AMERICAN MERCURY TO BEAR WITNESS TO THE TRUTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002600080065-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 166
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: March 1, 1960
• Content Type: BOOK

7
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Twining and DeGaulle .......... Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby 3 '
Business Is Deserting America ............................ Ralph Nader 25
Payola ......................................................................................................Shields ReMine 30
An Indefensible Verdict .............................................Herbert W. Stanley 43
WE GAVE IT To THEM ................................................Harold Lord Varney 47
First Ladies of the Ballot Box ........................Alice Downey Nelson 57
"Mental Health" and the W.H.O ......................................................................... 59
The Riches of Memory ...........................................................................J. R. Hill 64
Life Atop Mount Washington ...................................................Len Corlin 65
Academic Freedom ...............................................................Elizabeth Staples 69
"The Day of Infamy" ................................................Rev. Richard Ginder 72
WAS IT SUICIDE? ..............................................................................Louise Horton 76
On the Next Page ...............................................................N. St. Barbe Sladen 83
St. Louis Defeats Metro Plan ...................................................Jo Hindman 85
IN THE MERCURY'S OPINION ..........................................Russell Maguire 91
Rothschilds and Rockefellers, Part II ............................................................... 93
Have You a Bird-Like Appetite? .......................................Dana Stanton 95
An Appeal to the Free World .........The Grand Duke Wladimir 96
MERCURY WARNED YOU ............................. ....................................................... _.......... 104
The Surprising Case of the I.L.O ................William L. McGrath 107
Tax Foundation, Inc., Study Urges Rate Revision .............................. 114
Our Military Position .....................................................................An Editorial 115
A Blessed Event for the Planet Earth .....................L. M. Hasbrouck 117
Cutting Passport "Red Tape" for Red Spies ..................John Lines 121
The Last Flight ....................................................................................Polly Sheldon 124
What You Should Know About Birthmarks Leo Rosenhouse 125
Teen-Age Patriots ..............................................................................Pat Beardslee 129
Textile Troubles ...........................................................................Stephen Paulsen 131
Human Mole .....................................................................Lorena Ann Olmsted 137
Meet the Pallygators ................. _........................ ............................. Tom Roberts 141
What's Going On Here? ...............................................................E. A. Jaksha 143
Where Are the Skywriters? ..........................................Frank P. Thomas 149
Mercury Memos ? 2 Facetiae ? 29 Four Corners, USA ? 82
Bookshelf ? 155 ~wMercury Forum ? 158
e 200 /01/29?:?CIA-RDP80B016 6R0026~ b80065-}35
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A M E R I C A N
MEICURy
TO BEAR WITNESS TO THE TRUTH
MARCH 1960 VOLUME XC NO. 434
Chairman of the Board
RUSSELL MAGUIRE
Business Manager
LESLIE J. YARBROUGH
Managing Editor
MAURINE HALLIBURTON
Political Editor West Coast Editor Roving Editor
HAROLD LORD VARNEY Jo HINDMAN EUGENE W. CASTLE
Military Editor
MAJ. GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY
Associate Editors
SHIELDS REMINE JOANN OYAAS
Editorial Assistants
MAGDALENA SMITH PHYLLIS VAN AUKEN
Production -Manager Circulation Director
JOHN J. SHEAHAN ALMA E. DREWES
Contributors
HILARY GREY, CHARLES C. TAN SILL, ILANON MOON, ROBERT J. ALLEN, KEN KLU HERZ,
HARLEY F. COPE, WHEELER WILLIAMS, A. W. PRITCHARD, EMMETT J. CULLIGAN,
JUSTIN F. DENZEL, LEOPOLD BRAUN, MARTHA OSBORN, JOHN BENEDICT, J. A. LOVELL,
L. M. HASBROUCx, A. W. BRUSTAT, CHARLES H. COLEMAN, EDWARD BERGSTROM,
CLAUDE BUNZEL, EDWARD F. HUTTON, JACK KEMMERER, HILAIRE Du BERRIER,
JOHN SIKORA, NELL W. EVANS, MAURICE LEAHY, EDWARD JANISCH, PAUL BROCK
Published monthly by the American Mercury Magazine, Inc. at 35 cents a copy.
Annual subscription $4.00 in U. S. and possessions; $4.50 in Canada; $5.00 in all
other countries. Printed in the U.S.A. Entered as second-class postage, paid at New
York, New York. Additional entry St. Louis, Missouri, ? Copyright 1960 by American
Mercury Magazine, Inc. All rights reserved. Protected under International Copyright
Convention and the Pan American Copyright Convention. No articles may be reprinted
in whole or in part without written permission. Not responsible for the return of
unsolicited manuscripts.
Publication, Editorial and General Offices, 250 West 57th Street, New York 19, N. Y.
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WILLOUGHBY'S military evalua-
A
C
.
HARLES
MAJ. GENERAL
tieth Century ailments center this month on
f en
lle
-
d De
".,...
\r-o-
., ,
4i 1 wining an
NATO contretemps last December. Willoughby's distin-
guished, world-wide military career has frequently found
such perceptive voice. From 1939 to 1951 he was General
Douglas MacArthur's chief of intelligence. He built the defense and sup-
ply installations on Bataan and Corregidor that enabled MacArthur's men
to maintain their heroic, protracted stand. In March, 1942, Willoughby
was one of the few key officers to accompany MacArthur's dramatic
breakthrough to Australia. Extraordinary service in all MacArthur's
campaigns from Papua to the Phillipine liberation earned Willoughby
numerous decorations, including the Silver Star, the Distinguished
Service Cross and the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf
Cluster. Responsible for peace-time counter-intelligence in Tokyo,
Willoughby concerned himself with Soviet directed international Com-
munism in Asia and espionage in Japan. He uncloaked Richard Sorge,
Press Attache in the German Embassy in Tokyo, who was actually a
Soviet master spy with links in Shanghai to powerful Japanese and
American communist collaborators. To spread Soviet domination, Sorge
and his cohorts had motivated the necessary collision of Japan and the
United States at Pearl Harbor. General Willoughby, as a military chief
and author of many standard military works, filed his personal knowledge
(over a million words) of the Sorge conspiracy with Washington security
agencies and certain Congressional committees under the title "A
Partial Documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case". As the author
of popular books and magazine articles, he published a concentrated
look at Sorge call "Shanghai Conspiracy" (E.P. Dutton, 1952).
LOUISE HORTON has long been a member of New York's anti-Com-
munist Oriel Society. She is one of the few journalists Povl Bang-Jensen
ever permitted an interview, mostly because the Society's president, Dr.
Maurice Leahy, was one of his few supporters; the Society itself was
the only forum Bang-Jensen ever trusted enough to tell completely his
side of his bitter, controversial battle with the United Nations over the
release of names of Hungarian anti-Communist, anti-Soviet informers.
Mr. Bang-Jensen is dead, mysteriously; Miss Horton, on page 76,
asks Was It Suicide?
2
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A M E R I C A N
C'i;.esa, Zmi O7 o X957
by Major General Charles A. Willoughby
V%k CURY MARCH 1960
MER
r
The voice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
M URDER WILL OUT, they say,
but it took ten years to come
out into, the open in the case of
the moribund N o r t h Atlantic
Treaty Organization, that cello-
phane facade of the West, which
is mortally vulnerable along the
line from Denmark to Switzer-
land, and which the Russians have
chosen to challenge at its most
sensitive point: Berlin.
Newspaper headlines screamed
the "secret" details of a blunt
critique of France by General Na-
than F. Twining, chairman of the
American Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), during an almost routine
annual meeting of the NATO
Military Committee in Paris on
December 10, 1959. Names are
incidental; instead of Twining and
General Charles de Gaulle, it could
have been Gruenther or Ridgeway
in opposition to Mendes-France or
Auriol or Coty-or any of the top
commanders of that slowly decay-
ing political make-shift, NATO, in
the period 1949-1959.
The situation leading to Twin-
ing's explosive declaration has been
known to the cognoscenti for many
years-a festering sore that had to
erupt sooner or later. The astound-
ing feature is that the actual colli-
sion was so long in the making.
The timing was odd, unless one
assumed that this was an official
Washington demarche, i. e., diplo-
matic gobbledegook for an embar-
rassing change of pace. Twining
was obviously not talking on his
own. His position as chairman of
the JCS was too vulnerable to
take any departmental risks. Be-
sides, our generals in cushy sine-
cures, have been prudently silent
on similar occasions since MacAr-
thur was fired.
3
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THE AMERICAN MERCURY
of France or de
The selection
as the whipping
Gaulle .(or both)
incidental. It could
boy is purely
have been pr
members of N
and the "sword,"
i. e., the Armies,
Force, delivering the
i. e., the Air
deterrent, thread-
massive, nuclear
bare cliches t
NATO-the "shield," that were dead fromlegal cover. A uni-
that British spy Dr.
the moment
started to transmit
Klaus Fuchs
to his masters in
atomic secrets
though our own
the Kremlin,
did almost as much
Harry Hopkins
damage under
of negligence and
form degree
to all of the
apathy is chargeable
NATO partners
Span-
certainly the
Germans and
iards. The at
form attitude towards Spain, 1939), is highly sug-
lone victor a
battle (1936-
gestive of N
tech-
NATO by the
is kept out of
Den-
of Iceland, Den-
nical opposition
gestive NATO practices. Spain Norway whose NATO's military each, while Spain can
contri-
mark and N
effec-
butions to N
negligible, about half
tiveness are
a division e
(and does)
con-
highest NATO
one of the
tingents.
G with Mendes-France,
B EGINNING
orpedoed EDC-the
t
of NATO, the French
forerunner o
conspicuous and have
have become
toward the
moved headlong
Gaulle collision in a
Twining-de
set of circumstances.
very special
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The motivation is not quite clear.
De Gaulle is known to be temper-
mental and a highly complex per-
sonality. He was kicked around,
humiliated and mercilessly chivvied
by a pair of sadistical experts,
Roosevelt and Churchill, in 1942,
and de Gaulle has a long memory.
The abortive expedition in the
Egyptian crisis did not help any,
though the Israeli had already won
the campaign hands, down and
could have seized the Suez Canal
without French or British assist-
ance. Washington stepped in in a
way which tended to destroy every
vestige of future Western con-
fidence-though it is rumored that
it was due to Soviet nuclear
threats (could this be a grim fore-
cast of more blackmail to come?).
The State Department, which has
positive genius for saying the right
things at the wrong time, had a
hand in Twining's disclosure. A
showdown with de Gaulle was
anti-climactic while Ike was smiling
his way around half the globe,
charming totally ineffective neut-
ralists (who are neither on the side
of the Lord, nor will furnish the
last battalions) .
The immediate cause of the
smouldering conflict w a s de
Gaulle's intransigeance in refusing
the stock piling of nuclear weapons
on American bases in France unless
France shared -control. This
position obviously tended to emas-
culate a Western fetish, "the mas-
 The advent of the Sputnik forced our laggard or prudently silent intelligence
services to admit that the Soviets have a growing arsenal of missiles of variable
ranges: IRBM, 1,500 miles, to the ICBM, 5,000 miles.
The location of missile launching sites was reluctantly revealed. They are
principally in Soviet military enclaves in the former Baltic States, in Communist
East Germany, in the Konigsberg area and in Czechoslovakia--the most rabidly
Communistic satellite between the Oder and the Yalu. This Czech salient juts
deeply into the Allied defense areas in West Germany. Red short-range missiles
of 300 to 600 miles blanket American bases, airfields and garrisons along the
Rhine. As early as 1957, the map locations of Soviet missile sites in the
Czechoslovakin salient were reported by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby; the
source: a formidable refuge underground organization.
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6 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
?
sive nuclear deterrent," hard core
of American strategic defense with
a retaliation potential. The im-
mediately damaging effect of this
position was to compel the transfer
of important American air units
from French fields to forward Ger-
man airdomes, already congested
to the bursting point and thus
vulnerable to interdiction by Czech
nuclear missions.
While the forward displacement
of American air units, under com-
pulsion, into the effective range of
hostile intermediate ballistic mis-
siles is a military monstrosity, in-
compatible with our mutual secur-
ity formula, there were other
equally serious elements in the
deterioriating NATO situation
which were not exclusively charge-
able to the French but which were
symptomatic of a general break-
down of the West. (See Plate No.
3: "The Decline in Western Arma-
ments.") The evolution of a sort
of creeping apathy is evident in a
persistent failure to recognize and
admit the steadily growing Soviet
menace in every military category.
A sober study of cause and effect,
however, does not single out France
as a principal offender but rather
defines the collective historical re-
sponsibility of all NATO members,
viz.:
1. Panicky demobilization of the
West in 1945.
2. Conversely, USSR's continued
arming to the teeth.
3. Failure of the West to respond
with even peacetime armaments,
equivalent to an average prewar
year (1928).
4. Fatuous reliance on the exclu-
sive possession of atomic secrets, the
atom bomb, the "massive nuclear
deterrent."
5. Official silence on the "weak-
ening shield" of NATO.
6. Failure to evaluate the Soviet
missile program.
7. The cumulative impact of
these errors have seriously endan-
gered the West.
T FIE TWINING-DE GAULLE Cm-
broglio was unavoidable (un-
less the affair was covered up as
in the past). It could have hap-
pened any time since 1949. The
NATO pot has been boiling stead-
ily ; at any given point of pressure,
the lid might have blown off.
Actually, it tilted dangerously in
1957, at the annual NATO meet-
ing in Paris. Trouble was brewing
noisily then, but our captive press
soft-pedalled the issue and the
"authorities" passed the word not
to rock the boat. The mid-Novem-
ber (1957) report of the NATO
Parliamentary Group was a re-
bellious, cynical minority report by
deeply worried people who were
too honest to remain silent, the
Hon. Arthur Gilson, a former
chairman, and Dutch General R.
H. Calmeyer, both Benelux dele-
gates. The report was newsworthy
in that it was strictly official,
coming from within the bosom of
the NATO family and that it
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0 u n
deceptive silence about NATO's
obvious military failings. The
scathing Gilson-Calmeyer report
was overshadowed by the drama
and glitter of the main conference,
but it furnished a revealing clue
to West-European thinking and
intentions. Some highly suggestive
incidents could not be shrugged
away; the French delegates walked
out in protest against British-
American arms deliveries to Tu-
nisia. The Tunisian interlude,
while on a comparatively small-
TWINING AND DE GAULLE
r
pro-
fessional was fed up with playing
o
second fiddle to juniors in rank
and experience. These were the
straws in the wind to gauge the
temper of our restless Allies.
The Gilson-Calmeyer report
(forerunner of Twining's position)
listed certain "areas of urgency"
calling for positive action, viz.:
The Soviet threat cannot be met
simply by means of the atomic
bomb. (Europe has no faith in
the massive deterrent alone.)
Continental members of NATO
do not feel adequately protected by
nuclear weapons U. e., such weapons
were never completely available to
them)....
Atomic weapons call for a re-
organization of ground forces (i. e.,
they charge General Lauris Norstad
with inadequate guidance).
NATO ground forces are suffer-
ing a steady disintegration which
must be arrested (i. e., the "shield"
is too weak and requires additional
ready divisions). . .
scale, retained all the venomous
flavor of our Suez Canal inter- I N COMPARISON, the subsequent
Communique listed 36 subpara-
vention-that lethal blow to part- graphs that required further spade-
nership from which the West work. Most of them lacked irn-
evidentally never recovered and mediacy. There was a vague pat-
which explains, in part, de Gaulle's tern of coordination but no prior-
attitudes. At this delicate point in ities of execution. Totally lacking
1957, Field Marshal Montgomery was a nuance of survival implicit
filed notice of resignation as in the Russian threat of missile
NATO Deputy Chief. Perhaps warfare. There was a lukewarm
this reflected Britain's announced agreement with the basic Gilson-
policy of gradual withdrawal from Calmeyer points, viz.:
Europe, unquestionably engendered
by the deep (10) The most modern weapons
humiliation of the are being introduced in the Soviet
Suez affair e
h
armed forces... .
(19) We have no alternative but
to develop the most effective NATO
strength, taking into account the
most recent developments in weap-
ons....
(20) Establish stocks of nuclear
warheads (and make available) in-
termediate range ballistic misiles....
(22) G r e a t e r efficiency for
NATO through standardization and
integration in all fields.
NATO meetings in 1957 defined
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 9
.a, to
1957 was a year of shattered illusions. The advent of Sputnik to support
the USSR's claims to advanced types of medium- and long-range missiles
marked the gradual shift of strategic balance in favor of the Kremlin.
The Soviet lead in conventional armies, in the crucial Mid-European sector
was well established; it had never been challenged. In the missile race, the
Allies lost strategic decisions: The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (under
pressure of ambitious and powerful air interests) gambled on the "massive
deterrently air" (airborne bomb delivery) while the Soviet General Staff
gambled on the "equally massive deterrent by missiles" and gained a dangerous
advantage of two to four years-the missile gap, 1958-1962.
In a decision to recover strategic balance, the British proposed a reduction
of their normal military forces to stake their defenses on the missile, i.e.,
retaliatory nuclear fire. The map shows flight ranges and/or radii of missiles
from British bases.
The picture is wholly deceptive. There are not enough missiles and not
enough bases-and all of them vulnerable. The Soviets are now in a position
to execute retaliatory fire. The best to be hoped for is an indefinite and
precarious "balance of nuclear terror."
and accepted general requirements
which the French have seen fit to
refuse in 1959. Twining's main
criticisms were already anticipated.
From the American viewpoint,
then and now, the placing of inter-
mediate range missiles on forward
European bases was a deadly
"must" item. The relative fiction
of the airborne massive deterrent,
stubbornly maintained by the Air
Force, became a nuclear stalemate
from the moment the Russians got
their hands on the American atom
bomb via British-Canadian es-
pionage.
In the formative period, U. S.
industrial centers were difficult to
reach by Soviet bombers; a sub-
stantial proportion of industrial
capacity was expected to survive.
With brilliant understanding of
military values, the Soviets con-
centrated on missilry, i. e., the re-
finement of Hitler's V-bomb. The
purpose was eventually to get at
the U. S. with intercontinental
missiles of 5,000 mile ranges.
Europe could be taken care of with
huge conventional armies (already
in being). By the same token,
however, American mid-range
missiles of 1,500 mile ranges on
European launching sites could
threaten the Soviet industrial com-
plex to the same degree that the
Soviet intercontinental m o d e l
threatened corresponding Ameri-
can installations. Thus, the East-
West has been heading toward a
missile stalemate, to be sure, but
just as workable as the Air Force
deterrent stalemate today. The
simplified formula was: European
bases plus intermediate range
missiles equal Soviet intercontinen-
tal missiles directed primarily at
the U. S.
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.c
U NFORTUNATELY, several
NATO members. notably
Denmark and Norway (rescued by
the U. S. during the late war),
turned "lukewarm," obviously
frightened by Soviet retaliatory
threats (blackmail) and obviously
unaware that the only alternative
was unconditional surrender. This
reaction was forecast by gossip
along Embassy Row in Washing-
ton in a remark attributed to a
military attache of "one of the
Scandinavian countries." He said,
"Well, the trajectories of the inter-
continental missiles will pass over
our heads, anyway." This was a
rather silly conclusion, since the
Soviets also possess missiles of lesser
ranges, 350 to 700 miles, that could
reach northern targets from Narvik
to Denmark and other NATO
establishments from Brussels to
Rome.
The U. S. (i. e., the military and
executive experts) gambled on the
massive deterrent by air and lost
valuable time, while the Soviets
gambled on an equally valid deter-
rent by missiles and gained a tran-
sient but very real advantage. This
is what is meant by the missile gap,
i. e., the time lag between Soviet
and American efforts in the same
area. This evolution of a nuclear
race and a possible nuclear stale-
mate (provided the Kremlin gives
us time) lends renewed emphasis
to conventional armies, i. e., the
number of ready divisions. General
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Calmeyer, who in 1957 preceded
Twining in soul searching, flatly
admits "a steady disintegration" of
NATO ground forces. This de-
ficiency was recognized for years-
but it was never stressed and
nothing was done about it.
In 1949, NATO commanders
requested 90 divisions which was
a peacetime standard for the year
1928 (or any year in that era).
This normal figure was scaled
down successively to 60 divisions
(1952), then 45 divisions (1955),
although the Soviet menace in-
creased immeasurably in the mean-
time. General Norstad recently de-
manded as an irreducible minimum
30 divisions-an aviator's estimate,
naturally. None of these elastic
requirements were ever met-ex-
cept on paper. NATO has re-
mained static and weak (15/20
divisions), for ten years. Calmeyer's
complaint that NATO ground
forces are disintegrating is an im-
plied acknowledgement of Europe's
failure or refusal to rearm. To hold
the U. S. responsible, however, is
a piece of Gargantuan effrontery.
The standard argument that
Europe's war-shattered economy
does not permit rearmament is
hypocritical nonsense. Both Russia
and Red China were equally war
shattered, but they made the
grade! Impoverished Spain fought
and won a bitter civil war, en-
gineered and supported by the
Kremlin (1936-1939), but has al-
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 11
ways maintained an Army of 11 mately 100 divisions to a NATO
ready divisions, an index of what total of 21%2 on the front: Den-
can be accomplished on a shoe- mark - Switzerland. Applying the
string. At this date there is no standard of 1928, a normal year,
single member of NATO, except the drop is from 109 to 30, less
Turkey, that equals Spain's nu- Spain. Comparing wartime mobili-
merical contribution. It is the will zations, the discrepancies become
to resist that counts! fantastic.
This shabby, overall postwar
HE EUROPEAN EVASIONS are record (1945-1956) required the
Tlargely based on a political in- outlay of over $50 billion in Ameri-
tramural struggle between "butter can foreign aid. This staggering
and guns." For example, the total represents the value of the
British defense budget runs to combined real estate assessments
about four billion dollars (one- of 50 major American cities: At
tenth the average annual military least half of this mammoth sum
expenditure of the U. S.), but is was alloted to military expendi-
offset by calculated welfare state tures abroad-defense require-
spending in the same amount. Free ments, mutual aid, mutual secur-
glasses and dentures will not stop ity and other dishonest cliches de-
the Cossacks on the move! signed to sugarcoat a bitter tax
The West, in the decade follow- bill. The sequence of Plates 3, 4 and
ing Hiroshima, indulged in years 5 lists the details of these trans-
of careless, somnolent illusions. actions from 1945 to 1956; records
Seemingly secure behind t h e since 1956 are in arrears about two
"shield of a massive deterrent," years and are neither easy to obtain
only a minimum of defensive, con- nor easy to analyze; however, over-
ventional armament was provided all figures are fairly static.
for. While the USSR armed to What are we getting for our
the teeth after 1945, the short- money, in terms of fighting di-
sighted West failed to maintain visions, "ready" divisions when the
even a fraction of the number of chips are down?
ready divisions that was produced If the Mid-European front re-
ll
annua
y in an average peacetime quires 30 divisions (I consider the
year. The absolute decline in estimate too low), they must be
Western armament is shockingly furnished by local conscripts.
apparent in the record of the Mid- There are not enough American
European nations that are man- draftees (conscripts) for further
ning the "shield." They dropped commitments abroad. Calmeyer's
from a pre-war total of approxi- plaintive protest,,that "European
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THE AMERICAN MERCURY
r
(NATO) members do not feel
adequately protected" could easily
be remedied if Europe were to
make at least one-third the mobili-
zation effort it has made habitually
in peacetime (1928) and without
foreign aid. Indeed, plaintive
Europe has not even tapped a con-
siderable manpower reserve of over
10,000,000 refugees (expellees)
from behind the Iron Curtain.
Five per cent of that available
total would give Norstad all the
divisions that he wants, not to
PLATE No. 3
The Decline in Western (NATO) Armaments
Ready Divisions from 1914-1959
Ref.
Country
WW I WWII 1928
1957
1959
Percentage
1
Benelux
18
22
17
4.5
5
4.5
5
50%
2
United States
34
79
12
0%
3
United Kingdom
89
49
23
4.5
4
2
4
France
118
90
30
5
2
70%
5
Germany
228
190
10
3
7
28%
6
Italy
45
50
28
8
8
100%
7
Spain
25
25
11
11
11
Russia
225
225
- 175
175
-
Compared with the output in the 1928 column, the percentage performance
for 1959 (last column) is totally inadequate and formed the basis for General
Calmeyer's (1957) and General Twining's (1959) protests.
1) Benelux was overrun twice in World Wars I and II.
2) The U. S. has always had a modest peace establishment; the comparative
percentage is thus not entirely valid. Our "stake" in West Europe is arguable.
Europe should be defended by Europeans.
3) Britain plans to withdraw partially (and may still do so). The debacle
of Suez showed that she is not prepared for overseas expeditions.
4) France, expected to furnish 12 divisisons for NATO, has withdrawn
the bulk of her troops for employment in Algiers. European mobilization of
reserves is normally fast, but will be delayed by nuclear attacks and serious
damage to communications.
5) Germany will arm to 12 divisions by 1961. She thus becomes one of
the mainstays of the NATO ensemble in Mid-Europe. In recognition, German
General H. Speidel has been designated commander in chief, Land-Cent (and
actually commands American forces). Germany is extremely vulnerable to
missile fire from East German and Czech bases.
6) The Italians can hardly intervene along the Rhine, along the crucial
NATO front. (Denmark-Berlin-Switzerland). They will have their hands full
facing unreliable Communist Yugoslavia.
7) Spain is not yet a full member of NATO. Her troops are available
and vital naval and air bases are located in her territories.
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TWINING AND DE GAU~,LE 13
PLATE No. 4
Foreign Aid Comparative Tables: NATO and the Far East
Unit Cost of Ready Divisions (in Millions) 1945-1956
Table I. NATO: Denmark-Switzerland
Aid Unit Cost Aid Unit Cost
Country Divs. 1945-1956 per Div. 1956-1957 per Div.
Germany ........................ 3 3,800 1,250 43 14
France ............................ 2 4,300 1,075 215 54
United Kingdom........... 4.5 3,700 820 41 9
Benelux ........................... 4.5 1,500 330 5 1
Denmark ........................ 1 247 247 94 95
Aggregate ............... 15 13,547 903 398 26
The crucial front (Denmark-Switzerland) has produced only 15 divisions,
exclusive of the American contingent of five divisions. Roughly $13 billion
were poured into that area in the period 1945-1956.
The cumulative average or unit-cost per ready division in that same period
is consequently $903 million. By comparison, the cumulative average for 1956-
1957 has shrunk to approximately one-third the ten-year average, i.e., $398
million, and the "unit cost" per ready division is down to an average of
$26 million.
There are apparently abnormal differences in cost between France and the
United, Kingdom; the dislocation is due to France being almost wholly engaged
in Algiers-a suggestive example of how colonial unrest (agitated by Com-
munism) boomerangs against the West. American funds inferentially pay for
Algerian operations.
Table II. NATO: Southwest Europe
Country Divs.
Italy ................................ 8
Greece ............................. 6
Turkey ............................ 12
Spain ............................... 11
Norway ........................... 1
Aggregate ............... 38
Aid Unit Cost
1945-1956 per Div.
2,600 320
1,700 280
593 49
241 21
236 236
4,370 115
Aid Unit Cost
1956-1957 per Div.
64 8
43 7
86 8
124 11
2 2
317 8
Other areas and components of NATO have operated more economically
than our "principal" Allies. This group furnished 38 divisions, i.e., double
the number on the central European front (Denmark-Switzerland) at about
one-eighth the unit cost per division.
Spain is not. a NATO member but developed 11 divisions.
The very substantial amounts made available to Norway, about the same
as for Spain, have produced only two divisions and an evasive position on
missile sites. Denmark has shown similar reluctance and is generally out of
line in unit costs, past and present.
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14 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
PLATE No. 5
Foreign Aid Comparative Tables: NATO and SEATO
Product and Unit Cost in Ready Divisions (in Millions)
Table III. The Far East and SEATO
Country
Divs.
Aid
1945-1956
Unit Cost
per Div.
Aid Unit Cost
1956-1957 per Div.
Korea ..............................
21
1,800
85
308 14
3
Japan ..............................
6
2,300
390
18
5
3
Formosa ..........................
26
2,300
88
.
97
Philippines ......................
4
788
172
24 6
Viet-Nam ........................
10
570
57
168 16
Aggregate ...............
67
7,758
115
615 9
Comparisons between NATO and SEATO are inescapable. The Far East
is in direct and actively hostile contact with communist forces, as in Korea
and Viet-Nam.
The Far East developed four times (67) the number of ready divisions as
in Central Europe (15 divisions) at half the cumulative average (1945-1956)
and for 1956-1957 at one-third the unit cost per division.
Compared with Table II, "Southwest Europe," the "poor relations of
NATO," the Far East operated at about the same unit cost for 1945-1956.
Viet-Nam and Korea were relatively high, as they were, in direct physical
contact with Communist land armies.
Neutralists or Pro-Communists
Country Divs.
Aid
1945-1956
Unit Cost
per Div.
Aid Unit Cost
1956-1957 per Div.
Czechoslovakia ............... -
188
188
-
188
Indonesia ........................ -
128
128
8
128
India ............................... -
272
272
80
272
Yugoslavia ...................... -
780
780
43
780
Aggregate ............... -
1,368
1,368
131
1,368
Aid to this group is indefensible. The neutralists want to have their
Western cake and eat it, too. There are no tangible military contributions
of any kind. When the necessity came up to fly war materials to Indo-China
in 1948 via Karachi, India refused authority. Krishna Menon, Nehru's-favorite,
is consistently hostile to the West.
Does anyone really believe that Yugoslavia will fight for the West in a
showdown? In the meantime, Yugoslavia received the same amount in aid
as the Philippines, a war-tested Ally, and less than Turkey, a key nation in
the Middle East.
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 15
In dealing with the Communist bloc, we should adopt the historical precedent,
developed by the Soviets in the Spanish Civil War: the formation of "inter-
national brigades." The manpower is available in over 10,000,000 refugees or
expellees, who have a "cause."
mention the morale factor. These
people are anxious to join some
paramilitary formations. They are
politically highly organized, they
have deep personal grievances,
they lost their homes at the point
of Soviet bayonets, they have some-
thing to fight for-a deep emo-
tional urge of cruelty and injustice,
which hardly can be expected
from our young soldiers, from
Atlanta or Birmingham or Seattle,
though they are flung into every
alien rats nest of the globe.
W RILE THE Gilson-Calmeyer-
Twining-de Gaulle collisions
must be viewed as a chain reaction
that began some years ago, the
whole business was essentially
predicated on a military power
balance that has almost imper-
ceptively shifted in direction of the
USSR, a power balance that was
predictable inasmuch as it was in-
herent in Russian history, in the fact
that the Communists took over with
a fanatical nergy, a diplomatic
brilliance and a brutality of force,
never conceived of by the Czars.
Western fellow travellers and
appeasers would like to interpret
this situation in terms of an
ideology, the need for coexistence,
the complacent, evolutionary drift
of the Welfare State (i. e., social-
ism) to the totalitarian Communist
State. This is patently false. While
the Welfare State is softening its
citizens, the Communist State
holds them in the iron grip of
compulsory labor, exclusively orien-
ted toward heavy industries to pro-
duce armaments of every category.
The Soviets have realistically
evaluated history in the twentieth
century as a clash of power politics
"with the Lord on the side of the
strongest battalions." Their first
concern was the creation of for-
midable armies. Their foreign
policy thereafter operated from
strength to weakness. The roots of
Soviet Russia's present power actu-
ally stem from the suicidal "give
aways" of Yalta, Teheran and
Potsdam and "many conferences
of ignoble secrecy," as Senator
Styles Bridges once put it tersely.
Our own political decisions, how-
ever, were obviously not de-
termined by valid military and
geopolitical estimates. The military
have no voice in a government of
civilians or political appointees
who are not schooled in broad in-
ternational thinking but are almost
wholly immersed in their local
politics.
When it became apparent that
megalomaniac p o l i t i c a n s like
Roosevelt and Churchill wandered
off into a surrealist dreamland of
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16 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
coexistence with Stalin, there were
no vehement protests, no urgency
of counsel to protect the future. In
such an impasse, the moral re-
sponsibility for national, military
guidance rests almost exclusively
with the JCS in Washington, the
custodian of Armies, the august
keepers of war and peace. This
potential military brain trust has
come under fire recently, and the
debacle of Berlin has brought them
into sharp public focus and rasping
Congressional inquiries.
A :since $50 billion of foreign aid
since 1945, under the patently
deceptive title of "mutual se-
curity," Congress was shocked by
Eisenhower's bland, official admis-
sion that a "ground war was un-
thinkable," meaning that the 21
Allied divisions along the front
(Denmark - Berlin - Switzerland)
were no match for the 60/70
Soviet and Satellite divisions in the
same general area. Indeed, the
damaging ratio of three to one in
favor of the Soviets is normally
considered sufficient for a "blitz
offensive." The proportional dis-
crepancy in conventional forces
must be a constant temptation for
Russia to cut loose with a "pre-
ventive war." The myopic reliance
of the West on the "massive de-
terrent" is no longer valid since
the Russians have reached parity,
if not better, in nuclear arma-
ments of every category.
The Soviet "Frankenstein" was
in embryo in 1918. The dangerous
evolution of 1945-1950 should have
been anticipated by our military
and political "experts." While the
State Department generally has
predominated in the field of inter-
national policy, forecasts and esti-
mates, an appraisal of possible ac-
tion was also within the purview
of the military, specifically the
General Staff, the Chiefs of Serv-
ices, military attaches abroad and
that distillate of military thinking:
the JCS.
Some notion of the relation be-
tween General Staff efficiency and
foreign policy can be derived from
the record of the German Army in
the period of 1870-1914. With a
total of 25 divisions or 750,000
men (one-third of the American
forces on, global duty - today),
Germany maintained the peace of
Europe for 40 years, the longest
period of peace in modern Euro-
pean history. The British con-
trolled "Entente Cordiale," a
combination of Great Britain,
France and Czarist Russia which
triggered World War I, actually
maintained three times the Ger-
man forces in being. In the period
of 1870-1914, the Germans fol-
lowed ? a fixed, clear-cut military
policy:' the Bismarckian formula of
"Zug urn Zug," a chess term de-
noting that each move of the
pawns be balanced by a compen-
sating counter-move. It was, how-
ever, a policy of triggered military
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TWINING AND E AULLE
readiness essentially for defense, as
demonstrated by the maintenance
of peace in the European cockpit.
It was a policy of equilibrium, a
balance of force, with built-in risks
and penalties for the violators of
this delicate truce.
It is evident in Plates 6 and 7
that the U. S., i. e., the West
(NATO), has no conception of
military balance.
The U. S. has not heretofore
been called upon to develop and
maintain a "triggered readiness."
In 1917 and in 1941, time was
available from six 'months to a
year for American mobilization,
either for a front held by Allied
remnants or in the zone of the
interior for eventual deployment.
We were more than ready in 1945
-but panicky demobilization (the
point system recommended by
civilian experts) dissipated our
forces overnight while Russia re-
mained armed to the teeth! In
the end, this relentless, calculated
superiority in conventional armies
became the trump card the Rus-
sians have been playing effectively
from Potsdam to Geneva. This
Soviet potential should have been
recognized by the JCS, the Na-
tional Security Council and other
policy-making agencies-a litter of
loosely organized groups with civil
echelons predominating-
THE COP-HEAVINESS of the
Washington -defense mech-
anism is evident in the mammoth
size of "Liberty 5-6700," the De-
partment of Defense telephone di-
rectory: 231 pages (9 x 11/2).
Incidentally, the cable circuits and
telephone lines leading from that
sprawling powerhouse are con-
trolled by a communist-infested
union-tell-tale index of the same
security laxity that lost us the
original nuclear formula to a
British-American spy ring,
A random page of the directory
of the Defense Department, the
top military echelon, shows 132
entries; 101 are held by civilians
(previous military service possible
but not known) and only 31 by
officers in various grades. The
ratio is thus three to one in favor
of the civilian element which domi-
nates, controls and ultimately
makes the decisions. One of the
most sensitive sub-divisions is con-
trolled by a chap with war service,
as a reserve officer in relatively
insignificant assignments (though
he was rapidly promoted by a
shrewd superior). The area of his
activities was anywhere from 1,000
to 2,000 miles behind the fighting
front, though it is only fair to say
that he did not seek this volun-
tary safety area. The ex-captain
(reserve) can reflect with some
grim satisfaction that he now has
considerable rank under his
thumb: one major general, two
admirals, five brigadiers and four
colonels.
The impact of the civilian mind
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HE AMERICAN MERCURY
DEMILITARIZED ZONE BLILGANIN'S PLAN I
O NATO DIVISIONS *CZECH DIVISIONS ? SOVIET DIVISIONS
PLATE No. 6
Mid-Europe: Cold War Line-Up
Allied and Soviet satellite troops face each other in the critical Mid-European
area. These are ready divisions, triggered for action-except the American
contingent which is handicapped by women and children, as in Korea, represent-
ing a burden for protection or removal when the shooting starts. The Berlin
sector, an enclave in Red territory, is especially vulnerable.
Note that the Allied divisions are dispersed: Greek or Italian units can
hardly intervene along the Rhine. They will have their hands full along
their own frontiers. As of 1959, the cards are heavily stacked in favor of the
Soviets. The current ratio in strength is one to three against the Allies.
In terms of mutual security, mutual aid, foreign aid (and other dishonest
cliches designed to sugarcoat a bitter tax bill), the expenditure of approximately
$25 billion (military items) in 14 years has only resulted in tactical and
strategical failure, bordering on capitulation: "A ground war is unthinkable...."
The critical front (Denmark-Switzerland) has produced' only 15 to 16
ready divisions, exclusive of the American contingent; this is the Eisenhower-
Gruenther-Norstad "shield" or "trip wire." In comparison, from 1945-1956 the
Far East developed four times the number of ready divisions (67) than Mid-
Europe (16) at half the cumulative cost, and for 1956-1957 at approximately
one-eighth the unit cost per division.
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 19
The Mass
~4_ 1 000 Hi
0 j
Nato Divisions t Ruoao-Sat Division
PLATE No. 7
The Russian Assault on the Front (Denmark-Switzerland)
Overlay to Plate No. 6: "Mid-Europe: Cold War Line-Up"
Plate 7 is a "transparent" placed over a base plate (No. 6: "Mid-Europe:
Cold War Line-Up") in order to simplify details or to emphasize major points-
in this case, the relative strength of the opponents now ranged along the front
(Denmark-Berlin-Switzerland), the vulnerable NATO front. The Russian "ob-
jective" is the penetration of that front. Note the numbers of Allied and
Russian divisions, their groupings for attack and defense.
Once the front-Denmark-Berlin-Switzerland-is pierced, there are no size-
able forces in central France (due to the bulk of first-line French troops
currently employed in Algiers). There is a military vacuum until the line of
the Pyrenees and the fresh divisions of the Spanish Army-the only Army in
Europe that defeated the Kremlin in open battle (1936-1939).. Thus Spain-
maligned, harassed and persecuted by the fellow travelling press of the West-
may yet become the last refuge for the retreating columns of NATO.
From Spain, i.e., the Iberian Peninsula including Portugal, a counter
offensive is eventually possible, following the pattern of the Normandy landing
and paralleling a similar situation in Wellington's campaign and the ultimate
defeat of Napolean I who had overrun Western Europe-just as the Soviet
Russian-Mongoloid hordes may conceivably overrun NATO (Oswald Spengler's
"fading West"). As regards the air factor, the "massive nuclear deterrent" is
approaching parity as between opponents and, in the end, represents a negative
"balance of terror" . . . and who will pick up the pieces?
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(when in authority) on profession- parent that the JCS as a corporate
al, military recommendations is body is not providing the advice
evident in the very significant end- and leadership which the country
requires. "
J_- - _-- . . . . 1II
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine the fall of 1954, the JCS unani-
Corps, the JCS, etc. Of 55 pro- mously agreed that there should be
fessional, technical requests for ac- no range limitations on surface-to-
tion, the civilian Secretary of De- surface missiles employed by the
fense rejected 46 items. Percen- Army in a tactical role. All intelli-
gence indications pointed to the
tagewise, this represents an overall Soviet Army developing long-range
adverse ruling of about 90 per missiles, also. The U. S. Army
cent. The strikes against the mili- then intensified its missile program.
tary are in a depressing ratio of "Since 1951, we had approval
ten to one; this hardly can be for a missile of about 500-mile-
called policymaking-but rather range. In 1956, the JCS reversed
their position and limited the Army
the calculated chicanery of obstruc- range arbitrarily to 200 miles. This
tionism; it would be fair to say was at the time of the Suez Canal
that service rivalry for budget crisis and the USSR Army then
allocations played a role. There is had operational missiles of 750-mile-
expert criticism of the system. range....
"The cost of an operational
General Maxwell Taylor, Army ICBM (intercontinental missile, still
Chief of Staff, who was frequently experimental) is about $18 million.
at the receiving end-about 40 per An IRBM (intermediate-range mis-
cent-has this to say: sile) costs about half, or seven
millions, but a short-range missile
GENERAL TAYLOR: ". . . Budget (Army pattern) costs only about
making controls strategy. The Na- half a million dollars."
tional Security Council, top plan-
ning agency (which feeds on the HROUGH A COMPLETELY arbi-
CIA, top information collecting Ttrary administrative act, the
agency), has failed to develop basic
policies or give clear guidance to Army range of artillery (the mis-
military strategy. The JCS (lack- sile is a form of artillery) was ig-
ing this support) have failed to nored and Army functions and
produce a strategy of their own. missions, inherent in its evolution-
The defense strategy of the U. S.
does not do the job. . . ary history, were casually trans-
"Our weakness is not determining ferred to a fledgling Air Force
standards of sufficiency- how much which generally has not the slight-
is enough for the atomic retalitory est conception of the battlefield but
force. . . . we never look at the thinks largely in terms of strategic
problem horizontally. . . ."
THE HOUSE DEFENSE APPROPRI- attrition. This is one of the rea-
ATIONS COMMITTEE: ". It is ap- sons of Field Marshal Montgom-
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 21
ery's abrupt resignation as NATO
Deputy Chief in 1957.
The present competitive position
between the USSR and the U. S.
(or the West) is in the area of
missilry and it is in this lethal area
that expert military counsel and
anticipation are of the utmost im-
portance. The responsibility rests
with the JCS-though they could
be (and were) overruled by willful
civilian Secretaries of Defense.
In the grim struggle for survival
in the nuclear age, however, the
civilian echelon in our defense
machinery is strictly amateur as
compared with the hard-bitten pro-
fessionals of the Soviet Armies. It
is admitted that there were inter-
mittent flare-ups of so-called "serv-
ice rivalries," i. e., the competition
for Congressional appropriations.
Obviously, it is here that the great-
est impartiality and the finest mili-
tary judgment are required. How-
ever, something vastly more im-
portant is at stake : the evolution
of a military policy in the nuclear
age. We lost the first round-per-
haps the decisive round: the theft
of our atomic secrets through a
British-American-Canadian s p y
ring. There were other damaging
factors. The not-so-naive division
of Germany at Yalta and Potsdam
(engineered by H. Dexter White,
a Soviet secret agent and a con-
fident of Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau) presented the
Communists with German techni-
cal know-how in the submarine
(schnorkel) and rocket (V-2
bomb) fields, from Nordhausen to
Peenemundc; we were lucky in
barely rescuing Wernher von Braun
and General Dornberger's missile
crews. The JCS (and/or the CIA,
OSS, etc.,) could reasonably have
anticipated the trend of Soviet
armaments, a development or
adaptation of Hitler's rockets and
jet-engines and the eventual shift
of emphasis from the manned
bomber to the ballistic missile.
General Gavin has made an ir-
refutable point. These are matters
of military judgment--which is
either correct or at fault. Even
with an official predilection for the
manned bomber (the airborne
massive deterrent), the JCS (or
the civil element in the Pentagon)
ruled against a test employment in
the Korean War, a crucial point
in recent history when the aspira-
tions of Red China to world power
could have been crushed or at
least badly damaged. The absolute
nadir of JCS judgment in that
crisis was manifest in their lusty
support of the humiliating dis-
missal of MacArthur and Bradley's
negative classic about "the wrong
war, at the wrong time and in the
wrong place."
A BRIEF REFLECTION on geopoli-
tics, military distances and the
supply factors would have shown
the idiocy of that position. The
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22 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
PLATE No. 8
The War of Distances
1, Warsaw-Berlin: 400 miles. 2, Moscow-Berlin: 1,200 miles.
3, Moscow-Vladivostok: 10,000 miles.
The "geopolitics" of war or peace are affected by geographical distances.
While modern air transport is a great leveller of distances, "bulk" in men
or materiel cannot be flown economically. This places emphasis on mileage
on the ground. It is still a war of distances for Armies who march on foot
by truck or rails.
In North Korea (1950-1951), the mass of the Red Chinese Armies (75
divisions) advanced from Mukden to Seoul 4/600 miles by night marches, to
attack eight American and 12 Korean divisions in a ratio of one to four.
There was American air interdiction, probably 600 fighter-bombers on a narrow
front of 250 miles, plastering a limited roadnet, but they could not stop the
Chinese hordes though, in fact, they wore then down by attrition of supply.
Elementary military reflection on distances and the inherent supply factor
would deduce that (1) USSR is least vulnerable in Western Europe but
(2) obviously vulnerable in the Far East with a thin rail-line to the White Russian
supply base, the Trans-Baikal railroad of 10,000 miles. Russia should (and
could) have been challenged in the Far East--a recommendation for which
MacArthur was ultimately dismissed.
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TWINING AND DE GAULLE 23
USSR was (and is) most vulner-
able in the Far East with a thin
rail-line of 10,000 miles from its
major European bases. It should
have been challenged and fought
there. Conversely, Russia, is least
vulnerable in Western Europe, in
greatest strength and in direct con-
tact with Allied forces and at dis-
tances that could be handled by
one-night truck movements. These
reflections accentuate the gravity
of the current NATO embroglio,
in terms of ultimate resistance. In
this connection, a Paris dispatch
reports a curious incident. Admiral
Walter F. Boone (classified vaguely
as a NATO "spokesman") pre-
sented military data prepared by
a socalled "Institute for Strategic
Studies." The odd feature is that
our high military "authorities"
have to quote from a British in-
telligence outfit (one of many
postwar civilian groups suddenly
dabbling in military intelligence
research) when the Washington
CIA was available with a budget,
variously reported as between $25
and $45 million and a global net
of investigators. There are equiva-
lent American civilian agencies,
containing a certain percentage of
former OSS, CIA and G-2 per-
sonnel. There must be a dozen of
these subsidized groups, ranging
from the "Rand" . organization
(Air Force money) to "Conlon
Associates" (Senate Foreign Re-
lations money). T h e y are a
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veritable haven of what the
French tactfully describe as em-
busques, but they do formulate
policy concepts for their lazy em-
ployers. These people do not have
the immense resources of the CIA.
They operate a sort of newspaper
clipping service; they translate
documents (sometimes spurious)
they relay international gossip (on
sale to the highest bidder) and
slightly disguised or paraphrased
bits of "information" (often used
by several intelligence agencies at
the same time).
T HE WEST'S state of nerves is
such that every word of propa-
ganda about or by the USSR is
accepted as the Bible truth. It is
difficult to check and or refute or
confirm Soviet intelligence infor-
mation. Western intelligence has
been unable to penetrate the Iron
Curtain to any depth. Espionage
agents in the Soviet Union face
barbaric torture and death; there
is no complaisant, hair splitting
Supreme Court to give them re-
prieve. Actually, the bulk of this
information, at least initially, has
come from German sources-the
Gehlen Organization reportedly
employed by CIA. General Gehlen
was the Soviet intelligence special-
ist of the Wehrmacht during the
war, and his work was rated as
superior by the cognoscenti. The
NATO "spokesman" may or may
not have checked with General
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24 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
Gehlen when he relayed the pessi-
mistic British "estimates" on the
Soviet military establishment, viz.:
Army: 2,350,000. Navy: 700,000.
Security forces: 350,000. The Navy
increased from 600,000 tons (1940)
to 1,600,000 tons (1959) with 2,270
surface vessels and probably 600
submarines.
The Air Force is said to operate
20,000 planes from a miscellany of
1,000 bases.
Missile bases are reported at
about 100 sites, strung from the
Baltic to the Carpathians. There
is virtually a fourth arm of the
Service, the "Missile Corps" of
200,000 men. They operate all
types of rockets (including principal
American types). Latest (uncon-
firmed) reports describe an inter-
continental missile, with a warhead
of 1,800 pounds and a range of
5,000 miles. (This is possible; the
engine thrust for the Sputnik and
Lunik could handle this weight).
This is a frightening picture, if
applied to Plate 1, "Soviet Short-
and- Mid - Range Missiles from
Czech Rocket Sites." Actually, no
such nuclear yield. would be re-
quired for European targets.
Fortunately, with a combination
of SAC and mid-range missiles, we
are also in a position to reach and
destroy Soviet-Satellite capitals and
bases-the moment London, Paris
or Bonn are attacked, though it is
obvious that Soviets are primarily
concerned with bigger game-the
U. S.
FACED WITH THIS Soviet poten-
tial (unconfirmed), de Gaulle's
current position is not as obstruc-
tionist as it may appear. The
nuclear terror must be balanced.
There is only one solution-the
rapid build-up of equivalent nu-
clear weapons capacity to equate
Soviet blackmail. Indeed, all the
reliable forces of the West (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey)
should have these weapons in
hand, in one form or another and
without diplomatic quibbling. We
have the know-how; they have the
manpower.
It is in that exploratory direction
that JCS-National Security Coun-
cil policy must be developed. But
there will always be the uneasy
question of where, when and how
this dire situation came about.
Democracy is quite apt to breed
Caesars-and they need not be in
uniform.
The mortal peril of the West
today, is traceable to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, a dynastic dreamer who
had both the talent and the villainy
of all the Caesars of history.
We "Get Cranky"
Most of us-an overwhelming majority of us- Are individualists and apt to
get cranky when government tries to substitute collective action for personal
freedom.-Erwin D. Canham, Pres. Chamber of Commerce of United States
(From speech before Pacific NW Trade Assn., Fairbanks, Alaska, Sept. 4, 1959)
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Cheap labor, i'o2aser a a-tr st laws, ver -
mentcal subsidies, lour import tariffs zre why...
BUSINESS IS DESERTING AMERICA
by Ralph Nader
FF . FTER WORLD WAR II, our gov- 'Japan have found our ingrained
A. ernment's favorite foreign gullibility to internationlism ?to be
hobby was the giving of America's amazingly persistent despite the bit-
earnings, paid in taxes, to Europe- ter lessons of recent history.
an nations in order to rebuild their Coddled and nurtured by Ameri-
war-ravaged economies. Now that ca in the postwar years, these na-
these countries are enjoying the tions are repaying our generosity
greatest prosperity in their history, by making deepening inroads into
it is the United States that is in our consumer market. But much
trouble. more alarming is the eager coop-
The trade balance, for the first eration of American business in
time in decades, has turned against hastening this process of undercut-
the United States with all indica- ting domestic production. With in-
tions pointing to further imbalance. creasing frequency, goods, pro-
In 195#3, America's deficit in for- duced by American wholly or par-
eign payments was $3.5 billion and tially-owned foreign enterprises,
in 1.959 it climbed over the $4 bil- are having the twofold effect of
lion mark. Our gold reserves are cutting into American export trade
being depleted and the standing of and encroaching upon the domestic
the dollar seriously impaired. market.
Professing free trade at official U.S. foreign investment goes
levels while, in practice, hamstring- back many years but the new group
ing U.S. exports by prohibitions, of voluntary industrial expatriates
quotas and other discriminatory leaving our shores to produce goods
treatment, Western Europe and abroad that will compete with
25
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26 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
home based firms represents a vantage point they strike back to
novel type of commercial sabotage. undermine the economy that per-
The trend became discernible as mitted them to turn liberty into
early as 1949 when large firms like license. There is a growing concen-
R
i
em
ngton Rand, Burroughs, Apex tration of American foreign invest-
Electrical Products closed down or ment in products competing with
cut back many of their plants in domestic industry.
U.S. cities in favor of foreign based Into our ports flow, for example,
operations. Remington Rand's portable type-
At a recent meeting of leading writers from Holland, I.B.M.'s of-
American business leaders, a presi- fice e
ui
t f
q
pmen
rom France and
dent of a large corporation ex- International Harvesters' tractors
pressed, in one of the informal from England. Ford Motor Com-
huddles, the sentiments that are pang's German subsidi
ary reported
turning a trend into a spiral. He 1959 exports to the U.S. ran nearly
said,
three times those of 1958. In 1959
It is anachronistic to keep be- the Simca auto firm, 25 per cent
lieving that we can compete on the owned by Chrysler Corporation,
world market, with prevailing ta- doubled shipments over 1958. Brit-
riffs, quotas, exchange and other re-
strictions, against foreign products ish Ford Motor Company by late
reflecting much lower production 1959 revealed 66,000 1960 Ford
costs. If you can't beat them, I say Anglias already ordered by North
join them. And also, gentlemen, as American buyers. Cars shipped
our country is committed to free over here use foreign labor, foreign
trade, we can establish operations steel, glass, aluminum, paint, rub-
abroad and undersell American pro-
ducers for the American market. ber and foreign suppliers of parts
and accessories.
A General Electric executive
,
speaking at a conference in Boston The ominous portent of this pro- :A i
cess underwa
last f
ll
i
d
l
fl
y
a
,
s re
ec
ected in a
ared that America can
meet this foreign competition not statement by a high U.S. auto
by raising tariffs but by buying executive: "I hope that by the
foreign plants. time I retire, half of our com-
pany's production will be abroad."
S
YAWNED-and having prospered Officials of these companies are
-under a free enterprise sys- reluctant, when interviewed, to talk
tem, American business firms are about their industrial expatriation.
deserting our shores and, taking Their replies are confined to a vari-
their American capital and know- ation of "that is a delicate ques-
how, are setting up in socialistic tion." The "question" is apparently
countries of Europe. From this going, to become more delicate.
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 ]BUSINESS Is DESERTING AMERICA
Qualified observers, in one of their
rare agreements, concur that Eu-
rope's trade surplus-will continue
skyward. Exports to the U.S. from
the 17-nation Organization for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation shot
over the $2 billion level for the first
half of this year as compared to
1958's $1.4 billion. Meanwhile
Europe's imports from the U.S. fell
from $2 billion to $1.8 billion.
Until now only the high pro-
ductivity of the American worker
and our technological lead have
kept an incipient crisis from being
a disaster, given present trade poli-
cies. However, even these assets
are diminishing. Our production
line skills are helping to modernize
and streamline European tech-
niques and raise productivity per
laborer. Considering that wages
range from ten cents an hour in
Japan to a near maximum of 75
cents an hour in Europe, the po-
tential momentum of this surge
into our market is massive. And
we no longer are setting the pace
in technology.
T HE DUAL EFFECT of this move-
ment across the Atlantic will-
be to depress our exports and, by
increasing imports, further drain
our foreign exchange credits. Un-
employment and floundering in-
dustries are the byproducts.
hastening concentration. Smaller
firms unable to establish foreign
facilities are placed in a defense-
less position by import competition.
Many of these smaller firms will
soon face the prospect of liquida-
tion or absorption by larger outfits
thus contributing to further de-
terioration of the free competitive
system that built the world's great-
est economy.
The factors luring these indus-
tries abroad are numerous. Among
them are cheaper labor, looser for-
eign anti-trust laws, subsidies given
industries by foreign governments,
the high and rigid cost structure
here and the low American tariff.
All make the siren call from alien
shores highly attractive. Profits are
higher and tax advantages substan-
tial.
The formation of the Common
Market has convinced hundreds of
American firms of the need to
establish plants in Western Europe.
As one executive declared, "When
the tariff provisions get into full
swing, you aren't going to see any-
thing from this country over there."
In addition to facilitating the sell-
ing of products within the Com-
mon Market area, our businessmen
are savoring the lucrative prospect
of shipping to the States.
The transatlantic sprint has had
the stimulation, paradoxically
In industries possessing a large enough, of the U.S. government,
number of producers, this exodus which-until recently-urged other
has an added pernicious effect of countries not to buy from America.
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28 THE AMERICAN MERCURY
One of the purposes of the Mar- of domestic investment by suitable
shall Plan was to reduce dollar buy-
ing and stimulate intra-European
trade.
The Economic Cooperation Ad-
ministration pursued a dedicat-
ed effort in this direction. A
decade ago, a New England indus-
trialist summed up the consensus
of his colleagues: "We were hope-
ful ECA would be of great benefit.
But now we find that they are urg-
ing France, for instance, to buy
tools-in England."
Washington's
munificence was
rewarded by Western Europe's high
tariffs, quota and exchange restric-
tions, prohibitions of entry and
discriminatory treatment of our in-
vestments in their overseas posses-
sions. Presently, our government is
suffering the indignity of having to
request of Japan, Britain, Austria,
Italy and others to reduce their
discriminations against American
goods. Timidly, we beseech these
nations to divert some of their
opulence to sharing the crushing
burden of foreign aid that rests
on our taxpayers. Meanwhile we
maintain a policy of free trade that
is taking us to economic disruption.
An example is the near obliteration
of the domestic pottery industry.
Over 90 per cent of lightweight
china tableware sold in this coun-
try is imported.
Instead of creating competitive
market conditions vis-a-vis im-
tariff and quota provisions, our
government does its best to make
our market more vulnerable to for-
eign competition.
As could be expected, a United
Nations report a few years ago ad-
vised Latin American businessmen '.
to promote trade with Europe and
buy less from the United States.
In the name of internationalism,
the industries that cannot compete
with imports are given the choice
of walking the plank or heading for
foreign areas to become part of the
competing adversary.
MERICANS have good cause to
ask two questions:
(1) What kind of government is
it that pursues a studied policy of
making foreign investments more
attractive than domestic?
(2) What type of responsibility
is shown by businessmen who desert
the nation that fostered them with-
out feeling any obligation to shore
up our economic defenses and capa-
bilities?
Our business and political lead-
ers had better do some hard think-
ing about their duties to their own
country. Only they can prevent the
further eroding from without of the
economy.
Our prosperous friends 'abroad,
whose very salvation issued from
America, are not going to stam-
pede in their rush to our rescue.
There will be no Marshall Plan
ports so as to encourage expansion to save us.
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V
AT A LECTURE on psychiatric theory, a beauteous student felt her-
self pinched continuously by the man behind her. She made no effort
to stop him. Over a coffee cup. later she confided: "It wasn't really
my concern. I decided it was his problem."
AN AMERICAN ENGINEER was touring Moscow's subway system.
His official Intourist guide, surprisingly acquiescent, had shown him
everything he'd asked about.
"This is a remarkably well-designed subway," said the engineer, as
they were leaving, "but why weren't the trains running?"
Replied the Soviet: "And what about the lynchings in the South?"
THE MAN who has a sour disposition probably thinks the world he's
living in is a lemon.
DURING MANEUVERS IN KANSAS, one extremely gusty noon a
soldier floated down into camp. Though battered and bruised from his
buffeting, he was taken immediately before the commanding officer.
"It took extraordinary nerve to come parachuting down in this
wind," boomed the CO, "but you shouldn't have been allowed to do
anything so dangerous."
"But I didn't come down in a parachute," shrugged the soldier. "I
went up in a tent."
THE GOVERNMENT tells us to pay as we go but it doesn't tell
us where we're going.
MAMA BEAR was already in the kitchen when Papa and Baby Bear
came down for breakfast. Papa glared into his cereal bowl. "Some-
one's been eating my porridge and has eaten it all up," he grunted.
Baby Bear scowled into his bowl. "Someone's been eating my
porridge and has eaten it all up," he snarled.
Mama Bear turned from the stove and growled: "Complaining, com-
plaining, always complaining; is that all you two can do? I haven't
even cooked your porridge yet!"
29
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"Freedom is nothing in the world but the opportunity for self-discipline" --Clemenceau
A chaotic industry lets an accepted practice take up
prurience, thus evoking the specter of federal control
by Shields ReMine
P AYOLA is private payment a disc
jockey takes in return for play-
ing certain records a great deal
when, normally, one play would
have been excessive. It is an an-
tique practice. Every popular song
hit this country's ever had was well
payolaed before we found ourselves
unconsciously humming it.
Broadcasting and popular music
were early- infatuated with one an-
other, their marriage is long and
lasting, and what made the two
one is the world's most meretricious
matchmaker: show business. One
of their progeny is the popular rec-
ord industry. To these components
of the communications' industry
payola seems always to have lain at
some remove, for it is a vigorous
fertilizer-manure, if you will, but
all the same, vital. Only in recent
months has payola's insinuating
mellifluousness achieved household
word status. Pronounced bureauoc-
racy multipronged : p a y o l a is
criminal.
President Eisenhower examined
it in Attorney General Rogers' late
December report. In "the spec-
tacle of corruption in the broad-
cast industry," Rogers spot-lighted
payola.
During February, Congress' top
box-office committee, Rep. Oren
Harris' (Dem., Ark.) subcommittee
on Legislative Oversight, having
exorcised Bernard Goldfine and
Charles Van Doren, moved gar-
ruously on to the payola devil. As
had Rogers, the committee sought
reform legislation to tighten fed-
eral control of the industry.
Chastised for sitting "idly by"
scandal were the regulatory agen-
cies, the FCC and the FTC. Not
soon enough did they conclude
payola was sneak advertising.
December 3 the Federal Com-
munications Commission ordered
the nation's 5,236 broadcasting
30
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PAYOLA
stations to return affidavits telling
`'any matter broadcast which was
not identified by an announcement
as being broadcast because of such
payment." By law, the FCC could
revoke the license of a guilty sta-
tion. The FCC has never done
that. Both Rogers and the Harris
committee urge the FCC be em-
powered to suspend licenses for
short periods. For years, the FCC
has discussed payola privately.
Regulatory policy for all matters
is "unwavering laissez faire", states
the New York Times television
critic, Jack Gould. "The FCC's
favorite gambit has been to put
every problem down for a hearing
and then ask for briefs so that a
study can be undertaken," he ex-
plains. "It is government by vigor-
ous postponement."
O N DECEMBER 6, the Federal
Trade Commission charged
three leading record manufactur-
ing companies and six major rec-
ord distributors (later, more than
100) with "deceiving the public".
The payolaed product perverting
us all, it seemed, was popular rec-
ords. The FTC's duty is to see
that the nation's business is not
corrupted and its charge against
payola, the FTC's first, was but a
part of a drive against any form
of advertising it considers objec-
tional in any media. Disc jockeys
(deejay. DJ, or plain jock) the
FTC called, co-conspirators. It
never formally charged one, but
turned over to the FCC "hun-
dreds" of names. Immediately,
over the nation, about that many
either quit or got fired.
In Norfolk, Virginia, three gents
and one lady jock were martyred-
merely for proving that neither
payola nor "exposure" could force
public acceptance of a bad record.
Of a November dawn, at Station
WCMS, the Norfolk Four spun
something called "Pahalacaka." By
the next dawn noxious "Pahalaca-
ka" was 320 spins old, but in
numbed Norfolk sales were nil.
Ordered to cease, the Norfolk Four
removed their cause to the picket
line. Their peevish placards read :
"We want payola, too." "$100,000
salaries have to go."
All that went were the four
jocks.
The fifth investigation was that
of District Attorney Frank S. Ho-
gan. In New York on November
19, he subpoenaed the financial
records of 11 small recording com-
panies.
Mr. Sydney Nathan, owner of
King Records; Inc., told the United
Press he would give Hogan a stack
of cancelled checks, cashed over
the years by some 250 big city disc
jockeys. Nathan said the checks
represented his $1,800 a. month
payola investment: in his books, a
legitimate business expense. He
called payola a dirty rotten mess
and was glad to see it out in the
open at last.
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3< THE AMERICAN MERCURY
"Payola did not increase record
sales," confided Nathan. "Our sta-
tistics showed that we didn't get
our records played any more often
whether we paid or not. We quit
it."
NOTHER DECISIVE FACTOR may
have been that to indulge in
it is to resemble a caterpillar trip-
ping over itself. Robert W. Lish-
man, chief counsel of the Harris
subcommittee, t o o k allegations
from 27 cities and drew a Jackson
Pollocky portrait of payola:
1. Radio or TV station people
(disc jockeys, program directors,
music librarians, management it-
self) who play only records promis-
ing some direct or indirect finan-
cial return. The deejay may loathe
the record but he'll expose it six
to ten times a day every day, sug-
gesting that the reason he plays it
so much is because he enjoys it or
because it is in the "top 10" or
"top 40." Ratings rigged, natural-
ly, through bribing record sellers
to falsify sales reports and - disc
jockeys to exaggerate how many
times they actually played the rec-
ord. For a good rating, however
achieved, is status which stimulates
legitimate sales.
(A' characteristic of popularity,
however, is that it may generate
virulent anti-bodies. The "Hit Pa-
rade" show's happy habit through
a decade of craze was using only
songs at the top of the various
popular music ratings. Then a sta-
tistical preponderance of rock'n'roll
shriveled its vast audience, one of
the age's lesser mysteries, and for
lack of other rated status, the "Hit
Parade" was silenced.)
2. Station personnel who must
be guaranteed a piece of the talent
which performs. Thus, even juve-
nile talent will cash its full pay-
check, and then return perhaps all
of it to management's pocket. The
fact of exposure was payment
enough.
3. Key licensee people (man-
agement) who, in some instances,
have had long, serious criminal
records.
4. Man-in-the-street interviews
rigged, especially at election time,
for a systematic vilification of per-
sons and companies.
5. Manufacturers who, in return
for some subtle, not-very-honorable
mention, were delighted to cough
up cash or other produce to net-
work personnel who, in turn, were
tools of public relations firms spe-
cializing in getting products men-
tioned inadvertently or noticed
casually. (NBC, determined to
destroy deception, says from now
on it'll buy all its giveaway prizes
or, for its promise of discreet identi-
fication, accept gifts free.)
Bureauocracy needed but one
focused glance at payola's ma-
chinations to see that it was a form
of commercial bribery, or "push
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PAYOLA 33
money," a misdemeanor punishable
by a year in prison and a $500 fine.
They intend to eradicate it, no sim-
ple matter. Far more important
will be their inquiry into what in-
fluence it has had on the basic
thinking of the entire communica-
tions industry.
. For one thing, its acceptance has
helped lead broadcasting (includ-
ing television) into thinking the
airwaves were its private resource
to exploit at will-with subliminal
advertising, for example, which is
nothing but psychological payola.
The airwaves belong to the people,
as do all natural resources. The
federal government only leases the
airwaves to broadcasting. Their
use must be entirely consistent
with the public's interest. a re-
sponsibility of both the FCC and
the industry. That the airwaves
be commercially exploited is es-
sential; but how utilized, and how
closely the FCC dares let itself
regulate free speech is the prob-
lem. A notion intensely repellent
is that Uncle Sam, in any way,
should ever become the Big Broth-
er of Culture.
Despite current recrimination,
Congress, as has broadcasting, knew
all about payola long ago. In 1956
network television practices were
being scrutinized by the House
Judiciary Anti-trust Subcommittee
of which Rep. Emanuel Celler
(Devi., N. Y.) was chairman. Pay-
ola was alluded to for one reason:
any effort on the part of any unit
of the broadcasting industry to
abolish payola would require in-
dustry-wide promises of abolition,
lest the responsible, but somewhat
naive unit, suffer fatal loss of
revenue. The networks, even to-
day, suggest that "industry-wide
anything" and "anti-trust" are
synonymous. FCC Chairman John
C. Doerfer, on December 18, 1959,
told them that a self-directed in-
dustry-wide clean-up of its ever
darkening anti-trust tinges would
be welcomed. But in 1956, the
shuffle of sin was such that, appar-
ently, Rep. Celler never got a clear
look at payola--not an Italian
word, incidentally, but one coined
by Monroe H. Rosenfeld, a New
York Morning Telegraph staffer
who is, in his spare time, a song
writer.
I N MARCH, 1958, ASCAP and
BMI booked their ancient feud
into the Senate. Tuned in this
time was the Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Subcommittee
on Communications headed by
Sen. John 0. Pastore (Dem.,
R. 1.). ASCAP (The American
Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers) is an agency which col-
lects royalties for its members on
whatever of their music is com-
mercially performed. BMI (Broad-
cast Music, Inc.), a similar organi-
zation, and thus in direct competi-
tion with ASCAP, is wholly owned
by 557 radio and TV stations. In
recent months, NBC and CBS have
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34 THE AMERICAN MERCURY d
divested themselves of BMI stock, Pastore hear? From the ASCAP
leaving ABC as the only network camp came the voice of Seymour
(and largest individual) owner. M. Lazar, a Beverly Hills attorney
ASCAP and BMI share their who specializes in music business
similarities publicly by telling any- clients:
one who will listen how the other "The best example of how BMI
society is corrupting the nation's corrupts", he said, ". . . is the disc
music. jockey situation. Practically the
Another agency which shares an only way that a song can be ex-
identical financial interest in music, posed . . is by being played by
is the American Guild of Authors disc jockeys ... in Los Angeles you
and Composers. AGAC president, must pay cash." Mr. Lazar said
Burton Lane, in a letter to FCC he knew some deejays who made
Chairman Doerfer sharply charged $300 to $500 a week above their
BMI with having "achieved con- normal salaries of $25,000-$50,000
trol of American popular music a year.
(through) forced feeding (of) "That is an awful lot of money
rock'n'roll music to the public. in salary," observed Mr. Lazar.
RCA has admitted the use of its
licensed stations and facilities to