BASIC QUESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000400020040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: July 11, 1952
• Content Type: MISC

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SECURITY INFORM4TION
11 July 1952
ENCLOSURE 2
BASIC QUESTIONS
1. To what extent have the policies which govern the national
psychological programs been applied? As shown in Enclosure 1
been sought to apply them fully for Latin American countries.
In which areas is policy clarification necessary?
a. As shown in Enclosure 1, policy clarification from
Statelis underway as to OPC covert operations
doqp-- -A s- lasure 4---the general. directives in th
CIA Strategic Plan, based on general NSC policy, tend to
require far broader covert activity than is authorized as a
matter of policy by ARA of State in view of the Good Neighbor V- a.
and non-intervention policies.
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jM es WMN Severance by Venezuela of diplomatic
relations with Russia and Czechoslovakia represents a notable shift;
last year's petroleum conference also indicated an increase of U.S.
influence in official circles in Venezuela with respect to U.S. priva
investment; however, the precarious political situation in Venezuela,
the undoubted popularity of the Accion Democratica party, and the
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2.
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probability of increased radicalism on the part of this party as it is
forcibly withheld from power, augur ill for the future. Soviet power
and influence have been decreased in Cuba through the removal of the
Soviet Legation from Havana, and recent U.S. collaboration with Brazil
on provision of capital and economic development have notably increased
U.S. overt capabilities there. As a probable result of these and related
developments, it is indicated that the Soviet Union is placing greater
emphasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America,
3. To what extent have U.S. capabilities been employed in carry-
ing out a national psychological )rogram? Which U. S. actions have proven
most effective in rea izing the p ograms See paragraph 3 of Enclosure
1.
On the basis of experieree during the preceding year, which of
our-capabilities should be reinfrced, increased, or developed
m The covert field organization and mechanism
!"w4-4 t -1?1? hr ~`Mcle~ should be reinforced, increased and
developed, with particular emphasis on indigenous mechanisms having no 25X6
apparent U.S. bias or contact,. ?
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Latin America is an area unique for the United States, .25X1
among other things, in the overt Good Neighbor and non-intervention
policies of long standi
those overt policies.
4. What are the major factors which now impede the successful
prosecution of our national psychological program?
a. The constitutionally and traditionally overt nature of
U.S. Government action as to policy/management, administration, budget,
accountability, and paperwork, all in combination with the relative
newness of covert executive action to the United States. This tends
to create top-heavy overt systems at all levels in these fields which
(1) create the most serious security risks, a matter particularly
serious to the national interest in Latin America, (2) produce in
some cases policies and directives not based on an ascertainment of
the precise situation to be met, (3) load down operational personnel
with a great weight of often repetitive paperwork which does not con-
tribute to and which often greatly hinders effective operation, (4)
require reference of minute details up a long line of approval, greatly
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restricting the capabilities of operational personnel in the field,
injuring morale, foreclosing the exploitation of many valuable targets
of opportunity, and tending to create some unrealistic and dangerous action.
b. The resulting retention at headquarters of excessive
personnel, lack of sufficient trained personnel in the field, and the
long lead-time needed to mount covert operations.
Indicate the strength of the enemy and other deterrents, such
as prevailing conditions in certain areas (nationalism, economic in-
stability, etc.) See paragraph of Enclosure l.
Indicate also the extent to which our major alliances represent an
impediment to the successful conduct of our national psychological
b. Collaboration with Franco Spain is, of course, a deterrent,
though a minor one, in Latin America. Since Latin America is a refuge
for many Spanish Republicans, any such collaboration furnishes one
minor theme for Soviet propaganda.
in the area.
a. U.S. concentration on European matters, and particularly
the large quantities of money expended in that area, have given rise to
Latin American charges that the U.S. is neglecting its natural and truest
friends. This, however, should have little effect on missions,
with the possible exception of the mission to combat ti-Americanism
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