LETTER TO(Sanitized)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R003700100012-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
31
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 5, 2003
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 30, 1960
Content Type:
LETTER
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Body:
a
S 0 SEP l O
STAT
STAT
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areciatsd.
skin; this inforsnatiou availab) to as is indeed
This will *cknoviedge receipt of your letter of
It Sspt.mber 198-0 ant. the enclosure thereto. Your inters st
Sincerely,
SIM
SLAT
1 - ER
1 - JSE
LDP/ WH 1rh 26 Sep 60
Rewritten for JSk; gnature: EQIDCI/
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
2-DD/P
1 - CUPS
1 - C/WH
:blp 30 Sep 60
ed for DCI signature contained concurrent. s of
r ~*, _ ,. r.??A
for the DD/P. ?
Release 2003/10/O7I f 8?B0t{dR070W0 .1.2-0=!
STAT
STAT
STAT
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26 September 1960
MaMORABDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VLA. Deput;- Dire
ctor (Plans
p
Letter from
SUBJECT
1is P ?o-oosed Solution
attached is a sugestedl reply for the Director's eignature.
25X1
25X1
25X1
.Attachments:
As ;tatsd (; )
cc: DDCI
DDP
acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
1.~6~ L
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STAT
co:DDCI
STAT
Signature Recommended:
Deputy Director -(Plans)
STAT DDP/WH
~rh (26 September 1960)
STAT
Originator:]
STAT -.DDP/WH
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SU*l and I > M4r ase e
cop
STAT
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Hon. Allen W. Dulles
Chief, Central Intelligence Agency
W a shinE,,t on 25, D.03.
12 September 1960
Dear Mr . Dulles,
Inclosed you will find a proposed solution to the Cuban rroblen-i, whi:;h I
hope you will find useful. I started working on it when I heard over the ra-
dio Mr. Kruscshev's rocket rattling against the U.S.A. concerning R_issian in-
volvement in Cuba if force and armed intervention is used by the American -e-
verntnent to change the Status Quo in Castroland. I felt ashamed that not'?ing
has been done when somethir_M positive can be done about the Cuban s'_tuatien
and the communist tropical madmmn.
I can relax and continue sitting back and see the world 7o by ra it is
not my concern, but after second thoughts , America's survival is at stake
and this is as much my concern as it is the President's.
I presume that me and my children will be better off by me keer:jn y4r
mouth shut, than by sending you these papers, but I also remember that many
people in Europe kept their mouth shut before the Second World War, and today
they and their children are dead, killed by their own silence and usiconc?:n,
when a madman was rising in their midets.
I am not a Cuban, I don't have any relatives residing in Cuba and there
is not a single drop of Cuban blood in my veins. I am a native born A:mer-_can
citizen that sees the danger America faces now and feel that I can contribute
with a grain of sand to save what is not altoTuether lost.
This work has not been done at the snurr of the moment, but after riue:h
thoughts and months of study and research. As you shall see I have devid.ed
my plan in four main sections that fall In four different categories, but
that are closely related and each one is as important as the other.
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The four main categories are:
I. Political Offensive
II. Economic Offensive
III. propaganda Offensive
IV. Armed Intervention
I hope you will find my sw estions -.practical and workable for the benefit
of our nation and the Latin American people.
Sincerely yours,
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I
POI:TTICAL OFFENSIVE
A Cuban Government in Exile. The United States 3Tovern;.ent should do the utrost to
help organize a Cuban " overnment in Exile. There are many prominent ?.nd i i olli -
gent Anti-Castro-anti-Communist Cuban citizens living in New York and 'iami; and
other parts of the country that are exiles either fro-;i Batista or frog Casty-o. -'
properly approached these peoplo would gladly join an organization thrt wily. be a
in toppling the Castro regime. There are many sincere intellectuals I or min part of
the militant White nose movement, FAYCA (Fuerzas Armadas y Civiles Ar_~?i.-Co~r#:unirt;ec
Frente Humanista Cristiano, etc. u'r_ich are definitely anti-Castro and. anti-+ =ti
and they can bring enormous preotive to a Cuban Government in Exile il it i-1
Initiative. We should take the initiative to encourage and ;et to ue-ther t_ie
ders of these prominent Cuban oru;ar_izations so that they meet to f orT.
We most take the initiative, because time is precious and none shoula; be lost s,-Tt)c; W3
are running against time before a cunning:. enemy takes control of a l:t :e isZ=Lnd :i-_-
les from our shores.
An agent or a functionary o the State Department should stablis'1 the ;iece: i-
ry liaison with this organizations and an invitation should be isfrued to send dio-3-
gates to a meeting (preferable at the Pan-American Building- in Wa-hinton,
elect this 7overnment in exile. After forming such government, the i~. . should hick
it up -morally (by retiring "ipso facto" official reco-~nition to the C!?.L:tro ?e i ~<
and recognizinc the Cuban Government in Exile. Finnacial assistance :o':hould be
either by loans or direct contribit ions for administrative expenses. A Dec-:?t
ding should be allocated to the overriment in Exile in another city far awa - f
',lashington nref erable at .T1orida for two obvious reasons: Fir
oa the Anti-Castro element in this country are livin at the Yiami- a i~na ar :a
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wbuld be easier to keen in touch with those elements. Second: ''v :havijj tll t
vernment i'uncti oninc far way from Washint-ton, it will keep most o'
element in Latin America fro-_, cal'inc? this rIovernrient a puppet of the U.$. A--~ r.mrEe-
spent should be made betweer, this lgovernment and the U.S.'s as to t,4),,4 -"u?jc!'oii, r-rmey
limitations and nurnose of said ? overt !.eVt While at US soil and its a `Tns? i r, 1-i -P, nrn-
nor in a future Host-Castro era.
2eco7niti on. 'leco'~nition ch;-uld be -?iven to this r overt ent a-s soon o e.
The recognition by other Latin American countries hold be encotras,,J
an1 z fA?
plishin7 such reco n_tions they will serve as yardstick to measure t be F i jr,,--r-
,~ ent norularity throuc-hout Latin America and the nonularity it u will .--ain ! .n -i?t:,i 'ro-
per. Of course, the le, itinacy of this overnnmt will be auesti_one"L hr ?,,,,Q +~"),I__
tries, especially those for;cin tart of the Sino-Soviet bloc, but i'k.rv:; -?o+
ent le.;iti_macy is as questionable as was 7atista' c when he overthrcic Pri H Sof a'
in 1952.
This is not a nreeedent in the a::nal: of American diplomacy herFi7se I 'a hrr re-
co< nized exiled ~ overnnents in the vast and we do in the present . Luri_rr :-, or3 r: War
II we r eco nized the Govern: lent 1--i exile of Iueen Wilhelmina in T,ondon. at d w@ 3 ro
r' conized the Polish, 1?orwe-;ia
=reek., etc. The Free Fr: nch r o e:nent hei.ded
`Aaulle was supported by us, nevertheless we re-co,-nized Hitler's ?uo t - l c:rnrr
Vichy headed by Marshall Her ri Detain and Pierre Laval. This >;crrer-n ent c . - , i t , ; a c.r
was questioned then, nevertheless, we sent Admiral William D. her.hr z o_tx f i r
ssador. 1?ow-a-days we reco: ni.ze the Taiwan. -overnanent which is c.e-f,t(-to $ -cv-, ? r+
in exile.
Results. Much harm can be doge to the Castro regime by settin ' vo a -oven -,leery, j')
exile. First: All the anti-Cae,ro factions in. this country and abroad will b a:,-'tad
and headed by a strong centralized organization. Second: The Cuban J,ennle in
land will know that there is Aorivone who is interested and care aooL' ??
Third: :-lore neonle neonle in CaFtrolan.d w'!11 be inclined to seek ra' 1 e hi e, t s^r -
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cially the young people, which are the ones that form the backbone .o' Cai"'ro' 3 f.a-
pnort and the ones that fill Raul Castro's Revolutionary Army. Fourth: -re aL
control the movements and actions of these loose organizations to oir ado-nta .
Fifth: When a police action is required against Castroland, the ?overrmn4ot 1:1,i
Exile can provide the necessary rianpower, since they can keep teb o the ;ubwv- 1 =.-
ving here.
Objective. The ultimate objective of this government is to help tol)-)le t:ae t4:f.rn~
regime and take over the government in Cuba in a post-Castro era. rhri.s :-ver a 1,
should be democratic, definitely anti-communist and positively Criondl=r f!c txV? I.S.
We should bear in mind that by destroying- the Castro ~;overrunen', we a.?e (14 a service not only to the Cuban and Latin American people but also to the AmeR?7 au
people as well, since the survival of our country is at stake right now i, i OU':nt
Much had been said about the na tional purpose lately. Isn't this a, part
national purpose? Are we relegating our survival to the whimsical attittiie of
bearded madman.
Russian "technician" are ewarriinr; all over Castroland. Can=-:st b _ses
manned by Russians and Chinese Communist are being; established. (See Exhl?bit -
It won't be long; when missile installations will have all our Eastern Seai')oart
(The hub and heart of the nation; in pointed for destruction. :Zus: ian tr,.nker:
and merchant ships are arriving at Havana. Will they become a Trojan hor e Gtr-
man style? Like the German coal freighters that were lined up in the nor"-s arr-
-f fiords of Norway hours before the invasion of Norway in 9 April 1914?
Now Krushchev is coming; f'or a visit to inspect his new domain end mut'.al fe?-
curity pact is planned. Raul Castro paved the way for the big day when Ct:ba wi: P
join the Varsovia Pact. Will his dream of dronning those atomic b oa,b a ill '?ew York
become a grim reality? 3y allowing Castro and his cohorts to cha-oha-cha with he
Russians in front of our own nose, we are offering the Communists the Putt re
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nation in a gold platter. The foothold in this Hemisphere that the cunni:i
always dreamed of, has been aquire effortlessly by the farmer fropt'le ste apes-.
It is definitely known tha'; the Castro government is Communist, not - )ecai E ?i
in their plight the Cubans call him Castrovich or because of its cor:r_uniat,ics -)ff
we condemn it, but by the admission of its leaders we know that thin rove: uiex
essentially and completely Communist (Exhibit 2). Also the "esee.lc_araza? gite i
by Mr. K. himself when he had the gall to tell the world he'll send his rocketr
flying here if we intervene in the Cuban mess. Cuba today, what's next? Puerto
Rico? (See Exhibit F68) or perhaps..-Hawaii? It won't be long when his bf.iaddtr
will impulse him to intervene on even the treatment the Hutterites are rt:ceivinv
in the Dakotas. The situation in Cuba has gone from mala to malisia. 11.
to us, and the whole of Latin America is watching, to apply the "maro ?uet~te" r.(,AI : I !
We were more concerned about the Conmiunist threat in Guatemala in l9'4,
we are with the Communist government in bower just 90 miles from our short s.
were more concerned with Guatemala in 195)-' due to its proximity to the Panama l -
nal (more than 800 miles) than we are apparently with Castroland. Is the Panae
Canal mote important to us than the mainland. If the Panama Canal was worth saris=na
in 1954 isn't our nation more than so in 1960? Castroland threat to our ratio l
security is worst than Guatemala's, not because of Cuba's proximity to our short- ,
but due to the worldwide appeal that Castro, Guevara, Jimenez, et! al _, had c atii
for themselves through the international Commmmist propaganda. It wt' 1 to pe n,o
than a Castillo Armas with his rayed army of 300 men and his two Pi,)er Cups f-, or
the United Fruit Company, to dislo{;e Castro from his entrenched position. 7f c;
tro was a Jacobo Arbenz, the blowing of "La Coubre" at Havana harbor or th ~ ex=,--
esion of the am no depot a couple of months ago would have been enou, -h to send
packing to Switzerland like the machine gunning of the oil tanks by the Pi+,er cu.3f;
at Guatemala City sent Arbenz rut pin . Ureortunately Castro and his hench ien f:-
hardened at the Sierra Maestra. Incidentally, aacobo Arbenz is back in th'.s Hey :. E;
phere. He isAjop eti ra6r thase52008LEb@/A7 :,'l -Rt6 0 1~~6F @Q QfVOPOr1 t ..n tr- .-te-
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mala? Were John Foster Dulles' effort in 19x4 in vain?
The 1' abrazo" to the Castro's anneal for crude oil by such an '_nfl.uenti .1 mar
as the President of the Permanent ~or_miission of the Mexican Con;rees, Emilii, SSar_
chez Piedra, is one of'-..the many sisrris the American people is expected to see. thrc-u out the future if bold action is not taken now. We most weight and t?ke in contr.
deration the effects of the Castro nronaganda on the rest of Latin America
We
can determine now what to expect frai countries like Bolivia, Chile, Peru, t cuadss
Argentina, Uruguay and even Brazil (with Luis Carlos Prestes still in hidint whicl-
have :-treat nucleous of Com unist within their borders, and ,,1hich these break rover -
ments cant or don't or dare antagonize.
If we owe to Juan Marinello and Lazaro Pena 's perseverance and cuani.nM the ;' -
tuation we face now in Cuba, we should bear in mind that like Cuba's Zarinello gnr
Mexico's Toledano, each country in the Caribbean, Central and South A;rerioa has,a
well organized, devoted and fanatical rroun of ComuIunists that are just waiting
and watching; how far their comrade Castrovich can -o without being bothered ,y
fearful 3i Stick of the Coloso Yanqui, to g;o themselves into action.
Some would said that andmbassador is necessary in Castroland for phis or t.z?t
reason. As far as this is concerned Ambassd.or Bonsal's stay in Cub Is doit. mu:
harm to Unsal's career and to the Department of State proper. The Cuoans in Ca ro-
land sees the continue stay of Bonsai there as symbol of American i-antr -l-ice of t:=
ternal affairs of Cuba. Diplomatically, the U.S. is giving a sort of orest.itre ,,: the
Castro regime by recognizing t as the legitimate r itoi.. 7111
looks that the 1812 British cry of "Once an Er g lishman, always and I rlis sn"
has a modern counterpart, "Once Consriunist, always Communist". It tuo?:r a ,srr to
make the British change their minds. It will take force to '~~.ake thr T uS ians
change their belief that they have Satan's devilish mission cam" conve rtin t-hie
world to their ideolo; y and that the countries they held cc.nti%ra mutt be ~rls1a-
ved forever. In 1812 the city of Wa.shinton was burned by the riti Eh, -1-t,13
prevent the modern imitators do the same thin7 with their rock-ts, b ; ou `, -ti-zcr
the tropical maniac and therefore taking away from the Ruar ian the mare s-`}
launching pad from where this can hapnen. Let's do this be-Tor-3 it i= tf)-, 1;u'-e.
I hereby propose three plans by which this can be accompl`_s i. Tn txiu
this clans the U.S. can intervene in Cuba ~rihout loosing -n L-a+!
Arierica, before the eyes of our a-1 lies, and the rest of the wra -J f' , i~ 7^ 1 -Tire.
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Russian intervention (if this is not a bluff) can be avoided. The other i r.-ce vice
a little more risk but is worth taking if the other two are not solub e, 1e: .use
it is the most sound and the one with th6 most posibility of success.
First Plan. Since this is an "embrollo eubano" we should let the Cubtns ec ecme
of the dirty work. We should forma special force which I shall call the "r' ban
Brigade" formed by anti-Castro Oubans living; in the U.S. and U.S. mnilL'tarv ker-
sonnel of Spanish ascendency servirv now with the armed forces which Fneal__ Fluent
Spanish (this is very important, as I shall explain later). They wil: fore. the
hard core or the "cadre personnel" of the Brigade. In no moment I have mer_'.ioned
the U.S. Marines. This is because of the sorry history the Marines have tr;ncu?h-
out Latin America. Much have been said about how, with the Marines help thc: cus-
toms and revenues of Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua i iproved during; the Des-
troyer Diplmmacy Era, but nearly nothing is heard of the ill feeling the Corns left
throughout Latin America and specially in the countries where they intervercd:
Haiti, Santo Domirg;o, Nicaragua and Mexico (Veracruz, 1914) and the rec;imes they
left behind after their intervention (i.e. The Trujillos and the Somozas).. ''r
Latin America; Marines, Irperialismo Yanqui, el Gran Garrote, El Colo o del I'or-
to and the Imperialismo del Dolar are synonymous. To send the Marines to Gigs
in force will be the easiest way of aligning all of Latin America to the Russian
camp*
It would sound queer that U.S. military elements form part of a foreiTi. bo-
dy (the way I proposed it will not be foreign, but a part of the Army', but it
is not impossible, by the same token, foreign personnel servo in our Army not-a-
days. i.e. the KATUSAS in Korea. In an emergency improvisations are vecess>-ray
and this is definit,,ly an emergency.
There are many militant Cuban organizations in the U.S. and abroad lab(,rlnw
for the overthrow of the Castro regime, among these are., F.A.Y.C.A., with 4,000
able bodied men in the New York and Miami areas; the aosa Blanca (Whit : Row 'aea-
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ded by Rafael Diaz Balart and Major Diaz Lanz, ex-former Castro Is Ohiaf a' the
Air Force; Cuba Democratica, headed by Carlos Irigoyen; ovimiento Recune -:.e ion
Camilo Cienfuegos headed by Carlos Rodriguez, Frente Hurnanista = ristiano; -;h
A.A.A.; Los Pinos Nuevos headed by Rafael Acosta, Asociacion Tlacional sta 3abana,
CCATYY; Cruzada Institucionalista; Frente Revolucionario Democrat co; and ally
the Frente Democratico Cristiano headed by a five men junta which inelude-i 1~?.
Ignacio -Rasco Bermudez, Justo Carrillo, Manuel Antonio de Verona, .dv.nael :-?tiae
Bueso and Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, a Cuban with immense prestige in Ohba
and abroad. Altoguether, these organizations can muster from l'>, OO to 2:). ~()
able bodied men, most of them veterans against the Batista war waachihiary.
that we don't have to explain why they are fighting for.
The proposed Cuban Brigade should be trained under our own Army rith i-ar
logistical, tactical and leadership support. This training should be P;ivt3 j
in some distant place far away from Miami, New York and Washing,,-Ion, a-, t
its secrecy and objectives will not be compromised. Cf course this Brigadk_
should be operated under our Department of Defense tnrouzthe Denartmc:nt },_ Y the
Army. The Cuban Government in Exile should provide the necessar men co z: "in-
ted through the different ormanization; but there his jurisdict=ion ends.
The best suitable plane for this training should be at Carte Polk in
siana for three important reasons: First: Since this post is now de~ctir.Aed
and there is no Army personnel, with the exception of the caretakers, the =n
while training there will not arouse the suspicion of other Arm.r perscnne
associating with them). Second: Since personnel lhvolved would hardly a-),. any
English they would not mingle with the local population and in that way t`u r
would not give out their mission. Third: The big port of New Orleane is * o
closest one to the Cuban Western Coast which is the most likely n. lace for a
good landing; when the momarr, will be propitious. Fort Jac?son South Ci-I? 3 .ina
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is a second good choice and Camp Tortuguero in Puerto Rico a third god I on-
There is a great potential in _the US Armed Forces that has been I -nor:.'
the Department of Defense. This great potential is the thousands of Pert ,
can officers and Non-Cons servinr, to the different branches of tree Arriod F -,r
These men can be successfully used in this pro gram. Most of there men are -
rans of the Second World War and the For:-an conflict. One of thz: r?ost 't-ir
pages in American Arms was written by the 65th Infantry Re.1;iment in Ka_-,:a tr;!
this regiment was composed mainly of Puerto Rican servicemen. There a ?,i st.i
in the Army marry of 'icient of+: icer s and non-come that were in bharr'e of the !rai-
ning, program at Camp Tortuguero, Puerto Rico that rained the 65th Infentrv Y erla e-
ments and since they know the language, custarns and idiosyncr cy the Cuba
ple they can train a Cuban Brigade as well as they did the Puort: :Lear:>.
This choice of Puerto Ricans cadre is good for two very imnertantreasa-e:
First: Since they :lave a common knowled--e of the Spanish lancua;g:, and the-o~z-_ r
understanding of the Cuban ps-rchology, they make the best trai.nin', eadr f o- t"i s
force. Second: If needed )e, the Puerto Ricans can and should a^co -na-ay
they form part of it) the Cuban. Brigade in any forthcomin-? intervention a?aa- .:s
Castroland, and since their nh, siognorry are alike to'., the Cubans or for the . -
tter like any other Latin A-ierican ethnic group, they would Hive
movement a seal of purely a criollo? and the secrecy of this American uri :i'i:st th_
United States.
HANDBOOK FOR REVOLUTIONISTS - BY CUBA'S ECONOMIC CZAR
:ST-SELLING BOOK in Latin Amer-
ica, if Fidel Castro of Cuba has
his way, will soon be a 187-page item
called "La Guerra de Guerrillas"-
"Guerrilla Warfare."
The author is Cuba's No. 2 leader,
Maj. Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Corn-
rnuuist-trained Argentine who heads
Cuba's National Bank.
The book, published in April by
the Castro Government's Institute of
Agrarian Reform, tells Latin Ameri-
cans how to overthrow their govern-
ments, take power and keep it.
bi simple language, Guevara ex-
plains how 20 armed men can break
up a column of thousands. H , plains how to use terrorism, sah{,I.;
and seizure of private propert r a=,
instruments of war. He tills ho-.+ to
fight guerrilla warfare in cities :(l
suburban areas.
The U. S., says Guevari, wan! co
liquidate Castro's regime, but do- 't
know how. Castro can get econ r: ix
help from "Egypt . . . the S4,,,
Union . . . perhaps Iraq.'
First edition of Giievat,t's bocl
sold out. But, said a Castro o6 t al
in Havana recently: "There wil' c
many more editions-in many I.:t_
guages."
The author: Maj. Er-
nesto (Che) Guevara
74 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 2, 1960
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papers and a number of radio stations
in Latin America.
Portrait of U. S. On it typical day, this
news" report contains stories under
headings such as these: "Student leaders
of Latin America visit Red China"; "Mex-
ico criticizes U. S. policy on corn ex-
ports"; "Youth problems in New York";
"How Soviet Russia brings prosperity to
l' ast Germany"; "Brazilian state govern-
,nent criticizes contract with American
power company"; "Land reform in
Cuba"; "Castro proclaims press freedom
in Cuba"; "Poland wants to help under-
developed countries of Latin America";
"Panama plans new moves against U. S.
imperialism"; "Hungary boosts output of
onsumer goods."
When Senator John F. Kennedy, cam-
paigning for the U. S. presidential nomi-
nation, declared recently that 17 million
North Americans go to bed hungry every
night, Prensa Latina grabbed the item,
and it got quite a play in Latin America.
"I tevoluci6n," Castro's semiofficial mouth-
piece in Havana, headlined the story:
"'I'he myth of prosperity in the United
States."
For Communist, leftist and ultranation-
alist editors, Prensa Latina is an invaluable
aid. It provides them with ammunition
to use in discrediting the U. S. while
picturing the Castro-Communist tie-up
as an ideal partnership for progress.
The Red slant. Most of the members
of Prensa Latina's staff are old hands at
spotting stories that can be given an anti-
U. S. twist. Masetti had years of experi-
ence with a similar service financed by
dictator Juan D. Peron of Argentina.
Many other members of the staff are
fellow travelers or Communists. Still
others are leftist-nationalists who favor
neutralism.
Now, some of these nationalists are
turning sour on Prensa Latina, for they
find that what they expected to be a gen-
uine news agency is merely a propaganda
arm of the Cuban Government. In pro-
test, Paul de Castro, a Brazilian, has re-
signed a responsible position with the
agency.
De Castro, as head of the Prensa La-
tina bureau in Rio de Janeiro, became
disillusioned with the organization and
the kind of "news" it was handling. He
became aware, also, that his office was
being used as an espionage center.
"The directors of Prensa Latina," De
Castro said, "are men of totalitarian
backgrounds? regarding the U. S. with a
blind hate due to the Peronist and Stalin-
ist backgrounds they share. Cuba is
their only concern, and Latin America
is so only to the extent that it serves
the interests of Cuba. Little by little,
it became evident to me that this was
it Cuban agency serving the Govern-
ment itself."
"If one may judge by Prensa Latina,"
he added, "the Cuban revolution has
taken a grave turn toward a police state,
with tyranny and indifference to truth as
its method and system."
Who pays the bills? Prensa Latina's
operating expenses are estimated by
news-service men to run from $150,000
to $200,000 a month, at a minimum. It is
not clear where much of the money
comes from. Revenue from the sale of
the service is negligible, for most clients
receive it free. The Cuban Government
is believed to pick up $60,000 of the tab
each month. Some believe the rest of
the money comes from a source behind
the Iron Curtain.
Prensa Latina has its radio counter-
part in it newly established network
called Cadena Latinoamericana-- Latin-
American Chain. Key station of the chain
is Radio Union, in Havana, owned by
the Cuban Confederation of Labor--CTC
-and staffed principally by Communists
and fellow travelers.
Radio Union broadcasts each night by
short wave to two relay stations-one
in Venezuela and one in Argentina. The
programs are rebroadcast to 16 stations
in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile,
Venezuela, Costa Rica and Guatemala.
Billed as "news," the programs consist of
propaganda. Among their listeners are
millions of Latin Americans who do not
read newspapers.
These broadcasts, now beamed only
to Latin America, are soon to be ex-
tended. The Government in Havana has
(continued on page 74)
A sinister Uncle Sam is lurking in
the background on the cover of
this booklet, entitled "$abotage."
Inside is Castro's address blaming
the U. S. for explosion of French
ship La Coubre in Havana harbor.
This booklet charges U. S. blew up
battleship Maine as a pretext for
entering Cuba's war against Spain,
in 1898. Similarly, U. S. is charged
with blowing up the munitions-
carrying La Coubre on March 4.
Here a greedy, diabolical Uncle
Sam prepares to seize Cuba in his
claws. Text charges Maj. Gen. Leon-
ard Wood-"big, ruddy, strong,
brutal"-as Cuba's military gover-
nor rigged the first election, in 1901.
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$~ Z ON
AL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
NAME AND ADDRESS
Chief, WH Divisio
FILE
INFORMATION
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
Asst. to the DCj1
FORM I APR lO 237 Replaces Form 30-4
which may be used.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955--0-3425331
10/072: CIA-RDPSA 01c46fe0B M0}O012-0
Acting Chief, Western Hemipphere Division
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
AT
MENTS (Number taxi: ommen, to sh t r ^vhom
to whom. Draw a line a: a-, colum ate. . m~ent.)
TAT
I DEC 56
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