MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY BY VICE ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER SEA CONTROL STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003500180001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: STUDY

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by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner
MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY
SEA CONTROL STUDY
Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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MISSIONS PAPER
FOREWORD
In 1970, with an end to nearly a decade of Vietnam con-
flict in sight, a new Chief of Naval Operations determined
that the first undertaking in planning the future U.S. Navy
must be a searching reassessment of the Navy's role and
raison d'etre. This introspective inquiry led to the defini-
tion of four "Naval mission areas"--Strategic Deterrence,
Sea Control, Projection of. Power Ashore, and Naval Presence.
There is nothing new or unique about statements of
purpose for the Navy. What is both new and unique about the
present set of mission statements is that they are being used
explicitly in formulating na;ral strategic plans, and allo-
cating resources during the annual budget process.
Naval Tactics can best be viewed in the light of these
four mission areas because tactics are obviously constrained
by the strategic choices and resource allocations derived
from the Service's missions. Accordingly, this paper
attempts to set the Naval Tactics course in perspective by
discussing the following aspects of naval missions:
I. Utility.
II. Evolution.
III. Definition.
IV. Issues.
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Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed
naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accus-
tomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the seas,"
"commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms,
"Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," "Presence" may seem
to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been
a re-definition of traditional U.S. Naval roles and missions.
The primary purpose of this re-definition is to force the
Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.
Why must we emphasize out-put? First, because a nation
of concerned free citizens and skeptical taxpayers is natu-
rally more interested in what is harvested than in what is
sown. By measuring t'e value of output in terms of national
objectives the country can rationally decide what resources
it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as
manpower, ships, aircraft, and training are of little help
in trying to determine why we need a Navy or, if we do need
one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to
do.
Second, focusing on. missions helps tactical commanders
to keep objectives in mind. ASW tacticians often over-
concentrate on killing submarines when their ultimate objec-
tive is to ensure safe maritime operations. An example of a
good sense of objectives was the Israeli achievement of air
superiority in the 1967 war. Even though air superiority is
traditionally thought of as a function of dogfight tactics,
the Israelis recognized that shooting the enemy from the air
was not the objective. Destroying Egyptian aircraft was.
They employed deep surprise attacks on enemy airfields to
successfully achieve this objective.
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Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is
difficult to manage because it is difficult for an individual
to visualize. By subdividing these masses into their ex-
pected output, or missions, we are able to establish priori-
ties for allocating resources, to know how much we are
spending for different objectives, and to judge their con-
sonance with national strategy.
Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decision
making also. For instance, we shall propose that the Sea
Control mission is executed by tactics of sortie control
(barrier operations), choke point control, open area opera-
tions, and local defense. Different platforms have different
utility in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, VP air-
craft are best for open area operations; surface escorts best
for local defense, and submarines best for choke point
operations. Although each of these forces has secondary
applications, resource distribution among them will be dic-
tated by our evaluation of which tactics are going to be most
important to us.
Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at
even more detailed levels of resource allocation. A sub-
marine designed for choke point operations should emphasize
quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local or
escort defense needs speed even at the expense of quietness.
If we understand this, we will trade off speed versus quiet-
ness according to our evaluation of probable employment.
Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting
the best among several competing systems. A research program
may develop five new air-launched munitions, but we may not
be able to afford production of more than three. We shall
divide tactical air projection tactics into deep interdiction,
battlefield support, close air support, and counter air/anti-
air warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands
for weapons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdic-
tion, it is critical in close air support. Surely in our mix
of three new weapons we will.want at least one that stresses
accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history
will show that the military has sometimes become hypnotized
by the weapons needed or used in one particular tactic or
mission to the neglect of newly emerging requirements.
Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members
of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one of
its parts. This can help keep vested interests in proper
perspective. Even the most professional, well-motivated
individual can become so committed to a particular missile
system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel pro-
gram that he loses sight of what is best for the whole
organization.
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How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas as
Strategic Deterrence, Sea. Control, Projection of Power Ashore,
and Naval Presence? It was evolutionary. Navies have not
always had each of these missions nor is this likely to be
the definitive list of naval missions.
The first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea
Control. A classic example of the importance of being able
to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis in
480 B.C. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the
wall. The Athenian admiral, Themistocles, turned the tables
by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off
from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens
and Attica.
A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian
Sea Control repeatedly permitted outflanking the land-based
Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome's exercise of Sea
Control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to sup-
port Hannibal. And so it went. There were many technologi-
cal milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initia-
tives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe
movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.
In time, trade routes, flourished, exploration became more
far ranging, the horizons of imperialism widened, commerce
grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand security
for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the
sine qua non of economic growth and well-being. The nature
of-Sea Control evolved to include the protection of shipping
for the nation's economy as well as its overseas military
expeditions. By the same token, denial of an enemy's use of
the seas for commerce as well as military purposes became an
important element of warfare--blockade hurt economies and
war-making potential.
By the early 19th century, another important naval mission
had evolved--the projection of ground forces from the sea onto
the land. While there are many examples of landing operations
throughout military history, amphibious warfare in the modern
sense began during the Wars of the French Revolution. Examples
are the British amphibious assault operations at the Helder
(1799) and Aboukir (1801). Ground troops traditionally trans-
ported by sea to some staging area began to use sea platforms
as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was given
to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through am-
phibious assault. This also extended the traditional Sea
Control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforce-
ment and economic shipping, navies now had to protect the
amphibious assault force.
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Also during the 19th century, the term "gunboat diplomacy"
came into the naval vocabulary. In the.quest for colonies,
nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate sheiks and
pashas and to serve warning on one another. In time the
range of this activity extended from warning and coercion to
demonstrations of goodwill. It has come to be known as the
Naval Presence mission. Sea Control, Projection of Power
Ashore by amphibious means and Naval Presence were the mis-
sions of navies through the end of World War II.
During that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in
the Sea Control mission (e.g., Midway, Coral Sea, and Battle
of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support of the
amphibious assault mission. When the war ended, however,
there was no potential challenger to U.S. Sea Control. In
essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify
a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of
new missions. Two arose.
The innovation in missions came from the final stages of
World War II, when naval tactical air power played a role in
the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Postwar improvements
in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this use of
naval air power. In a sense, the tactical air projection mission
was born. The Navy staked out its claim to the use of air power
in support of land campaigns: strategic air attack on enemy
industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the
battlefield; and close air support of ground forces. Its value
was demonstrated early in the Korean campaign where there were
few alternative means of providing air support ashore.
The second innovation in naval missions came with the
introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military
requirement. The combination of improved aircraft perfor-
mance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the air-
craft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission.
With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to peace-
time needs and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place
in the military family, it is understandable that there was
a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the
mid-1960's, the development of the Polaris submarine concept
eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission
for the Navy.
At about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth
of the Soviet naval challenge caused mission priorities to
begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of traditional
Sea Control requirements. Today, the balance of naval re-
sources and attention devoted to each of these four missions,
Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore
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rInc Naval Presence, is especially difficult because ci their
complex interdependence and because almost all naval forces
have multimission capabilities.
The distinction between the four missions is primarily one
c)t purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and inter-
dependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we care-
.u _y examine each mission individually. We must know what
each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook some
useful new tactic or weapon and, so that we can strike the
proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.
III- DEFINITION OF NAVAL MISSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THEIR
FORCES AND TACTICS
_ateaxg Deterrence Mission
Our strategic deterrence
>,jectives are:
To deter all-out attack on
the United States or its
allies;
N=%,V iL PRESENCE
o to face any potential
aggressor contemplating less
than all-out attack with un-
acceptanle risks; and
r.o maintain a stable politi-
1. environment within which
the threat of aggression or
coercion against the United
testes or its allies is
:Minimized.
J.i support of these national objectives, we have three
principal military "tactics" or force preparedness objectives.
The first is to maintain an assured second strike capability
in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack
on the United States. Today that means dissuading the Soviets
from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by main-
tainina a strategic attack force capable of inflicting un-
a.cceptable damage on any enemy even after he has attacked us.
'T'he, Navy's Polaris/Posei(ion/Trident forcer are fundamental
to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival
I)r( )ability.
A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that
the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position
by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a
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portion of our strategic forces, would it then make sense for
the United States to retaliate by striking Soviet cities,
knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to
strike our cities? In these circumstances we would need the
alternative of controlled response. This means making our
strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in
targeting and capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can
be well tailored to these requirements.
A third objective is to deter third powers from attacking
the United States with nuclear weapons. Because of,the great
disparity between any third country's nuclear arsenal and ours,
the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter- others.
Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic
forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage to
the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to allow the
opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is
markedly superior to ours, we would find that political deci-
sions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always
keep in mind the balance of power image that our forces por-
tray to the non-Soviet world. In part, this image affects
what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part,
it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and
how we criticize ourselves.
In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is sub-
divided into four tactics:
? ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
? CONTROLLED RESPONSE
? DETER THIRD POWERS
? BALANCE OF POWER IMAGE
There is very little overlap between strategic deter-
rence and other Navy mission areas at present. However,
significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce
the ability of SSBN's to survive without assistance from
friendly Sea Control forces. With this exception and the
fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for
nuclear strikes, naval forces for strategic nuclear deter-
rence are almost exclusively devoted to that mission.
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-oa Control Mission
The term "Sea Control,"
derives from the traditional
phrase "control of the sea."
This change in terminology may
seem minor, but it is a delib-
erate attempt to acknowledge
the limitations on ocean con-
trol brought about by the
development of the submarine
and the airplane.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through a
period of maritime history in which full regulation of the
seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain. Initially,
this could be accomplished through possession of a superior
sailing fleet. The enemy's harbors were closely watched by
patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were
called forth to defeat- the enemy or at least to force him
back into port whenever he dared to sortie. Later, when
steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the British
found that they needed both coaling stations and control of
vital choke points around the world. The intention was still
to be able to move a superior fleet into position for a show-
down engagement before an enemy had the opportunity to use
the seas for his advantage. The term "control of the sea,"
as used by Mahan, meant both denying use of the seas to the
enemy and asserting one's own use.
British and German naval strategies in World War I re-
flected this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive
encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of
t.!ie seas. Hence, caution dominated the tactics of Jutland.
.lermany challenged British reliance on a superior battle
fleet by first emplovinq surface ship commerce raiders, then
by unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by
attempting to blockade the German U-boat with mines layed
across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval
strategists understood how radically the concept of "control
of Lhe seas" was altered by the advent of the submarine.
British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World
War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions.
Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine
might be more useful than another battleship or two.
Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that
control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However,
in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engage-
ment of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that
i.i: was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that
allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the end of
World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's
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enemy while asserting one's own exclusive use had been over-
taken by technology. On the one hand it was nearly impossible
to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the
other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy
air power would make the assertion of one's presence pro-
hibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after
the second World War, the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on
sea power that the term "control of the seas" understandably
continued to carry its long established connotation.
The new term "Sea Control" is intended to connote more
realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of
time. It is conceivable today to temporarily exert air, sub-
marine, and surface control in an area while moving ships
into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas
forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most
limited sense, to totally control the seas for one's own use,
onto totally deny them to an enemy.
This may change with evolving technology and tactics
but, in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term
"Sea Control," from two directions: denying an enemy the
right to use some seas at some times; and, asserting our own
right to use some seas at some times. Any sea power may
assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right to
the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be
divided between the two objectives. For instance, in
Figure 1 if the United States were attempting in wartime to
use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, it would be
operating near the left side of the diagram with the greater
percentage of its effort on asserting sea control. In a
situation like the Vietnam War, we operated on the right
extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but
we did make a substantial effort to deny the other side
access to Haiphong. An opponent, of course, will usually
respond with countering objectives and tactics as in the
lower half of the figure.
ASSERTION OF SEA CONTROL
DENIAL OF SEA CONTROL
DENIAL OF SEA CONTROL
ASSERTION OF SEA CONTROL
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F()ur U.S. National objectives which call for asserting
our use of the sea and by the same token denial of them to
an opponent are:
? To ensure industrial supplies.
To reinforce/resupply military forces engaged
overseas.
? To provide wartime economic/military supplies to
allies.
? To provide safety for naval forces in the Projection
of Power Ashore role.
There are four different tactical approaches for
achieving these Sea Control objectives:
:_sortie Control: Bottling up an opponent in his
ports or on his bases car, still be attempted. As opposed to
the 18th and 19th century tactic of forcing a major fleet
engagement at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of
individual units as they sortie. If we assume an opponent
will be in control of the air near his ports, sortie control
tactics must primarily depend on submarines and mines.
If successful, sortie control is a most economical
means of cutting off a nation's use of the seas or ability
to interfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have
their disadvantages. No blockade is 100% successful. Some
units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities commence
and will remain to haunt opposition forces. Against the
enemy's aircraft there is no static defense. Planes must
be bombed at their bases. Thus we must conclude that block-
ades are weapons of attrition requiring time to be effective.
But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of
all: ingenious man has usually found ways to circumvent
blockades.
Choke Point Control: Sometimes the best place to
engage the enemy is in a geographical. bottleneck through
which he must pass. In so doing platforms like ASW aircraft
that probably could not survive in the area of the enemy's
sortie point can be used. This also requires patience.
Once an enemy's forces have cleared sortie and choke
point operations, there are two remaining tactics for dealing
with them.
Open Area Operations: Once the enemy is loose at
sea or in the air- surveillance and search systems can assist
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in locating and putting him at bay. Aircraft are perhaps
the most appropriate platform because of high search rates.
Here again, though, time and patience are required.
Local Engagement: In contrast to searching out a
large area, we can let the enemy come to us. If we are
asserting our use of the seas this means that his attacking
aircraft, ships and/or submarines must close our forces to
within weapon release range. This enables us to concentrate
our defensive forces around the units 'to be protected.
Defensive forces may consist of surface escorts, submarines
and whatever aircraft can be brought to the scene, VP, VS,
VF, and VA. These forces may attempt to destroy the enemy's
launching platform prior to weapon release or may attempt to
deflect, or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we
are denying use of the seas to someone else, local engagement
amounts to positioning forces in a limited region and waiting
in prey.
The weapons employed in these four tactics are numerous,
their selection depending on timing and the situation. The
same weapon may be used to assert our control or to deny con-
trol to an opponent. This multimission character of many
weapons systems often causes misunderatanding of the boundary
between Sea Control and the other naval missions. Figure 2
shows the weapons systems applicable to specific Sea Control
tactics.
WEAPONS SYSTEMS APPLICABLE TO SEA CONTROL TACTICS
TACTICS SORTIE CHOKE POINT OPEN AREA LOCAL
WEAPONS
SYSTEMS
SUBMARINES
ASW AIRCRAFT
FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT
SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEMS
ATTACK
AIRCRAFT
MINES
ESCORT SHIPS
CONTROL CONTROL OPERATION DEFENSE
OX
x x x
x
x
x x x
FIGURE 2
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:Itr executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques
deserve particular mention:
Oeception: Assertive Sea Control objectives do not
necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the
enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability
to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control ob-
_jIec:tive. Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices, and other
antisearch techniques can be employed, often in combination
with other tactics.
Intimidation: The perceptions of other nations of
our sea Control capability relative to that of other major
powers can influence political and military decisions. What
any nation says about its capabilities influences the chal-
:I.enges that are offered or accepted.
In summary, Sea Control tactics include:
? SORTIE CONTROL
? CHOKE POINT CONTROL
? OPEN AREA OPERATIONS
? LOCAL ENGAGEMENT
DECEPTION
n INTIMIDATION
Projection of Power Ashore Missions
NAVAL
PRESENC
Sea Control is concerned
with what happens on, under and
over the ocean surface. Projec-
tion of Power Ashore is concerned
with the impact of naval forces
on land forces and can be divided
into three categories: amphibi-
crus assault, naval bombardment,
and tactical air.
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Amphibious Assault Projection: Ships have long
been used to transport military power to conflict areas. As
noted earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition
began to develop as a naval mission in the early 19th century.
The calamitous assault at Galliopli in 1915 and subsequent
failure to distinguish poor execution from good strategy
lowered enthusiasm for this mission. However, World War II
and the Korean conflict testified to its continuing impor-
tance.
Amphibious assaults are opposed landings on hostile
territory and have four objectives:
? To secure territory from which a land campaign
can be launched and supported. We do this by assault from
the sea in several circumstances. One is when there is no
other practical approach, that is the enemy territory is a
geographical or political island. Another is when we want
to outflank and surprise the enemy. The Okinawa and the
Normandy landings in World War II are examples. The purpose
of the assault on Okinawa was to secure a base from which to
launch the invasion of Japan. In Normandy, the assault
launched the attack into heartland Germany.
? To secure land area from which an air operation
can be launched and supported. One of the costliest amphibi-
ous assaults during World War II was launched against Iwo Jima
to gain a site from which the Air Force could strike Japan.
? To secure selected territory or facilities to
prevent enemy use of them. The first offensive action of
World War II in the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal
to deny the Japanese the airfield facilities from which they
could interdict U.S. supply routes between Pearl Harbor and
Australia.
? To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his
communications, divert his effort, etc., by means of amphibi-
ous raids with planned withdrawal.
Amphibious tactics are classified by the size of the
operation:
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COMPARISON OF AMPHIBIOUS TASK ORGANIZATIONS
MAF*
MAB*
MAU*
RAID
TROOPS
TO 33,000
8000-12,000
1800-4000
50-250
SHIPS
43-52
15-17
4-6
1-2
HELOS
250-300
75-120
30-36
10-14
ATTACK
AIRCRAFT
50-60
18-20
6-8**
2-4**
BOATS
320-350
80-100
30-40
2-10
GUNFIRE
8-10 8"
SUPPORT
22-30 5"/54
12-14 51/54
2-4 5%54
0-3 5"/54
MAF -- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
MAB -- MARINE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
MAU - MARINE AMPHIBIOUS UNIT
**VTOL
These rough force compositions are by no means rigid.
There are many specific ways in which amphibious assault forces
can be tailored to the particular requirements at hand. Obvi-
ously the landing force must be adequate in size to handle the
tasks assigned ashore. As the size of an assault increases,
there are two factors that scale upward more than propor-
tionally to the number of troops to be landed. One is the
number of specialized units that are required such as command,
control and communications ships or facilities; minesweeping
capability; aircraft and gunfire support. The other factor is
the time to assemble, sail, prepare the landing area and
assault. The larger the operation the more complex it becomes
with attendant delays and risks of enemy advance defensive
preparations.
Finally, when little or no opposition is encountered,
such as in Lebanon in 1958, amphibious forces can be landed
"administratively." They can then be employed as regular
ground forces if supported. Administrative landings are con-
sidered amphibious operations only when the unique over-the-
beach capability of amphibious force is an essential element.
Naval Bombardment: Although most commonly
associated with amphibious assault, bombardment can have
three separate objectives:
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? To provide direct support to troops operating
near a coastline.
? To interdict movements along a coastline.
o To harass military or civil operations in
coastal areas.
Bombardment is presently available from naval guns in
destroyeks and cruisers. There are two tactics: either direct
or indirect fire control can be employed depending on the
distance of the ship and target from shore. Targets can be
prearranged geographically, called by observers on the beach,
or selected visually from a ship or aircraft. The accuracy
of fire can be spotted from on board ship, from ashore, or
from an aircraft. In time, even. conventionally armed missiles
may also be employed in this role.
Tactical Air Projection: Tactical air power is
used to achieve three objectives:
? Destroy portions of the enemy's warmaking
potential.
? Provide support to a ground campaign. directly
or by interdicting enemy support to the engaged
areas.
? Deny an enemy these same options against us.
There are four basic tactics by which these objectives
are achieved: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction;
close air support; and counterair/anti-air warfare.
Deep Interdiction: Attacks conducted to destroy,
neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before
it can be directed against friendly forces are deep inter-
diction. Targets assigned may be military or civilian,
remote from the battle area and perhaps more strategic than
tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and
material under the protective cover of darkness or adverse
weather, an all-weather attack capability is important.
Battlefield Interdiction: Sometimes referred to
as Direct Air Support (DAS), battlefield interdiction differs
from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually mili-
tary and of immediate tactical importance, and air space con-
trol must be closely coordinated with front line support
operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict
the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or
maneuver his forces.
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Close Air Support: Close air support is direct
support to front line ground forces, generally exercised much
as is call-fire support from field artillery. Therefore, very
close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.
Counterair/Anti-air Warfare: In order to conduct
Aw three types of air strike operations, counterair forces
are employed to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities to
minimize expected attrition of our forces. The threat over
enemy territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), anti-
aircraft guns (AAA) and/or fighter interceptor aircraft.
Counters to these range from attack on enemy air bases or
weapons sites to direct protection with our fighters or
e]nctronic countermeasures. When the situation is reversed,
and an opponent is projecting his air power over our territory,
onf-i-air warfare operations come into play. Fighters, SAMS
and AAA are employed exacting attrition on enemy aircraft.
ALL of these tactical air projection tactics are
carried out by attack aircraft supported as feasible and
necessary by fighter-interceptor air superiority forces. One
of the values of categorizing air projection missions is to
identify the aircraft and weapon characteristics and tactics
best suited to each mission. Figure 4 does this with some
of the principal aircraft and weapon characteristics.
AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR
TACTICAL AIR PROJECTION MISSIONS
(H-high; M-medium; L-Iow;)
CLOSE AIR
DEEP INTERDICTION BATTLEFIELD SUPPORT SUPPORT COUNTERAIR
AIRCRAFT
SPEED
H
M
L
H
MANEUVERABILITY
H
M
H
H
RANGE
H
M
L
M
ENDURANCE
M
M
H
M
ALL WEATHER
H
M
I-
M
SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS H M
M
DELIVERY SYSTEM
ECM CAPABILITY
H
M
IL
H
WEAPONS PAYLOAD
H
M
M
WEAPONS
LONG RANGE
H
M
I-
M
LARGE WARHEAD
H
M
L
L
ANTI-PERSONNEL
L
M
H
ANTI-MATERIAL
H
H
H
SOPHISTICATED (SMART)
H
M
(-
Figure 4
16
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There will be specific scenarios where some of the judg-
mental evaluations in Figure 4 will be incorrect. it
would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have
maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons.
Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics
prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use
and likely need can be valuable.
Before leaving the projection mission, we would note
that only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the
Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. Many
weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious
assaults on choke points or tactical air strikes on enemy air
bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission.
Sea-based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions
for anti-air warfare and against enemy surface combatants.
The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces
nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the
operation. Is the objective to secure/deny use of the seas
or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance,
much of the layman's confusion over aircraft carriers use
stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively
in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the
Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers
were used almost exclusively to establish control of the
ocean's surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to
play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.
In summary Projection of Power Ashore Tactics are:
? Amphibious Assault
? MAF
? MAB
? MAU
? Raid
? Naval Bombardment
? Direct
? Indirect
? Tactical Air
? Deep Interdiction
? Battlefield Interdiction
? Close Air Support
? Counter -Air/Anti -Air
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Nrival Presence Mission
Simply stated, the Naval
Presence mission is the use of
naval forces, short of war, to
achieve political objectives.
The use of presence forces is
for two broad objectives:
? To deter actions inimical to
the interests of the United
States or its allies.
? To encourage actions that
are in the interests of the
United States or its allies.
We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two
tactics: preventive deployments and reactive deployments.
The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence
in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a
crisis (reactive). In a preventive deployment our force
capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which
night arise and clearly cannot be markedly inferior to some
either naval force in the neighborhood, but can rely to some
~ tent on the implication that reinforcements can be made
..available if necessary. on the other hand, in a reactive
deployment any force deployed needs to possess an immediately
credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. if
.:another sea power, such as the Soviet Union, is in the area,
,) comparison of forces will be inevitable.
In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider
what size and composition of force is appropriate to the
situation. There are basically five actions with which a
Naval Presence force can threaten another nation:
4 Amphibious assault
0 Air attack
0 Bombardment
0 Blockade
0 Exposure through reconnaissance
in addition, almost any size and type of presence force
can imply that the United States is concerned with the situa-
tion and may decide to bring other military forces to bear.
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All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we
tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can
move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be
appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the
threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would not
be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on the
capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show support
for a small government threatened with insurrection might be
more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting over-
reaction.
When selecting a Naval Presence force, we must also
take into account how the countries that we want to influence
will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly dif-
ferent categories of national perceptions:
The Soviet Union: When contemplating a U.S.
presence force, the Soviets must assess their comparative
naval strength available over time, and the expected degree
of U.S. resolve. Their principal strength comparison would
probably be on which country can exercise sea control in the
area in question since the United States is not likely to
pose a threat of projecting power directly against the U.S.S.R.,
except in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.
Nations Allied to the Soviets: Nations with
close ties to the Soviets must assess relative U.S.--U.S.S.R.
capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers
will be asking the questions, "Can the United States project
its assembled power onto my shores? and "Can the U.S.S.R.
deny them that capability?" Thus third nation appraisal of
relative sea control strengths may be the most critical
factor. We should note, however, that third power assess-
ments may not correspond to the assessments either we or the
Soviets would make of identical military factors.
Unaligned Third Nations: There will be cases
where a nation is not able to invoke major power support in
a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such
a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to
project its power ashore to influence events in that country
itself.
Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as
sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the
least understood of all Navy missions. A well-orchestrated
naval presence can be enormously useful in complementing
diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied
deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, naval presence
can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can
be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objectives,
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c`aing forces, and appraising perceptions, there will never
be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.
in summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission
L_V. CURRENT AND FUTURE ISSUES INVOLVING NAVAL MISSIONS
AREAS
The United States, as we have seen, has performed the
tour basic: naval missions for many years. Yet the dynamic
nature of world conditions demands a continuing reassessment
of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative
emphasis on their individual tactics. National priorities
nhange; the nature of the threat changes. Only by under-
:t.anding the complex interdependence between naval missions
.r.d their elements can we expect to be able to allocate re-
,our.ces wisely and prepare for the future rather than the
,last.
Some of the key issues which must be addressed are:
:traregic Deterrence
0 Can we maintain our balance of power image and
accent control-led response w-!thout appearing to be
developing a first strike capability?
ea Control
Will probable~scenarios allow time for attrition
tactics? t ar,lr~" s ._ f _
Can local engagement forces be made more effective?
Should future SSN's be designed for employment in
barriers (attrition) or as escorts?(local en aqe-
illeIlt4 ? }t,
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Projection of Power Ashore
Amphibious Assault
? What size assault force is most likely to be
needed?
? Should we design lift forces and tactics
differently for different size assaults?
Naval Bombardment
? Should the vanishing 6-inch and 8-inch guns be
replaced?
? Is there a place for bombardment by non-nuclear
missiles?
? How much high performance capability is needed
(or can we afford) for degp interdiction?
? What tactical application could V/STOL aircraft
best fulfill?
? In what way are electronic warfare requirements
influenced by the different tactics?
Naval Presence
? Are there different operating policies that
would yield a greater presence capability?
Inter-Mission Issues
Strategic Deterrence vs. General Purpose Forces
? How much of the Navy's resources belong in
Strategic Deterrence?
? Should sea-based missiles be favored over the
other elements of the TRIAD and assume a
greater role in Strategic Deterrence?
Sea Control vs. Projection of Power
? Does the increased size of the Soviet Navy
signal the end of our freedom to project power
from sea sanctuaries and justify shifting more
resources into Sea Control?
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0 Did our Vietnam experience diminish the
probability of future projection wars?
v Are "Lo-mix" Sea Control forces incompatible
with the Projection of Power?
Presence vs. Combative Missions
Is the Presence mission. becoming sufficiently
important to warrant building or designing
forces for that purpose?
Obviously we cannot resolve these issues of inter-
mission priority in a vacuum. We must consider both what our
national political object:i-,es are and what any potential op-
ponent is doing. Our principal military concern, of course,
is the growing Soviet Navy. The evolution of their post-
World War II navy would indicate that they started with a
sea denial orientation as evidenced by their emphasis on sub-
marines. There are those who argue that this was intended
only to deny us access to waters from which we could Project
Power into the Soviet Union. There are others who contend
that their sea denial capability now includes being able to
interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of oceans.
It also seems clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen to exer-
cise its Naval Presence capabilities aggressively. Whether
they look on this as a fall-out of their other capabilities
or have done so deliberately is difficult to assess. With
the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers and the continuing
expansion of their amphibious forces, there is a growing
question of whether they have ambitions for Projection of
Power Ashore capability. If so, it would logically be
accompanied by assertive Sea Control capabilities to defend
their projection forces. Even smaller non-allied navies,
such as the Chinese, must be taken into account. They, as
the Soviets, are starting with a sea denial orientation.
With relatively simple sea denial weapons such as anti-ship
missiles and mines proliferating and extending in reach, the
threat of sea denial in restricted waters from even the
smallest navies may well increase in the future.
There will always be this constant flow and counter
now of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. Perhaps
*When we think in the accustomed terms of projection of
power from sea sanctuaries, we incline toward larger, more
cost-effective. and more efficient platforms (the "hi" of the
"hi-To mix"). Sea Control favors numbers of units because
operations will likely spread to numerous areas; the "Lo"
side of the mix.
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it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the
one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing
this. On the other, the changing nature of world political
relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabili-
ties to support national policy. Naval officers, as profes-
sionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually
question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis
for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs.
Unless we do, we will be left behind attempting to use yes-
terday's tools to achieve today's objectives.
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 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE #3
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SIG - 2ND STRIKE? NO
PRO: DETERRENCE = PERCEPTION NOT ACCURACY
IMPRESSION IF 1ST STRIKE FROM SHORT RANGE
CONTROLLED RESPONSE - YES
3RD POWER - YES?
BALANCE POWER - NO -
TOO SOPHISTICATED
MAINLY FOR CONTROLLED RESPONSE - COMPARE OTHER ALTERNATIVES
# BOATS 43/710 ~~ a d
1. SALT II - WHAT WANT?
2. BREAK SALT I - WITH WHAT?
2ND STRIKE - YES
DISADVANTAGES?
CONTROLLED RESPONSE
SHORT,\RANGE - ACCURACY
NAME S 4ri /1 4.. J ~N
2q..% [14)?V O 61,4A/
1/15,7f I':"
//urC11 //t~TC~/>.iJ SG>r/ U3 4"-
&/, 5 ," / T?-/ C/S/
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Jon Steele Hugh 0/Brien - Civ
Sal Salopek
Mike Midas
Tom Tollefson
Dick Whittington
Jeannie Todaro
Dill Siepel - DD
Ed Reilly - VP
Dave Parr - CG
Butch Williams
Steve Hamilton
Don Houk - DD
Al Boothe
Ken Clare
Jim Gamrath
Bob Kessler
Sandy Stoddard
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 SEA CONTROL #4
Approved For Release A-RDP80B01554R003500180001-8 #8 Matrix
Tom Buell #12 USAF
TACTLASS #7 Assert/
Passive towed sonar array Deny
Weakness?
Any passive - hull system?
Where applicable?
Open area
Area search/hour
Detection range vs. speed
Local Engagement
Speed alternatives
Sprint - drift
Slow force
CAN HELP?
SORTIE - MINES
CHOKE - MINES - RECCO - AIR SUPERIORITY
OPEN - RECCO
LOCAL - RECCO - AIR SUPERIORITY - SONOBUOYS?
ADD TO AF MISSIONS?
NAMES
C1/mil^ , 71e'c~.
J/iv/ L~A~r Y C/Sn~
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1rjD 3 Cu vn/i.~~G q (c4F #iJSs' Zap ./~ a c,kS?4
 Approved For Release Q1/O9,fq: CIA-RDP80B01554R003500180001
#10
C VSTOL
NAMES
P4al- CaoP - c1-5^1
B/c-t BA-- -r2AIE4 t4-F-^/
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 Approved For Rel H 1fT5 : CIA-RDP80B01554RO035001800#98
AMOUNT LIFT 50 + SHIPS NOW - OCEANS
GFS NEWPORT NEWS VISIT - LAST OF 8"
NAMES
- Gu s?q,4*-' d /
J,; 1 r3 ) ( use-/
(5~24 7 , usiz> c
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 Approved For ts-Qt /09/05: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003500180 b U8
SA
#14 CG
KOREA - NAVY ABSENT - PUEBLO
REASSERT PRESENCE?
BETTER WITH ARMY?
INDIAN OCEAN - YES/NO?
REACTIVE VS PREVENTIVE
COAST GUARD HELP - TRAINING?
NAMES WV 44-144&
.~tii iE Cu.L,4-1 i~/(s5 USCG- t/.S.g
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=8-
~~ 1/~12~ L~- t~.5%4- L~rC L 5~ C_,~/Y1gn( cisA