BACKGROUND THE SHORT TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000200020003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 12, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING `*' '12 November 1953
The short term political outlook in Italy
1. Pella's government is avowedly "transi-
tional" and was to have expired October
31.
a. However, Pella has sought to streng-
then his position by securing a
political victory on the Trieste is-
sue, the focus of Italian nationalist:
sentiment.
2. We believe the. minimum that the Italians
would accept at any 5-power conference
would be a solution returning the bulk
of Zone A to Italy.
a. The Italians would probably be will-
ing to cede to Tito some predominately
Slovene areas on the edge of Zone A
as well as to the north in return for
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comparable concessions in Zone B.
b. They would not cede the port of
Zaule (Servola) to Yugoslavia, ex-
cept possibly in return for major
concessions in Zone B.
c. Italy would grant Yugoslavia exten-
sive port and access rights in
Trieste itself and would accept
mutual minority guarantees.
d. It probably would also accept demili-
tarization of both zones.
3. The short term political outlook in Italy
depends largely on the outcome of the
Trieste issue.
a. If a solution were reached along the
above lines, Pella would almost cer-
tainly remain in power.
b. Failing a prompt solution which ap-
pears at least as satisfactory to
Italian opinion as the UU gg
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October 8 decision, Pella will
almost certainly resign or his
government fall.
4. Pella's fall on the Trieste issue would
increase Italian political instability
and further strengthen the left and
right extremes at the expense of the
center.
5. Even if Pella does not fall on the
Trieste issue, we believe that the
governmental situation will remain un-
stable and that the present government
will not survive the next two years.
a. Growing popular demands for social
and economic change will place fur-
ther strains on the stability of the
government.
b. There is a possibility of major
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c. The Monarchists, who now support
the Pella cabinet, will sooner or
later insist on representation
in it and thereby will precipitate
another political crisis.
6. Although over the longer run the chances
of Italy going Communist may increase,
we believe it unlikely that failure to
satisfy Italy on Trieste, or develop-
ments subsequent to this, would lead to
succession of the Communists to power
within the next two years.
a. It is possible, though unlikely,
that a wave of emotionalism sweeping
Italy as a consequence of a Trieste
setback, perhaps combined with a
prolonged general, strike, could
create a revolutionary situation
in which the left might seek to
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overthrow the government.
b. In the unlikely event of a sharp
government move to the right, it is
also possible that the Communists
would feel compelled to attempt a
coup.
c. We believe that the Italian security
forces could and would put down such
an attempt.
7. The most feasible way in which a shift
to the left could take place would be
through creation of a more left-oriented
center coalition which the Nenni Social-
ists would agree to support, just as
the Monarchists support Pella today.
a. A less feasible alternative would be
the so-called Nenni solution, the cre?
ation of a government composed of the"
Nenni and. Saragat Socialists and a
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large portion of the present
center parties.
b. We believe that the advent of any
left-oriented coalition is unlikely,
notwithstanding any Italian setback
on Trieste.
8. We believe that the most likely succes-
sor to Pella would be a center or center
right government, probably involving
continued Monarchist support.
a. Despite the inherent differences be-
tween the reformist left wing of the
CD party on the one hand, and its
own conservative right wing and the
Monarchists on the other, these
differences are probably easier to
reconcile than the differences be-
tween the CD left wing and the Nenni
Socialists.
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Italian EDC ratification diminished.
c. Moreover, governments of an increas
ingly rightist character might be
less able to deal effectively with
Italy's underlying social and eco-
nomic ills, thus further enhancing
the popular appeal of the Communist-
Socialist left.
10, US support of a Trieste settlement favor-
able to Italy would be the most immediate-
ly effective step toward strengthening
the present Italian government.
a. However, given the present confusion
and organization and financial weak-
ness of the center parties, we be-
lieve that an Italian success on
Trieste alone would not be sufficient
to arrest the gradual weakening of
the democratic center in Italy.
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This proved to be the case in the
formation of the Pella cabinet,
which the CD left wing was given im-
portant posts in
collaboration.
In discounting the likelihood of a short
term drift to left or right extremism in
Italy, we do not mean to underestimate
the seriousness with which we view the
Italian political situation.
a. Any new government formed if Pella
fell on the Trieste issue would be
even more nationalistic in its for-
eign policy and less disposed to
cooperate with the U. S.
b. Although Italy would almost certainly
remain in NATO, domestic support for':
Italy's NATO effort would be greatly
weakened and the prospects for
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