PEIPING SPONSORS THAILAND EX-PREMIER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000300010006-3
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 5, 1998
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 5, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80R01443R000300010006-3.pdf | 122.97 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 80R01443R000300010006-3
NSC BRIEFING 5 August 1954
PEIPING SPONSORS THAILAND EX-PREMIER
1. First news in many months regarding former Thai premier,
Pridi Phanomyong was 23 July Peiping radio broadcast that
he guest of honor at banquet of China Peace Committee.
A. Pridi, who worked underground with Allies in
World War II, headed Thai government after
Japan's defeat, vanished after 1947 coup lead
by Thailand's present premier, Marshal Phibun.
Whereabouts since 1947 obscure; often reported
in China.
B. His Peiping reappearance quickly followed by
29 July byline in People's Daily. Article
parroted Communist line, with usual nods to
".peaceful coexistence," trade with "People's
Democracies," great victory for "peace" in
Indochina.
C. More important, piece violently condemned
Thai government as "reactionary puppet"
American imperialists, with whom plotting
aggression. Thai people warned they "duty-
bound" overthrow government, thereby restore
Thailand's good name.
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II. Re-emergence Pridi appears important step in Peiping's
intensified psychological campaign against pro-Western
Phibun regime.
A. Ultimate objective campaign: force present
Thai government abandon West, accommodate
to Communist power. If not, replace regime
by one that will accommodate.
B. However, doubtful Peiping thinks any present
chance armed uprisings and return Pridi.
1. Few Communist activists in
Thailand, either Chinese or
Thai.
2. Anti-government groups, who not
necessarily pro-Communist, been
weakened, dispersed during
Phibun's long tenure.
III. Peiping's sponsorship Pridi perhaps equally intended for
effect on Colombo powers--particularly Burma.
A. Contrast between Peiping's kind words for
these "neutralists" and vitriolic attacks
pro-Western Thailand obvious.
B. Should have effect on leaders with
latent SEATO sympathies.
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IV. Pridi's reappearance in post-Geneva period well-calculated
increase nervousness Thai regime.
A. Thai leaders have irrational fear Pridi;
have done all possible discredit him,
suppress followers.
B. Reaction to Pridi article frenzied: fresh
round-up Pridi-ites; alert of armed forces;
C. Government spokesman termed article "first
step" in Communist campaign conquest
Thailand.
V. Although Thai leaders publicly defend pro-Western orienta-
tion, indications private doubt over wisdom this policy.
A. Before Indochina armistice, Premier Phibun's
own newspaper warned West that Southeast
Asia might accommodate to Communism unless
given clear indication Western intent
defend area.
B. USIA officials in Bangkok report that
Thai leaders consider post-Geneva danger
greater than ever.
C. Potentially influential Thai group has
always doubted that US would come to
defense Thailand in showdown.
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D. Danger some government leaders will come
to share this view, since advocates of
retreat to neutrality can argue Pridi's
real or imagined threat to continued
tenure ruling clique.
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