OUTLINE OF ONE MEMO OF 9 NOVEMBER: 'THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY (THROUGH 1955)'
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020004-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 7, 1998
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 12, 1953
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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SECURITY INFORMATION
t ,~l
Outline of ONE memo of 9 November :
"THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK
IN ITALY (through 1955)"
Impact of Trieste. Developments on Pella
Governmen
A. Owing to center parties' weakened con-
dition since the June elections, Pella's
government is avowedly "transitional"
and was to have expired on 31 October.
Pella has sought a political victory on
Trieste to strengthen his position.
B. Minimum Italy would probably accept at
any Five Power conference would be re-
turn of bulk of Zone A. Concessions
Italy would probably make to Yugoslavia
include:
(1)
Exchange of some predominantly
Slovene areas on edge of Zone A
for comparable cessions in Zone
B
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but Italy would not cede port of
Zaule (Servola), except possibly
for major concessions in Zone B.
(2) Extensive port and access rights in
Trieste city, and mutual minority
guarantees.
(3) Demilitarization of both zones.
C. Early solution on these lines would al-
most certainly keep Pella,in power, but
only if Italian public considered it as
satisfactory as the 8 October declara-
tion.
D. Pella's fall on Trieste issue would fur-
thur strengthen left and right extremes
at expense of center.
II. Longer Term Outlook
A. Even if Pella survives on Trieste issue,
political instability will continue and
present government will probably not sur-
vive next two years.
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(1) Popular demands for social and
economic change are growing with
major strikes possible.
(2) Monarchists, now supporting Pella
cabinet, will eventually insist
on participation in it.
B. Communist accession to power in next
two years not likely
(1) Italian security forces could and
(2)
C. Any
and
would suppress any attempted coup.
Elections not scheduled before 1958
coalition between Nenni's Socialists
center parties unlikely in this per-
iod because of. deep differences between
him and Christian Democrats.
D. Most likely successor to Pella would be
center or center-right government, pro-
bably involving continued Monarchist
support.
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(1) Differences between Monarchists and
reformist Christian Democrats pro-
bably easier to-reconcile than those
between Christian Democrats and
Nenni's Socialists.
(2) Monarchists, though eventually de-
manding inclusion in government,
are not likely to demand vote on
restoration of Monarchy as price of
their participation.
E. A moderate rightist government might
eventually become more authoritarian in
methods, but a right dictatorship is
highly unlikely in next two years, since
support of moderate groups would still
be essential.
III. Implications of Fall of Pella Government
A. if Pella fell on Trieste issue, any new
government would be more nationalistic
and less disposed to cooperate with the
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(1) Domestic support for Italy's NATO
effort would be greatly weakened.
(2) Prospects for Italian EDC ratifica-_
tion would be diminished.
B. Rightist governments might be less able
to cope with Italy's social and economic
ills, thus enhancing popular appeal of
Social-Communists.
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