THE 20TH CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT: ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100010001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research. Staff on International Communism
THE 20th CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT:
ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
CIA/SRS-1
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FOLDER
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
"THE 20th CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT:
ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"
CIA/SRS-l
This is a speculative study which has been
discussed with US Government intelligence
officers but has not been formally coordinated.
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Page
Pertinent Background Factors 1
The Main Issues of the Congress 2
Internal Aspects 5
External Aspects 8
The Meaning of the Congress for International Communism 11
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THE 20th CPSU CONGRESS IN RETROSPECT:
ITS PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Pertinent Background Factors
1. The CPSU is the leading Communist Party in the world. Its
ideological leadership has been acknowledged even by the Chinese
Communist Party. Being in control of the Soviet state, it controls
the political, military and economic power of the USSR, the strong-
hold of World Communism. Thus its pronouncements on doctrine,
strategy, and tactics are of decisive importance to International
Communism. Communist courses of action are determined primarily
in Moscow; the Chinese "People's Republic", for all its potential strength,
is still dependent upon Soviet guidance and assistance. The USSR remains
the base of world Communism, and there is no indication that this situa-
tion is about to change. If now, at the fountain of Communist wisdom,
a new course is set which appears to deviate considerably from that of
the Stalin era, repercussions are likely to occur which may be of great
moment for both the Communist and the non-Communist world, if not
immediately, at least in the foreseeable future.
2. The reasons for the announced changes must be sought'far back
in the Stalin regime. Long before his death, the men around Stalin must
have recognized that he paid only lip service to the doctrine of flexibility.
After World War II, when the USSR had become a great power, the rigidity
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of Stalinist thought and action produced a stalemate in Europe, fear of Soviet
interference in non-committed nations, and a widening gap between the Party
and the Soviet people. It is probable that designs for altering the basis of
the regime were pondered - and perhaps to some extent. discussed - in the
dictator's entourage. When. it became obvious that Stalin's days were num-
bered, immediate plans for a reorganization of government and Party were
made, and these were put into action upon his death. The successors to
Stalin must have realized that the reorganization and economic incentives,
initiated by Malenkov's "new course", could not, by themselves, create the
desired political climate at home and abroad. Even the liquidation of Beriya
and the sharp limitation of police power were not sufficient to demonstrate that
Soviet Communism had embarked on a new, less violent, more gradualistic
approach toward its objectives. Only an official break with the symbol of
past policies, Stalin, could really impress the Soviet people and the world.
The underlying purpose of the leadership was to promote political security
and socio-economic incentives internally, to develop the concept of "competi-
tive coexistence" externally, and to achieve global Communist "respectability1v.
These objectives were defined during the three years following Stalin's death;
they were confirmed and explained by the 20th CPSU Congress and made
explicit through the denigration of Stalin. It is against this background that
the 20th Congress must be understood.
The Main Issues of the Congress
3. The institution of Communist Party Congresses cannot be likened
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to democratic conventions. Primarily, these Congresses are used as
sounding boards for the justification of past policies and the outlining of
new ones. The 20th Congress served these traditional purposes, even
though it differed from previous Congresses in both tone and substance.
The results did not indicate that Communist fundamentals are to be sacri-
ficed. On the contrary, the Congress emphasized that Communism is,
and remains the wave of the future. But it did point out that the successes
of International Communism have given the "Socialist camp" a more solid
status in world politics and have thereby rendered Stalinist tactics obsolete.
The revolution has not been called off, the Congress admitted; revolutionary
techniques, however, are being changed. Revolution can become more
gradual and respectable. In other words, the policies set forth by the 20th
Congress are designed to make the anticipated eventual victory of Communism
more easily acceptable and to eliminate at least the more dangerous tensions
which have troubled the world throughout the cold war. To put this new
approach on a firm ideological basis, some doctrinal "modifications". were
announced, primarily with a view to rationalizing the type of successor regime,
discarding some of the more obnoxious Stalinist principles, and advertising
the so-called "return to Leninism".
4. However, a change from violence to "diplomacy" and from tension
to relaxation, no matter how well explained, cannot but have a deep psycholo-
gical impact on the people inside the Communist orbit and on the Communist
parties outside. Even if such "mellowing" process is only superficial, it
may set in motion forces extending far beyond the contemplation of the present
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collective leaders of the CPSU. These leaders must be mindful that the
Bolshevik regime is a unique historic phenomenon. It has been able to main-
tain itself in power for almost four decades after its original objective, the
victory of the Bolshevik revolution, was achieved. It has achieved this
extraordinary feat by what might be called "permanent revolution from above".
Tensions had to be kept high in order to prevent a peaceful post-revolutionary
development. Totalitarian dictatorship had to be justified by alleging the
necessity for an unending struggle against the "class enemy" within and
"capitalist imperialism" without, according to Lenin's concept of the "inevitable
death struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps". Stalin merely
extended and exacerbated this struggle, and, since the significance of nuclear
weapons apparently escaped him, he continued it without letup after World
War II. Since the new Soviet-Communist platform calls for a general relaxa-
tion of tensions, the question naturally arises whether the leaders of the CPSU
and other parties can dispense with permanent tension without at the same time
undermining their monolithic dictatorship. The 20th Congress refrained from
exhorting the people to continue the "relentless struggle against the class
enemy"; the bugaboo of internal danger was, for the time being, layed down.
However, it maintained the theory of hostile camps, albeit in a much milder
form. The Party has modified its strategy against the capitalist camp enough
to tone down the "struggle against foreign enemies of socialism", thereby
weakening the argument that socialist vigilance requires the continuation of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is unlikely that the shrewd managers
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of the USSR have not recognized these problems. The fact that they none-
theless decided to launch their new approach, suggests that their reasons
must have been weighty indeed, and their confidence great.
Internal Aspects
5. Stalin's successors, generally speaking, have heavily emphasized
inducements rather than force. There is apparently less of arbitrary police
cruelty; slave labor camps are allegedly being dismantled. Labor laws have
been liberalized, and - with few exceptions - economic inducements, first
introduced by Malenkov, have been continued by Khrushchev though with
changed emphasis. But while Malenkov, still very much under Stalin's spell,
counted on the support of the governmental bureaucracy against the Party
whose influence had been waning, Party leader Khrushchev re-established
Party predominance and turned dictatorial power back to it. At the same time,
Khrushchev sought to improve relations between the Party and the people,
which in the Stalin era had seriously deteriorated. This method is likely to
strengthen Party dictatorship in a time of diminishing tensions. The Soviet
leaders are as unwilling now as they have ever been - and will be in the
foreseeable future - to democratize their system and to permit public discis -
sion of political problems. This was demonstrated by the lack of discussion
during the 20th Congress, as well as by PRAVDA's recent warning not to
extend criticism to include the Party and the system.
6. It is clear, therefore, that the "return to Leninism" does not mean
the return to "Party democracy40. Nor is the substitution of Party. dictatorship
for one-man rule necessarily an improvement from the viewpoint of US security.
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There is no reason to assume that the modified "Neo"-Leninism, now so
heavily propagandized, is more than formally different from the Soviet system
as we have known it. It may be recalled that the practice of "Party democracy",
or "democratic centralism", was severely limited by Lenin, who warned against
" fractionalizationt' as early as 1921, after the Kronstadt revolt. At the 10th
CPSU Congress in the same year, Lenin justified his position by referring to
the danger of hostile class interests using the instrument of debate for their
own counter-revolutionary purposes. Nevertheless, there still occurred
occasional intra-Party discussions, cautiously airing opposing views. So
strong was this habit that Stalin, having succeeded Lenin, could not completely
eliminate its remnants until 1928 when his position was firmly consolidated.
During the remainder of Stalin's regime "party democracy" disappeared under
the secret police terror. The collective leaders of the USSR now claim that
they are re-instating this principle. However, the mere fact that Khrushchev
has called for more frequent plenary meetings of the Central Committee is no
proof that genuine "democratic centralism" has been restored. He may permit
perfunctory discussions so long as they do not show any deviationist tendency.
Generally, however, such meetings probably can and will be used as a means
of maintaining better control of this body and of coaxing - or pressuring - it
into rubberstamping the edicts of the collective leaders without resort to the
overt threat of police action. In truth, the heavily advertised "return to
Leninism" consists primarily of a change in methods. The leaders of the
CPSU have given up the Byzantine trimmings of the Stalin "cult of personality"
without relinquishing any of their powers.
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7. The return to Leninism, we are told, means the return to
"collective leadership". There were, indeed, traces of this principle
under Lenin, which Stalin managed to eliminate by 1928, prior to forced
collectivization. Its highly vaunted renovation does not mean that power
will now be distributed with checks and balances; it merely indicates a
different method of using power. At best, "collective leadership" might
develop into an oligarchy with quasi-"democratic" trappings. It might trans-
form the present despotism into a form of "enlightened absolutism".
Collective leadership at present is a euphemism for the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Within this Presidium, predominant power
is exercised by the half-dozen active. "old Bolsheviks", of whom Khrushchev
seems to be primus inter pares. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev and his
colleagues appear to be willing to listen to arguments and consult with experts.
They may be demanding and receiving more objective intelligence reports.
As they develop a more realistic attitude toward the facts of international life,
they may be able to look beyond the narrow confines of their ideology and
formulate more realistic and subtle policies to achieve their goal peacefully.
The result of this change can already be seen. The Soviet leaders have
recognized both the destructive consequences of war and its futility in the
nuclear age. They have therefore resorted to such peaceful methods as
economic competition in lieu of military pressure. They are trying to stabilize
their own economy by stimulating productivity; and they have introduced
measures improving the lot of their own underdogs while at the same time
whittling down the incomes of the nouveaux riches .
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8. In order to carry out these policies, the break with Stalin had to
be complete. The break itself was not a surprise. Surprising, only, was the
violence of Khrushchev's attack against Stalin in his "secret" speech of
25 February. This action may have been designed to perform psychological
surgery onthe Party. But it was also conceived as a warning to the Communists
throughout the world that flexibility had been restored to Soviet policy, which
could now employ tactics adequate to cope with the fact that the nature of
revolution had changed. The reversal of more than 25 years of Stalinist
indoctrination unquestionably will force many communists throughout the world
to make difficult adjustments. But such adjustments have been made before and
have not impaired the continuing vigor of the International Communist movement.
The Soviet leaders must have known that the 20th Congress would produce a
period of confusion, particularly among the parties outside the orbit. But
they probably calculated that eventually adjustments could and would be made.
In any case, the interests of the USSR both as a nation and as the base of world
Communism had to take precedence. We suggest that the Soviet leaders
earnestly pondered these problems for many months and, having come to
their conclusion, felt no hesitation to consummate the break with Stalin. If
this assumption is correct, it would appear that they had not been forced to
make the violent attack against Stalin on 25 February because of internal or
external pressures.
External Aspects
9. It was stated above that the CPSU leaders left the "class enemy"
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within unmentioned. The same cannot be said of the "capitalist imperialists",
even though the noise of sabre rattling sounded rather muffled. The Soviet
leaders have continued to emphasize the differences between the socialist
and imperialist camps; by implication they have retained the thesis of basic
irreconcilability. Nevertheless, they did transform their once rude and
vitriolic aggressiveness into a politer version of Communist verbiage, which
was made more tolerable, if not actually conciliatory, by diplomatic flourishes
and by some actual "concessions" such as the withdrawal from Austria. The
development of nuclear weapons and jet propulsion, together with the growing
belief, especially since the Summit Meeting, that the West does not now harbor
aggressive designs, probably contributed decisively to Communist confidence
in the future and led to the reinvigoration of what had long been known as
"peaceful coexistence". Stalin had used this term in the Twenties but never
gave it practical meaning. Malenkov reintroduced the concept, and Khrushchev,
applying "creative interpretation6s, transformed it into "competitive coexistence".
This new doctrine harmonizes admirably with the de-emphasis of armed power.
At the same time the Soviet leaders may believe that it will stimulate the
domestic Soviet economy while at the same time weakening the Western
economic system. This, in turn, would stimulate the "contradictions among
capitalist states fighting for world markets". Moreover, by inferring that
the USSR is no longer isolated but has become the center of a worldwide
system of socialist states, the Soviet and Communist leaders have admitted
implicitly that at least some of the former "colonial and semi-colonial countries"
have become politically independent. Their policy of creating a non-committed
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91peace bloc", of keeping it at least neutral, and perhaps winning it over to
the socialist camp, may have led to revisions of their classic colonial
doctrine.
10. The break with Stalin signifies that the leaders of the CPSU will no
longer insist that they have a monopoly on the 11correct " way to "socialism".
During Stalin's lifetime the only ex-post-facto blessing of a deviation from
this Soviet doctrine was that which he had reluctantly given to Mao. A
Canossa trip to Belgrade would have been unthinkable. The Leninist formula
that various ways can lead to Socialism - with the end of the road always the
conquest by Communist revolution - was not used by Stalin. The reaffirma-
tion of this formula by the 20th Congress has probably quelled some mis-
givings on the part of the less sophisticated neutrals. It is likely to create
increasing demands from the satellites to follow their own path to "socialism".
If Moscow denies them this right, it will have proved its insincerity before
the world and may lose, thereby, much of the good will it now possesses in
some non-committed countries. Nor will it, in the long run, be able to
maintain the appearance of respectability, particularly vis-a-vis potential
United Front partners. Much less will it be able to impress non-Communist
democracies with its claim that it will attempt to gain power legally by
parliamentary means, and not by violent overthrow of governments.
11. It should be restated here, and it cannot be emphasized too strongly
that recognition by the Soviet leaders of the significance of nuclear weapons
is the underlying cause for Lhair policy shift. For the present, at least,
atom and jet are the basic deterrents to general war, and probably also
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to local wars. Despite repeated pronouncements that a nuclear war would
destroy only Capitalism, the Communists have no real ideological "guide
to action" in this field; they surely must realize that the atom knows no
ideological preferences. Stalin probably tried hard but in vain to come to
grips with this problem since the day of Hiroshima. His successors appear
to have found a temporary solution by shifting from dangerous military
pressures to less dangerous economic blandishments. Nevertheless,
although their policies are designed to avoid war and to let capitalism die
"peacefully", there is no prohibition for Communists to divide the capitalist
camp and render it harmless. Meanwhile, the "socialist" camp will continue
to solicit allies among the imperialists, be they states, groups, or
individuals. 20th century changes in capitalist economy are minimized or
ridiculed. The Leninist view of the inevitable downfall of capitalism at its
highest stage, imperialism, has remained intact. Evolutionary tendencies,
which goaded Lenin into writing vitriolic pamphlets, are still outlawed in
spite of United Front overtures to socialist "opportunists".
The Meaning of the Congress for International Communism
12. The basic structure of Marxist-Leninist Communism has remained
untouched. There is no indication that the present Soviet leaders have
renounced the goal of world domination. However, they no longer insist
that this conquest can and must come to pass under exclusive Soviet leader-
ship. Nor is there any hint that a Communist world would have to be
dominated by the USSR. This means the acceptance of a gradualist approach
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to Communist objectives which not only is considered feasible in view of the
strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the growth of the uncommitted neutralist
"peace camp", but also is made necessary by the destructiveness of nuclear
weapons and by the great jeopardy to Communism's continued existence in
the event of war. The post-Stalinist concept of Communist victory is the
achievement of "socialism" in individual countries in a manner suited to
national conditions, followed by the joining of such countries in a loose
community of "socialist" states. At first, these states would 'retain their
national identities but as time goes by they would gradually merge into a
World-Communist community which would rule itself according to ideologi-
cally motivated universal laws, having discarded national governments as
we know them today. Apparently the Soviet leaders anticipate the completion
of the first step, the end of capitalism in individual nations, by the end of
the century. It is conceivable that they think in terms of a classless society
emerging only in the 21st century, inasmuch as the establishment of such a
society is hardly possible so long as politically inimical camps continue to
exist.
13. If this view of the Soviet leaders' estimate is correct, it would
follow that they can give considerably more leeway to the satellite parties.
From the Soviet point of view, the military and economic integration of
these countries with the USSR is sufficiently strong to permit a modicum of
what Stalinists used to call "nationalist deviation". Communism in the Far
East has to be adapted to conditions prevailing in that area, as was already
recognized in the Soviet acceptance of Maoism. While there is, and
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probably will continue for some time to be, confusion among the Party rank
and file, resulting from the break with the Stalin idol, this confusion is
unlikely to provoke many defections. Outside the USSR, it will be easier
to achieve socialism by the "national" road than under the Soviet yoke.
Soviet control and influence will be maintained, but in a subtler manner.
Resistance against Communism will thus be overcome by a process of
attrition rather than revolution.
14. The confusion resulting from the break with Stalin will last longer
and probably have deeper consequences in the parties outside the Communist
orbit. Their doubts will be shared by leaders of international Front organi-
zations. This period of efforts to adjust policies and methods to the new
Soviet approach could be lengthened, and confusion could '-)e widened if
Western political warfare adequately exploits this unique opportunity.
Nevertheless, the climate of political relaxation in non-Communist'govern-
ments and the prospect of broader interpretation of the Communist objectives
will enable the leaders of these parties and fronts to maneuver overtly with
a minimum degree of obnoxiousness, while covertly strengthening their
cadres for the tasks ahead.
15. It is suggested that the long-range result of the 20th CPSU Congress
will turn out to be beneficial from the Communist point of view - provided
the lack of tension does not soften the movement's hard core vanguard.
The Soviet approach is realistic and ingenious. It takes into account
military facts of life. It explores the increased stature of the Communist
part of the world and the nationalistic sensitivities of the former "colonial
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and semi-colonial" countries. It feels strong enough to engage the US in
an economic popularity contest. It tries hard, and not altogether unsuccess-
fully, to raise the level of Communist respectability. On the other hand, it
does not hesitate to stir up troi-ble in areas of political vacuum, such as
the Middle East, if it can thereby advance its influence to hitherto closed
parts of the world. Unless it is stopped, it will do the same in Latin
America and Africa. Altogether, Moscow, under Stalin, has learned its
lesson. It now uses psychology, taking initiatives designed to put the West
on the defense. With this strategy, and appropriate tactics, it appears
hopeful of a bloodless victory over a system which, in the Communist belief,
is doomed to collapse sooner or later - probably sooner.
16. The question arises whether the new Soviet-Communist line will
require more of an organization than is presently at its disposal. Not
enough is known about the intricacies of Communist international communica-
tions to come to definite conclusions. Overtly at least, the Soviet missions
abroad avoid contact with national Party and Front leaders. Covert connec-
tions exist to provide personnel guidance, policy directives, and financial
assistance. This machinery, however, is expensive, cumbersome,
haphazard, and dangerous. Thus the problem may arise how to give com-
prehensive guidance to the apparatus in different countries whose political,
social and economic developments vary. Better means of overall coordin-
ation may have to be developed. It is therefore possible that sometime in
the future a new device may be put into operation which would take care of
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Communist communication in a more systematic way. This would probably
not be an organization as such. Rather, it might be an international Party
"conference", possibly under an "innocent" cover, and conceivably with
participation of non-Communist Marxists, set up to transmit policy directives
and solve operational problems. Such a "conference" would be particularly
necessary if the Communist leaders came to the conclusion that the
relaxation of tensions had produced a slackening of Party discipline and a
deterioration of Communist resourcefulness. This possibility raises certain
fundamental questions: Can Communism withstand the changes resulting
from the 20th Party Congress without losing its revolutionary zeal? Is
there in preparation a "mellowing process" which in time will bring about
a metamorphosis of Communism? Or, is the present line merely a
gigantic shift of tactics, imposed by the development of nuclear weapons
and their jet-propelled delivery and made possible by both the greater
strength of the Communist bloc and the emerging independence of former
colonial nations?
17. We cannot but assume that the Communist leaders would reject
a "mellowing" process. They will try to do all in their power to prevent
it from developing. Their only concept of Communist metamorphosis is
linked to the shift from socialism to Communism, i. e. from the dictator-
ship of the proletariat to a classless society. They are likely to seek a
period of some years of relaxation during which they can extend their
influence with the help of overt respectability while building up and tough-
ening their covert organizations and, what is more important, strengthen-
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ing the overall potential of the USSR. At the same time, they might also
consider the usefulness of permitting the Satellites a greater show of
independence. As national states, remaining under veiled Soviet control,
they would testify to Moscow's good faith. They might assist in the
development of relations with Western Europe, possibly through their own
liberated socialists who might be put in touch with Free World socialist
parties. This would greatly advance the United Front tactic on an inter-
national scale. But all these measures would be designed only to further
basic Communist objectives.. Since violence has characterized Communist
actions in the past, subtler methods could be mistaken, even by Party
members, as an indication of "mellowing". Nothing would be farther from
Soviet-Communist intentions.
18. There is, however, an outside chance that Khrushchev's newer
course, deviating as it were from the irreconcilable, aggressive precepts
of Lenin and Stalin, may carry the germs of revolutionary paralysis
within itself. It is conceivable that a psychological transformation could
vitiate the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism. Once freed from
the confines of permanent tensions, mental attitudes may develop which
could become stronger than Communist faith and discipline. Such a trans-
formation would be slow, at first hardly noticeable, but it might work itself
up persistently from the grass roots to the "leading circles". It is
impossible to estimate how long such a process would need to become
apparent, nor is it possible to foresee its ultimate outcome. Muct would
depend upon the character of future Soviet leadership.
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19. The premise for a successful Communist holding operation is
the continuation in power of the CPSU's Presidium as presently constituted.
The shrewd "old Bolsheviks" will ruthlessly (and noiselessly) suppress
any evidence of "mellowing". Nor can it be expected that the middle and
higher ranks, of functionaries and officers have any intention of jeopardiz-
ing their position by crowding the present leaders. It is futile to speculate
on the character of the regime which will succeed today's collective leaders,
but it is possible that the present constellation may last 5-10 years, provided
"peaceful coexistence" continues. If antibiotics of transformation have
penetrated the Communist body politic, their effect, if any, probably will
not show during this period. If transformation is permitted to come to the
surface later, it will do so very slowly, almost unnoticeably. It may be a
generation or two before tangible changes become apparent. Moreover,
any major disruptive event, such as internal upheavals or local wars,
would be likely to interrupt the healing process. Thus it cannot be expected
that a "mellowing process" could become effective during the next decade.
Nor is it overly pessimistic to predict that a healthy transformation of
Communism into a movement of constructive social endeavors cannot be
expected in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile we shall be compelled to
continue warding off a diabolically clever opponent whose ingenuity and
resourcefulness, unfortunately, is growing.
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