COVERT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS FOR EXPLOITATION OF STALIN S DEATH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000300040063-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: March 17, 1953
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved Foelease 200OSQI1-RDP80-010600300040063-2
Security Information
MAR 17 1953
C At WARFARE Q S
I. PURPOSE
A. To make immediate maxim muse of existing covert psychological
warfare assets and facilities to exploit opportunities created by
Stalin's death and thereby endeavor to:
1. Impede the orderly transition of power and establishment
of authority by the new Soviet regime.
2. Create a psychological climate of confusion, uncertainty,
suspicion and doubt within the areas under direct Soviet control,
3. Intensify disaffection and passive resistance to the regime.
4. Induce defection of Soviet military and government repre-
sentatives stationed abroad.
5. Promote conflict and division between the Soviet Union and
its satellites.
II. TARGET AREA
Soviet Union and those areas of Eastern Europe and Asia where large
concentration of Soviet military and civilian personnel are found.
III. TARGET GROUPS
A. Soviet Military
1. Soviet military personnel serving with the Soviet forces
of occupation.
2. Soviet military personnel on diplomatic duty abroad.
3. Soviet military - all ranks - inside the USSR.
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B. Soviet Official Representatives
1. Diplomatic and official representatives stationed abroad.
2. TASS and similar categories of Soviet personnel stationed
abroad.
3, Dependents of the Soviet personnel stationed abroad.
4, Soviet representatives on temporary assignments to the UN
and other international organisations.
C. Soviet Population Inside the USSR Borders
1. Great Russian ethnic group.
2. Non-Great Russian ethnic groups.
IV, ASSUMPTIONS
In addition to the basic assumptions listed in the PSB plan, the
following assumptions should be included:
A. It is assumed that the new Soviet leadership is acting within the
framework of a comprehensive plan designed to assure the orderly transfer
of power after Stalin's death.
B. It is assumed that within the framework of such a plan, the new
Soviet regime will initiate a series of provocative military, diplomatic,
psychological and economic warfare measures, short of starting a general
war, designed to throw off balance western efforts to interfere with or
impede the consolidations of the regime's power.
C. It is assumed that the new Soviet regime will undertake specific
measures designed to test the reaction of the West to the new regime. These
measures will be aimed at exacerbating the disunity of the West and prevent-
ing the formation of a united western effort against the new Soviet leader-
ship.
D. Finally, it is assumed that the new Soviet regime will make tactical
peace overtures to the West for the purpose of exploiting the neutralist
sentiment in many countries and gaining the time required for consolidation
of its rule.
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V. (NERAL OBJECTIVES
The general strategic objectives to be served by the short range
program of covert psychological operations for exploitation of Stalints
death are:
A. To establish the Soviet Military as the patriotic guardian of
tradition and protector of the people against the tyranny of the com-
munist Party rule.
. B. To instill within the Soviet Military the desire to seize the
opportunity to liberate the peoples of the USSR, and encourage the people
to incite and support the armed forces to struggle for liberation.
C. To undermine the confidence of the Soviet peoples in the new
regime by:
1. Fomenting conflicts and prompting fission within the top com-
mand of the Soviet Government.
2. Destroying the effectiveness of the new regime by compromise
and character assassination of its key persons.
3. Promoting fear, confusion and disaffection among the peoples
of the USSR.
4. Emphasizing that the course which the new regime is determined
to follow leads to further worsening of the standard of living, new
purges and a probable war.
D. To weaken the effectiveness of the State Security apparatus by
emphasizing that the day of reckoning is approaching and everything they
do against the people will be held against them.
E. To bring about defection of Soviet military and official representa-
tives stationed abroad in order to undermine the confidence of the new
regime in its officials.
F. To encourage the peoples of the USSR to take advantage of the
present situation through intensification of their anti-regime activities.
Such activities should be limited to:
1. Intensification of passive resistance.
2. Intensification of slow-downs in production.
3. Collective efforts to neutralize the informant system.
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G. To intensify deviation of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR by
emphasizing the Great Russian complexion of the new regime.
VI. TASKS
In the attainment of general objectives, all existing covert assets
and facilities will be exploited. Additional capabilities, whenever
practicable and possible, will be developed to exploit all targets of
opportunity.
Task A To establish the Soviet armed forces as the protector
of the people, and to encourage them to liberate their
country from the tyranny of Party rule.
25X1 C
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Task B To undermine the confidence of the Soviet peoples in the
new regime.
25X1 C
Task C To weaken the effectiveness of the State Security
apparatus.
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Task D To bring about defection of Soviet military and official
representatives stationed abroad.
25X1 C
1. Same as described under TASK A.
Task E. To encourage the peoples of the USSR to intensify their
anti-regime activities.
25X1 C
1. Same as described under TASK A.
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Task F To intensify deviation of the non-Russian peoples from
the new regime.
SECRET `,
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 Iease. 2008106 -RDP80-01065
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
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25X1A
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