LETTER TO MR. DAVID D. BURKS FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000200050069-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: November 17, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

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[Reprinted from Tim AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, July, 19591
The United States and the Geneva Protocol
of 1924: "A New Holy Alliance"?
DURING the decade following 1920 the relations of Latin America with the
League of Nations were a source of worry and concern to the American
government. In particular, the Department of State feared Latin American
efforts to use the League as a countervailing force against United States policy
in the Western Hemisphere. The Department was immoderately hostile,
consequently, to any League participation in hemisphere affairs; it even
forced the exclusion of League observers from the Pan-American Conferences
of 1923 and 1928. The American posture was, in fact, only one facet of a
general policy: to have nothing to do with the League in political matters.
For its part, the League generally reacted to United States policy with re-
straint and caution and only became active in Latin America during the
1930's, when Washington eventually welcomed League efforts to settle the
Leticia and Chaco disputes.'
In the 1920's, however, the League's interest in disarmament led it inad-
vertently to take a step that American officials regarded as a serious threat to
the isolation of the Western Hemisphere from the League, and thus in turn
a threat to the unique position of the United States in the area. This step was
the drafting of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, a treaty viewed by official circles
in Washington as an unfriendly European concert. Indeed, Secretaries of State
Charles Evans Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg both regarded the Protocol as a
potential "new Holy Alliance." Hoping to strengthen those elements in Eu-
rope that opposed it, therefore, the secretaries manifested their opposition to
the treaty. The American position had considerable influence on the failure
of the Protocol; some commentators have argued that the United States was
mainly responsible for its demise. The European powers directly concerned
sought to fill the resulting vacuum with the Locarno agreements. The United
1 Warren H. Kelchner, Latin American Relations with the League of Nations (Boston, 1930),
11-15. Allen W les, Analysis of Certain Activities of the League of Nations, Nov. 7, 1925,
Record roup 59, State Decimal Files, 1910-29, 5ooC/388%, National Archives. Hereafter cited
as NADF with file and document numbers. By 1924 all the Latin American states except
Ecuador, Peru, and Mexico had joined the League, but not all were active. For the American
policy on the relations between the League and the Pan-American conferences see Francis White
to Charles Evans Hughes, July 28, 1925, ibid., 710.11/878.
891
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892 David D. Burks
States saw in these not a threat but a positive gain for European peace and
so supported them, although in an indecisive and indirect manner.
The Geneva Protocol was the most important of the many attempts to
strengthen the constitutional structure of the League in order to establish an
international security as a basis for disarmament. Advocates of the Protocol
believed that Articles XII and XV of the Covenant seriously limited the
League's power to prevent war. Article XII permitted war three months after
the Council had failed to reach a unanimous decision in a dispute, while
Article XV exempted domestic questions from League jurisdiction. The
Protocol filled these two "gaps" in the Covenant. It provided for compulsory
arbitration of disputes that the League Council could not settle and it ex-
tended the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court by requiring the sub-
mission to that body of alleged domestic disputes. If, however, the Court ad-
judged the dispute to be domestic in nature, the League lost jurisdiction,
although the good offices of the Council or the Assembly were not fore-
closed. This provision, known as the "Japanese amendment" because that
country sponsored it at Geneva, freed the way for League conciliation of do-
mestic issues. A nation that had signed the Protocol but refused in a dispute
to abide by these provisions of the Protocol was, ipso facto, judged the ag-
gressor. And this nation was then automatically subject to the League's sanc-
tions. The Protocol undertook to solve in this manner the thorny task of
defining aggression.'
The Protocol first attracted the attention of Secretary Hughes because of a
provision that after its ratification a disarmament conference would be held.
Any conference of this type had potent political appeal in the United States.
Speaking in Cincinnati during the 1924 presidential campaign, Hughes re-
ferred in passing to American willingness to cooperate in disarmament s
When the League Secretariat, encouraged by this remark, informally in-
quired if the United States would accept an invitation to the Protocol dis-
armament conference, Hughes answered that his position would depend
entirely upon the relationship between the Protocol and the conference. At
the same time, he confidentially informed Undersecretary of State Joseph C.
Grew and the consul in Bern, Hugh Gibson, that the Protocol's inclusion of
"domestic questions" was the great obstacle to American participation in such
a conference. Although not defining what he meant by "domestic questions,"
2 The Protocol (full title, Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of international Disputes) is
contained in Walter C. Langsam, Documents and Readings in the History o/ Europe since 1919
(rev. ed., Chicago, 1951), 205-15. The basic studies of the Prow~A are Philip J. Noel-Baker,
The Geneva Protocol (London, 11925) and David H. Miller, The Geneva Protocol (New York,
11925).
8 New York Times, Oct. 4,1924.
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 893
Hughes undoubtedly had Japanese exclusion in mind. The Immigration Act
of 1924 abrogated the Gentlemen's Agreement of i9o8, and according to press
reports it was against this law that the Japanese amendments to the Protocol
were directed.' Hughes also believed that only if the conference did not dis-
cuss the Protocol and only if the resulting agreement was not entrusted to
the League for enforcement could the United States consider attending. In
other words, disarmament under League auspices was unacceptable.' The
problem of "domestic questions" faded into relative insignificance and the
appeal of a disarmament conference evaporated altogether when Hughes be-
gan to believe that the arbitration provisions of the Protocol were dangerous
to the United States. This belief resulted in large part from soundings of
certain European statesmen.
Of crucial importance in this regard. were the views of Foreign Minister
Eduard Bene"s of Czechoslovakia, one of the chief architects of the Protocol.
In response to the questions of Frederick F. A. Pearson, American charge
d'affaires ad interim in Prague, Benes" explained in November, 1924, that the
Protocol would preclude the United States from acting against a Latin
American country under the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine.
Drawing upon his philosophy of collective security, Beneg thought that the
Corollary might be protected through Council intervention in defense of
American interests. This concept of the League acting as a fiduciary the
American representative believed unacceptable; in the last analysis, the Corol-
lary, no less than the Doctrine itself, was a unilateral policy.6 To the question
of what impact the Protocol, if it had been in force at the time, would have
had on President Woodrow Wilson's military intervention in Mexican af-
fairs, Benes had a striking answer. If the United States had not first appealed
to the Council, Mexico could have obtained the support of League sanctions.
Beneg offered other solutions for American objections to the Protocol. He
suggested that the League be federalized by the creation of regional organiza-
tions for the Western Hemisphere, for .Asia, and for Europe. He also pointed
out that the approaching election in Great Britain might result in amend-
4 Hugh Gibson to Hughes, Oct. io; memorandum of the Secretary of State, Oct. II; Gibson
to Hughes, Oct. i6, 1924, NADF, 51I.3B1/222; Philip C. Jessup, international Security, the
American Role in Collective Action for Peace (New York, 1935), 33-34. In a speech made at
Indianapolis on October 14, Hughes strongly attacked the Protocol because of its provisions for
"domestic questions."
s Hughes to Gibson, Nov. 8, 1924, NADF, 511.3B1/228. Consistent with Hughes's attitude
on disarmament was his policy on the related question of arms traffic control. Although in 1924
the United States participated in the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission on the prob-
lem, Hughes dropped the matter when it became involved with the Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (2 vols., New York, 1950, II, 436-37.
6 Pearson referred to American policy as the Monroe Doctrine, but it is clear from the con-
text that he actually meant the Corollary.
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894 David D. Burks
ments to the Protocol. Pearson wrote to Hughes that one of the amendments
"ought to pertain to naval action in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine."
The Protocol as it then stood, he meant, would pe-mit the League to employ
the British navy in Latin American waters.'
Shortly after receiving Pearson's report, Hughes sought advice on the
legal aspects of the Protocol. Since obviously the United States would not
ratify, the problem was how the country would he affected as a nonmember.
The ruling section of the Protocol was Article XVI. This provided that a
nonsignatory state should be invited to accept the conditions of the Protocol
in case of conflict with a signatory. But if the state so invited refused to ac-
cept the Protocol conditions and resorted to war against a signatory state, the
League could apply sanctions against it. In subst: once, the Protocol did not
claim more extensive jurisdiction over nonmembe-Es than did the Covenant.
Once, however, the nonsignatory had submitted v) the Protocol, it found it-
self faced with a more absolute determination of the dispute. For what the
Protocal did provide in place of the combination ''c;f conciliation and arbitra-
tion contained in the Covenant was arbitration alone except in those cases
involving domestic questions.'
From the legal point of view, the compulsory arbitration of the Protocol
coupled with the inclusion of nonsignatories coui I be seen as dangerous to
the United States. And, in fact, this was the opinion of Charles C. Hyde, the
solicitor of the Department of State. He believed that, consequently, the Pro-
tocol would threaten the Caribbean protectorates ard the rights of the United
States as a neutral. The United States should therefore kill the treaty and
propose another arbitration plan that would protect the Monroe Doctrine.'
z Pearson to Hughes, Nov. I; Hughes to Pearson, Dec. ;, 1924, NADF, 511.3B1/242.
Pearson's remarks were supposedly unofficial, but Hughes co3:imended him for them. Bens
vigorously disagreed with the thesis that the Japanese amendr cents were directed against the
United States. He took the view that the Protocol was an imjrovement over the terms of the
Covenant since it assured the United States of League support in a conflict with Japan, for
obviously the League Council would declare Japanese exclusion a domestic question. In December
Benes admitted to the American ambassador, Lewis Einstein, th it "the thinly spread application
of the Protocol principles throughout the world is of very slight concern . . . and . . . he felt
but little interest in the hypothesis of a Chilean aggression against Bolivia or confidence in
assistance coming to Czechoslovakia if attacked, from remote .quarters of the world." He also
said that the Protocol's objective was to protect the "lesser" European states as a basis for `
European confederation. Since this purpose was not inconsister- with England's foreign policy,
she would sign after acceptance of amendments protecting he fleet. This emphasis upon the
European nature of the Protocol contradicted the statements mde by Benes to Pearson in No-
vember. Einstein to Hughes, Dec. 31, 1924, NADF, 511.3B1/266.
8 Manley 0. Hudson, What the Protocol Does, VII, no. 7, pt. x of World Peace Foundation
Pamphlets (Boston, 1924), 439.
8 Nov. 20, 1924, NADF, 511.381/246%. Hyde did examine at some length the implications
for the United States if it ratified the Protocol, but the eviden+ a indicates that ratification was
never seriously considered.
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 895
Henry P. Fletcher, a lawyer and then ambassador to Italy, generally con-
curred in this judgment 10
Although the Protocol was drafted by the Assembly of the League, the
Council was assigned the responsibility of calling a disarmament conference
after a sufficient number of powers had approved the Protocol.'1 On Novem-
ber ig, z9a4, a confidential Foreign Office source revealed to the American
government that the British would request a delay in Council action in order
to study the Protocol and to consult the Dominions 12 Ambassador Fletcher,
home from Italy for the presidential election, expressed the feelings of
Hughes when he wrote to Ambassador Kellogg in London that news of the
British move "was a matter of great relief and pleasure."" After returning
to his post, Fletcher met with British Foreign Minister Sir Austen Chamber-
lain in Rome for the Council meeting on December io, even though the
postponement of action had ended the pressure for American initiative. To
Fletcher's remark that the United States would gladly reveal its opinion of
the Protocol, Chamberlain responded that he would be "intensely interested
in knowing the American position before coming to any conclusion."14
Ambassador Fletcher also talked to Aristide Briand, visiting Rome as
French representative on the Council. Briand asked if the United States
would join the League. Perhaps, as Fletcher believed, Briand had been con-
fused by the Democratic campaign of 1924 during which john W. Davis
made an issue of American membership in the League. Fletcher's answer
was the blunt and unfriendly statement that the United States would not join
but that "as long as the League refrained from interference in her affairs"
his country would cooperate on suitable occasions. Briand then attempted to
discover the precise nature of American objections to the Protocol and the
textual changes necessary to satisfy them. He intimated that the authors of
the treaty would compromise to gain approval of the great powers, and he
to Report of Hyde, Nov. 24, 31924, ibid., 5131.3B1/246%. Fletcher suggested that the United
States let the treaty wreck itself.
11The conference was to begin on June z5, 1925, if by the previous May 1 three of the
four great powers on the Council (Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) and ten other members
of the League had ratified the Protocol.
12 Kellogg to Hughes, Nov. 19, 1924, NADF, 741.51/45. The actual delay was in the
preparation of the agenda for the disarmament conference. Kellogg also reported a predisposi-
tion on Britain's part to oppose the Protocol.
13 This feeling of relief probably came in part from a disinclination to face an invitation to
the Protocol disarmament conference. Fletcher to Kellogg, Nov. 20, 1924, Frank B. Kellogg
Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. Fletcher first intended to visit Chamberlain in
London and also, of course, talk to Kellogg, but he changed his plans because Kellogg sug-
gested that no additional information would be gained in this way. See Kellogg to Fletcher,
Dec. 1, 2, 3, 1924, ibid. Fletcher wrote to Kellogg that Hughes would acquaint him with De-
partment policy if the Protocol question became acute. Fletcher to Kellogg, Dec. 8, 1924, ibid.
14 Fletcher to Hughes, Dec. 9, 1924, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Library of Congress;
also NADF, 5oo.A14/14. Fletcher to Hughes, Dec. 10, 1924, Hughes Papers.
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896 David D. Burks
asked whether in that case the United States would ratify. Fletcher replied
that his government would not approve the Protocol as it stood; in fact,
inclusion of the United States as a nonsignatory within the scope of its
penalties was a most serious mistake, one capable of causing "resentment
at home or even serious friction between Europe and the United States."
Fletcher asserted that the United States would certainly not suffer a "Euro-
pean council" to apply a decision against it that it was an aggressor where it
was "perfectly proper" in defending its rights. Brand misunderstood, think-
ing Fletcher was referring to the Japanese amendment, and he hastened to
assure the American diplomat that when the Council considered a purely
domestic question, no state would be labeled the aggressor. The confusion
was ended by Fletcher's retort that the Protocol seemed to be an attempt to
restrict American action in such a way "that it might easily be made to
appear a new Holy Alliance." Fletcher suggested that there was a way to
calm American fears. Was not the Protocol designed for two purely Euro-
pean problems: the Russian and German threats? Briand agreed. The scope
of the treaty might then be limited to Europe, for then the objections to it as
a Holy Alliance "would automatically disappear." 1 riand admitted that some
limitation of this sort was possible. Even though he had made the suggestion,
Fletcher was not sanguine about its prospects. He wrote Hughes that Chile,
Brazil, and Uruguay had already signed and that probably the Protocol
could not be changed 15
With France, Great Britain played a key role in the Protocol negotiations.
Originally the British had been as enthusiastic as the French. Prime Minister
Ramsay MacDonald of the incumbent Labour government supported the
Protocol without realizing the strong objections it would arouse at home and
in the Dominions. When, on November 7, 1924, the Conservative govern-
ment of Stanley Baldwin came to power, the atmosphere changed. Although
the Baldwin government was predisposed to oppose the Protocol, it remained
undecided until late in February or early in March, 1925. As early as Decem-
ber io Great Britain informed France of its willingness to consider a pact
with France and Belgium and suggested that this could be discussed after
the Protocol's future had been decided. Actual cabinet consideration of the
Protocol was postponed until February, 1925, so that Robert Viscount Cecil, a
supporter of revision, could participate 16 That the cabinet's final decision was
15 Fletcher to Hughes, Dec. 15, 1924, NADF, 511.3B1/263.
16 Myron T. Herrick, American ambassador to France, to Hughes, Dec. 10, 1924, ibid.,
741.51/41, contains the report on the proposed tripartite pact that was to replace the Protocol.
For Cecil's opinion see Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography (New York,
594,), ,65-66. In February, 1925, the historical adviser of the British Foreign Office, Sir
J. Headlam-Morley, submitted a report urging revision instead if rejection. See The Diplomats,
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 897
in part the result of American influence is clearly shown by the story of
Anglo-American discussions.
On five different occasions Britain explored the American attitude toward
the Protocol. Although one approach was made in England via Ambassador
Kellogg, the more important conversations were those in Washington be-
tween British Ambassador Sir Esme Howard and the American Secretary of
State. On January 5, 1925, Howard called on Hughes, explaining that in a
private letter Sir Austen Chamberlain had requested him to discover the
American view of the Protocol. Howard said that the British government
was undecided about it. On one hand, the instrument might lead to events
embarrassing to Anglo-American relations, a most unwelcome possibility
since a "cardinal point" of British policy was friendship with the United
States. On the other hand, France and certain small countries rightly believed
that the failure of the Protocol would result in a burdensome arms race. His
government was seeking modifications which would resolve these difficulties,
and it wished to know American opinion, "which would play an important
part in consideration of the case." In this first interview Hughes refused to
commit himself to an official opinion. He emphasized that the problem in-
volved important questions of policy, that he could only give his personal
opinion until he had consulted President Calvin Coolidge, and that for these
reasons he wished Howard to refrain from answering Chamberlain until he
had obtained the President's approval. Because Coolidge was diffident about
policy making, Hughes was accustomed to a great deal of independence. But
this matter did involve a crucial policy decision requiring Coolidge's opinion.
The President approved of Hughes's position, and Howard was informed of
this at the second interview on January 8 17
In this first meeting Hughes said that he did not believe the Protocol
would be accepted without amendments. But "speaking frankly, he had
hoped that the Protocol would die a natural death because he saw in it
numerous sources of trouble. If it went through as it stood, America could
hardly help regarding the League of :Nations as a potential enemy." Hughes
1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N. J., 1953), 40-41. By March 5,
1925, the British cabinet had definitely made up its mind against the Protocol. Frederick A.
Sterling to Hughes, Mar. 5, 1925, NADF, 511.3B1/3o6.
17 The Hughes version is found in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, r925 (2 vols., Washington, D. C., 1940), I, 17-18. Hereafter cited as FR, 1925. In
April, 1925, Kellogg requested Howard's memorandum of the January meeting. Although this
is couched in somewhat stronger language than the Hughes version, it seems to be an accurate
reading between the lines of what Hughes was saying. Howard to Kellogg, Apr. 29, 1925, NADF,
5t1.3B1/345. It is interesting to note that the immediate predecessor of the Protocol was the
Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923). The Draft Treaty was less ambitious than the
Protocol; the United States refused to sign the Draft Treaty but did not actively oppose it.
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898 David D. Burks
objected to the Protocol for two reasons: the Roosevelt Corollary of the
Monroe Doctrine18 and American neutral rights. Regarding the first, he
thought there was "a proposal of a concert against the United States, when
the powers joining the Protocol considered that the United States had com-
mitted some act of aggression." But the United States would feel justified
since it would be acting in accordance with traditional policies. Howard
correctly took this as a reference to an American action in defense of the
Panama Canal that might lead a South American country to appeal to the
League. As Howard interpreted the conversation, Hughes was saying that
such an appeal would produce an explosion of American public opinion.
Hughes also stated that although he did not believe this concert would be-
come effective, in assessing it he had to assume the contrary. Thus the Proto-
col must be viewed with disfavor. It is clear that Hughes was implying that
the United States would not tolerate interference with its protectorates in
the Caribbean. Hughes also considered the Protocol as unfriendly to Ameri-
can neutral rights. But it is apparent both from the way he phrased his state-
ments and from the general tenor of opinion in the Department of State
that this problem did not worry him as much as the danger to the Roosevelt
Corollary, because it was doubted that any country would permit the League
to suspend its commercial relations with other countries. But this second
problem was Howard's overriding concern, since. Great Britain assumed
(and Hughes agreed) that the United States would insist on trading with
countries subjected to a Protocol blockade.
During the remainder of the interview, Hughes suggested that the
Protocol would inevitably imperil British interests and bring that country
into conflict with the United States, but he said that the British government
must act on its own responsibility. And although Britain might wish amend-
ments, these should not be presented as having American approval. He
reasoned that such action would cause political unpleasantness on the domes-
tic scene. This was quite likely the case, for although the Protocol had not
been an issue in the campaign of 1924, American efforts to collaborate with
the British in amending it would have antagonized the isolationists in the
Senate, and Hughes always feared the sort of conflict Woodrow Wilson had
sustained in 1gig. Ambassador Howard thought the role of the United States
could easily be hidden by a reservation to the Protocol allowing his govern-
ment to make arrangements "with any power that was not a member of the
18 According to his own definition of the Monroe Doctrine given in two speeches made in
the fall of 1923, it did not include the right of intervention. Intervention in the Caribbean under
the Roosevelt Corollary was based upon the rights of national defense and self-interest. See
Charles Evans Hughes, The Pathway of Peace (New York, 1925),538-39.
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 899
League" in the event sanctions were to be applied. Obviously, the world`
would have known that the United States was to be consulted, yet this reser-
vation did not imply an agreement with the United States.
On January 8 Howard called for a second interview. After a brief review
of the previous discussion, the British ambassador concentrated on the Mon-
roe Doctrine. What would the United States do, he asked, should the League
apply sanctions in a dispute between two Latin American countries? The
new problem thus posed involved all of Latin America instead of only
Middle America. Hughes refused to say more than it was not America's duty
to oppose the Protocol, but the British were aware, he assumed, that diffi-
culties analogous to the one Howard mentioned might appear elsewhere in
the world 19 (The answer to Howard's question is to be found, however, in
an address that Hughes gave on March 26, 1919, at the Union League Club
in New York City. At that time he had said that American questions should
be settled by the American nations acting jointly, unless as a group they in-
vited European intervention:20 he had followed this policy in the Panama-
Costa Rica boundary dispute in 1g2I. and he had not changed his mind by
1925 21) Howard then proposed a reservation to the Protocol specifically
permitting consultation with the United States, because Britain must tell its
League associates that sanctions could not be successfully applied over the
opposition of the United States.
Hughes and his advisers pictured the Protocol as a rebirth of the nine-
teenth-century concert of Europe that had supposedly threatened the newly
independent nations of Spanish America. The parallel between the Holy
Alliance and the Protocol as drawn by the Americans is all the more striking
because the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated against the former, seemed also to
be in serious conflict with the latter. As a practical matter the Protocol could
be called a "Holy Alliance" only if its adoption would convert the League of
Nations into a concert that assumed and could enforce the right of interven-
tion in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and only if this right of inter-
vention included the activities of a nonsignatory nation such as the United
States. From the legal standpoint, the Protocol threatened the Monroe
Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary by imposing on disputes in the
Americas the unpalatable alternatives of League arbitration or sanctions. The
realities of the matter appear to have been quite different. It should be noted
19 PR, 5925, I, 19-20.
20 International Conciliation, Special Bulletin II, Criticisms of the Draft Plan for the League
of Nations (New York, Apr., 19x9), 692.
21 For a discussion of the Panama-Costa Rica dispute see Lawrence 0. Ealy, The Republic
of Panama in World Affairs, r9o3-5o (Philadelphia, 1951), 6o-6z.
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902 David D. Burks
fact they opposed it because they regarded it "rat' er as a possible cause of
war than of increased security across the Atlantic."" Chamberlain was cor-
rect in stressing the importance of American opposition but by making this
the main argument he carried the point too far. The fact was that the sweep-
ing commitments of the Protocol, including its de facto guarantee of the 1919
settlement, were incompatible with Britain's view of the League and with its
pro-German policy. The objections of the dominions were also a factor,
though these (especially Canada's) rested partly upon the absence of the
United States from the League and the Protocol a0 Thus it can be concluded
that American opposition to the Protocol reinforce, rather than determined
Britain's stand, which in effect killed the Protocol: r
Chamberlain's suggestion of special pacts was a sound one, for if the
League could not be strengthened by the Protocol's universal approach,
manifestly its basic principles could be used in n.;rrower, regional treaties.
With this type of treaty Britain could avoid conflict with the United States
and dissension within the British Empire, yet achieve greater security.
Formal negotiations for more limited arrangement:: began with the German
note of February 9, r925, to Great Britain,32 although, as we have seen, the
British first broached the subject with a proposal of an entente to France.
When, on March 16, the German ambassador to the United States, Baron
von Maltzan, asked Secretary Kellogg for objections to or suggestions con-
cerning the proposed security pact, Kellogg refused comment, since the
United States could not join ss After Chamberlain's statement at the League
Council killed the Protocol, newspaper stories that the United States would
call a disarmament conference augmented French disappointment. French
Ambassador Emile Daeschner informed Secretary Kellogg on March 26 that
29 182, House of Commons Debates, 5S, 314-r9 (London, 1925). The statement was made
in support of the thesis that the Protocol would not encourage disarmament. Chamberlain's
speech to the Commons described British objections somewhat more accurately than his statement
to the Council. He pointed out that the universal obligations of the Protocol, requiring an in-
crease in the British navy, was the main reason for the rejection.
3? Edgar W. McInnis, The Unguarded Frontier: A History of American-Canadian Relations
(New York, 1942), 344-45; The Diplomats, ed. Craig and Gilbert. 38-39.
81 Gwendolen M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and Iraernational Security: The Role
of the Dominions, 19zg-39 (Toronto, 1947), 118-23; Richard W. Lyman, The First Labour
Government, 1924 (London, 1957[?]), 176-79. Lyman states tb t since even the Labour cabinet
of Ramsay MacDonald was divided about the merits of the Proto?o], one cannot assume that the
Labour government would have ratified it. The view that the United States figured importantly
in the British decision is presented by Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., Organizing
for Peace (Boston, 1954), 126.
22 Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore, Md., 1954),
34; W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France, and the German Problem, 1918-39 (London, 1943),
213-14.
33 FR, 1925, I, 20-21. Coolidge said much the same thing its a May press conference. New
York Times, May 27, 1925.
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 903
his government did not consider the Protocol dead and, in view of the
German threat, believed disarmament impractical at that time 34 And the
next month Ambassador Howard at the request of Chamberlain raised the
question of an American statement against the Protocol in order to influence
the coming September meeting of the sixth League Assembly 86
Secretary Kellogg was sufficiently concerned by these signs of life in the
Protocol to ask the opinion of Senator Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin, a mem-
ber of the Foreign Relations Committee38 The Senator advised that the
United States should not adhere to the Protocol, but that if it did not, the
Protocol's claim of jurisdiction over nonmembers would nonetheless be a
threat. An American refusal to submit a dispute to the League would create
a presumption of guilt. The League would have the legal right, therefore,
to coerce the United States for any action legitimately taken under the Roose-
velt Corollary as, for example, the Haitian intervention of rg14. "This is a
very serious situation," wrote Lenroot, "for ... the Protocol places in very
great jeopardy the Monroe Doctrine." Ambassador Fletcher meantime
argued convincingly to Kellogg and Coolidge that the European states might
put the Protocol into force without Great Britain 37 Kellogg had hoped, as
had Hughes, that the Protocol would fail; not because the United States
could not defend itself, but because he "did not relish the idea of any foreign
country demanding that we arbitrate the question of our control of Haiti,
Santo Domingo, or ... the question of any foreign country attempting to
take possession of the customs of Central American countries in order to
enforce debts, or ... anything pertaining to the Panama Canal."38 President
Coolidge suggested an official pronouncement against the Protocol; the prob-
84 FR, 1925, I, to-1I. Francis P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (2 vols.,
London, 1952), I, 269-70.
8s Memorandum of Kellogg, Apr. 28, 1925, NADF, 511.3B1/344 % . For Kellogg's views
on an American-sponsored disarmament conference and the prospects for the European security
pact see his memorandum of April 30, 1925, ibid., 5oo.A12/59a. David Bryn-Jones states in his
Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New York, 1937) that the American attitude had no influ-
ence on British policy and that Chamberlain's approach to the then Ambassador Kellogg in
February, 1925' was based on a desire to shift: the blame for the failure of the Protocol to the
United States. Although the February approach cannot be so lightly dismissed, Bryn-Jones's
statement seems to describe accurately the April appeal to Secretary Kellogg. By April, Britain
had publicly committed herself to an anti-Protocol policy.
B6The covering letter is dated May 15, 1925, NADF, 511.3B1/3451%. Lenroot regarded
the Protocol as "an alliance to preserve the status quo." This alliance could be directed against
the United States, and under the terms of the Protocol and the Covenant (Article XXI) the
Monroe Doctrine would be subject to interpretation by the World Court, the League, or arbi-
trators. This seems to be the only reference to Article XXI, the Covenant's ambiguous state-
ment about the Monroe Doctrine, in the official United States papers relating to the Protocol.
87 Fletcher to Kellogg, May 19, 1925, NADF, 840.00/21. A letter of Fletcher to Kellogg,
June 5, 1925, which I have not found, is mentioned in Kellogg to Hughes, June 19, 1925, Kel-
logg Papers.
88 Kellogg to Fletcher, June I I, 1925, ibid.
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904 David D. Burks
lem was how it should be done. Although Kellogg prepared an address that
mentioned the Protocol, Hughes's objections led him to hesitate.39
Coolidge finally spoke out on July 3, at Cambridge, Massachusetts. But
instead of condemning the Protocol he praised the Locarno negotiations4?
Obviously Kellogg had now realized the desirability of encouraging a re-
gional pact to replace the Protocol, as well as to promote European stability.
In contrast to the cool response he received in March, the German ambas-
sador was now cordially encouraged by the Department of State when he
called to express appreciation for the Cambridge spi-ech, which, he said, had
been perfectly timed since it had assured Germany, France, and England of
American interest. William R. Castle, head of the Division of Western Euro-
pean Affairs, urged the Germans to be conciliatory in negotiating with the
French, and suggested that they would lose world support if they quibbled
over French demands 41
Then, on July 30, Castle publicly reiterated American approval by saying
that although the United States was not abandoning its policy of noninter-
ference in European political affairs, it hoped "for they success of the European
Security Pact."42 After the Locarno conference Coolidge himself expressed
satisfaction with the resulting treaties,43 while Kellogg informed the Danish
and Italian ambassadors of American approval .4" In his message to Congress
on December 8 President Coolidge stated:
The Locarno agreements were made by the European countries directly in-
terested without any formal intervention of America. We have consistently
refrained from intervening except when our help has been sought and we have
felt it could be effectively given, as in the settlement of reparations and the Lon-
don conference. The recent Locarno agreements represent the success of the
39 "Some time ago the President suggested to me the advisability of making a pronounce-
ment against the Geneva Protocol and asked me how it could best be done." Kellogg to Hughes,
June 1g, 1925, ibid. Kellogg was also concerned that the Protocol might affect the chances for
Senate approval of American membership in the World Court, a step that the administration
had requested in 1923. Although I have not found Hughes's answer to Kellogg's letter of June
19, 1925, his general attitude in the discussions with Howard in January, 1925, and his earlier
advice to Coolidge as reported in this letter, indicate that he advised Kellogg against a forth-
right public statement of objections against the Protocol.
40 This speech is in the New York Times, July 4, 1925. Coolie;e said, "If the People of the
Old World are mutually distrustful of each other let them enter into mutual covenants for their
mutual security, and when such covenants have been made let them be solemnly observed no
matter what the sacrifice." Edwin L. James wrote in the New York Times that Coolidge was
keeping in close touch with the developments in the Locarno negotiations and that he had done
much to influence both France and Germany to agree. July 20, 1925.
41 NADF, 793.00/87.
42 New York Times, July 31, 1925. I have not found Kellogg's letter of August 4 to
Coolidge at Swampscott, Massachusetts, but have seen the latter's answering letter of August 6
in which he agreed that a statement on the Protocol was not desirable. A statement directly
mentioning the Protocol was apparently under consideration.
43 He said that Locarno was a "real achievement." New York Times, Oct. 17, 1925.
44DeC. 3, 1925, NADF, 5oo.A52/91.
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United States and the Geneva Protocol 905
policy which we have been insisting ought to be adopted, of having the European
countries settle their own political problems without involving this country 45
He added that the United States was gratified by this regional approach,
which promised substantial benefits to the world.
The failure of the Protocol prevented the disarmament conference from
being held in June, 1925, until after Locarno. Late in 1925 the League took a
new tack when it created a preparatory commission for the disarmament
conference and included the United States as a member.4 Much disturbed
by American policy on the Protocol, Eduard Benegs, conferring with Lewis
Einstein, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, in February, 1926, pre-
dicted failure for the preparatory commission because of American partici-
pation. France, he reported, insisted on including naval disarmament on the
agenda, and Britain agreed to this only on condition of American member-
ship. Benes believed that the Protocol's failure had not broken the intimate
relationship of disarmament and universal security. With some bitterness he
said that the guaranteeing of no more than regional security at Locarno
meant that disarmament was now an "essentially European question," or, in
other words, impossible 47
The unwillingness of Hughes and Kellogg to accept a disarmament effort
based on general security agreements had helped prevent any disarmament.
Had the Americans not opposed the Protocol-ratification of it was of course
a political impossibility-they would have forced the Baldwin cabinet to
consider more seriously amendment instead of rejection. Chamberlain could
only feel gratified at American disapproval of the Protocol; British distrust
of the League and American isolationism were walking hand in hand 48
Washington, D. C.
45 FR, 1925, II, xii-xiii, has the complete speech. Alanson B. Houghton, ambassador to
Great Britain, suggested this statement as a way to check European attempts to limit American
influence and also to quiet criticism. at home. Houghton to Kellogg, Oct. 27, 1925, NADF,
5oo.A12/75. The failure to invite the United States to the Locarno conference produced some
newspaper criticism.
46 Walters, History of the League, I, 360-61.
47 Einstein to Kellogg, Feb. 22, 1926, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress. This
letter was passed on to the President.
48 Houghton believed that the success of Locarno forbade the United States from bringing
a land disarmament conference (in which the United States was little interested) but not a
naval disarmament conference to Washington (Houghton to Kellogg, Oct. 24, 1925, FR, 1925,
I, 15). James T. Shotwell suggested in 1925 that the United States might declare its policy to be
governed by principles identical with those of the Protocol, in order that the rest of the world
could build a security system with some degree of confidence. International Conciliation, no.
208, Plans and Protocols to End War: Historical Outline and Guide by James T. Shotwell
(New York, Mar., 1925), 104.
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