COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE: POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100090001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
N?
COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites
CIA/SRS-:7
PART II/C
RECOU COPY
265
I
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 194, the trans-
mission or revelation of which, in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE:
Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites
CIA/SRS-7
PART II/C EAST GERMANY
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Gov-
ernment intelligence officers but
has not been formally coordinated.
It is based on information avail-
able to SRS as of :1. May 1958.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part II/C - EAST GERMANY
German Reunification July 1955-March 1956 1
The 20th Congress and East Germany 6
The October 1956 Crisis in East Germany 12
Reunification by Confederation 19
Party Factionalism 20
East German Leadership Unaffected by the
June 1957 Soviet Purge 23
The Khrushchev Visit 25
October 1957 Plenum Foreshadows a
Tightening of the Screw 27
Internal Party Conflict and the February 1958
Plenum 31
Review of the February 1958 Purge 39
Significance of the SED Crisis 45
The Outlook 48
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FOREWORD
This :report on East Germany is the fourth
installment of a series of studies being produced by the
Senior Research Staff under the general title Communism in
Eastern Europe: Post-Stalin Developments in the Satellites
(CIA/SRS-7, CONFIDENTIAL). The three previous install-
ments, labelled Part I, Part II/A and Part II/B, have dealt
respectively with general trends in the satellites and with
Poland and Hungary. Developments in the other satellites
will be considered in future reports, and the series will be
concluded with an appraisal of conditions and prospective
trends in Eastern Europe as a whole.
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PART II/C
EAST GERMANY
German Reunification July 1955-March 1956
1. The German Democratic Republic occupies a
special position among the Soviet satellites, inasmuch as it is
the state itself not merely the government - which is an
artificial creation of the USSR, viable only with its continued
support, and inasmuch as its ultimate fate is a problem of
world political importance. Developments within the GDR are
therefore inseparable from their international context.
2. It may be recalled that the directives of the heads
of governments to their foreign ministers, agreed upon at their
Geneva meeting in July 1955, had specified that the "solution
of the German question and the reunification.of Germany by
means of free elections must be carried out in accordance with
the national interests of the German people and the interests
of European security. "
3. From Geneva, Khrushchev proceeded straight to
Berlin. In a speech before a rally of East German workers on
the Marx-Engels Platz on July 26, 1955, he said:
"The German problem cannot be solved at the
expense of the interests of the German Democratic
Republic. We are convinced that the working
people of the German Democratic Republic will
never agree to Lie abolition of all their demo-
cratic reform. "
In other words, the Kremlin repudiated the Geneva directives.
The paramount considerations were no longer the national
interests of the German people and European security.: but
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the interests of the German Democratic Republic, voiced by
the working people through the Communist Party leader.
Free elections were of course no longer mentioned, at any
rate, in connection with the GDR.
4. On the other hand, it did not follow that the
interests of the Federal Republic deserved similar respect.
Premier Grotewohl, in his speech at the same rally, appealed
to the West Germans to overthrow their government - whether
by force or by free elections, he did not specify. "Brothers,
join hands now . . . It is high time, " he said, "that Social
Democratic, Communist and non-Party workers, trade
unionists and Christian workers in West Germany stood to-
gether and united their entire strength against monopolists
and their like, against exploitation and hardship . . . Then
an understanding among the Germans will become a fact and
the reunification of our Fatherland in a peaceful and demo-
cratic way will be achieved. "
5. Having hit upon the simple expedient of wash-
ing their hands of responsibility for the reunification. of Ger-
many by passing the buck to their East German comrades who
could be trusted not to abolish their own jobs, the Soviet lead-
ers belatedly did whatever they could to enhance the status of
their creation. A treaty on relations between the GDR and
the USSR,t confirming full equality in relations between the
two states and granting the GDR full responsibility for its
frontiers and lines of communication, was signed in Moscow
on September 20, 1955. It drew a strong protest from the
Western Powers, who continued to refuse to recognize the
existence of a state in the Soviet Zone.
6. On the occasion of the signature of the treaty,
Bulganin declared with a straight face that "the Republic is
developing successfully because the state has deep roots in
the entire history and life of the German people." Khrush-
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chew was on firmer ground when he asserted that the "build-
ing of sociali.sm.in the German Democratic Republic is such
.an important undertaking that it is impossible to find words
to describe its full significance and greatness at this moment.
On the theory that attack is the best defense, part of the
treaty's significance was revealed by Neues Deutschland of
October 6, 1955, the eve of the republic's sixth anniversary;
IT. . . our German Democratic Republic lives and
flourishes and will one day spread out and encom-
pass the whole of Germany, since such is the will
of the people. "
7. In the meantime, the status of the GDR was
deemed by the Kremlin to have grown so rapidly between July
and November 1955 that Molotov at the Foreign Ministers
Conference felt obliged to reject the Western proposals for
the implementation of the agreement on free all -German
elections, on the ground that they were' "in obvious contradic-
tion to the actual situation in Germany. " In his final statement,
Molotov emphasized once again that the German question could
not "be solved now without taking into consideration the fact
that there exist two German states with different social struc-
tures. . . IT
8. The solution, attributed to the East Gerrna n
government, which allegedly gave due consideration to the
fact of the existence of two German states, had been submitted
by Molotov on November 2. It proposed the establishment of
an all-German Council composed of parliamentary representa-
tives of East and West Germany as a. consultative body on mat-
ters of common interest. Mixed committees would discuss
matters relating to economic and cultural ties between the two
German states. Molotov asserted that the establishment of the
All-German Council would not "violate the interests of either
of the existing states, " nor must it "affect the social order
obtaining in the German Democratic RepubLic or in the German
Federal Republic. IT However, Molotov maintained it was
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necessary "that Thei:7 representatives should finally start a
joint discussion of all problems which disturb the German peo-
ple. It is necessary that a rapprochement and cooperation
start between [tfie two republics. Without it, it is impossible
to prepare the unification of Germany. "
9. At the end of November 1955, steps were taken
to ensure even firmer control over the government by trusted
Party members. Three new deputy chairmanships of the
Council of Ministers were created, six of the ten posts being
held by members of the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party,
the SED, with Walter Ulbricht, the First Party Secretary, as
first deputy chairman.
10. The law of January 18, 1956, for the creation
of East German national armed forces and a Ministry of
Defense, ostensibly motivated by the rearmament of West
Germany, was a further step in the process of endowing East
Germany with the formal attributes of sovereignty and equality
with the other "sovereign" satellites. The communique issued
on January 28, 1956, upon the conclusion of the Prague sessions
of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact,
announced that the East German People's Army had been formal-
ly accepted into the command of the Warsaw military organization.
11. The new Soviet position with regard to East
Germany was made unmistakably clear by Khrushchev's state-
ment to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956:
"In Germany herself the alignment of forces is
different from what it was in the past. The German
Democratic Republic . . . has gained in strength to
such a degree that today it is no longer possible to
speak of settling the German issue without its par-
ticipation or at its expense "
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And Tass, taking the West German Foreign Minister to task
for "spreading illusions about the methods of re-unifying
Germany, " stated on March 1, 1956, that
"in view of the fact that two sovereign states have
been internationally recognized to exist in Germany,
the only way to re-unification must be by negotia-
tions between the GDR and the Federal Republic.
Taking into account the actual situation in Germany,
one must realize that there is no other way to solve
this problem. "
12. Tass failed to explain what had happened since
July 1955 when the reunification of Germany not only could,
but must be effected by free elections. It was for obvious
reasons reluctant to mention the only event having any bearing
on the subject, the treaty concluded by the USSR itself with
the GDR, for Moscow was apparently unable to think up a plaus-
ible justification for this step, or to explain why this particular
gesture was so important or irrevocable.
13. However, in order to avoid the otherwise
inevitable conclusion that the Communist line on Germany
amounted to a veto of reunification, - for who could expect
the East German Communists to negotiate the loss of their
jobs and power? - they were careful to reiterate their pro-
fession of faith in the validity for West Germany too of the
basic tenet of the inevitable universal triumph of Communism.
Ernst Wollweber, Minister for State Security, said on Febru-
ary 22, 1956:
"The victory of Socialism in the whole world no
longer lies in the distant future . . In Germany,
the path is to secure and strengthen the workers'
and peasants' power in the GDR and to carry out a
democratic transformation of Western Germany. "
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Ulbricht told the members of the Third SED Conference
(March 20-30, 1956):
"We are not at present raising any Socialist demands
for the whole of Germany, but we declare not only
that the Socialist achievements of the GDR must be
safeguarded when reunification is brought about,
but also that they are a prerequisite for a peaceful
and democratic future for the whole of Germany.
As Socialists, however, we say openly that a
Socialist Germany is our objective, for this con-,
forms to the conditions determining the development
of society."
The 20th Congress and East Germany
14. In the meantime, in line with the "popular
front" tactics for Communist takeovers resurrected by the
20th Congress of the CPSU, the Third SED Conference invited
the West German Social Democrats (SPD) to cooperate in form-
ing such a front, stressing the SPD declarations against re-
armament and participation in military blocs. It was presum-
ably with the intention of paving the way for this cooperation
with the evolutionary wing of socialism that Ulbricht, in his 1
report on the proceedings of the 20th Congress he had attended,
had emphasized the "new situation. " The Congress had recog-
nized, Ulbricht said, that the Socialist camp had become strong
enough to be henceforth comparatively safe from attack. Hence,
Communist theory no longer considered violent revolution a
necessary step on the road to socialism. 2
1Published in the East German papers of March 4, 19 56.
2Applying this theory to German conditions, the resolution
adopted by the 23d session of the West German Communist
Party (KPD) meeting in East Berlin on March 17 and 18, 1956,
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15. East Germans presumably also read with some
satisfaction Ulbricht's reference to the rejection by the Moscow
Congress of Stalin's view that with the advance of Socialism
class war was intensified, but for the rest, Ulbricht, like the
other holdovers from the Stalinist era in the satellites, natur-
ally enough soft-pedalled de-Stalinization. Concerning Stalin
himself, Ulbricht merely voiced the opinion that, in spite of
his significant services in the building of Socialism, he had,
when he "later placed himself above the Party and fostered the
cult of the individual, " caused considerable damage to the
Soviet Communist Party. Consequently, one could not "reckon
Stalin among the classics of Marxism. " But even this rela-
tively mild criticism of Stalin was not repeated by Ulbricht in
his March 24 speech to the SED Conference. The Party meet-
ing reflected the Moscow developments by stressing the merits
of collective leadership and of broader responsibilities for
legislative bodies, and by setting up a "Commission for Meas-
ures for Broad Development of Democracy in the GDR. " The
Commission's chief task seemed to be to review cases of un-
dropped the demand for the revolutionary overthrow of the
Adenauer regime contained in the November 1952 "Program
of National Reunification of West Germany. " Instead, it
demanded the creation. of a "democratic people's movement, "
since the former slogan, under present conditions and con-
sidering the degree of maturity of the classes of the Federal
Republic, would prevent a rally of the masses of workers and
of all other democratic forces. In practice this meant that in
future the KPD would follow the tactic of collaborating Vith the
SPD instead of fighting it, in. order to achieve "unity of action
of the working class" with the hope of wizihing the 1957 Bunde-
stag elections. The Communists allegedly hoped thus to con-
tribute to the realization.of fundamental social reforms, but
their real aim, it is safe to assume, was to prevent the re-
armament of Western Germany and to achieve its, withdrawal
from NATO.
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Cn1"T"W*WA&.6
justified removal from the Party of "workers and working
peasants, " which seemed to limit its activities to low-level
Party members, particularly as there had been nothing com-
parable to the Rajk case in the GDR,. The widespread but il-
logical hopes that the very unpopular Ulbricht would be the
chief victim of de-Stalinization were effectively dashed by
Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau and SED Central Committee
Secretary Karl Schirdewan. Rau defended Ulbricht against
the "hysterical attacks of the enemy, " and Schirdewan made
it clear that "the decisive turning away from the personality
cult does not mean the negation of the role of personality with-
in the elected organs of the Party. "
16. In general the Party, as in most other satellites,
took the line that corrective action against the most glaring
abuses had been taken as far back as 1953, that some improve-
ment was, however, still possible and would be carried out,
but that the chief task was the improvement of economic con-
ditions, a problem to which Ulbricht devoted the greater part
of his speech. The standard of living in the GDR, he claimed,
had improved since 1953, when it had been largely responsible
for the June revolt, but it was still ~dmittedly low, especially
in comparison with West Germany. The regime was natur-
A rough idea can be gained from the following figures:
Consumer Goods
Food Industries
GDR
FR
GDR
FR
1936
100
100
100
100
1950
56
113
88
108
1953
76
152
113
154
1955
83
184
115
178
(Wolfgang Stolper in The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Cambridge, Mass. November 1957, p. 540).
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ally lavish in its promises of betterment: the end of rationing
in 1957, a shorter work week, more and better consumer goods,
larger pensions, additional housing facilities - all of them to
be achieved without cutting back industrial development plans.
The regime was, however, careful to add that any radical
improvement depended upon an increase in productivity - a
.precaution which greatly increased the credibility of the
promises, but by the same token reduced their morale build-
ing value considerably, a factor of particular importance for
East Germany. For during the seven years from 1948 to 1955,
the GDR's net loss of population as a result of mifration to
West Germany had amounted to over 1. 6 million, mostly
young men, that is about 10% of the population. The conse-
quences of this manpower loss for production, the armed
forces, the demographic structure of the country, and for
Communist propaganda, were serious.
17. In the fraternal greetings sent by the Third
Party Conference to the CPSU, the term "People's Democracy"
was used for the first time to describe the East German state.
It was obviously meant to indicate that the Communist Bloc
considered the situation final, regardless of eventual reunifica-
tion.
18. The fact that Ulbricht and his associates had
made it very clear that they - and the Kremlin - had no
intention of drawing the consequences for East Germany from
the indictment of Stalin and his methods and of making room
for a more liberal and humane team did not mean that the
matter was closed as far as the East German people in general
and the SED rank and file were concerned. What they resented
and what they wanted are revealed by reproof s and statements
of the Party leaders.
1
Ibid., p. 524.
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19. On April 29, 1956, for example, Neues
Deutschland carried a Party statement denying that personal-
ities had been glorified in the SED. "The emphasis put on
the role of leading and particularly outstanding labor leaders
like Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, and Walter Ulbricht, "
the statement explained, had "nothing to do with the cult of
personality, " but had been "an important symbol and a bene-
ficial and uniting element in the relations between the Party
and the working class and the people . . . " Neuer Wei of
June 27 declared that disciplinary measures would be used to
check rank and file agitation against the Party leadership and
demands for secret elections of Party officials. Unrest and
dissatisfaction were particularly widespread among members
of the intelligentsia and students. In June 1956 Ulbricht
complained to Party activists at the Humboldt University in
Berlin that "bourgeois opinions regarding freedom, uncer-
tainty about democratic centralism in the Party, and even
nihilist views which negate the role of the Party and state
leadership" had been apparent at Party meetings in the
academic sphere.
20. On two points only was the leadership prepared
to make actual concessions to the spirit of the times. Several
hundred thousand of the lowest paid workers received wage
increases, and on June 4, prices of textiles, shoes, clothing
and a number of luxury items were cut 25 to 60 percent.
Furthermore, following upon sharp criticism by Premier
Grotewohl of the methods of the State Security Service and
the judicial organization in the GDR, steps were taken to
correct some miscarriages of justice in the past.
21. These concessions were hardly sweeping
enough to curb the general discontent. Something more was
needed. To obtain the indispensable help, virtually the whole
top level of the East German government journeyed to Moscow
for two days of conversations. The joint communique, issued
on July 17, 1956, betrayed the intent to enhance the prestige
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eeArr~~i.
of the Ulbricht regime by strengthening the obstacles to the
reunification of Germany. It reasserted the Soviet-East
German aspiration for German unity, which, as the Council
of Ministers subsequently explained in East Berlin, was "not
simply a matter of the preservation and inviolability" of East
Germany's socialist achievements, but of "the realization
of these principles in Germany as a whole. " In the meantime
the East German regime was to be helped to raise the stand-
ard of living by the halving of Soviet occupation costs, by
increased deliveries of modern machinery, and by long term
credits on favorable terms.
22. In his subsequent report to the 28th Plenum
of the SED Central Committee, Ulbricht explained that the
Soviet assistance was designed to enable the GDR to compete
with and even to surpass West German achievements in
science, technology, and living standards, since, he now
admitted, "this economic competition will be decisive for the
future of Germany." But Ulbricht was careful to point out
that the abolition of rationing, promised for 1957, would
depend upon an increase in agricultural production, and that
during the Second Five-Year Plan there would be "a contra-
diction between the rapid growth. of the needs of the popula-
tion r consumer goo and the development of productive
forces. "
23. In the political sphere, Ulbricht at last ad-
mitted that Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin had "moved
Party members to the very depths and at the beginning led
to bewilderment among some members. " The organizations
primarily affected were those "in technical schools, univer-
sities, theaters, and press representatives. " Ulbricht
further conceded that although the Central Committee had
worked to eliminate manifestations of the personality cult
since 1953, "there have been errors repeated in this con=
nection," dnd that..' collectivity in the Politburo could be con-
stantly strengthened by continued critical evaluation of its
work. "
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CO L
24. Presumably needled by Khrushchev, as Rakosi
had been in Hungary, the Central Committee announced the
reinstatement of 89 out of 115 Party members who had been
expelled in 1952 and 1953, .among them Franz Dahlem and
Anton Ackermann, the principal exponents of a "German road
to Socialism, " but not of Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Herrn-
stadt, who had challenged Ulbricht's Party control most
openly. 1 It was further announced that 691 Social Democrats,
330 war criminals, and. 15, 000 guilty of "criminal and other
offenses, " had been released, the review of their harsh
sentences passed under cold war conditions having been made
possible by the improvement in East-West relations. But
demands for loosening of regime controls, ascribed to "imper-
ialist agencies, " were branded as attempts by the enemy to
promote "counter-revolution. " Two noteworthy admissions
were made - collectively - by the Central Committee: the
first, that slavish adherence to Stalinist policies had led to a
paralysis of personal initiative and prevented an objective
study of social and political problems in East Germany. The
second, that "the bureaucratic and soulless attitude of state
officials which violated the private interests of citizens, "
was at least partially responsible for the flight to West Ger-
many of a growing number of badly needed technicians,
skilled workers, and prospective conscripts. Who bore the
remaining responsibility was 6f course left unsaid.
The October 1956 Crisis in East Germany
25. All available evidence shows that even the
relative liberalization of the Party Line failed to allay the dis-
satisfaction with the Ulbricht leadership prevailing in the
Party as well as in the population at large, particularly in the
llt may be interesting to recall that Karl Schirdewan had been
foremost in 1953 in denouncing the "group and fraction"
activities and the "miserable menshevist tactics of the Party-
hostile Herrnstadt-Zaisser group. "
_12- C ON-1 7 6T A :L
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Universities. Hopes that Ulbricht would be purged persisted
for a long time, at any rate up to the Polish upheaval and the
Hungarian uprising in October. Except for a certain effer-
vescence among the students and intellectuals, the critical
period from October 18 to November 5, 1956, had passed
without disturbance in East Germany. It had to be recognized
that, whether by luck or by design, Ulbricht had successfully
avoided the Scylla of allowing the opposition too much rope
and the Charybdis of unyielding Stalinism. He had therefore,
from the orthodox Communist point of view, done a good job.
It is true that he had been greatly helped by the fact that no
militant factionalism had developed in the upper Party eche-
lons and that the population as a whole had remained passive.
There was evidently no general disposition to repeat the
experience of June 1953, and the most recalcitrant elements
of the population simply swelled the ranks of those escaping
to West Germany.
26. However, if it was true that the failure of the
Hungarian uprising had once more brought home to the satel-
lite peoples the futility of attempts to throw off the Russian-
Communist yoke, the success of the Poles in achieving a
measure of liberalization did encourage manifestations of
similar aspirations in the GDR. The atmosphere in a number
of meetings of workers and students which were addressed by
Party activists during that period is reported to have been
tense, and sharp complaints were voiced. A meeting called
on November 2 by a group of students of the Veterinary
Faculty of Humboldt University to protest against the compul-
sory study of Marxism-Leninism and of Russian, was par-
ticularly stormy. Although no overt acts of insubordination
occurred, the leadership found it advisable to hold out pros-
pects of additional economic concessions, while obstinately -
and evidently wisely, from its point of view - refusing any
relaxation in the political field. On the other hand, only few
arrests were made, and these were limited to the most
strongly revisionist intellectual circles, Wolfgang Harich,
-13- COl
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lecturer in social science at the Berlin Humboldt University,
and some of his friends being the most notable victims, but a
number of students were also included. Ulbricht apparently
had drawn the conclusion from the happenings in Poland and
Hungary that "liberal" Communist intellectuals represented
the greatest threat to Communist regimes. It was they who
prepared the ground for violent upheavals carried out by
students and workers.
27. It remained nevertheless true that economic
conditions had a great deal of influence on the effectiveness of
the intellectuals' spade work. Moreover, if East Germany
was ever to be able to lure the West Germans into the Com-
munist fold a substantial improvement in the standard of liv-
ing had to be achieved. However, Ulbricht was able to do
remarkably little: worker-management councils with very
limited rights, but broad duties to help increase production,
were promised to state enterprises at a Central Committee
meeting on November 12-14, pensions were somewhat in-
creased, and the 45-hour week was adopted, a concession
practically offset by the unofficial requirement of 2-3 hours
a week of "voluntary" work. It was true that the Polish and
Hungarian developments had raised new and serious problems
for the East German economy. Polish coal deliveries and
Rumanian oil shipments via Hungary had been seriously re-
duced; a visit to Warsaw on December 11, 1956, by an SED
Politburo delegation remained fruitless, judging by the re-
proach of selfishness raised against the Gomulka regime in
Neues Deutschland (December 14, 1956). Considering the
sharp polemics on the subject of the correctness of the
respective policies of the Warsaw and Pankow regimes in
which the press of the two countries had been engaged since
October, Poland's refusal to subordinate her interests to
those of the GDR was not surprising. In the end, it was the
USSR which had to step in with increased coal deliveries to
save the situation in this vitally important satellite. At the
same time, the GDR production plan for 1957 was revised
downward.
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28. Although its attitude by that time could hardly
have been considered ambiguous, the Ulbricht regime found
it useful to restate its complete loyalty to the CPSU, expressly
recognizing its leading role. This statement was issued in a
joint communique after a meeting of delegates of the GDR
and Czechoslovak Communist parties, December 9-10, 1956.
The communique also reaffirmed a firm decision to combat
"alleged national Communist tendencies."
29. A comprehensive restatement of the "Basic
Questions of SED Policy" was given by Ulbricht in his report
to the 30th session of the Central Committee on February 3,
1957. As was to be expected, Ulbricht dealt at great length
with the thorny problem of "different roads to socialism, "
concluding that the general principles of socialism must of
course be the same in every country, variations called for
by differences in concrete conditions being permissible only
with regard to "the forms and methods of the political
seizure of power by the working class, the pace and methods
of socializing the most important means of production and of
the other socialist transformations, the forms of socialist
democracy, and so forth. " In such matters socialist con-
struction had to be "creative" and take specific conditions
into account. Ulbricht did not miss the opportunity to pay
tribute to "the CPSU Politburo under the leadership of Com-
rade Stalin, " which had "particularly called our attention to
the fact that we in Germany cannot simply take over the forms
of Soviet power and other Soviet forms."
30. Ulbricht could not resist the temptation to pat
himself on the back inferentially, by drawing some lessons
from "the Hungarian events. " They had occurred because
the Hungarian Party leadership had not "consistently carried
out the dictatorship of the People's Democracy. " It had
failed, on the one hand, to "unite closely with the worker
class" and to maintain the "alliance with the working peasants"
but had, on the other, "permitted the activities of counter-
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_r'^T1- . TTTT 4 T
revolutionary forces, " led by the Pet8fi Circle, and had paid
insufficient attention to the "military preparations of foreign
agencies. "
31. In the GDR too, Ulbricht had to admit with
regret, there "had been some misunderstandings" in evaluat-
ing the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the
3rd SED Conference. Luckily, they had now be;.en supplanted
by a "realistic evaluation of the situation. " Ulbricht conceded,
however, that Khrushchev's "report on the results of the cult
of the individual had a shattering effect upon many, " and. that
there had been in the GDR "discussions which looked upon the
20th Congress as an appeal for liberalization and adoption of
bourgeois democracy"; moreover, "there were those who felt
that the Central Committee of the SED adhered too firmly to
Marxist-Leninist theory. " These demands, Ulbricht implied,
were quite unjustified, most of the mistakes having been
"abolished after Stalin's death. " The real problem which the
SED had tried to solve was a "relaxation of the tension in
Germany" which failed as a result of the revival of West
German imperialism. But a "series of regulations and prac-
tices" stemming from the severity of the cold war had been
eliminated, and "every effort was made to see that democratic
legality was strictly adhered to. " Measures had also been
taken "to meet the SPD half way and to facilitate the creation
of a bloc of the workers' parties and labor unions. "
32. Ulbricht also revealed that requests for the
publication of the full text of Khrushchev's report had been
made. They could not be granted, he argued, because the
Congress resolutions had been published verbatim and "them-
selves contained the conclusions on which future policy was
to be based" - thus relieving the Germans of the trouble of
drawing their own conclusions. Furthermore, the report was
limited to the question of the cult of the individual, "particu-
larly the violation of Soviet legality' -presumably none of the
Germans' business. Moreover, Ulbricht felt, "we, as Ger-
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mans, have the least right to discuss mistakes which occurred
in the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet Union was threat-
ened by fascist Germany . . . The Soviet government and
Comrade Stalin were right in taking certain internal and ex-
ternal security measures after Hitler came to power. In this
process, Comrade Stalin violated the Soviet laws for a time
. . ." However, "after the abolition of the cult of the individ-
ual, Comrade Stalin has been correctly appraised. We will
continue to respect his works and to learn from them . . . "
33. As for the GDR, Ulbricht declared that
"neither the agitation of the enemy against Stalinism, nor
revisionist theories, nor certain experiments in Poland,
which were recommended to the GDR, could divert us from
the right way" which had been followed since the 3rd Party
Congress. Ulbricht admitted that "the socialist camp had
suffered somewhat through the counterrevolutionary putsch
in Hungary, " but he claimed that "many citizens who previ-
ously had thoughtlessly demanded 'liberation' are thankful
today that events such as those in Hungary or certain develop-
ments in Poland were made impossible. " What Ulbricht
obviously meant to imply was that it was thanks to his wisdom
and firmness that the East Germans had been saved from
foolishly following the same course as the Hungarians, lead-
ing to the same results.
34. One of the chief mistakes made by the Hungar-
ian Party leadership had been, in Ulbricht's opinion, its
failure "to carry on the ideological struggle against the re
visionism of Nagy, Losonczy and other members of the
PetLfi faction and of the Writers Association. The Hungarian
Party and working class had to pay dearly for this mistake. "
Ulbr .cht's prescription was intensification of "individual'
Party work with the leading representatives of the intelligent-
sia, " explanation of "unclear questions in personal conversa-
tions, " and similar remedies. If Ulbricht expected factory
workers to emerge victorious from debates over problems of
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economy, sociology, philosophy, and so on, with a Herr
Professor and to convert them to their views by the sheer
force of superior logic and knowledge, he was certainly over-
optimistic, particularly as he himself conceded that the Party
cadres were deficient both in political education and in tech-
nical knowledge. Personally, Ulbricht does not seem to have
tried to use the method of persuasion when he had the oppor-
tunity with the members of the Harich group, for he never men-
tioned any such attempt. He found it simpler to deal with them
"administratively, " although they were charged with no open
"counterrevolutionary" act. Their crime was to have pursued
"the elimination of SED leadership and the separation of the
GDR from the Soviet Union, " and the abolition of the economic
ministers, the Ministry of State Security, and the MTS.
35. There was apparently another only slightly
less dangerous group of "comrades of Party organizations at
institutes, "whose basic heresy was the elimination of "demo-
cratic centralism by independence and by deciding general
questions through discussions and comments in the basic: Party
organizations. " This, Ulbricht declared, meant nothing less
than "the destruction. of the workers' and peasants' power. "
Some economists - Ulbricht mentioned Professors Benary,
Behrens, and Vieweg - demanded a return to a market economy
based on supply and demand and frankly admitted their belief
that it was time for the state to begin to wither away. This
heresy, Ulbricht explained, meant putting the "alleged contra-
diction between the democratic interests of the working masses"
an4l the "bureaucratic dictatorship of the state" ahead of the
struggle between imperialism and socialism. Its source was
to be found, he said, in the erroneous views expressed by
Yugoslav comrades, such as Kardelj, which, if applied, would
mean the "liquidation of the workers' and peasants' state. "
Other comrades went so far as to demand "open meetings" in
which non-members could participate on an equal footing with
Party members, and there were even "several" party members
who - horribile dictu - had disseminated enemy slander against
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leading comrades in the Party! But, Ulbricht reassured his
audience, "the deliberation and decision of these basic ques-
tions of SED policy will lead to the consolidation of the worker-
peasant power in the GDR. "
Reunification by Confederation
36. Ulbricht seized the opportunity to reformulate
the GDR demands concerning German reunification. His
involved and often ambiguous statement on the subject seemed
to mean that the "only" preconditions on which the GDR
insisted now were "the abolition of compulsory military serv-
ice in West Germany, the bilateral limitation of armed forces,
and the removal of the leading Nazi functionaries from the
state and economic apparatus. " Moreover, a European col-
lective security system and a zone of reduced armaments would
have to be created.
37. "The GDR does not demand as a precondition"
Ulbricht continued, "that Socialist transformations take place
in West Germany. " All it did demand was that "the worker
class create by itself, in alliance with the middle class. and
with circles of the national bourgeoisie, the foundations . . .
of the United Germany. For this it would be necessary to
hold a plebiscite on the transfer of key industries into people's
property, on a democratic land reform, and on a school re-
form. " It was explained that small stockholders should be
given full compensation for their shares, large stockholders
partial compensation, and only holdings exceeding 100 hec-
tares should be expropriated - presumably without compensa-
tion.
38. Once the necessary preconditions had been
fulfilled and the foundations built, the next step was to set up
an all-German council, composed of an equal number of
representatives from both states, which.would exercise the
functions of a government of a German Confederation and
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"prepare . . . the establishment of a uniform administration, it
i. e. uniform currency, customs union, unified transportation
and communications system, etc. It would also prepare "on
the basis of negotiations between equals" the "free all-German
elections for the National Assembly, `T which would be truly
democratic, because "the financing of parties by monopoly
capital, the buying of deputies, and the control of press and
radio by the big capitalist monopolies" would have been elim-
inated. The National Assembly would then form a new govern-
ment and adopt a constitution.
39. It should be added, however, that even Ulbricht
felt obliged to explain that the preconditions for the fulfillment
of his precondition were a defeat of Adenauer's CDU at the
next Bundestag elections and "the strengthening of the will for
action of the worker class. "
40. Considering the Communist aversion against
plebiscites, it may be interesting to note that Ulbricht recom-
mended that most of the preconditions, namely, withdrawal
from NATO, nationalization of key industries, land reform,
and school reform, should be decided by plebiscites in West-
ern Germany. In East Germany, of course, everything had
to be decided by representatives chosen on the basis of the
"valid election regulations. "
Party Factionalism
41. The course followed by Ulbricht to restore the
"monolithic" unity of the Party showed some flexibility, super-
ficially at any rate. :Besides Dahlem, two other Communist
leaders, Hans Jendretzki and Alexander Abusch, who had been
considered opponents of Ulbricht with national Communist lean-
ings and had been in disgrace since 1952, were admitted to the
Central Committee of the SED, but, judging by their subsequent
attitudes, only at the price of assurances of their future loyalty.
This impression is confirmed by the fact that Ulbricht showed
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no sign of a conciliatory spirit toward those intellectuals who
did not recant. Harich was sentenced to 10 years' penal
servitude (March 9, 1957). Professors Benary, Behrens, and
Gunther Kohlmey, of the Institute of Economic Science, who
had also criticized the predominance of administrative over
economic pressure in the state-owned enterprises, got away
merely with a refutation of their defeatist views in a special
issue of Wirtschaftswissenschaft and a critical rebuttal by
orthodox economists in Einheit (No. 2, 1957), which revealed
on the same occasion that these revisionist views had been
"spreading in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of
Science for over a year without meeting opposition. " Profes-
sor Vieweg, who had advocated abolition of the MTS and thus
like Professor Harich committed the mistake of anticipating
Khrushchev - and of farm collectivization as well, was ex-
pelled from the executive of the Peasants' Mutual Aid Associa-
tion and at the end of March found it advisable to flee to the
West.
42. Among the philosophers, besides Harich,
Professor Ernst Bloch, of the Karl Marx University in Leip-
zig, was accused in the student newspaper Forum of having
propagated a "mystic philosophy of hope" which had provided
"an ideological basis for . . . destructive criticism of our
social and state order, " although it falsely represented itself
as Marxist. Professor Bloch resigned his professorship in
February 1957. Professor Havemann, of the Humboldt Univer-
sity, had propounded the theses that the study of Marxist
philosophy was unnecessary for those not specifically concerned
with philosophical studies, and that to "assess a scientific re-
sult only according to whether or not it conforms to dialectical
materialism is fruitless and philosophical dogmatism. 0
Professor Havemann got away with a retraction of his views,
published in the same paper (March 20, 1957).
1Neues Deutschland, July 8, 1956.
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mmmmmww~
43. The radical "revision" of the curricula in
political theory and social science, besides the elimination
of the Russian language from the list of compulsory subjects,
had also been among the reforms most insistently demanded
by the students, but the Ulbricht regime was no more inclined
to make concessions to the students than to the faculty mem-
bers. The Party Central Committee warned that "only those
can study at our universities who are devoted to the Workers'
and Peasants" Statel, and on March 16, the authorities an-
nounced that before being admitted to study at a university,
young people would first have to work a year in industry and
produce a favorable report from the plant management, the
Party, the trade union, and the youth organization. 2 Never-
theless, student unrest continued, particularly at the Hum-
boldt University. In May Professor Schuetzler, dean of the
Veterinary Faculty, who had shown considerable sympathy
for the organizers of the November protest, and one of his
colleagues defected to the West. Over a hundred students
who boycotted the lectures of his successor were suspended,
and twelve students, threatened with arrest for their role as
ringleaders of the "opposition," also fled to the West. To re-
duce contacts with the West as well as the number of students
"visiting" West Germany and failing to return, a regulation
requiring a special permit from the educational authorities
to visit NATO countries was issued on May 29.
44. Reports of a "tense atmosphere" among some
workers in coastal areas and of tumultuous scenes in ship-
yards, provoked by economic grievances, which appeared in
the Neue Zt rcher Zeit: of March 29, 1957, seemed con.-
1
Neues Deutschland, December 14, 1956.
2General enforcement of the decision seems, however, to have
been held in abeyance, serving meanwhile as a sword of
Damocles.
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firmed by the staging of "exercises" in many East German
cities by newly organized armed workers' detachments
(Kampfgruppen). These "exercises" were evidently intended
to intimidate the malcontents. The existence of serious
shortages and therefore of grounds for discontent seemed also
to be borne out by the GDR Economic Plan for 1957, which
called for an increase in industrial production of only 6% and
a concentration of the available resources on the lagging raw
material and fuel bases. Under the circumstances, produc-
tion of consumer goods could not be increased, and the prom-
ised abolition of food rationing had to be postponed once again.
It was widely asserted that the plan, however unsatisfactory
from the consumers' point of view, nevertheless, represented
a retreat by Ulbricht, who had demanded larger investments
in long-range industrial projects .
East German Leadership Unaffected by the June 1957 Soviet
Purge
45. The announcement over the East Berlin Radio,
on July 3, 1957, of the purge of thei'anti--Party group"!; of the
CPSU Presidium, headed by Malenkov and Molotov, gave a
vivid illustration of the degree of real East German sovereign-
ty. The broadcast included the reaction of the SED Politburo
- not signed, as was customary, by Ulbricht - to the effect
that it backed the CPSU decision completely, although it soon
became obvious that the SED leaders were at sea as to its
implications for the GDR. On July 5, Neues Deutschland
carried an article by H. Matern, member of the Politburo,
in which he enlarged on the theme of Party unity, but care-
fully refrained from the usual assurances. of loyalty to Ulbricht,
or even to the Party leadership in general. The other news-
papers, not wishing to take any risks, prudently abstained
from any comment. Hopes were running high in GDR party
circles that the unpopular Ulbricht would not survive the con-
demnation by the CPSU of dogmatists and sectarians, i. e.
Stalinists, and would be replaced by the more conciliatory
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Karl Schirdewan, Secretary of the SED Central Committee,
but one never could tell. Ulbricht, after all, had never
opposed Khrushchev, as far as was known, and had steered
the GDR through the crises of the preceding autumn without
major disturbances, so there was no reason for him to have
incurred Khrushchev's displeasure. Events were soon to
prove that Ulbricht's credit in Moscow remained as good as
ever.
46. The 32nd Plenum of the SED Central Com-
mittee (July 10- 12, ]:957) proceeded uneventfully under Ul-
bricht's unruffled guidance. One of the most striking revela-
tions was made by Party Secretary Alfred Neumann, when he
took the labor unions (FDGB) to task for their strong tendency
to deal exclusively with social and economic questions "bluntly
speaking - to adopt a position of political neutrality . . . their
executive boards conducted an unsatisfactory fight against
revisionism. "
47. After a strong speech by Heinrich Rau, Minis-
ter of Foreign Trade, who blamed the deficiencies of the GDR
economy on the structure of the economic apparatus, Ulbricht
announced that proposals for the simplification and improve-
ment of planning and of the working methods of the state
apparatus were being actively prepared. Economic planning
was to remain centralized, but greater operational responsi-
bility was to be granted to local authorities. This course
happened to be in line with the industrial reorganization
initiated by Khrushchev in the USSR, and was by no means a
concession to the economic "revisionists" such as Benary
and Behrens, whose views were on the contrary, once again
sharply criticized in Neues Deutschland (July 10, 1957).
During the last weeks of July, a number of well publicized
trials of individuals - including four members of the Harich
group accused of conspiring to overthrow the government,
bore witness to the regime's adherence to the policy of re-
pression. Indeed, the public prosecutor was at pains to
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convey the impression in his indictment that had it not been
for the leadership's exceptional. firmness and vigilance in
November 1956, the GDR would have been the, scene of events
similar to those in Hungary.
48. The regime's efforts to subjugate the East
German Evangelical Church culminated in the creation of a
special Secretariat for Church Affairs and a regulation,
effective July 1, 1957, transferring the responsibility for
dispensing the state subsidy to the Church from the Finance
Ministry to the District Councils. The object was to circum-
vent the authority of the Central Office of the Church, headed
by Bishop Dibelius in West Berlin, and to provide the local
authorities with a lever to be used on the lower echelons. of
the Clergy.
The Khrushchev Visit
49. The GDR program for the reunification of
Germany, based on a negotiated confederation after the with-
drawal of all forces and troops., was once again set forth in
a statement issued on July 27 this was followed on August 7
by the visit by Khrushchev, who naturally strongly endorsed
the program. Khrushchev, moreover, made it clear that
those who favored the mutual. withdrawal of foreign troops
from Central Europe in the hope that the satellites would then
be able to choose their, own form of government and institu-
tions, free from foreign coercion at least, were mistaken.
50. Premier Otto Grotewohl, in a speech deliv-
ered at Rostock on August 11, 1957, expressed approval for
Khrushchev's statement that restoration of German unity was
a matter for the German people to decide, adding:
"Comrade Khrushchev said something else
which is of the utmost importance to us. He told
the People's Chamber: 'You can be certain that
the USSR, and the other socialist countries will,
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in case of need, do their duty by the German
Democratic Republic rand defend its democratic:
achievements, freedom, and independence.'
"Well, dear friends, this is not a mere diplo-
matic declaration of friendship. It is more, it is a
very grave warning to all those in the Western
world who lbelieve that the German -.Democratic
Republic can be softened up and integrated into
NATO. It is, I think, a very effective cold shower
for all hot heads harboring such criminal plans.
Anyone pondering the matter must reflect: he who
tries after this declaration to raise his hand against
the German Democratic Republic will not merely
have his hand knocked down, but will suffer a
crushing defeat. "
51. One of the purposes of the Khrushchev visit
was obviously to squelch the current rumors concerning
Ulbricht's impending demotion and to strengthen his authority
by a public show of confidence. At a private reception at
President Wilhelm Pi.eck's official residence on August 7,
Khrushchev is reported to have described Ulbricht as "the
most faithful of all the faithful." And addressing an East:
Berlin crowd on the 13th, he stated: "The Party and govern-
ment delegation of the Soviet Union declares we are in full
and complete agreement with the policy being followed by the
SED and its leadership headed by Comrade Ulbricht, " and
denied Western reports of friction between Soviet and SED
or GDR leadership.
52. Soviet political support of the Ulbricht regime
was complemented on 27 September by the granting on favor-
able terms of additional loans and credits totalling $175
million - making a grand total of $785 million since 1953 -
and the conclusion of a trade agreement on equally advan -
tageous terms for the GDR. Nevertheless, the government
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had to resign itself to reducing its annual gross industrial out-
put growth target, for the 1957-1960 period, from the 9%
established in 1956 to 6%. 1 But increased production of con-
sumer goods and food to permit the abolition of rationing -
now set for 1960 - was promised once again, without alloca-
tion of additional funds, however, and with heavy industry
retaining priority. A further indication of the regime's
economic difficulties was provided by the currency conversion
effected on October 13, which provided for the confiscation of
all sums considered as having been acquired by "speculation,"
and the cancellation of East marks held in West Germany.
October 1957 Plenum Foreshadows a Tightening of the Screw
53. Presumably stung by the sensational defection
to the West of Professor Alfred Kantorowicz, one of the GDR's
best known intellectuals, Ulbricht, in his speech to the 33rd
Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED (October 16-19,
1957), showed considerable concern for the large number of
"traitors" continuing to flee to West Germany.; He proposed
to combat this trend by a widespread propaganda action, al-
though rumors were already current that the main arguments
would soon be found in an addendum to the penal code. In the
meantime, Ulbricht seemed to be arguing - presumably on the
strength of assurances received in the course of the recent
Khrushchev visit, that the intelligentsia and others holding
bourgeois views might as well give up all hope for a capitalist
restoration and cease their fruitless opposition to Communism.
At the same time, however, Ulbricht practically admitted that
popular disaffection was unavoidable as long as the standard of
1
Announced by Ulbricht on October 17, 1957.
2261, 622 refugees were registered in West Germany in 1957,
about the same number as in the two preceding years.
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living in the GDR remained much lower than in the Federal
Republic. Addressing comrades who were apparently more
royalist than the king, Ulbricht declared: "There is a ques-
tion if these comrades have understood that the increase of
the supply of goods to satisfy the living. requirements of the
population is not only an economic measure but that it is of
foremost importance in connection with proving the superiority
of the socialist system over capitalism. "
54. It was hardly a coincidence that Khrushchev
had only recently championed "the important Marxist truth
that people first and foremost eat, drink, have homes and
clothe themselves before they are in a position to engage in
politics, science, and art, " (Pravda, August 28, 1957). The
only differences were that East Germany lacked the millions
of acres of virgin Siberian lands and that Germans are some-
what more exigent than Russians. Under the circumstances,
Ulbricht had to be content to affirm the Marxist truth in prin-
ciple and to rely on higher work norms and lower wages for
its implementation.
55. The Politburo report was delivered by Matern.
He too admitted the existence of "revisionist, bourgeois
liberal, and other reactionary ideologies" among intellectuals
and students, but claimed that the regime had not tolerated
"national Communism" or "wider democratization" under any
disguises. Indeed he boasted that the SED leadership had
correctly interpreted the 20th Party Congress and had pre-
vented the outbreak of attacks "against the main principles of
Marxism-Leninism or against the leading role of the CPSU" -
in other words, events in Poland and Hungary had proved the
SED had been right in refraining from de-Stalinization, liber-
alization, collective :Leadership, etc.
56. Among the few concrete decisions taken by the
33rd Plenum was the creation of a special Politburo Commis-
sion for Cultural Affairs under a notorious Soviet tool, Alfred
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Kurella. Paul Wandel, the Central Committee Secretary who
had been in charge of cultural affairs, criticized himself
severely for his weakness and was relieved of his position.
Shortly afterwards, Ernst Wollweber, Minister of State
Security, who, although he had successfully maintained order
in the critical days of November 1956, was generally believed
to have been opposed to excessive severity, "resigned" on the
grounds of ill health. He was replaced by Erich Mielke, a
notoriously "tough" partisan of Ulbricht.
57. There was ample evidence of a new assertive-
ness and tightening of the screws in practically every field.
This included greater emphasis on upward revision of work
norms, higher agricultural collectivization goals, pressure
on private craftsmen and business men to join cooperatives,
harsher punishments and suppression of criticism, efforts to
shunt youth to farms, tightening of the Party apparatus, fresh
attempts to increase teachers' reliability, heavier indoctrina-
tion in educational institutions and in the armed forces, and
greater pressure on the clergy. At the same time, a new wave
of . harassment of traffic to and from West Berlin was set in
motion. The legislation, foreshadowed by Ulbricht in his
speech to the 33rd Plenum, which made flight from East Ger-
many, assisting flight, or even guilty knowledge of flight,
treasonable offences and reaffirmed death or life sentences
for some "anti-state" offenses such as espionage or incitement
to boycott, was passed by the GDR Volkskammer on December
13, 1957. Although Neues Deutschland denied editorially that
these revisions of the penal code would harden judicial repres-
sion, it had to concede that they would at any rate not
liberalize it - as had been promised after the 20th CPSU
Congress in the spring of 1956.
58. It was hardly a coincidence that at the same
time the East German press carried accounts of numerous
convictions of people accused of spying and sabotage, in
striking contrast with the rarity of such items during the
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preceding 18 months. There were also reports of the sentenc-
ing of members of the clergy for illegal financial transactions
with West Germany and for "inhuman measures" against young
people, presumably referring to denial of confirmation to
those who had accepted the Communist "Jugendweihe. "
59. Implementation of the harder line in the
economic sector, however, proved considerably more trouble-
some. In the top Party leadership there existed strong
opposition to the plan to force exports at the expense of con-
sumer goods, to raise the norms or, what amounted to the
same thing, to reduce wages; it was argued that these meas-
ures would increase worker dissatisfaction much more than
production, causing dangerous unrest as in 1953, and increas-
ing flights to the West. Among Party leaders there was also
strong opposition to Ulbricht's plan to reorganize the indus-
trial structure along lines of greater local autonomy and of
plant mergers, which would be accompanied by the abolition
of a number of ministries, following the Soviet pattern.
60. Their ostensible grounds for opposition to
this plan, or at any rate for urging its very gradual implementa-
tion, were the lack of trained personnel to fill the new dis-
trict (Bezirk) economic posts, the increased cost in both per-
sonnel and money, and the doubtful advantages to be gained,
at least in the immediate future. What was more urgently
needed, the opposition leaders argued, was an increase in
the inadequate amount of raw materials supplied by the USSR,
especially those going into the manufacture of consumer goods.
It is of course hard to tell how well founded these objections
were, but there seems to be no doubt that another - unpub-
licized - objection, the reluctance of many economic officials
to give up their residences in East Berlin and to move to
small provincial centers, was genuine. A highly controver-
sial point, on which Ulbricht himself is reported to have been
unable to make up his mind, was the need to increase the
rights of the trade unions in setting or changing production
plans.
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61. A decision also had to be taken concerning
implementation of the farm collectivization campaign an-
nounced in June. So far, the collective farm sector had been
able to expand by taking over abandoned farmlands, but there
was little left to be absorbed. There was strong opposition
to a recent decision to intensify the pressure on private farms
by denying them the use of heavy MTS machinery, on the
ground that it would only .curtail agricultural production.
62. Finally, as the 35th Plenum was to reveal
later, there was sharp disagreement concerning the condi-
tions to be met for reunification. While strenuous attempts
were being made behind the scenes by each side to win over
the other to its point of view, the dramatic suicide on Decem-
ber 14, 1957 of Gerhard Ziller, Party Secretary in charge
of economic affairs, brought the conflict to a boil. Accord-
ing to reliable SED sources, Gerhard Ziller and Fritz Selb-
mann, a deputy premier and director of the Commission for
Industry and Transport, had, under the influence of liquor,
sharply criticized Ulbricht's line after a Party meeting of
the Wismut A. G., on December 9. Ulbricht, who was duly
informed, had a violent argument with Ziller on the 13th,
and Ziller committed suicide the following day.
Internal Party Conflict and the February 1958 Plenum
63. Paradoxically, the death of Ziller, who was
considered the most outspoken opponent of Ulbricht's
economic reforms, aggravated rather than imprcved''the
situation. Many Party members reasoned that if a veteran
and steadfast Communist like Ziller, a man who had pre-
ferred to "stick it out" under Hitler rather than to escape
abroad, who had a well-established reputation as a compe-
tent economist and an able administrator, and who had until
recently always been considered a loyal Ulbricht man, had
so strongly opposed Ulbricht's economic program, the situa-
tion must be indeed disastrous. Reading between the lines
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one can discern also the implication that Ziller had been the
champion of German as opposed to Soviet interests and
patterns.
64. Actually, behind the faFade of unity among the
Party leaders, the Politburo had been split for a long time
between supporters and opponents of Ulbricht's hard line.
Five members, Stoph., Ebert, Schirdewan, Grotewohl and
Matern, had originally been considered Ulbricht men, while
three, Rau, Oelssner, and Pieck, were reckoned as opponents.
But in the course of the internal conflict provoked by Ulbricht's
attempts to tighten the reins after the 1956 events in Poland
and Hungary, Schirdewan and Grotewohl were believed to have
opposed Ulbricht with increasing frequency, while Ebert and
Matern had retreated into a "neutral" attitude. More particu-
larly, Schirdewan was said to have differed with Ulbricht on
economic problems, on the question of the desirability of
German reunification, on the proper attitude toward the dis-
affected students - persuasion instead of repression - and in
general on the required degree of subservience to the USSR.
Reports from "well informed" sources on what went on behind
the scenes are too vague and confused to give a realiable pic-
ture of developments within the Party during the month pre-
ceding the 35th Plenum, called for January 15, 1958, which
was to decide the Party line. In particular, it is hardly
possible to tell whether the conflicting views were aired in
confidential Politburo meetings or whether Ulbricht used the
time before the Plenum to make sure of the full backing of
the Kremlin and to win over or intimidate as many opposing
or doubtful members as possible. That this was not an easy
task can be inferred from the facts that not one of the full
Politburo members was rated a staunch follower of Ulbricht,
and that the Plenum meeting was twice postponed, first to
January 27, and then to February 3, 1958.
65. In his speech at the opening of the Plenum,
Premier Grotewohl aptly described the stakes:
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"There are two points of view which basically
are the core of the whole dispute: one is that of
the attempt to set up a second leadership, the other
is that of establishing a platform, or the prerequi-
sites for the development of a platform, which, in
political respects, is bound to have a harmful effect
on our work. Some comrades here have said: we
never had such an intention and we have never pur-
sued such aims. But this is precisely the tragic
factor in the development of such matters. They
begin with personal arguments, they become intense,
increasingly pointed and violent. Finally, they be-
come political questions and factions are formed."'
66. Although only speeches backing Ulbricht's posi-
tion were published in Neues Deutschland, and most of these
only after a delay of almost three weeks presumably devoted to
careful censoring, they yield some clues to the proceedings: of
the Plenum.
67. The report of the Politburo was delivered by
Erich Honecker, a mere candidate member, but one of the
few men unquestionably loyal to Ulbricht. After dealing per-
functorily with the standard questions of peace, disarmament,
and reunification, Honecker plunged into the burning problem
of intra-party strife. The Schirdewan-Wollweber group and
others, he said, had engaged in fractional activities.
"They had wrongly understood the decisions of
the 20th CPSU Congress. They were of the opinion
1Radio East Berlin, February 25, 1958. It may be observed,
incidentally, that Grotewohl hereby unintentionally confirmed
the impossibility for the allegedly "monolithic" Communist
parties to escape the formation of factions.
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that the policy of relaxation of tensions also meant
a relaxation of the struggle against the class enemy.
There were sharp clashes in which Comrade Schir-
dewan took up a position against the Central Com-
mittee and its first secretary. "
The unmasking of the Harich group and other counter-revolu-
tionary tendencies had shown, Honecker said, that Schirdewan
misunderstood the need to fight revisionism. "We" - Honecker
boasted, presumably in contrast to Ochab and Rakosi - "have
not permitted counter-revolution to organize itself under the
cloak of the struggle against dogmatism. Without neglecting
it, we opened a vigorous fight against the main danger -
revisionism. We have not allowed any discussion of mistakes
to be forced on us ! 11
68. Wollweber was accused of most culpable negli-
gence in the fight against "hostile agencies" and of having
proselytised for the Schirdewan faction. Oelssner's faults
lay in the economic sphere: "opportunist distortion" of the
agricultural policy of the Party, and advocating "the mainten-
ance of over-centralization in various parts of the state appar-
atus"; in other words, he had been for a relaxation of the
collectivization policy and against industrial decentralization.
Honecker conceded, however, that Oe].ssner had not been a
member of the Schirdewan-Wollweber group, although he had
helped it.
69. Last but not least, Schirdewan and Wollweber
were identified as the principal exponents of a group which
showed "unwillingness to understand the danger of the illusory
opinion that the unity of Germany should be brought about at
any price. "2
1Quotations from Radio Berlin Summary, February 8, 1958.
2Neues Deutschland, February 8, 1958.
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70. The Central Committee was requested to take
the necessary measures on the basis of the Party statute.
Whatever their previous convictions may have been, the mem-
bers of the Politburo now hastened to dissociate themselves
from their branded colleagues and to heave their stone at them.
Grotewohl stoutly repudiated Schirdewan's alleged attempt to
''sow contradictions" between himself and Ulbricht. He assured
his: listeners that neither of them would "allow possible personal
differences to become the subject of a dispute on political ques-
tions. "
71. Matern claimed that the roots of the factional
activities of "Schirdewan, Wollweber and others" went back to
the autumn of 1956 when it began to be alleged that the decisions
of the 20th CPSU Congress had been wrongly evaluated. "No
one can deny, " he said, "that manifestations of softening up
were generally widespread among us, " and Comrade Schirde-
wan had grossly underestimated the softening up tactics of the
opponents. Fortunately, the Party had followed a correct
policy and this greatly strengthened its position. Politburo
member Friedrich Ebert quoted Lenin on the evils of "faction-
mongering" to conclude that "Comrade Wollweber and several
others" had "wrongly assessed the role and policy of the
Party. "
72. Party Secretary Professor Kurt Hager admitted
that Ulbricht had been accused of "treating the comrades
wrongly, " but defended his habit of speaking "a candid, criti-
cal, and sometimes harsh language" in view of *hat the Party
owed him. He then quoted examples of the revisionist views
of the comrades concerned (Schirdewan et at), regarding the
so-called "comfortable" building of socialism, the oblitera-
tion.of the differences in connection with the creation of Ger-
man unity, and the shrinking from ideological disputes.
Finally, he denied that the planned "simplification of the state
apparatus" had anything to do with the "municipalization " of
the GDR economy, as the "revisionists" had apparently
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alleged. On the contrary, he made the somewhat surprising
assertion that the reform - generally referred to as a de-
centralization of industry - went "hand in hand with a
strengthening of central directions and control, as far as
both the association of publicly owned enterprises and the
state planning commission are concerned. "
73. Party Secretary Albert Norden asserted that
the "factional Schirdewan-Wollweber group" had not only
questioned the authority of the first Party Secretary, but
were making efforts to remove him. One of the most violent
attacks against Schirdewan and Wollweber was made by Franz
Dahlem, himself a former sinner, who accused them of
"underestimation of the imperialist danger, a tendency to an
evolutionary development which in practice was bound to lead
to a slowing down of socialist progress and a setback. " He
also accused Schirdewan of suffering from a "complex of
personal ambition as a coming man. "
74. At the Plenum meeting Rau, charged Oelssner
with having advocated the dissolution of weak agricultural
cooperatives and having "favored comrades like Schirdewwan",
charges which were repeated and amplified by Deputy Premier
Willi Stoph. In a speech at Potsdam on February 25, ampli-
fying his Plenum speech, Heinrich Rau also accused the
Schirdewan-WoLlweber group with having "tried to distort the
Politburo's demands for realistic plans" and for having
"called for a slowing down of the pace. "
75. Dahlem, in his Plenum speech, indicted Selb-
mann on two charges: smugness and superciliousness on the
one hand, and on the other, authorship of a pamphlet in which,
not socialism, but nuclear power was described as the revol-
utionary characteristic of our age. But Selbmann's chief
failing, according to Rau, was that he too opposed the indus-
trial reorganization plan. "Selbmann held the view that an
economy can only be directed from above by well-trained
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economic functionaries. Our opinion is that everything is
being decided by the masses, by the working class . . . "
According to Rau, Selbmann's mistaken views had been des-
cribed as. "managerism" by Ulbricht in his speech to the
35th Plenum. 1
76. The speeches in which Schirdewan and Oelssner
defended their positions were not published. They are said,
particularly Schirdewan, to have denied any intention of form-
ing.a faction or of wanting to unseat Ulbricht. All they had
attempted to do was to persuade Ulbricht and their colleagues
that the hard line would only enhance the GDR's economic dif-
ficulties and alienate the people to a degree which might lead
to a repetition of the events of 1953. They had advocated a
policy of "safety valves" and "gradualness.
77. None of the men under fire recanted and
abjured 'h'is error. The great mistake of the Schirdewan
group seems to have been speaking a little too soon. Thus,
in. his report on the imminent preparations to be made for
the Fifth Party Congress, scheduled to meet in July 1958,
Alfred Neumann announced that the agenda would include
"a general, free and factual discussion on all fundamental
questions of the policy of the SED and the state, and on all
inner-Party problems. "
78. The official communique on the results of
the 35th Plenum issued on February 7, 1958, contained the
usual appeals for the preservation of peace, unity and devel-
1
Selbmann had also apparently made some pointed remarks
about comrades who had emigrated to the USSR during the
Hitler period (Ulbricht among them) while others, had spent
those years in German concentration camps, (Schirdewan
and Selbmann among them). Rau sharply attacked him for
thus attempting to play off one group against the other.
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opment of the Party, and similar topics, but also made the
paradoxical statement that the dissemination of dialectical
materialism, the ideology of the party of the working class,
among the working people is the most important link in the
chain C development of socialist consciousness. " The
workers of East Germany were apparently unfamiliar with
their own ideology.
79. The v.o>mmuniqu& also admitted that to imple-
ment the second Five Year Plan, an ideological fight against
bourgeois ideology, opportunistic and revisionist manifesta-
tions, must be waged. . . The Plenum had to concern itself
with the activities of an opportunist group in the Party, which
had tried to change its political line. "
80. Ulbricht's speech in which, according to the
communique, he summed up the results of this comprehensive
discussion and answered fully the questions that had been
raised" has. unfortunately not been published. But his argu-
ments, added to the example of the other Party leaders, must
have been convincing, for on the following day ADN, the offi-
cial news agency, announced the unanimous decision of the
Central Committee to expel Schirdewan "for fractional activi-
ties" and Wollweber for "infringements of the Party statute"
and to reprimand them severely; to remove Oelssner from the
Politburo for repeated violation of Lt27 discipline, " and to
elect Alfred Neumann in his place. Paul Froelich, the Leipzig
Party Secretary and a loyal adherent of Ulbricht, was elected
to the Central Committee and, together with Honecker and two
other Ulbricht followers, was made a member of its secretar-
iat. Curiously enough, Schirdewan's expulsion from the Polit-
buro was not mentioned.
81. A few days later, the press announced the
departure of Premier Grotewohi for a "vacation-cure" of
several weeks (February 13), and the release of Oelssner
from his duties as deputy premier. This was followed a
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month later by the resignation from the People's Chamber of
Schirdewan, Wollweber, and Oelssner. (March 12, 1958).
82. There was no official explanation of the much
more lenient treatment accorded to Selbmann. He was, it is
true, deprived of his deputy premiership and of the director-
ship of the Commission.for Industry and Transport, but he was
given another official assignment in the shape of the deputy
chairmanship of the State Planning Commission, and, instead
of a public reprimand from the Party and expulsion from the
Central Committee like Ulbricht's other critics, he was-merely
given a private warning. It has been said that the difference
in treatment was to be explained by Selbmann's personal popu-
larity, but there had been no previous indications that he was
more popular than Schirdewan. The theory that his economic
competence made him well--.nigh. invaluable to the regime - and
was also highly appreciated in Moscow - seems more plausible,
particularly in the light of his immediate departure for that
city on an economic mission and his appointment to a high
position in the State Planning Commission. Furthermore, the
only serious charge brought against Selbmann appears to have
been his opposition to the grant of greater powers in industry
to the workers, as Rau put it. Actually it may rather have
been a question of backing trained industrial managers versus
local Party officials, but that would hardly have constituted
"softness" or revisionism, rather its opposite, dogmatism,
which was notoriously a much less serious offense.
Review of the February 1958 Purge
83. The remarkable thing about the political crisis
which shook the GDR in February 1958 is not that it should
have happened, but its timing - 15 months after the Polish and
Hungarian uprisings, although one may conclude that they were
all sparked by the same event, the 20th Party Congress, which
ratified Khrushchev's "creative reinterpretation" of the Party
Line, and his indictment of Stalin. Curiously enough, the
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statement made by Matern that the issue first arose in the
autumn of 1956 seems to be true, for before November of that
year Schirdewan, the most prominent of the "fractionists, !'
was considered Ulbricht's most faithful lieutenant and heir
apparent, and it is only after November 1956 that he was first
reported to have given any indications of disagreeing with
Ulbricht's "hard" line. Why the tragic result of the Hungarian
uprising should have converted Schirdewan to revisionism
instead of convincing him, if proof was needed, that given
Soviet opposition this road could only lead to disaster, is a
psychological enigma, the solution of which can only be guessed.
84. A good guess, based on the clues provided by
his accusers, seems to be that the genuineness of the Polish
October and of the Hungarian Revolution opened Schirdewan's
eyes to the futility of a policy which hoped to impose a dis-
tasteful political and. economic system at the point of bayonets
wielded by foreign soldiers, and to the ever-present danger
of a popular explosion, however hopeless. He may have be-
lieved that a milder and more "national" form of Communism
might prove not only acceptable to the East Germans, but to
many West Germans as well. The belief that Trojan horse
tactics, combined with a more attractively packaged gift,
offered the best chance of success, might go far to explain his
alleged advocacy of conditions for reunification which the West
Germans might find acceptable. It is even possible that it was
the question of reunification which provided the chief apple of
discord in the Politburo, for it seems unlikely that Party stal-
warts such as Schirdewan and Wollweber would have opposed
Ulbricht so stubbornly if the issues had been of relatively
minor importance. Moreover, this is implied in the Politburo
report to the 35th Plenum, especially in the following passage:
"The difference of opinion which arose in con-
nection with the preparation of the 29th Plenum of
the Central Committee and later, and the dangers
which emerged from the attacks of the enemy,
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decided Comrade Ulbricht to submit to the 30th
aanuary 1957 Plenum a draft memorandum,
setting out a. clear assessment of the situation,
providing a clear, answer to questions about future
developments, and putting forward a policy for the
reunification of Germany on the basis of confed-
eration . . .
"But there was evidence of certain resistance
in carrying out the line decided by the Central Com-
mittee. Some comrades, for example Comrade
Schirdewan, did not want to take part in the im-
plementation of the resolution."
85. Evidence to support the official accusation
that Schirdewan was attempting to form an anti-Ulbrihht fac-
tion with the intention of taking his place is entirely lacking.
The numerous unofficial accounts which give an entirely dif-
ferent picture are much more plausible. According to these,
Schirdewan merely defended his point of view with increasing
frequency in the period preceding the implementation 'of new and
more restrictive policies, both in Politburo meetings and in
private conversations with Ulbricht and other Party leaders..
Some of his "softer" views on administrative procedures were
alleged to be supported by men like Wollweber, and his eco, -
nomic views by Ziller before his death, by Oelssner, and
Selbmann, as well as by "others, " as Honecker said in his
official report. That these "others" were fairly numerous,
can be gathered from the Party press reports on local meet-
ings convened over the country for the purpose of approving
the decisions of the 35th Plenum. The Freital Steel Works
meeting deplored "opportunistic and revisionist manifesta-
tions in the factory" (Neues Deutschland, February 14, 1958),
the Historical Institute of the Berlin Academy of Science meet-
ing regretted "the lack of concern for revisionist tendencies"
(ibid), the Dresden Party Meeting admitted "laggardness in
ideology" (Saechsische Zeitung , February 14), the Gera meet-
ing confirmed the existence of "opportunism and revisionism
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in the Party organization and working class" (Volkswacht,
February 17), the Maerkische Volksstimme (February 13 and
19) accused "many comrades" of having "evidenced opportun-
istic and revisionist views" in the Potsdam district, and many
other papers carried similar reports.
86. It goes without saying that a vigorous campaign
to reform the Party by getting rid of apathetic or hostile mem-
bers and increasing discipline among the remainder by severe
reprimands, as well as to change the predominantly anti-
regime attitude in educational institutions, has been under way
ever since. The aim is obviously to tighten the Party organ-
ization in view of the forthcoming Party Congress. It is not
an easy task, especially as the membership is comparatively
large (roughly 1, 250, 000) and about half of these are former
SPD members, whose conversion in.corpore to Marxism
when the SPD merged with the Communist Party in 1946 was
too sudden to have been very sincere.
87. The issues dividing Ulbricht and the opposition
appear to have been economic, cultural and political. It
seems reasonable to assume that it was the economic issue
which brought matters to a head and forced a showdown, as
was also implied by the order in which the issues were listed
in the joint commuruquh issued after the visit of a Hungarian
delegation in March. The communique said inter alia that
"Both parties regard as the indispensable pre-
requisites for the victory of socialism the ruthless
combating and overcoming of revisionist theories
which are aimed at slowing down the rate of the
building of socialism, the abandonment of the
socialist transformation of agriculture, and the
weakening of the state power theories which mani-
fest themselves in various spheres of cultural
life. They are vigorously opposed to all influences
of bourgeois ideology and all influences of nation-
alism and. chauvinism. "l
Radio Berlin, March 25, 1958.
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88. The communique speaks, it is true, of "slow-
ing down the rate of building of socialism, " but what it actually
referred to was most probably opposition to a speed-up. This
was made clear in an article by Matern.in the January issue of
Einheit, the Party's theoretical magazine:
"A quicker and more successful building of
socialism in our Republic is our most important
contribution to the power of the socialist camp and
thus to the success of the struggle against the
imperialist war mongers: The rapid economic
development of our Republic is also of great sig-
nificance for winning the economic competition
.of socialism with the most highly developed
imperialist countries. "
89. The rapid - and successful - socialization of
East Germany was particularly important also for other,
special reasons. The first was to remove the glaring dis-
parity between. conditions in East and West Germany, 1 and the
second was to silence those who conceded that while Commu-
nism could confer some benefits on economically backward
countries, it could not succeed in the more advanced countries.
"It is the great task of our republic, " Matern declared, "to
implement socialist construction and to prove that the future
belongs to socialism in a highly developed industrial country,
too. r"Z
1A comparison of figures given in the Federal Republic and
GDR statistical yearbooks for 1957 reveals that average real
income in the GDR was 20% below income in the Federal
Republic, while the same food basket would have cost 40%
more.
2lbid. , March 26, 1958.
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90. It would follow that the economic progress I
of the GDR had not been fast enough to satisfy Moscow which
demanded additional sacrifices from the East German workers
and peasants in order to hasten the worldwide triumph of Com-
munism. Ulbricht was perfectly willing, merely requesting
additional economic assistance chiefly in the form of raw
materials on credit. Schirdewan and his friends, it appears,
did not dare oppose Ulbricht's policy on work norms, wages,
and collectivization, squarely. Rather, they argued that it
would be self-defeating, since it would exacerbate worker and
peasant dissatisfaction, encourage go-slow tactics and defec-
tions, and might easily lead to strikes and even to a repetition
of the 1953 events.
91. In the educational-political field, the Schirde-
wan group was apparently against resort to expulsions, to
threats of selecting students- according to ideological criteria,
and to compulsory manual labor - as advocated by Ulbricht -
to put an end to the prevailing situation in colleges and uni-
versities. In these institutions, Professor Kurt Hager told
the Third Higher Education Conference (February 28, 1958)
there still prevailed "'outmoded bourgeois views and doctrines. "
1
In its report covering the year 1957, the GDR Statistical
Administration claimed, for example, an increase in 1957
over 1956 of 8% in industrial production, of 8% in agricultur-
al production, and of 4% in wages. Visitors to the Leipzig
Fair in March seemed to agree that conditions had indeed
improved somewhat, small private industry doing particularly
well. Incidentally, it may be added that this phenomenon was
not to the liking of the regime, which in February introduced
legislation to reduce the maximum permissible number of
workers in private enterprises from 30 to 11.
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92. In internal political matters, the Schirdewan
group presumably advocated less police repression and great-
er political freedom along lines similar to Gomulka's. As
for foreign policy, little is known beyond the important fact
revealed by Maternl that one of the reasons they favored a
slower rate of socialization was to make reunification with
West Germany easier presumably the basis of the accusa-
tion that they favored reunification "at any price." Although
Schirdewan and his friends appear to have carefully avoided
anything that might have been construed as anti-Russian, it
is not surprising that their views' should have been labelled
by their opponents as "'revisionist, " that is, tainted with
"national Communisrri," especially in view of the really
irrelevant, but nevertheless effective, point made by Selb-
mann, that Ulbricht had spent the war years in the USSR.
Very possibly they are against Russian domination, but they
were prudent enough not to say so. Schirdewan's advocacy
of concessions for the sake of reunification with West Germany
could, however,. easily be interpreted as an. indirect way of
pursuing the objective of getting rid of the Russians.
Significance of the SED Crisis
93. As already pointed out, the most striking
aspect of the SED crisis of February 1958 is the length of its
gestation period and its comparative mildness. The explana-
tion for this phenomenon may be found in a number of factors:
The still vivid recollection of the 1953
experience;
The great strength of the Russian occupation
troops;
The fact that socialization had not been pushed
ahead as far and as fast as in most of the other
satellites;
1Neues Deutschland, March 18, 1958.
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A more efficient and less abusive administra-
tive apparatus than in other satellites;
The safety valve provided by the possibility
of escaping to West Germany.
94. Political and juridical considerations may also
exert considerable influence upon many East Germans If it
be true that the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary were
primarily inspired by nationalism and patriotism, East Ger-
man nationalists, Communist as well as non-Communist,
undoubtedly realized that in the absence of a peace treaty,
the ius gentium gave them no right to demand an end to Rus-
sian occupation, the precondition for the repudiation of Com-
munism. On the other hand, the more fanatic an East German
nationalist, the less inclined he must be to press for a peace
treaty which, under present political and military world. con-
ditions, he could hardly expect would be satisfactory, with
regard both to the Polish frontier and to reunification. More-
over, as no East German, barring a few Stalinists, can think
of the country's future otherwise than in terms of a united
Germany, the West German government's point of view is
bound to carry considerable weight; viz. opposition under
present circumstances to a peace treaty or to any spectacular
gestures which might have disastrous consequences.
95. It is therefore quite understandable that, forced
to eschew the prepotent appeal of nationalism, active opposition
to the Ulbricht regime - and mere verbal opposition at that -
should have developed only slowly in East Germany, or, it
might be more correct to say, in Schirdewan, who was to
provide its indispensable rallying point and mouthpiece. How-
e_ver:.tbemovement,. helped by Ulbricht's personal unpopularity -
to which three speakers at the 35th Plenum bore witness - and
by the fact that Schirdewan was head of the Party cadre and
personnel office, appears to have acquired momentum very
rapidly once it started toward the end of 1957 and especially
after the suicide of Ziller on December 14. There seems to
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be little doubt that by January 1958, Schirdewan and his
friends were supported not only by most of the workers,
peasants, intellectuals, and the managers, but also by a
majority of the Party, including the members of the Polit-
bur'o..
96. There is no, reason to assume that Schirdewan,
Wollweber, Oelssner or Selbmann, or most other opponents
of Ulbricht in the Party, are themselves anything but sincere
Communists, but it is only reasonable to assume that their
''soft" approach was backed by all anti-Communists, on the
principle that something is better than nothing. In East Ger-
many the academic circles seem to be the bulwark of anti-
Communism, and, given the respect a Profes-sor enjoys in
Germany, their opposition is of preponderent importance.
Nor is it likely to abate. One can hardly expect them to ac-
cept the claim of Marxism-Leninism to the dignity of a science,
nor to comply with such demands as that enunciated by the Com-
munist Professor Naumannl that the Party wanted "intellectuals,
profes's:ors, lecturers and our students to be educated in such a
way that they . refrain from feeling superior to the working
class. " Still less superior, Naumann must have been thinking,
to its vanguard, the Communist Party members, for his next
sentence that the Party "demands devotion and subordination"
was hardly unrelated!
97. It goes without saying that most East German
farmers and members of the middle class are hostile to
Communism. As for the workers, there is no reason why
their feelings should not be very much the same as in 1953.
The complaint of Kurt Seibt, first Secretary of the Party
executive board of Potsdam Bezirk, that "we have made only
1Speech at the Third Academic Conference of the SED, Radio
East Berlin, March 4, 1958, attacking Professors Herneck
and Havemann.
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little progress in the: recruitment of candidates for membership
in the Party from among the workersrl was certainly not
peculiar to that district.
98. In view of the almost unanimous agreement of
competent observers on the strength of the opposition to
Ulbricht prior to the 35th Plenum, his sweeping victory is
somewhat puzzling. The road to the meeting place of the
Plenum of the Central Committee was not the road to Damas-
cus, nor could Ulbricht's mediocre oratorical gifts have been
sufficient to explain the suddenuolte face of so many men.
Indeed, the only possible explanation of Ulbricht's victory
seems to be support from Moscow and the threats that go with
it. Obviously, Khrushchev was not going to repeat the 1956
mistake in Hungary and be obliged to cure what he could have
prevented.
The Outlook
99. But subsequent developments have proved that
Ulbricht's victory was hardly as decisive as it had seemed.
Repressive measures have indeed been applied, particularly
against students, the :Party has been "strengthened" by expul-
sions and reprimands, the controversial "Law on Perfecting
and Simplifying the Work of the East German State Structure"
has been enacted, and the unacceptable reunification terms
have been confirmed. `' But no steps have been taken, even
after Ulbricht's return from a three weeks "vacation" in the
USSR at the end of March, or seem to be in prospect, to
implement the two most explosive measures in dispute; the
intensified collectivization drive or the increase of work norms.
Ulbricht apparently satisfied himself that Schirdewan and his
1Maerkische Volksstinnm.e, February 19, 1958.
21n an interview to a Suddeutsche Zeitung correspondent,
Radio Berlin, February 15, 1958.
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friends' warnings on this score had not been entirely ground-
less:, and Moscow must have concurred. He undoubtedly feels
that he cannot risk taking on both the workers and the peasants
with an unreliable Party apparatus, and the next few months
will undoubtedly be used to make the necessary personnel
changes to set the stage for the enactment of the new regula-
tions by the Fifth Party Congress in July. Lest the delay be
interpreted as an abandonment of his "hard" line and there-
fore actually a victory for Schirdewan, Ulbricht seized the
opportunity provided by the visit of the Hungarian delegation
to include in the communique: a paragraph asserting that
"Both parties regard as indispensable pre-
requisites for the victory of socialism the ruthless
combating and overcoming of the revisionist
theories which are slowing down the rate of the
building of socialism, the abandonment of the
socialist transformation of agriculture, and the
weakening of the state power theories which
manifest themselves in various spheres of cul-
tural life. They are vigorously opposed to all
influences of bourgeois ideology and all mani-
festations. of nationalism and chauvinism. "
(March 25).
100. There seems to be little justification for
speculations on Ulbricht's imminent downfall. He can obvious-
ly be overthrown only by Khrushchev, and there is no reason
why Khrushchev should do so. Ulbricht can hardly have taken
the stand he did, or won out at the February Plenum, without
Moscow's full backing, and, unlike Rakosi, he certainly
managed things satisfactorily from the Soviet point of view.
That does not mean, however, that if the opposition's. dire
predictions of economic setbacks provoked by the eventual
application of the harder line are realized, Moscow will not
ultimately sacrifice Ulbricht, whose unpopularity in itself
constitutes a liability. The lenient treatment of Selbmann
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might well be explicable, in part at least, by a desire on the
part of the Kremlin to keep an alternate on the side lines.
The sharp attacks levelled by Ulbrihht supporters against
Selbmann during and immediately after the Plenum, presum-
ably intended to rule out such a move, Selbmann's appointment
as deputy chairman of the Planning Commission on February
19, 1958, and the sudden cessation of the anti-Selbmann cam-
paign at the beginning of March, certainly point in that direc-
tion.
101. There is also a difference between the situa-
tion in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and the situation in the GDR
in 1958, where none of the men under fire at the 35th Plenum
have, as far as is known, taken an anti-Russian line or even
advocated neutrality as Nagy had done. Furthermore, it
should be kept in mind that while an ambitious but sincere
Hungarian Communist could dream of emulating Tito, every
East German Communist knows that an independent GDR is
out of the question and that a break with Moscow would there-
fore signify not a gain for himself, but the end of his power
and privileges. Schi:rdewan and some of his friends have been
accused, it is true, of wanting "reunification at any price, "
but it would not be the first time that charges against a politi-
cal opponent have been exaggerated.
102. The Khrushchev-Ulbricht reunification plan,
as outlined once again by Ulbricht on February 15, 1958,
demands the fulfillment by West Germany of a number of
preliminary conditions, 1 in return for which the two govern-
ments would sign a treaty of confederation. The act of confed-
'Besides withdrawal from NATO, nuclear neutralization, etc.
the conditions include, for example, the "ending of the perse-
cution of peace fighters and democrats in West Germany, "
without any counterpart in East Germany. In other words, the
Communists would have the right to carry out political propa-
ganda in West Germany, but the bourgeois parties would not
enjoy that right in East Germany.
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eration.would apparently comprise nothing more than the form-
ation of an all-German council, empowered to recommend
`"arrangements." on customs and currency, on communications,
on clearing West Berlin of espionage agents, and similar
matters:. And even if and when all-German elections were
held some day, the plan made it quite clear that whatever hap-
pened, Communism would be maintained and developed in East
Germany. Incidentally, the "more advanced" East German.-
electoral system would remain in use.
103. In an interview given to Neues Deutschland on
April 1, 1958, Ulbricht even went one step further. He con-
verted the preconditions for confederation into preconditions
for the peace treaty which Khrushchev was willing to discuss
at a summit conference.
104. Ulbricht probably thought the Soviet guarantee
of assistance to the East German regime of August 1957 was
too recent and notorious to need restatement. Khrushchev,
however, in his speech at Tatabanya on April 8, 1958, pledged
the help of the Soviet forces anew to all Socialist governments
in case of "a putsch or counterrevolution. "
105. One can understand that Schirdewan and some
of his friends should have felt that the Khrushchev-Ulbri;.cht
concept of "reunification" stood little chance of acceptance by
the West Germans and, as good Communists, they may have
believed the Trojan horse approach would yield greater divi-
dends for Communism - and for themselves. But for that it
was obviously necessary to soften the conditions for reunifica-
tion considerably.
106. While the Schirdewan "line" is certainly not
the policy of the Kremlin at the present time, it is not anti-
Russian or anti-Communist. Schirdewan himself was reported
to have been so convinced of its irreproachableness that he
wanted to go to Moscow to make this quite clear, and Wollweber,
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who incidentally lives in the Karlshorst Soviet compound, is said
to have actually been in Moscow. Things may change, Khrush-
chev is anything but obstinate, and Schirdewan's "rehabilitation"
cannot be ruled out, although Selbmann's chances to be Ulbricht's
eventual successor seem better.
107. The conclusion one may draw is that, barring
unforeseen events of transcendent importance, the question
whether Ulbricht or one of the leaders of the opposition will
rule East Germany will chiefly depend upon economic develop-
ments in 1958. If the., plan is fulfilled, there would be no reason
to change the Ulbricht line, even if he himself were "persuaded"
to resign on account of his personal unpopularity, in which case
Honecker or Matern might be his successor. If the plan is not
fulfilled, whether as a result of workers' go-slow tactics,
sabotage, or strikes, and managerial troubles stemming from
the industrial reorganization, it would be logical to expect to
see the "fracticnist" group in the saddle, but with Selbmann
rather than Schirdewan in the key position, provided, however,
the strikes did not lead to violence, in which case the Russians
would be practically certain to back Ulbricht.
108. It must be admitted that although the East
Germans would have a somewhat easier life under Selbmann
or Schirdewan than under Ulbricht, the change would hardly
affect the international situation. Moscow could perfectly well
continue to rule out the application of that part of Schirdewan's
program which would lower the price of reunification. A soft-
er line would probably, it is true, make Communism somewhat
more tolerable to the population of East Germany, but tolera-
tion and willing acceptance are two different things. It is
difficult to imagine the vast majority of Germans going any
further than reluctant toleration of a Russian ideology and
system, imposed by Russian tommy guns and tanks, however
long they have to put up with it.
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109. As passions can always prevail over reason
under severe provocation, local riots. are of course always a
possibility, but they could have no more chance of success
than in 1953. As for an armed rebellion against the regime,
no reasonable East German could plan such a thing. The
stand taken by West Germany and the other NATO powers
themselves, that East Germany is merely an occupied part
of Germany, clearly puts it up to the West to take the lead
in any action to evict the Russians and their local minions by
force. But the Western Powers and West Germany in partic-
ular have solemnly renounced the use of force to liberate the
satellites and after the recent Russian successes in the field
of ballistics, the chances for a change of policy are smaller
than.ever. And if the West Germans refuse to fight for re-
unification, why should the East Germans?
110. Barring radical changes in the USSR, the only
"danger" threatening the East German state, as distinct from
its Communist leaders. mi ght arise from a Social Democratic
(SPD) victory in a West German general election, possibly in
the next elections in 1961. For unless governmental responsi-
bility produces a change in SPD policy, their victory might
well lead to the disappearance of the East German "state" as
a result of the reunification of Germany but the net result
would scarcely be a weakening of the Communist foothold in
Germany.
111. As the German-Hungarian communiqu& of
March 25, 1958, stated with commendable frankness, accept-
ance of the Rapacki plan by West Germany, as advocated by
the SPD, would "considerably favor Germany's peaceful
reunification"? evidently on Communist terms.
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