ADDRESS TO NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK CITY BY STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 22, 1973
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release
ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH FILES
01/09/05: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
22 MAY 1973
TURNER
ATION IN NEW YORK CITY BY STANSFIELD
Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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 Approved For RelNyse-2fflK(LW :-CIA-WflEL1R003600(T0 1973
THANK YOU PRESIDENT JACK PARK - HEAD TABLE
GUESTS 'I
WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH AT NWC - MIRROR
WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE
TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY
MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450
DES-FTEJTTUE [EATJERS]H P-
COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE
VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
AUTHORITARIAN WORLD
PROPER
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1 '
 OUR OBJECT IqEPr-OvBS+VEL PleC6 rr? i 5 TRIN~?Rg0B01554R003600010001-5
THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -
WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS
FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS
SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -
TECH CHANGING
COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES
UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND
LOSS STATEMENT
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WHEN SAY TO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC STANDARD OF MEASURE MEAN 2 THINGS
FIRST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS
WHY A MILITARY?
WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?
QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED
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 SECONDLY, I i Tcyr Iii(eMEqMR4CN6)5p.nFffWIMMP1554R003600010001-5
BUSINESS WORLD SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT
WE LACK SUCH TOOLS
NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS
ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT
WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR
NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - DRIVING SHIPS
ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT
TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED
FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES
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 READINES F(C~ekOr~e11~~CIA-5SRE10001-5
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE
ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS
WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES
COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS
FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME
SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS
TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED
JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM
DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING
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 ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
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PRESENCE OF ILITARY -FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT
SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY
ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY
DEBATE ON POINT IN BETWEEN
WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSESLCAN BRACKET
START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS
HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED IS MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME
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 AVOID INVOt W N t1Jd 114 ke4@ / I:CiiR& 5WaOTAO "01-5 7
CONSENSUS MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN
SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY
WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD
START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES
ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE
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 BALANCE OF /R die ? eiJ i&T2ffli T9/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5 8
MUST HAVE POWER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE
INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,
ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY
ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS
COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER
IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR
PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN
CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT
SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING
IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING
UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN
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 OTHER WORDtpproved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES
ViR7uES
MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS V-I OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'1S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE - QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES
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 10
WHAT POLIT I, &04gp~r ~gase 2'Otf'1'f09/(33'PCI1ot!R;PS'&3M5~R0kAVO'FtTW1 WI AND
AND SHOULD. NOT DETERMINE
CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USNA WELL REALIZE
G
OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS
PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY
ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
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 11
PURPOSE OF Hg d~01rLlnrse 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP
TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER - WILL
NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMA
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES 180? - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION
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 12
ftff
r?veA I Q( Pllt se 00VO LU E R FORCE 01554R003600010001-5
MOVE INTO
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON ILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE
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 THIS DEMANWO! @ RoiAROe Eo(FLg(d!BLEiAIN~Et aC-BUAko A&idobT-DES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT
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13
 NEW YORK CITY - -
NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
22 MAY 1973
Thank you, President Jack Park, distinguished head table
guests, members of the New York City Naval Academy Alumni
Association. It's a treat and a great pleasure to be here
with you today. I am honored to be your speaker and
to have the opportunity to talk about what we are attempting
to accomplish at the Naval War College and what effect
that effort may have on the Navy of the future. I will keep
my formal comments brief so that we will have time for questions.
My task as President of your Navy's senior educational
institution is a particularly interesting one today. As you
know, I am involved in directing the mid-career education of
450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our
military services, the State Department, Coast Guard and the CIA.
These are men who are destined for top leadership positions.
They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what
I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations
for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and much
of their training and education have been in a technical world
where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian
world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.
Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in
these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise
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subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple.
The first subject is St-rategy or the -uncertain world of-broad
strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt
from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of
the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S.,
Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and
80,s?"
The second subject that we cover is the inexact world
of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase
one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier
or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited
capabilities?"
Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of.tactical
decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that
standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the
complexities in all of these cases, we face. the ultimate un-
certainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of
you gentlemen enjoy in the profit, and loss statement! (At least
I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)
When I say that we do not have a specific standard of.
measure,.for our $80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two
things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense,
cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of
you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when
might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are
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less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a
corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's
needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring
performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers
you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in
the business world you . fortunately have many good measures
such a sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on
assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such
There is , - then, a great need
for military men who can approach complex problems such as
establishing. military objectives and measuring success without
waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men
who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact
arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects
of inexact policies of vast national and international import.
The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded
by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based
our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.
George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way
of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military
force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.
We are, though, accustomed to measuring our objectives
in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the
Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms
of how well our foreign policy backed by military preparedness,
held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension
of communism since.- 1.94.9 was to .Cuba, not an extension of
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- With containment gone we'must now redefine our objectives
and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course
at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students
back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first,
insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of
foreign policy in peacetime.
Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for
military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is
just as understandable as it.is for a man
who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask
whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente
appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears
to be less critical.
There are also those who contend that it is not in our
interests today to use the presence of military forces in
support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic
needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre
rattling is too risky.
One could argue each of these points interminably. The
debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no
presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to
all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about
some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable
for this country to set its defenses. I think. that, we can
bracket that point.
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I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point
between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments
if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this
country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in prevent-
ing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet
Union. How much military power we require to prevent this,
and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.
Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to
avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous, ground war in
Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must
lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more
Vietnams.. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against
potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force,
for diplomatic. purpose.. Even with.the.best techniques that tools
like systems analysis can offer us, precise numerical analysis is
not capable of identifying this point.. It is a matter of weighing
national priorities /and exercising judgment.
We must weigh those.prio-rities in light of the changes
both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On
the international scene this means recognizing the impact of
our emergence from the bi-polar world. into a multi-polar one.
At the War College we start our students with the study of
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th
Century B.C. This was an era of a hi-polar focus. We point
out that bi-polar periods have been aberations in history. More
often there have been a number of powers to balance against
each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have
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power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited
to military force. National power is comprised of industrial
strength, national will, moral stature,-organizational-ability
and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue
for military students, is to probe for that type of military
force which the country needs to complement.our other sources
of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the
1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather
than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam,.
the construction-of those forces may be. different. It requires
sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing
rather than fighting and winning, especially in terms of
understanding how other's. perceptions of our-military___.might can.
influence their diplomatic decisions.
In other words, a world of multi-power negotiations requires
a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable
of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of
negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail
to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by
engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement
that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment
will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of
,our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than
heretofore.
G-,T'nat'those needs are, though, is something that we in
uniform can not and should not determine. That is where the
changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. As
graduates of the USNA, you know that we in the military uniform
are APPf #IsFof e e 4pQ~'F_/99/05 : C I~?P8~1.554R @eD1t0001-5
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Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow
whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose,
dedication, and proficiency. We also must.advise whether our
forces are capable of achieving the national objectives or
strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to
intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders to do
this - to understand the society they serve, and to deal intel-
ligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character
of the national will.
There is no simple way for the public to express that will
under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through
the Congress and the President; I submit though, that this
requires from the public apositive approach to military matters.
The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to
into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest
in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task.
Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with
the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be
180? out from an unexpressed public opinion.
Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force,
the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing
direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft
must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in
your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction
to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that
such force is both tailored and employed only as the national
will dictates.
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We are striving, through higher military education. today, to be
ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on
military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and
more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than
ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate
preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous
weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.
We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that
the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's
direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose
is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply
appreciated.
Thank you.
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8
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
NY - SPEECH - - USNA ALUMNI 22 MAY 1973
THANK YOU PRESIDENT JACK PARK - HEAD TABLE
GUESTS
WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH AT NWC - MIRROR
WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE
TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY
MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF 450
DES-II VLD IUF LLNDLKSHIP
COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE
VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
AUTHORITARIAN WORLD
PROPER
BUT MOVING UP
OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING
THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -
WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS
FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS
SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -
TECH CHANGING
COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES
UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND
LOSS STATEMENT
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
imrm ^nr in NOT 'HAVE SPECIFIC STAN ARD OF MEASURE ALAN L 111INGS
:e
FIRST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS
WHY A MILITARY?
WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?
QUESTIONS .ON OBJECT. IVES. LESS, AMENABLE THAN-- IS QUESTION--. HOW A..
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S NEED
SECONDLY, DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE 4
BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER.
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT
WE LACK SUCH TOOLS
NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS
ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT
WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR
NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN DRIVING SHIPS .
ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT
TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED
FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES
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READIN:ES FOR ACTION ALONG THE SOVIET - CHINESE PERIPHERY
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR SUCCESS - HELD LINE
ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS
WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES
COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS
FIRST. DETERRENT IN PEACETIME
SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS
TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED
JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM
DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING
ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
PRESEN OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT
SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY
ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY
DEBATE ON POINT I N BETWEEN
WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET.
START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMMITMENTS
HOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED 1S MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EX 14LML
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 "VOi ; \i+,%i?i 1rCi'"EN [N PROL ONGED AMBIGUOUS G BOND 't+iAR i t1 S
1I1V1/ 1tllVi~tt-i i 1t1 t 1V y
CONSENSUS (MUST LIE SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN
SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY
WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT,OF THE CHANGES
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR~WORLD
START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES
ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE
BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT 8
MUST HAVE POW~EER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE
INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,
ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY
ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS
COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER
IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR
PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN
CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT
J ADDIT10i!1 TO FIGHTING
SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING
UHUC STAMMUiI`dG t1LirU!ilER S PER CE - riIU1 OAi'
I?4FLUENCE TH I R DIP,-O'IATIC DECISIONS
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r}Tttrfl yifn~~-lr'
U I nLf\ GF'U
A WORLD OF MULTI-POWER NEGOTIATIONS, REQUIRES
MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS VITURES OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY-A FRACTION-OF HISFORCE - QUICK-
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION. TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY.
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES
WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN NOT AND 10
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE
CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USNA WELL REALIZE
OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS
PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY
ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
1
11
PURPOSE OF A WAR COLLEGE
INTELLECTUALLY PREPARE THE NEXT CROP
TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER WILL
-N0 SIMPLE WAY FOR. THE PUBLIC TO-.EXPRESS THAT..-WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMAY.
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES 18O - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION
12
MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUNGEER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVING, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
OCATINIG CONSENSUS ON IV1LIT,ARY PURPOSE WE' REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
TH~S DEMANDS HIGHER AND MORE FLEXIBLE INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITIES
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE - TECH AGE OF-SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT
13
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
--NEW YORK. CITY
NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
22 MAY 1973
Thank you, President Jack Park, distinguished head table
guests, members of the New York City Naval Academy Alumni
Association. It's a treat and a great pleasure to be here
with you today. I am honored to be your speaker and
to have the opportunity to talk about what we are attempting
to accomplish at the Naval War College and what effect
that effort may have on the Navy of the future. I will keep
my formal comments brief so that we will have time for questions.
My task as President of your Navy's senior educational
institution is a patticularly-interesting one today. As you
know, I am involved in directing the mid-career education of
450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our
military services, the State Department, Coast Guard and the CIA.
These are men who are destined for top leadership positions.
They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what
I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations
for almost. all phenomena. Their vocational experience and much
of their training and education have been in a technical world
=where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian.
world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.
Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in
these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple.
The first subject is Strategy or the -uncertain world ofbroad
strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt
from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of
the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S.
Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and
80's?"
The second subject that we cover is the inexact world
of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase
one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier
or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited
capabilities?"
Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical
decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that
standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the
complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate un-
certainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of
you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least
i hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)
When I say that we do not have a specific standard of
measure,_for our $80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two
things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense,
cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of
you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when
might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a
corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's
needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring
performance. How well did the Navy satisfy its customers
you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in
the business world you fortunately have many good measures
such a sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on
assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such
There is, then, a great need
for military men who can approach complex problems such as
establishing-military objectives, and measuring success without
waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men
who are not. only skilled craftsmen at the relatively. exact
arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects
of inexact policies of vast national and international import.
The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded
by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based
our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.
George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way
of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military
force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.
We are, though, accustomed to measuring our objectives
in terms of readiness for military action anywhere along the
Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms
of how well our foreign policy backed by military preparedness,
held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension
of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
perimeter, but a leapfrog across the seas.
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP&0B01554R003600010001-5
With containment gone we'must now-redefine our objectives
appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears
to be less critical.
There are also those who contend that it is not in our
interests today to use the. presence of military forces in
support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic
needs are too urgent to afford this capability or that sabre
rattling is too risky.
One could argue each of these points interminably. The
and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course
at the Naval War College, we insist. on taking the students
back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first,
insurance in case of war and second, use as an instrument of
foreign policy in peacetime.
Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for
military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is
just as understandable as it is for a man
who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask
whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente
debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or
presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to
all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about
some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable
for this country to set its defenses. I think that ' e can
bracket that Point.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point
between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments
if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this
country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in prevent-
ing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet
Union. How much military power we require to prevent this,
and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.
Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to
avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in
Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must
lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more.
Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of insurance against
potential conflicts and possible ways to employ-military force,
for diplomatic purpose-. Even with the best techniques that-tools
like systems analysis can offer us, .precise numerical analysis is
not capable of identifying this point. It is a matter of weighing
national priorities /and exercising judgment.
We must weigh those priorities in light of the changes
both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On
the international scene this means recognizing the impact of
our emergence from the bi-polar world into a.multi-polar one.
At the,War College we start our students with the study of
Thucvdides' History-of the.Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th
Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. WW le point
out that bi-polar periods have been aberations.in history. More
often there have been a number of powers to balance against
each other. Balance of nosier, means just that. You must have
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited
to military -force. National power is comprised of industrial
strength, national wile, moral stature; organizational ability
and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue
for military students, is to probe for that type of military
force which the country needs to complement our other sources
of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the
1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather
than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam,.
the construction of those forces may be different. It requires
sophistication for a military man to think in terms of influencing
rather than fighting and winning, especially in terms of
understanding how other's. perceptions of our military might can
influence their diplomatic decisions.
In other words, a world of. multi-power negotiations requires
a military posture that has virtues other-than simply being capable
of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of
negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail
to. do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by
engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement
that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment
will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of
our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than
heretofore.
What those needs are, though, is something that we in
uniform can not and should not determine. That is where the
changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. As
graduates of the US IA, you know that we in the military uniform
A ~rovec For ffelease 2001/09/0 YA-RQP80B01? C 6Qp0010001-5
are SerV _.~S _O e l _._~'. i_.a na , u e
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow
whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose,
this - to understand the society they serve, and to deal intel-
ligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character
of the national will.
There is no simple way for the public to express that will
forces are capable of achieving the national objectives or
strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to
intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders to d
dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise whether our
under our democratic process. It must, of course, be
through
the Congress and the President. I submit though, that this
requires from the public a positive approach to military matters.
The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to
into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest
in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task.
Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with
the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be
180? out from an unexpressed public opinion.
Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force,
the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing
direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft
must not mean the end of public concern for and interest in
your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of positive direction
to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that
such force is both tailored and employed only as the national
will dictates.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 :-jCIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
We are striving, through higher, military education today, to be
ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on
military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and
more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than
ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate
preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous
weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.
We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that
the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's
direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose
is selected. Your help in reaching this goal would be deeply
appreciated.
Thank you.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
8
 Approved ForRe'Iease 2001/09/05 : CIA-R P80B01554R003600010001-5
NEW YORK CITY
NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
22 MAY 1973
Thank you, President Jack Park, distinguished head table
guests, members of the New York City Naval Academy Alumni
Association. It's a treat and a great pleasure to be here
with you today. I am honored to be your speaker and
to have the opportunity to talk about what we are attempting
to accomplish at the Naval War College ,and what effect
that effort may have on the Navy of the future. I will keep
my formal comments brief so that we will have time for questions.
My task as President of your Navy's senior educational
institution is a particu!arlyinteresting one today. As you
know, I am involved in directing the mid-career education of
450 hand-picked officers and career civilians from all of our
military services, the State Department, Coast Guard and the CIA.
These are men who are destined for top leadership positions.
They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. from what
I call a Newtonian Universe, a universe of rational explanations
for almost all phenomena. Their vocational experience and much
of their training and education have been in a technical world
where right and wrong answers must exist and an authoritarian
world of military decisions that are either correct or incorrect.
Our objective at the Naval War College is to develop in
these officers a concept of thinking about three very imprecise
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 :CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
subjects with which all senior decision makers must grapple.
The first subject is Strategy or the uncertain world of broad
strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt
from the bi-polar world of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of
the 1950's and 60's to the multi-polar environment of the U.S.,
Soviets, European community, China and Japan, of the 1970's and
80's?"
The second subject that we cover is the inexact world
of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase
one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier
or do we buy two or three smaller carriers each with limited
capabilities?"
Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical
decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly that
standard doctrines are always outdated. Compounding the
complexities in all of these cases, we face the ultimate un-
certainty of not having a standard of measure such as most of
you gentlemen enjoy in the profit and loss statement! (At least
I hope that most of you are enjoying yours.)
When I say that we do not have a specific. standard of
measure, .for our $80B corporation in the DOD, I mean two
things. First, our corporation, the Department of Defense,
cannot agree upon basic objectives as easily as can those of
you in business. Why do we want a military? Where and when
might we employ it. These questions regarding objectives are
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
less amenable to clarification than is the question of how a
corporation or a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's
needs. Secondly, we also have difficulty in measuring
performance. How we1l did the Navy satisfy its customers
you the public last year? Compared with the Army? Now in
the business world,you fortunately have many good- measures
such a sales, profit as a percent of sales, turnover, return on
assets, return on stockholders investment. We lack such
There is, then, a great need
for military men who can approach complex problems such as
establishing military objectives and measuring success without
waiting for the test of war. To do these things we need men
who are not only skilled craftsmen at the relatively exact
arts of driving ships and aircraft, but men who are architects
of inexact policies of vast national and international import.
The task that these officers face in 1973 is compounded
by the fact that the very foundation on which we have based
our military objectives since World War II has disappeared.
George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way
of monolithic communism. We can no longer justify military
force on pushing back communism wherever it may exude.
We are, though, accustomed to measuring our objectives
in terms of readiness fqr military action anywhere along the
Soviet-Chinese periphery. We measured our success in terms
of how well our foreign policy backed by military preparedness,
held the line. Interestingly, the only geographical extension
of communism since 1949 was to Cuba, not an extension of
perimeter, but a leapfrog across the seas.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
3
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
With containment gone we must now redefine our objectives
and our measures of success in new terms. Thus, in our course
at the Naval War College, we insist on taking the students
back to the two fundamental reasons for military power - first,
insurance in case of war and. second, use as an instrument of
foreign policy in peacetime.
Today, though, there are some who avow that our need for
military insurance has diminished if not disappeared. This is
?just as understandable as it is for a man
who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory to ask
whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums. Detente
appears to be approaching; in turn, military preparedness appears
to be less critical.
There are also those who contend that it is not in our
interests today to use the presence of military forces in
support of foreign policy. They point out that our domestic
needs are too urgent to afford,this capability or that sabre
rattling is too risky.
One could argue each of these points interminably. The
debate would not be between the extremes of no insurance or no
presence capability on one hand and overwhelming superiority to
all potential opponents on the other. The debate would be about
some point in between, some point where it appears acceptable
for/ this country to set its defenses. I think that ee can
bracket that point.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
I would start from the assumption that one acceptable point
between the extremes would be our honoring our NATO commitments
if Western Europe were assaulted. There are few people in this
country who do not agree that our vital interests lie in prevent-
ing Western Europe from falling into the orbit of the Soviet
Union. How much military power we require to prevent this,
and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate.
Now, nearer to the other extreme, most people today want to
avoid involvement in another prolonged ambiguous ground war in
Asia. National consensus on our need for military forces must
lie somewhere in between support for NATO and aversion to more
Vietnams. The spectrum covers a vast scope of.insurance against
potential conflicts and possible ways to employ military force,
for diplomatic purpose. Even with the best techniques that tools
like systems analysis can offer us, precise numerical analysis is
not capable of identifying this point. It is a matter of weighing
national priorities/ and exercising judgment.
We must weigh those priorities in light of the changes
both in the world environment and in domestic attitudes. On
the international scene this means recognizing the impact of
our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one.
At the War College we start our students with the study of
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars, in the 5th
Century B.C. This was an era of a bi-polar focus. We point
out that bi-polar periods have been aberations in history. More
often there have been a number,of-powers to balance against
each other. Balance of power, means just that. You must have
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIAFRDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
power to be a player in the game. Power, though, is not limited
to military force. National power is comprised of industrial
strength, national will, moral stature, organizational ability
and other elements in addition to military strength. The issue
for military students, is to probe for that type of military
force which the country needs to complement our other sources
of power. If a prime purpose of having military forces in the
1970's is to balance, or, to provide negotiating pressure, rather
than to contain by military action as in Korea and Vietnam,
the construction of those forces may be different. It requires
sophistication'for a military man to think in terms of influencing
rather than fighting and winning, especially in terms of
understanding how other's..percepti.ons of our military might can
influence their diplomatic decisions.
In other words,_a world of. multi-power negotiations requires
a military posture that has virtues other than simply being capable
of defeating the next fellow's. In fact, in an era of
negotiations you may achieve your military purpose or fail
to do so without directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by
engaging only a fraction of his force in a quick engagement
that is hastily terminated. I suggest that today's environment
will require us to pay more attention to the responsiveness of
our military forces to political and diplomatic needs, than
heretofore.
What those needs are, though, is something that we in
uniform can not and.should not determine. That is where the
changes in domestic attitudes must come into consideration. As
graduates of the USNA, you know that we in the military uniform
are s er & dr#le O*f09/ A C bbl 6btVD10001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow
whatever course the nation selects and to do so with purpose,
dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise whether our
forces are capable of achieving the national objectives or
strategy. The purpose of having a War College today is to
intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders to do
this - to understand the society they serve, and to deal intel-
ligently with the imprecise, uncertain and subjective character
of the national will.
There is no simple way for the public to express that will
under our democratic process. It must, of course, be through
the Congress and the President; I submit though, that this
requires from the public a positive approach to military matters.
The most dangerous course I can imagine would be for us to
into an evaluation of military needs through disinterest
in the military or through dismay at the magnitude of the task.
Nothing could be more extravagant. We could well end up with
the military preparing for a set of objectives that might be
180? out from an unexpressed public opinion.
Thus, as we move into the era of the All-Volunteer Force,
the public must assume a greater responsibility for providing
direction to the military establishment. The end of the draft
must not mean the end-of public concern for and interest in
your armed forces. In short, giving a sense of.-:p.os;itive.;direction
to military purpose is an essential element to ensuring that
such force is both tailored and employed only as the national
will dictates.
7
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
We are striving, through higher military education today, to be
ready to work with the civilian public in locating the consensus on
military purpose that we require. The task demands higher and
more flexible intellectual capabilities in military men than
ever before. The risks in making errors or in inadequate
preparation are severe in this age of swift and treacherous
weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces.
We are dedicated in higher military education to ensuring that
the military leaders of tomorrow are sensitive to the public's
direction and worthy of its relying on them for whatever purpose
is selected. Your help in reaching this-goal would be deeply
appreciated'.
Thank you.
Approved For Release 2001/09/085 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001 09/05: CIA- DP$OD01554R0036D0010001-51f
i 1r,:4'i\
k Is: i j i'~T uRLJ 10 LE
J v ` t
',W? (.A T ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH AT NWC - MIRROR
WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON T
E NAVY OF THE FUTURE
TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING ONE TODAY
ID-CAREER -EDUCATION OF 450
DES(INLU IUk' LLADLRSHIV
COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE
VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
AUTHORITARIAN WORLD
PROPER
BUT MOVING UP
OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING
THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS MUST GRAPPLE -
WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS
FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS
SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -
TECH CHANGING
CO 01OUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES
UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND
LOSS STATE ENT
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved F . o L eaease 2091/09/05,; c A-R p 5 4R,Qp36~osi~oQo1r5
'tii
FIST, DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU IN BUSINESS
WHY A MILITARY?
WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?
QUE S T IONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN SATISFY A CONSUMER'S-NEED
SECONDLY, DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE 4 '
BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER,
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT
WE LACK SUCH TOOLS
NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS
ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT
WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN! - DRIVING SHIPS
ARr1HITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES -VAST IMPORT
TASK OFFICERS FACE I N 1973 I S COMPOUNDED
FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECTIVES
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approvaed_.For, ,Relase ?,,QOM ,AP9 05: CIkRPP B944RQ03f00010001-5
. Ts u urSS - LD LII~L
ri"IC US l.tf _ v b~ ~1d ~ Hr
ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG ACROSS THE SEAS
ITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES & MEASURES
COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS
FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME
SECONDLY, INSURANCE IN CASE DETERRENCE FAILS
TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR-MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED
JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM
DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING
ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE
PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT
SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY
ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY
DEBATE ON POINT I N BETWEEN
WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET
.ST A T FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COMM/1ITIPME'I T S
SHOW MUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED I S MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 CIA-F tDF~86B01554R003'6d0010001-5
CONSENSUS MUST L I E SOMEWHERE !.1' BETWEEN
SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY
WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
DOMESTIC ATTITUDES.
IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD
START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES
ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE
.BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT 8
MUST HAVE POWER = NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE
INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,
ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY
ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS
COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER
IF A PRIME PURPOSE MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR
PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN
CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT
SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING
IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING
UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN
INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
FIJ' R \{~ (JO 3 1 r :oil IE IF. (JO MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS Vi=H''1 E` OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY - ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE = QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES
WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN Ni AND
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE
CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USIA WELL REALIZE
OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION SELECTS
PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY
ALSO MUST ADVISE THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
10
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 Approved Fr Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
T f ^.j i \I n -PARE HE tr`i-r ^n
unt R~~ ,?RE T ` ~; I CRUt
TO UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL CHARACTER - WILL
NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE PUBLIC A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMAY
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES " -
~80 UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION
12
MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VO U- ER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
DIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT -,NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC.CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STI' ~I"NG, THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
To BE ?`ADY TO 1O RK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON ~~ILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
{T -{: '(r^'_=D iNIT) ~Ar,D CI CVTDI r T?,ITr-- I f Cf'T!IAI rnt~r.D~ T T Tc:
LL /1! UL:_ ill I LLLL U I Ut1L umi rlu i i i LJ
Ri S CS OF `ERRORS SEVERE TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WE;';! O dRY A `!D BALANCING FORCES
~LLi
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600010001-5
--NEW YORK CITY
NAVAL ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION
22 MAY 1973
Thank you, President Jack Park/distinguished head table
guests /members of the New York City Naval Academy Alumni
Association./ It's a treat and a great pleasure to be here
with you today. I am honored to be your speaker/and
to have the opportunity to talk/about what we are attempting
to accomplish /at the Naval War College and what effect/
that effort may have on the Navy of the future/ I will keep
my formal comments brief/so that we will have-time for questions/
My task/as President of your Navy's senior educational
institution/ is a particularly interesting one today/ As you
know, I am involved in directing the mid-career education/ of
453 hand-picked officers and career civilians/frori all of our
world of military decisions/that are either correct or incorrect/
Our objective at the Naval Mar College/is to develop in
military services,/the State Department, Coast Guard and the CIA/
These are men who are destined for top leadership positions/
They come to the Naval War College in Newport, R.I from what
I call a Newtonian Universe,/a universe of rational explanations
for almost all phenomena./ Their vocational experience/ and much
of their training and education have been in a technical world
:mere right and wrong answers must exist/and an authoritarian
these officers a concept of th i nking/about three very imprecise
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 :. CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
from the bi-polar world/of just the U.S. and Soviet Union of
subjects/with which all senior decision makers must grapple./
The first subject is Strategy/r the-uncertain world of broad-
strategic questions such as "How does the United States adapt
u,~1 ~'JLa environment of the U.S.,
Soviets, European community China and Japan, of the 1970's and
80's??
.The second subject that we cove /S the inexact world
of management where we face decisions such as "Do we purchase
one very capable and survivable billion dollar aircraft carrier/
or do we buy two or three smaller carriers,/each with limited
capabilities?'/
Thirdly, we deal with the probabilistic world of tactical
decisions amidst technologies which are changing so rapidly/hat
standard ~~caoctrines a e~always out~d
a ed.
Compounding the
complexities in all Vf these se Vwve face the ultimate un-
certainty/ f noi\ h
our $80B corporation in the DOD,/
Why do we want a military ?Where- and when
might we employ it./ These questions regarding objectivesare
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less amenable to clarification (than is the question of how a
corporationr a company best sets out to satisfy a consumer's
needs. lsw"' l T" also have difficulty in measuring
performance. /How well did the Navy satisfy its customers
you the public last year?f Compared with the Army?/Now in
the business world/you fortunately__ _have many good measures/
such a sales, profit as a percent of sales,/turnover, return on
There is.,_-then, a great
for military men/who can approach complex problems/such as
establishing. military objectives//and measuring sees without
waiting for the test of war./ To do these things fwe need men
who are not only skilled craftsmen/at.the relatively exact
arts of driving ships and aircraft/but men who are architects
of inexact policiesf vast national and international import
The task that these officers face in 1973/s compounded
by the fact//that the very foundation on which we have based
our military objectives since World War II has disappeared
George Kennan's policy of containment has gone the way
of monolithic communism./We can no longer justify military
forcen pushing back communism wherever it may exude/
We are, though, accustomed' "o measuring our objectives
in terms of readinesfor military action anywhere.along the
Soviet-Chinese periphery/ We measured our success /n terms
of how well our foreign pol
acked by military preparedness/
held the line Interestingly,/the only geographical extension
of commlun i sm since 194 9y'=rzas to Cu:bay~not an extension of
perime'tekppr' i d Por l dsre~04M/ $ C i 2[ SP554R003600010001-5
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With containment goneae'must now redefine our objectives/
and our measures of success in new terms/ Thus, in our course
at the Naval War College ,we insist on taking the students
back/to the two fundamental reasons for military power/ first,
insurance in case of war/. nd.second, use as an instrument of
foreign policy in peacetime./
Today, though/there are some who avow/hat our need for
military insurance has diminished/if not disappeared//This is
/ust as understandable/s it is for a man
who has paid for a new sprinkler system in his factory/to ask
appears to be approaching;/in turn, military preparedness ar-s
whether he can reduce his fire insurance premiums Detente
to be less critical
There are also those who contend/hat it is not in our
interests today/to use the_presence;of military forcesin
support of foreign policy/ They point out that our domestic
needs are too urgent to afford this capabilityr that sabre
rattling is too risky.
G
debate would not be between the extremes
One could argue each of these points interminably./The
no insurance or no
presence capability on one handnd overwhelming superiority to
all potential opponents on the other /The debate would be about
some point in between,/some point where it appears acceptable
for this count-ry to set its defenses/L think that we can
bracket that point./
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 I would start from the assumption/th
between the extremes could be our honoring our NATO commitments/
if Western Europe were assaulted/ There are few people in this
country/.vho do not agree that our vital interests lie/in prevent-
ing Western Europe/from falling into the orbit of the Soviet
Union. /How much military power we require to prevent this,
and of what kind, is a matter for considerable debate./
Now, nearer to the other extreme/most people today want to
avoid involvement n-another prolonge
for diplomatic purpose// Even with the best techniques/hat tools
Potential conflicts/and possible ways to employ military force,
Vietnams/ The spectrum covers a vast scop/f insurance against
lie somewhere in between support for NATO/and aversion to more
mbiguous ground war in
Asia .National consensus on. our need for military forces//mst
like systems analysis can offer us
precise numerical analysis is
not capable of identifying this point.// It is a matter of weighing
national priorities
and exercising judgment.
We must weigh those priorities
light of the changes
both in the world environment/and in domestic attitudes.
our emergence from the bi-polar world into a multi-polar one
At the W ,7ar College/we start our students with the study of
the1irrt?ernational scene this means recognizing the impact
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian Wars
v
Century E.C. his was an era of a hi-polar focus. Je point
out that bi -polar periods have been aberations in history/More
:_ ~en there have been a number of po.11 rsAo balance against
ach oti her Balance of power, Ps S !us-* iai_./You must have
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g~ wer to be a playe1 in the game./ Power, though, is not limited
to military force./ rational power is comprised of industrial
strength, national ill, moral stature; organizational abilityr
and other elements in addition to military strength, The issue
for military
is to probe for that type of military
force//which the country needs to complement
of power. J/ If a prime
1970'slis to balance,
than
contain by military action
the construction of those forces
sophistication for a military ma
In other words a world of.multiu-power negotiations requires
a military posture that has virtues~other than. simply being capable
influence their diplomatic decisions.
understanding how other's. perceptions of our. military might//can
as in Korea and Vietnam,.
may be.different
It requires
rather than fighting and winning,//especially in. terms of.
of defeating the next fellow's/1t In fact, in an era of
negotiations
you may achieve your military purpose or fail
to do soflwit`hout directly engaging the enemy, or perhaps by
only a fraction of his force//in a quick engagement
that is hastily terminated
I suggest that today's environment
purpose of having military forces in the
or, to provide negotiating pressure,flrather
will require us//to pay morb attention to the responsiveness of
our military forces
heretofore.
political and diplomatic needs, than
What thosef e s are, though
is something that we in
uniform can not//and should not determine.
changes in domestic attitude
our other sources
That is where the
graduates of the USNA,flyou know that we in the military uniform
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Our role is to be prepared to comprehend and to follow
whatever course the nation selects/and to do so with purpose,
dedication, and proficiency. We also must advise whether our
forces are capable/of achieving the national objectives. or
strategy./ The purpose of having a War College today/is to
intellectually prepare the next crop of naval leaders moo=
to understand the society they serve/ and to deal intel-
ligently with the imprecise /Uncertain and subjective character
of the national will./
There is no simple way for the public to express that will/
under our democratic process./ It must, of course, be through
the Congress and the Pres~dent./I submit though, that this
The most dangerous course i can imagine would be for us to
back into an evaluation of military needs/hrough disinterest
in the military/or through dismay at the magnitude of the task./
Nothing could be more extravagant./we could well end up with
the military preparing for a set of objectivehat might be
180? out from an unexpressed public opinion./
Thus/as we move into the
era of the All-Volunteer Force,
f
responsibility/for providing
the public must assume a greater
must not mean the end of public concern fore/and interest in
direction to the military establishment./The end of the draft
your armed forces. In
short, giving a
sense of.positive direction
to military purpose/is an essential element to ensuring that
such force is both tailored/nd< employed only as the national
ill dictates.
7 .
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 We are striving,/through higher military education today, to be
ready to work with the civilian public in-.locating the---consensus on
military purpose that we require/ The task demands higher and
more flexible intellectual capabilities in military me than
ever before .The risks in making errors/or in.inadequate
preparation/are severe in this age of swift and treacherous
weaponry and of intricate balancing of international forces
We are dedicated in higher military education/ o ensuring that
the military leaders of tomorrow/are sensitive to the public's
directionAnd worthy of its relying on them /for whatever purpose
is selected our help in reaching this goal would be deeply
appreciated.
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 Approved Fo 4 C'f 109/05 - AQ44RO036000y
r?,I' vt + fln[( T ? ! in ri/ v /lam.
i i t l\ ; '~ U 1;._J I ALi'~ 11 L4\ i`lri \ - ; l t=rill
OI n IS
l r UL L
''WHAT ATTEMPTING TO ACCO'1PLISH AT NWC - MIRROR
WHAT EFFECT MAY HAVE ON THE NAVY OF THE FUTURE
TASK IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING.ONE TODAY
MID-CAREER EDUCATION OF-45O- -
DESl Ii1LU IUP L J-WLFSHIP
COME FROM A NEWTONIAN UNIVERSE
VOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
AUTHORITARIAN WORLD
PROPER
BUT MOVING UP
OUR OBJECTIVE - DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THINKING
THREE VERY IMPRECISE SUBJECTS - MUST GRAPPLE -
WHETHER IN WORLD OF MILITARY OR BUSINESS
FIRST, UNCERTAIN WORLD OF BROAD QUESTIONS
SECOND, INEXACT WORLD OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
THIRDLY, PROBABLISTIC WORLD OF TACTICAL DECISIONS -
TECH CHANGING
COMPOUNDING THE COMPLEXITIES - IMPRECISE OBJECTIVES
UNCERTAINTY OF NOT HAVING A. STANDARD OF MEASURE - PROFIT AND
LOSS STATEMENT
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 arl`~
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FIRSTI DOD CANNOT ESTABLISH & AGREE UPON BASIC OBJECTIVES -
AS EASILY AS YOU I N BUSINESS
WHY A MILITARY?
WHERE & WHEN MIGHT EMPLOY IT?
QUESTIONS ON OBJECTIVES LESS AMENABLE THAN IS QUESTION HOW A
CORPORATION CAN -SATISFY A CO1SUPIER'S NEED - _
SECONDLY, DIFFICULTY IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE 4
BUSINESS WORLD: SALES, PROFIT AS % OF SALES, TURNOVER
RETURN ON ASSETS, RETURN ON STOCKHOLDERS INVESTMENT
WE LACK SUCH TOOLS
NEED FOR MILITARY MEN WHO CAN APPROACH COMPLEX PROBLEMS
ESTABLISHING MILITARY OBJECTIVES & MEASURING THE DEGREE OF FULFILLMENT
WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE TEST OF WAR
NOT ONLY SKILLED CRAFTSMEN - DRIVING SHIPS
ARCHITECTS OF INEXACT POLICIES - VAST IMPORT
TASK OFFICERS FACE IN 1973 IS COMPOUNDED
FOUNDATION HAS DISAPPEARED
v
ACCUSTOMED TO MEASURING OUR OBJECT IVES
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 Approved For Release 2001!09'05. PIA-RDPOOBO-1.55-4ROQ ?00010001-5
O'iED 1 O iiEAS UR I N0 OUR SUCCESS - U
ELD LINE
ONLY EXTENSION TO CUBA LEAP FROG. ACROSS THE SEAS
WITH CONTAINMENT GONE WE MUST NOW REDEFINE OBJECTIVES a MEASURES
COURSE - TAKING THE STUDENTS BACK TO TWO FUNDAMENTAL REASONS
FIRST, DETERRENT IN PEACETIME
SECONDLY, INSURANCE I N CASE DETERRENCE FAILS
TODAY, SOME WHO AVOW THAT OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
INSURANCE HAS DIMINISHED
JUST AS UNDERSTANDABLE - NEW SPRINKLER SYSTEM
DETENTE APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING
ALSO THOSE WHO CONTEND - NOT IN OUR INTERESTS - TO USE THE.
PRESENCE OF MILITARY FORCES - SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY
DOMESTIC NEEDS ARE TOO URGENT
SABER RATTLING IS TOO RISKY
ARGUE EACH OF THESE POINTS INTERMINABLY DEBATE NOT BE
BETWEEN THE EXTREMES OF
NO INSURANCE OR NO PRESENCE CAPABILITY & OVERWHELMING
SUPERIORITY
DEBATE ON POINT I N BETWEEN
WHERE ACCEPTABLE FOR COUNTRY TO SET ITS DEFENSES CAN BRACKET
START FROM THE ASSUMPTION - HONORING OUR NATO COM1'iITNENTS
HOW ''SUCH MILITARY POWER REQUIRED I S MATTER FOR DEBATE
NEARER TO THE OTHER EXTREME
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 Approved For Release 2001f09/05 CIA=RDP$0B01554ROO3600010001-5
C' '1 1(' i'T 1 f i ('1v ;1C~1,?' i}i_ T' it Ai
~' tl'~~:L t'9JUJ iUJ 1 L I L. vLjiiLriI1Lr\L 114 ~DL 1 I'll F LN
SPECTRUM - VAST SCOPE - INSURANCE - WAYS EMPLOY
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IS NOT CAPABLE OF IDENTIFYING THIS EXPLICITLY
WEIGH PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGES -
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
IMPACT OF EMERGENCE FROM THE BI-POLAR WORLD
START OUR STUDENTS WITH THUCYDIDES
ERA A BI-POLAR FOCUS - ABERATION
NUMBER OF POWERS TO BALANCE
BALANCE OF POWER MEANS JUST THAT
MUST HAVE PO4IER - NOT LIMITED TO MILITARY FORCE
INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, NATIONAL WILL, MORAL STATURE,
ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY
ISSUE MILITARY STUDENTS PROBE FOR THAT TYPE OF MILITARY FORCE COUNTRY NEEDS;
COMPLEMENT OUR OTHER SOURCES OF POWER
IF A PRIME PURPOSE - MILITARY FORCES IN 1970'S IS TO BALANCE OR
PROVIDE NEGOTIATING RATHER THAN TO CONTAIN
CONSTRUCTION OF FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT
SOPHISTICATION FOR A MILITARY MAN TO THINK OF INFLUENCING
IN ADDITION TO FIGHTING
UNDERSTANDING HOW OTHER'S PERCEPTIONS CAN
INFLUENCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC DECISIONS
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
tom`. itt~ t _~ ; F Hj 1 r T rjji.ii i : i( ;"~ Ni t-r r
iJ, LL) Ui liU+ i i-i U'r'ti~i~ i`~ U ION,) , REQUIRES
MILITARY POSTURE THAT HAS Vi' UR~S OTHER THAN SIMPLY BEING
CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE NEXT FELLOW'S
MAY ACHIEVE YOUR MILITARY PURPOSE
WITHOUT DIRECTLY ENGAGING THE ENEMY ONLY A FRACTION OF HIS FORCE - QUICK
ENGAGEMENT - HASTILY TERMINATED
SUGGEST TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE MILITARY,
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC FORCES
WHAT POLITICAL NEEDS ARE - SOMETHING THAT WE IN UNIFORM CAN NDI AND
10
AND SHOULD NOT DETERMINE
CHANGES IN DOMESTIC ATTITUDES
MILITARY ARE SERVANTS - USNA WELL REALIZE .
OUR ROLE - PREPARED TO COMPREHEND AND TO FOLLOW COURSE THE
NATION 'SELECTS
PURPOSE, DEDICATION, AND PROFICIENCY
ALSO MUST ADVISE. THE DEGREE FORCES CAPABLE OF
SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
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 ',,Approved For=:Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
7..-- ~ia~ ~ fl n HE ~t~ n^ NEXT
ri,_LaUlr1 LLr rr,.tHRI in: h;:/i CrtuP
70 UNDERSTAND THE SOCIETY THEY SERVE
DEAL WITH THE IMPRECISE, UNCERTAIN NATIONAL. CHARACTER - WILL
NO SIMPLE WAY FOR THE PUBLIC TO EXPRESS THAT WILL
THROUGH THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRES FROM THE -PIIBLI C A POSITIVE APPROACH
TO MILITARY MATTERS
DANGEROUS TO BACK INTO AN EVALUATION OF MILITARY NEEDS DISINTEREST - DISMAL
EXTRAVAGANT END UP WITH THE MILITARY PREPARING
SET OF OBJECTIVES 1800 - UNEXPRESSED PUBLIC OPINION
12
MOVE INTO THE ERA OF THE ALL VOLUN-EER FORCE
PUBLIC MUST ASSUME A GREATER RESPONSIBILITY
IIRECTION TO THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
THE END OF THE DRAFT - NOT MEAN THE END OF PUBLIC CONCERN
GIVING SENSE OF POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MILITARY
PURPOSE - ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
IN ENSURING SUCH FORCE BOTH TAILORED AND EMPLOYED
AS THE NATIONAL WILL DICTATES
STRIVIN .. THROUGH HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
TO BE READY TO WORK WITH YOU
LOCATING CONSENSUS ON #/ILITARY PURPOSE WE REQUIRE AS GUIDANCE
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003600010001-5
UITCU?=D
AMT)
Mf1DC
'
C! CVTD! C
Ti.ITC I I CfT!II I
t'!1L~!!DTI TTTCC'
tt.! att! i\
!.!YJ
;t~t',!
I
; LL/\ ALL
-114ILL !_Lil,?Ui-;?
UI-U I-WiL?I i l.._.3
RISKS OF ERRORS SEVERE TECH AGE OF SWIFT AND TREACHEROUS
WEAPONRY AND BALANCING FORCES
DEDICATED IN HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION
ENSURING LEADERS OF TOMORROW
SENSITIVE TO YOUR DIRECTION
WORTHY OF YOUR RELYING ON THEM
WHATEVER PURPOSE YOU SELECT
TUTC fl :F;ri! I lC
M a Lt_I;I~,tYiiJ
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