ent through the Minister of the Domain of
Interior and Security. Locally, each of Guinea's 29
administrative regions has its own police commis-
sioner, who is under the jurisdiction of the respective
regional governors. Police commissioners also exist at
the arrondissement level.
The 1,500 -roan National Police Force performs
ordinary police functions investigation of crimes,
traffic control, and law enforcement. It includes a
numtwr of specialized police and security units, such
as the Surete Nationale, the Economic Police Force,
and immigration and customs inspectors. Many of
these have overlapping functions.
The Economic Police Force was created in 1963.
(;barged with the suppression of economic crimes,
fraud, and speculation leading to price fluctuations, it
26
has been accorded the right to search and seize. The
Economic Police assume particularly active roles
during the anticorruption campaigns announced
periodically by the leadership. The Economic Police
are not effective, however, because they are subverted,
through bribes, by those they should control.
Immigration and customs inspectors are present at
all important border crossing points. They cooperate
closely with the gendarmerie units patrolling the
borders and with the Surete. Detachments are on duty
in Conakry at the port and at the international airport.
Entry and exit are tightly controlled, and border
authorities are particularly alert to smuggling attempts
and to border crossings by anti -Toure personnel.
Guinean police appear to be reasonably effective in
maintaining order; however, police recruits are not as
well trained and equipped as those of the other
uniformed services. Recruits are sent to the Police
Training School at Kankan, which is estimated to
have trained about 360 recruits between 1939 and
1966. Details on the availability of laboratory and
technical aids to investigation, such as fingerprinting
and ballistics, are not available, but such aids are
believed to be minimal.
President Toure relies heavily on the 1,000 -man
National Gendarmerie to maintain order, particularly
in rural areas. Its duties also include maintenance of
internal security. It provides normal police services for
much of the population and controls the country's bor-
ders. (The army also has some responsibilities for border
control, particularly along the border with Portuguese
Guinea.) The gendarmerie is headed by a chief of
staff, who coordinates its activities with other services
in the Combined Staff. Coordination also is required
with the governor of the region in which units are
located. The gendarmerie is divided among five
squadron areas, following the general pattern of the
country's four major geographic regions plus Conakry.
Squadron headquarters are located at Kindia, Labe,
Kankan, Nzerekore, and Conakry. Within each
squadron area the gendarmerie is organized into city
brigades, frontier brigades, and mobile platoons.
Because the gendarmerie is lightly armed, has limited
transportation equipment, and is widely dispersed
throughout the country, coordinated action is very
difficult. It is a moderately well- trained force,
however, and can perform its mission capably during
normal times. The gendarmerie is treated by Toure as
a separate, select group among the branches of the
armed forces. Toure's favoritism was indicated in
February 1970, when control of Guinea's Daly
effective communications network, which serves the
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army, police, gendarmerie, and regional government
officials, was transferred from army to gendarmerie
control. The gendarmerie seems to have performed to
the President's satisfaction since 1970 and has kept
him well informed about events within the interior.
Gendarmarie recruits are selected from the army and
sent to the gendarmerie training school in Conakry.
The exact function of the approxinrtely 1,200
Republican Guard is not known, but the Guard falls
under the Minister of the Domain of Interior and
Security and directly under the control of the Surete
Nationale. The Guard's duties have previously
included protection of the President. other govern-
ment officials, and government installations.
Important political prisoners were often placed ire the
Guard's custody. Toure reorganized his personal
bodyguard after 1970, increasing his reliance on
Cuban and Soviet advisers and purging several
Guineans from this elite group. It is not known
precisely how these changes affected the duties of the
Republican Guard. There are Guard troops in each
admini,trative region. The force lost its job as guard of
the Presidential Palace to the special security force
organized in 1972.
The 8,000 -man militia, a paramilitary organization
attached to the PDC, has important police functions
although it is not a regular police force. Administrative
control of the militia rests with the Minister of the
People's Army. Normally it is used on ceremonial
occasions to help organize demonstrations and keep
order. In some villages where there are no regular
security forces, the militia appears to have a primary
role in maintaining law and order. Militia tactics
include the setting up of roadblocks and checkpoints
to examine work and travel permits, and it has been
empowered to make arrests. Many militiamen are
armed during alerts. The militia is especially
important to the regime as an instrument for reporting
on the movement and activities of the population.
Informal sources, such as members of the militia and
party informants, provide the regime with much of its
most important information.
2. Intelligence and security services
The 1971 purges enhanced the role played by the
intelligence and security services. By 1972 their status
was quite high, and all other ministries paid deference
to the Ministry of Interior and Security. The regular
intelligence and security force is active and effective in
monitoring the diplomatic community. judging from
the quick exposure and suppression of even the
slightest manifestation of anti -Toure activity, the
security services are effective in protecting the regime
against subversion. Cubans are the principal advisers
to the intelligence and security services, as well as to
the Presidential Security Force. An estimated 40
Cubans were serving as advisers as of August 1972.
Included in both the PDG and the militia are
irregular systems of informants who report directly to
the President and to the police. 'These individuals
often are not paid but provide information as a service
to the party. President 'Toure has the largest network of
informants, who operate outside the regular channels
of the security services to help him keep tabs on his
ministers and other important Guineans. This
network, pr- &-ably organized along Tamil} lines,
appears to be quite effective.
The Surete Nationale is the principal body
specifically organized to provide intelligence and to
act as the investigative element against subversion. It
monitors internal political activity and maintains
surveillance over the activities of the foreign
community. Because of Toure's suspicions and fears of
possible threats to Guinea's independence and
sovereignty, surveillance and investigation �both of
foreigners and of Guineans �arc important functions
of the Surete Nationale. Mail is censored, phones are
tapped, travel to the interior and abroad is carefully
controlled through visas and permits, it curfew for
foreigners is enforced, and official contacts between
foreign diplomats and Guineans must be approved in
advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Checkpoints are established on the outskirts of
Conakry and throughout the country, and planned
long absences from one's home area must be cleared in
advance by local part and police officials. The police
traffic section �a unit responsible for highway security
outside the towns, especially in the Conakry area
was renamed the Commissariat of Public Roads and
placed tinder the control of the Surete in 1966.
Military intelligence functions were the responsibil-
ity of the Deuxieme Bureau of the army until early
1970, when that bureau was abolished. There is no
evidence that the bureau was reestablished following
the 1970 attack. Since its demise, President Toure has
relied primarily on the Surete Nationale, border
control units of the gendarmerie, and the reporting of
various informers to provide him with most of the
intelligence he considers important. Collection of
intelligence on Guinean exiles anti on foreign countries
has probably been assumed by the Surete, whose
officials also advised Sierra Leone President Siaka
Stevens on security matters following Stevens'
takeover in 1968.
27
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3. Countersubversive measures and capabilities
'rhe Guinean security services have, on the whole,
proved themselves loyal to the gover anent. Open
dissidence has been effectively suppressed on those
rare occasions when it has occurred. The allocation of
security duties among several different organizations
(and the care taken to sec that no one� individual or
gronuP accumulates power sufficient to threaten the
President) has given 'ronre alternative means of
control si:�ild one organization prove wanting. For
instance, Toure ordered a special army unit front
Conakry to Faranah in 1972 when local officials and
security forces proved either linable or ttnwilliug to
suppress public disorders during and after an election
dispute. When army units failed to respond effectively
to orders during the 1970 raid on Conakry. Toure
depended on local militia units and the gendarmerie
to repulse the invaders. Roth units seemed to perform
to Toure's satisfaction.
The government possesses the abilit to move a fe�w
hundred troops to strategic places within the country.
Transport aircraft are available, and there are airfields
at the important interior towns. About 200 Guinean
troops were moved overland by truck to Freetown,
Sierra Leone. during it government crisis in that
country in 1971.
The overall effectiveness of the security forces and
their ability to protect the regime are attested to by the
fact that no internally inspired conp plot h:s ever been
implemented. Such plots, which included scone
contrived by Toure for political reasons, have been
exposed at an early stage.
28
G. Selected bibliography (U /01j)
Political turmoil and government suspicious have
prevented field research in Guinea during recent years.
The few comprehensive treatments which exist are in
the French language and often are dated.
Arcin. La Guinee Francaise. Paris. 1907. Old, bill
still the hasic work on Guinean ethnic groups.
Attvood, Willi The Reds and the Blacks. New
York: Ilarper and Row. 1967. Includes an inteesting
account of Annhassador Attwood's tour in Cuing
(1961.6
Garter. C"'endolen. African One -Party States.
Ithaca: Cornell Ui iversity Pros. 1960. Guinea is one
of several states treated. Useful in helping assess
Tonre's one -party system.
Department of the Army. Area Handbook for
Guinea. Washington, D.C.: TIt(- American University.
1961. A comprehensive, detailed survey of Guinea but
somewhat dated.
Morrow, john II. The First American Ambassador
to Guinea, New Brunswick. N. j.: Rutgers University
Press. 1968. Interesting, modern history, bill
conditions have changed considerably since it was
ritten.
Iliviere, Claude. i%lutations Sodales en Guinee.
Paris: Editions Marcel Rnviere. 1971.
Suret- Canale, )caul. La Republique de Guinee.
Paris: Editors Sociales. 1970. The hest and most
detailed available study of modern Guinea, despite
the obvious leftist Political outlook of the author, a
French sociologist with Gontnnunist sympathies who
spent 5 years in Guinea 19.38 -63) as a teacher.
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Chruauloly WON)
1945
October
France grants political rights to African colonies, and Guinea
elects representatives to French parliament for first time.
1946
October
African Democratic R�rlly (RDA) is founded by left -of- center
African politicians from French colonies.
1952
Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), Guinean branch of the
RDA, is reorganized and Sekou Toure becomes secretary
general.
1957
March
PDG wins 57 of 60 seats in Territorial Assembly and forms
territorial cabinet. This assembly later becomes, first National
Assembly of the Republic of Guinea.
1958
September
In referendum (.:uinea rejects membership in French Com-
munity.
October
Guinea proclaims independence.
1960
February
FRIA (now FRIGUTA) alumina processing complex begins
operations.
July
Three -Year Plan inaugurated.
1961
January
Sekou Toure elected to 7 -year term as President of Guinea.
November
Leftwing "teachers plot" against government is exposed,
followed by subsequent loosening of Guinea's close ties with
Communist countries.
1964
November
In response to continuing econonsic decline, Toure decrees
Guinea's "fundamental law of the revolution." which calls
for greater state control of economy.
1965
October
Plot to overthrow the Toure regime is uncovered. Toure
charges Ivory Coast and France with complicity and breaks
relations with both.
1966
March
President Toure offers Kwame 'Nkl umah haw�eee Mn Guinea
after Nkrumah is overahrown 1)y �GMranaian Arm).
October
Guinea's Foreign Minister is detained it sierra by Ghanaian
officials; as hostage for return of Nkruru Ghai". Toure.
holds United States responsible because minister Mas taken
from U.S. commercial airliner. Issue resolved through OAU
mediation.
1968
January
National elections lwld; bekcuu Toure reelected President of
Guinea b.v near unanimous vote.
September
Guinea signs $64.5 million kan with IBRID to finaiwe ex-
ploitstion of Boke bauxite deposits by Westeroo consortium.
1969
January
Toure establishes political committees in Guinean Army,
deemphasizes its military role, and increases its involvement
in .civic action programs.
March
About 40 military and civilian officials arrested in connection
with alleged coup plot.
June
Toure narrowly escapes assassination during state visit of
Zambian President Kaunda. Assailant is killed by security
forces.
1970
November
Guinean exiles and Portuguese forces stage commando raid
on Conakry, hitting the headquarters of the rebel movement
opposed to Portuguese rule in Portuguese Guinea and freeing
Portuguese prisoners captured by the rebels and held in
Guinean Army camps.
December
Soviet naval vessels take up patrol off Guinea coast in
response to Toure request.
1971
January
Toure charges W,mt Germany with complicity in the 1970
attack on Conakry; all West German nationals are expelled
from Guinea and relations are broken.
National Assembly sentences 92 persons to death and 72 to
life imprisonment for their alleged part in 1970 attack.
29
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SECRET
March
Guinea and Sierra Leone sign mutual defense agreement.
Guinean troops immediately sent to Freetown to protect
President Stevens front mutinous army troops.
June
Hundreds of Guinean and some foreigners arrested and
interrogated. Radio Guinea airs extensive confessions which
assert that U.S. and major W-stern powers were engaging in
spying and subversion.
1972
April
Ninth National Congress of PDG annou� ces government
reorganization and points to economic development as
principal concern for 1972.
glus:ary (ul80)
April -Moy
Tw,r brief visits to Liberia by President Toure mark first
time in several years he has ventured outside Guinea.
May -41dy
Unusually large number of foreign dignitaries visit Guinea,
including Cuban Premier Castro and Ivory Coast President
Houphouet Boigny.
1973
January
PA1GC leader Amilear Cabral assassinated in Conakry.
AnRRF %'IATION
FonEIGN
ENGLISH
BPN..........
Bureau l'olilique National............
National Political Bureau
CER..........
Corms l'l:a.wii1mtmtit 16oplatiannairo.
Centers of Revolutionary Education
CNR.........
Conseil National de la Rcrolutiort......
National Congress of the Revolution
C: NTG........
Con 'fedcration Nutionale des Trarailleurn
National Confederation of Guinean
de Guirlee
Workers
FLNG........
Front deLibera:ion Nationale deGuinee.
Guinean National Iberation Front
JRDA........
Jeunesse de la Rerolution Democratiquc
Youth o: the African Democratie Revo-
AJricaine
lution
PAiGC'.......
Partido Ajricano do Independeucia do
African Party for the Independence of
Guine a Cabo Verde
Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde
Parti Democratique de Guinec........
Democratic Party of Guinea
PRL..........
Pouroir Reeolutionnaire Local........
local Revolutionary Authority
RDA.........
Rassenlblemenl Democralique Africain.
African Democratic Rally
30 NO FOREIGN DISSE 11
St:CRFT
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