THE 25 YEARS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTY PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A000700030009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 3, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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The 25 Years of the Chiraso Communist Party
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The enclosed document is a translation of an eztract from the Bulletin of
Aurora University, entitled: "The 25 Years of the Chinese Commit Pv.rty,
1921-3.948," written by 0 Brier
-end-
Enclosure:
Translation of The 25 Years of the Chinese Communist Party."
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The 25 Years of the Chinese Communist Party
1921-1946
By 00 Briere
Extract from ?
Bulletin of Aurora University; 1946
Series III, Volume 7, no 3
(Pull Translation)
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Introduction 45ondense7.
In a world that is divided anew, among and within the nations, the horizon is deal:
on an -sides, particularly in China, The real crucial problem there is that of
adjusting relations between the xnw and the CCP. Is such adjustment possible?
We do not believe it because the CCP calls for collaboration with the government
in the hope of dominating and reigning alone. An entente between them is impossible,
as the first attempt at cooperation (1924) has well proved. All the good words
and lavish promises cannot change that which has been evident from the beginning.
Beginnings of the CCP (1921-1928)
Modern Chinese history begins officially with the 1911 revolution, which finished
the Manchu regime and brought in the Republic. But that was external and did not bring
the dreamed-of transformation. The real break between ancient and new China dates from
the "Movement of May 4, 1919", Such was the name given to demonstrations by Peiping
students against the disappointing provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. This agitation
by the student class was clothed with a special character for it interpreted China's
profound aspirations. Politically it resulted in a boycott of Japanese goods. From the
cultural point of view, it gave a definite impetus to the "New Culture Movement" launched
by Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1) in the famous magazine "New Youth" in 1917. These two
men promoted the spoken style or "Pai-hua" in place of the antique literary style which
was concise to the point of obscurity. But in their view, this Literary Reform was but
the first step towards completing the transformation of China; they hoped by putting
reading matter within the comprehension of the people to spread the new ideas more
easily.
A vague enthusiasm swept over the country following these student demonstrations;
many periodicals appeared, written in colloquial style, seeking a synthesis between the
old national culture and modern western civilization. Under the influence of "New Youth",
which gave the tone, they spoke passionately of the slogan "science of democracy", as
being the last 'word of modern civilization; for they wished to free themselves from
Confnciasimm, whieh they blamed for the stagnation of China.
It is not strange that in this ferment of spirit, and intense need of change,
attention was directed to Soviet experience. The intellectual elite of the nation was
to be found at that time in Peking. The National Peking University was truly the home
of new ideas. Its professors and students expressed their thoughts through the medium
of various influential magazines. Among them Ch' en Tu-hsiu, who already was very famous,
suddenly gave himself to close study of the Russian October Revolution, along with has
colleague Li Ta-ohao.(2) These two men gathered around themselves a number of young men
interested in Marxist theories and founded a magazine "The Weekly Review" to diffuse
their ideas. This was the first center of interest in Marxism in China (1919).
But if Peking was then the indisputable intellectual center of China, it was not
the best center for the hatching and growth of Communist ideas. Shanghai, the great
industrial citye.offered much greater possibilities because of her faotories and her
labor population. On the other hand staying in Peking had become difficult for Ch' en,
who had spent several months there in prison. Also he was anxious to come to Shanghai,
where he had been invited by several social-anarchist groups. Conversations were held
in the former French Concession, at No 716 on the then Avenue Joftre, in the home of
Tai Chi-tsao, (3), later a member of the KMT. Their headquarters were camouflaged under
the name of School of Foreign Languages. In fact a number of students were trained
there who later went to the Oriental Institute in Moscow or were scattered throughout
the interior for propaganda purposes. But thanks to the advice of Voitinsky, agent of
the executive committee of the Comintern (4), to create a Communist party in China,
the purely anarchist elements were eliminated; a Communist magazine man started 'whose
expense was defrayed by this same Voitinsky (May 1920). Little by little various members
were added whose names were to be fam)us in the annals of the party. The group called
itself "Society of Socialist Youth".
Some time after the conversations and the purging. out of members adjudged to be
unorthodox from the Marxist point of view, Vhitinsky proposed to organize a genuine
Communist party. Chsen Tu-hsiu agreed and gathered the most prominent members of the
society to a general meeting (May 1921). The result of the discussions was the official
founding of the Chinese Communist Party (June 1921). Its leaders were Chien Tu-hsiu for
Shanghai, Li-Ta-chao for Peiping and ran Ping-shan (5) for Canton. A representative
of the now party was dispatched to Moscow, to the congress of the Proletarians of the
Far East. That was when the affiliating of the Communist party with the IT was considered
for the first time, and Moscow showed itself favorable,
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While Chien Tu-hziu, the outstanding personage, was clothed with supreme dignity
as the secretary-general of the party, other Communist groups were formed of Chinese
etudents abroad; in France with Chou En-la., (6) and Li Li-san; in Germany with the
future general Chu Teh; in Russia with Chu Ch'iu-pai. In the interior of China, active
propaganda was begun among laborers and students. Also in Hunan, the Communist section
of which 7) asthe secretary, founded in a Rem months a score of Red unions.
The following year (1922) in May, at the second general oongress of the party in
Shanghai, the Soviet delegate proposed officially an alliance between the two parties0
a and CCE7 Joffe was specially dispatched to effect this manoeuver. Chten Tu-hsiu
expressed his disapproval of this policy, which necessitated, for ths tiae being at least,
a sacrifice of certain essential aims of Communism. His intransiGeance came near causing
a split and it took all the authority of the Third Internatilnale to make him allow this
change of attitude.
In December of that year, while Chen Tu-hsiu vent to help at the third congroun
of the Third Internationale (Comintern) Joffe had an interview with Sun Ven (Sun Yat-son)
in Shanghai, endeavoring to make him admit the principle of collaboration between the
two parties. The result of the talks was the celebrated statement of 26 January, 1923
in these terms: "Dr, Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet
system cannot be actually introduced in China, because there do not exist the conditions
for successfully establishing Communism or bolshevism. This opinion is fully shared by
M. Joffe, who thinks that the most pressing problem for China is to achieve her national
unification; also, with regard to this great task, he assures Dr. Sun of the warm sympathy
and aid of Russia for the Chinese people. And Joffe solemnly promised that Russia would
abstain from all Communist propaganda in China. Despite this success, his mission in
aBr points gained nothing for the cause, and the Russian government sent Karahkan in
his place. This man was more fortunate and succeeded in getting recognition of the
Soviet regimoo In return, Russia renounced her special rights in China. Soon after this
interview, Sun Yat-sen obtained Soviet advisers for reorgenizing the KMT. Very soon a
flood of Russian agents under the direction of Borodin and Galen, came to spread over
Canton.
Nevertheless the perplexities or Sun Yat-sen ceased not for a sinele day, so he
continued his inquires. In March one Liao Chung-Kai, who hadfbllowed Joffe to Japan,
returned declaring to Sun Yat-sen that there was actually no Communism in Russia. The
latter, much impressed, sent General Chian, Kai-shek to Moscow for more information.
After a six months stay in the USSR and many discussions with Trotsky and Stalin, the
future Generalissimo returned with a verdict also favorable. Furthermore, the CCP met
in its third national congress at Canton in Juno 1923, and took the historic decinion to
enter the KMT and co-operate with it (10 July). From that moment, the Comintern worked
hard in favor of the two parties being friends. Finally, in January 1924, all these
advances were officially approved by the first national KMT Congress, which voted the
principle of collaboration between the two parties, leaving to the Communists their
own separate committees and organs.
From then on the Communist partydbveted all its efforts to gaining supremacy in
the ranks of the KMT, with the support and under the direction of the Comintern.
Ch' en Tu-hsiu, the secretary general was then at the apogee of his glory and influency.
At his directim, China was divided into three zones: Shanghai, which he administered
directly, Peiping and Canton, where Li Ta-ohao and T'an P'ing-shan were reepectively in
command. But in reality, theetrue masters of these two cities were the two sons of
Ch'en, Yen-nien and Ch'iao-nien. Besides, various kinumenor intimates were slipped lnto
Important posts of the party here and there, so that one could say not without reason
that the Communist party had become almost the family fief on Chen Tu-hsiu. The
growing influence of the party added in like measure to the personal prestige of its
ohdefs
This golden age, in which there was bestowed on him the title of Chinese Lenin,
passed quickly enough. In fact, his authority never was unquestioned., On the one
hand, he must execute the commissions of the Soviet u?ents. On'the other, the
Communist Party never did have actual homogeneity; it consisted of three centers,
divided among themeelves and in disagreement on the principles themselves. Underground
rivalry broke out between the Shanghai section, which ha directly administered, and that
of Carton which was controlled by his son Chen Yen-nien and the furture party sentinels,
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Mao Tseetung, Chou En-lais etc. The first question which divided the two groups
was the land nroblem. The Cantonese group, advised by Borodin, sought full appli-
cation of the Communist doctrine of land nationalization. Mao Tse-tung tells
in his autobiography that after the Nnnking Road incident of 30 May 1925, he gave
msolf entirely to the peasant movement. He aroused the peasants against the land-
lords, and the latter hounded him. Then he took refuge in Canton at the moment
when Chiang Kai-shek, director of the Whampoa Military Academy, was named general
of the First Army and Wang Chingewei took the title of heed of the government in
place of Sun Yatesen, who bad died in Peiping on 12 March 1925. In Canton, Mao
opert hiC energies publishing a journal vlich attacked the EMT right wing and in
organizing the peasant movement. But he was chiefly interested in the peasantry
from the Communist point of view; it was from this angle that he wrote two
pamphlets in which he outlined a radical land policy and advocated a vigorous
organization of peasants under the aegis of the Communist Party. Ch'en Tuehsint,
faithfel to the policy of union with the NNT? rebuffed these projects and ever.
Thrbsdo publishing the chief organs of the party. This vas the first incident
which began to widen the rift between the two man. Mao Tseetung, erstwhile a
fervent admirer of Cheen Tuehsiu at Peiping University (1910, prepared to become
his mortal enemy.
? The progress of the Communists rapidly disturbed KMT circles. At the
second general party congress (January 1926), in order to curb Communist intrigues
it was decided to admit them only as auxiliaries, never as regular members, into
the executive organs; in committees, they must never rise above the rank of
members.
On the other hand, the Communist group in Canton continued to agitate and
advocate a more radical policy. At a meeting held in Canton on 18 Mrrch 1926
to commemorate the anniversary of the Paris Commune, a leader of the Communist
Party publicly affirmed that the hour had come to realize dictatorship of the
proletariat. This was equivalent to rejecting all subordination to the KET. But
ChgenTuehaiu held above all to the e3liance of the two parties and did not listen
to these proposals.
Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek launched his expedition against the north in order to
realize the unity of China under the aegis of the KMT. The southern armies quickly
conquered all south of the Yangtze and at the end of the year the Canton government
moved to Wuhan, where it came under the dominatien of the left, favorable to the
Communists. The latter, believing themselves to be on the eve of seizing power
In China, multiplied their intrigues. They took much leadership in the Wuhan
government, which brought reactions from Chiang Kai-shek and the KET right; in
order to check them, the generalissimo took possession of Shanghai, then of Nanking,
where he established another regime loyal to himself (18 April 1927). Then he
issued a proclamation condemning Communism and ordering an immediate purge of the
army and administration. In Shanghaipeoarticularly, severe restraints were put
upon laborers in the Red unions.
Despite the growing tempest between the two parties, ChenTw-hsin remained
firmly attached to the principle of collaboration. When Wang Chingewei? chief
of the xlm loft wine, returned from Burma, Ch'en went to see him and together
they signed a declaration reaffirming the principle of alliance between their
two parties. "Comrades, despite the success of the national revolution, our
enemies are living and always seeking to profit from our weaknesses; let us remain
united; our harmony is indispensable. The CCP fully recognizes the place of the
KNT and of the Three Princinles in the national revolution...This is what China
needs, not any dictatorship of the proletariat, but coeoperation between the two
parties. None of the difficulties which may arise between thena their divergences
of view, are irreconcilable...At any cost collaboration must not be brokenu(5 April
1927).
Annoyingly enough, this same ChtlenTu-Tasiu? who had reluctantly accepted the
Comintern directives to carry out a policy of union between the two parties,
showed himself now the most persistent champion of this policy. He blamed and
dismissed Mao Tse-tung for having created troubles in Hunan against the KMT
authorities. Also be was not surnrised that the situation was very tense since the
Fifth Congress of the Communist Party which was opened in May 1927; the antienT
atmosphere was very strong, and the advocates of rupture were very violent in
presenting their point of view. But Chien Tu-heiu shoved himself inflexible and
succeeded once mors in irnosing his authority, without even consulting the Central
Cememittee. Once too often, he rejected the proposals of Mao Tseetueg for a rapid
intensification of the ariaz struggle. This was his last victory, events soon
became too much for him and a growing opposition prepared to overthrow him.
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On 21 May cane the first militarr putsch by the Communists at Changsha,
followed by massacres, which greatly increased the suspicions of even the left
ming of the KET and rendered the position of Borodin more precarious. What
Elrod the powder was the notable clumsiness of an Indian Communist, Roy, Soviet
delegate with the IDT forces. On June first, he invited Wang Chingewei to a
secret conference, expecting to find in him an ally, in his capacity as chief of
the KET left wing. He sterol with Wang a confidential telegram from Moscow
demanding the immediate use of revolutionary methods in the territory of the Wuhan
government; that is to say, land confiscat4on, formation of a strong proletarian
army of 50,000 men, creation of a revolutionary tribunal, etc. Wang Chingewei?
amazed, demanded and obtained copies of the document; on 4 June, he went to
Cheng-chou in Ronan, to inform tho southern generals of the Soviet ultimatum and
of the coup d'etat which was in preparation. On 13 June, these came back to Wuhan
and after much discussion took the decision to chase the Communists out of the
EMT, but kept it secret for a while longer.
Borodin seeing the error, protested vigorously to Moscow, who recalled Roy
and demanded of him a reckoning. It is said that Roy disclaimed responsibility
for the affair, throwing it beck on another Soviet colleague. Trotzky, in one
of his books, "The Disfigured Revolution" accuees Stalin of opportunism or taking
the short view in having obliged the COP to submit to the KIAT rather than to follow
its con essentially Marxist policy. It is his view, the logical opinion of a man
who advocated permanent revolution. Or perhaps MOSCOW underestimated the strength
of the KUT in believing themselves capable of giving orders to the loft wing, of
guiding it as they pleased. In aey case, it did not turn out that may. On 15
July, aftor a month of preparation, Wong Ching-wei proposed officiallm and obtained
the expulsion of the Communists. In consequence, Borodin and the other Soviet
Advisers had to leave China.
On 1 August, because there was no longer any need for pretense, a portion of
the troops of Chang Fa-kluei,(8) under the command of two of his officers, Ho.
Lung (9) and Yeh Teing,(10) revolted and seized Nan-Wang by surprise c For several
days there was looting, arson, and a reign of terror. On the 5th, the uprising was
quelled. The generals Ho Lung and Yoh T'ing, were repulsed and went their way.
Ho Lung established himeelf on the Hunan-Hupeh border, -chile Yeh Tling rent to
Kraegtung? where between Seaton and Canton he organized the first Red districts
of Haiefeng and Lu-tong; at the end of the year he took an active part in an uprising
in Canton.
While these events were transpiring, the Communist Party Central Committee
held an extraordinary meeting on 7 August. ChpenTuehsiu was deprived of his
office as secretary general, and struggle against the KUT was decided on. Never-
thelese, complete rupture did not come at once. The Comintern always counselled
collaboration, if not with the rovernment, at least with the revolutionary elements
of the NMT.
In imitation of Ho Lung and of Yeh T'ing, doubtful elements of the lax army, which
had been left as rea2-guardy 3evolted and made themselves centers of Communist action.
In Niangzi Chu Teh rebelled, attacking and mastering in the region of Chao-mei. With
a reorganized army ho ravaged the north of Rwangtung. On 7 November at Kai-feng the
first congress of workmen:, soldiers, and soviet proletarians set up the government of
Hai-feng and Lu-feng. But in tl-e and the most important was the Canton rebellion.
(11 - Deeember; /927) in mach the Communists distinguished themselves by cruel
massacres and lootiege: on the lieth:, Chang Fa-khei recaptured the city and was guilty
of reprisals no lose terrible which increased the number of Communist eeepathizers
aeore the bourgeoisie. The encesses of those days caused the departure of many ne'..:,abic
Commiivrists, discouraged. There also resulted Ft complete rupture between. the KUT left
and the Cormunist Partyor ,
an. at on f the Part and the a to of Kin U192g:12311
At the beginning of 1928, the party was in a state of complete disorganization.
There was urgent need to proceed with a readaptetion of Communist policy, which
had failed. The Comintern in a plenary reu:O.on he/O. in oscow, 9 to 25 Februare
1928, criticised the methods of the Chinese Communists and sent a leader Hsiang
Chung-fa, who was named secretary general of the party, and Li-son. The
disastrous experience of Canton had proved that the party could not seize political
power by force; it was then decided to abandon the s'rstem of Putsches and to devote
all their efforts to organizing the ;ndustrial and naasant classes. This change
of nolley was apnroved by the Sizth Congrene of the Comintem held also in Uoscou
from 18 August to 1 Seotember 1928: It is wholly necessary to oppooe the game
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of rebellion manifested in certain seotions. The executive Committee of the
Uenintern conelders that the chief task for the party, as for the Sovietized
dietricts le to launch tho aerarian revolution and to orgeeize bands which will
be gradually transformed into a Red army". ang Lene-ii, "Suppressing Cor s
ialaditey in China", p 427.
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In China:, there was a re-grouping of forces wiihin the perte itself. Internal
aiscord nes ra-pant; there was no unanimity of views.
Chen Tu-hsiu though dieeosseesed of newer by a nsjorite of the Central
0 meittee, nevertheless retained much authority in party ranks. He returned to
Shanghai and continued to deferd nis views by means of hie nen. His influence
aroug the Red unions was considerable, and they showed hiit much deference. After
the Canton uprising, he wrote a letter to the Central Committee asking them to
avoid armed conflict with the British authorities of Hong-Kong and to collaeorate
with the NUT left and with the Third Party, recently fourded by Tan P'ingeehanv
ODO of the first dissidents. The Central Committee replied with a lord of blamo
for his pronosals and accused him of opportunism. Greatly displeased, Ch'en
redoubled his activity in secret; he constituted for himself a small group of
faithfuls with the design of overthrowing the Central Committee. His attacks
against the officials policy of the party continued until the Committee, worn
out, expelled him with all his following, calling them "the faction of opnosition".
It is the custom to give him the epithet "Trotzkyits" but that is not fundamentally
exact. In doctrine, le nee totally opposed to Trotsky. Far from extolling the
"permanent revolution", he held very mild theories. No recommended to the
Central Committee the dissolution of the fled army; the cessation of strikes and
varidus agitations, imputing the check of the Chinese revolution to the Third
Internationale; he counselled returning to the study of Marxist theory, maintaining
the revolutionary rorces? and waiting In peace for the return of a favorable
occasion. The document developing these ideas carried a hundred signatures.
The Central Committee replied by the irnediate expulsion of Ch' en Tu-hsiu and his
folloying? somewhat similar to the purge be Stalin lith regard to the "tail" of
Lenin.
After his expulsion his dominant feeling towards the Committee was hate rather
than difference of opinion. He joined other expelled persons who were in fact
Trotakyites. Then he began forming a Trotskyite party using financial support
from the Fourth Internationale and Trotzkeite students returned from Russia.
In a few months he collected thousands of followers and was able to set up a
new Communist government to rival that of the Central Committee. Affiliated
graape raeidly eprung up everywhere. Ch' en Tu-hsiu became again "the Red emperor".
Along with the orgenizatioe of his party, he tried to set forth a new doctrine,
whose base was his opposition to the Red army, to the Soviet government and their
agrarian policy. Bitter war ensued between the two parties. The difference was
chiefly one of method?, Ch'en Tu-hsiu had the fault in Stalinist eyes of posteoning
the realiztion of Communism to the Greek Ralends 0
The Trotzkyite parte had only emphemeral success. That which united them
was rather a common hatred of the Ste linist faction than any profound faith for
definite action.. NThen the intimates of Chen Tu-hsiu perceived that this
ideology led nowhere, defection quickly spread among their ranks; some of the
disillusioned rejoined the Nanking government, others the rival faction. Finally
Chen Tu-hsiu was turned over to the police by one of his family (15 November
1932) and imprisoned. Pardoned during the SinceJapanese war (to August 1937)
be was taken back into the but died soon after (24 Mny 1942).
The disturbance provoked in Stalinist circles by the activities of Cb.genTur-hsiu
lasted for some time; nevertheless his "opeortunist" policy, his gentle Communism,
could not withstand the dangers to the Communist party as well as the policy
followed by Li Li-san. (11)
Li Li.-san was a student returned from France, where he had aided in forming
a section of the Communist party among his fellow countrymen. He was, even in the
judgment of Mao Tseetung, one of the most brilliant personalities of the party
and one of the nearest to Trotsky that China had produced, certainly much more than
the Tocem51413 ho ellu:i.Catl his time Intl7aon ShangliAi and Hard=
via=the o ztst ?arty 11.T, big nvadoorLdt; He dcmizzted the par4y
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Impressed by the success of Communist arms in various districts of Kwangtunge
Nene% Hupet, and Mengel, Li Liesan adopted a policy opposite to that of Chen
Teelsiu, scorning also the directives of the Comintern and the agrarian policy
eetoVied by Mao Tseetueg. Exaggerating the maturity of the revolutionary situation
in
china, he adopted a policy of extreme violence. Believing the moment propitious
for overthrowing the Namking goveramentp for Chiang mas engaged with the northern
general Yen Hsieshan and Fong Yaeheiang? he tried to combine a general offensive
of the Red armies with popular uprisings stirred up in the big centers. Hn wanted
to create terror in the villages in order to demoralize the bourgeoisie. This
extreme revolutionary tactic frightened the Comintern, who had just expressed their
opposition to putsches, and caused panic among the other members of the CCP, who
=communicated him. Far from submitting, Li Li-san created a dissident Central
Committee in Hupah. Sustained in secret by Chquepei, eicretaryegeneral of
the party, he continued his struggle against the Central Committee; his followers
rapidly increased. Moscow, having studied reports upon reports, ordered an immediate
end teethe "line of LI Li-san", and summoned him to Russia to account for his deeds.
His lack of success or rather his fleeting success before Chang-aha (28 Jigy 1930)
put him in a bad military situation, and besides he had to obey orders from Moscow.
' After his departure, the party was entirely disorganized, for the rebellions
he had provoked were easily suppressed. In the winter of that SSE3 year (1930)0
the Central Committee ens able to subdue the followers of Li Li-san, and began
to purge the administrations where they were in control; 25 percent of the total
were excluded. Then the orthodox embers of the Committee reunited, in the congress
of 15 January 1931 and severely condemned the policy of Li Li-san.
Li Li-san disappeared, but "Lilisanism" was not entirely crushed with him. In
the arpy it caused a very serious incident which imperilled the entire Red armyr,
At Fuet'ien in Hunan, a group of Red troops under Liu Lietsao, eiehed to follow
the line of Li Liesan, revolted, arrested the President of the Kiangsi Soviets, and
disarmed a part ofthe troops. This caused no little excitement in Fuet0ien? which
was close to Chi-an, at the very center of the Soviet districts. "Indeed," says
Mho Tse-tung, it seemed that the fate of the revolution depended on the issue
-of this struggle". After the first moment ef dismay in the Red camp, they set
themselves to suppress this dancer. Quickly Liu Lietsao was arrested9 his soldiers
disarmed and "licinidated"! Such was the end of "Lilisanism" but the alarm had
been hot and the party nearly collapsed as a result of its own internal quarrels.
Despite these domestic difficulties, the most serious yet experienced by the
party, the various small bands of Red soldiers took advantage of the conflicts
betveen Chiang Kei-shek and the northern generals, to develop themselves in the
provinces of.Keangtung, Fukien:, Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Anhwei. Soviets were
established in the eccuoied districts, where they began, from the end of 1928,
to practice the reforms prescribed by the Comintern; confiscation of large land-
holdings and redivision of the seized lands among poor peasants and the families
of soldiers. Thus resulted the setting up of many strongly Communist places, from
which came forth Red troops. Among these bases, a erincipal one was Chla-ling on
the Hunan border where a Soviet was established in November 1927. A solid base
was met up in Chingekaneshan (on the HunaneKiangsi border) and a moderate policy
adopted as against certain violent elements who advocated pillage and massacre.
The following year, in Man Chu Teh arrived with his troops and joined thee with
those of Mao Tse-tung. In the autumn there was a meeting of delegates from Sovietized
"hsien" of this area. A minorite showed some attachment to a more radical and
violent policy, but the majority rallied around Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, (12)
that is, to the policy of land division and Vie establishment of Soviets. Finally _
the Central Cceedttee ratified the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, in accord with the
Sixth Communist Congress of Moscoe. H,,rmony was restored between the leaders
of the party and of the Sovietized districts.
Among other centers of Communist activity,, we mention a district in the
vest of Hupeh occueied by Ho Lam and another in the rest established by HatHai-
tung (13) nucleus of the future Soviet of 0-yllevan, where two notable Reds, HA
Haiangechlien (14) and Chang Kuo-t'ao (15) were brought together.
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Another zone was Sovietized in the northeast of Kiangsi, which became a
powerful base (winter of 1927). In the spring of 1928, a movement began armed
Chi-an? which was destined to become the center of the Soviet rovernment. In
the west of Fukien, another region was organized, where the Ninth congress of
the perty was held; there the way was prepared for the future etate of Kiangsi
. (December 1929)a The following year the entire south of this arovince fell
into the hands of the Red army.. On the seventh of February, 1930, an imnortant
local conference reunited delegates of the party, the army and the governmente
The land problem was discuased at length and in its broad outlines, and the
decision was taken, against "opnortunists" such as Ch'en Tuahsiu? to proceed
with land redistribution and to set up the Soviet Government of Kiangsi.. In
fact more than a year, had to elapse before the definitive organization of a
regular government. On 8 November 1931, at Juiachin, capital of the new state,
the first all-China Soviet Congress me held, at which Mao Tse-tung was elected
President of the Red districts of Kiangai, and Chu Teh was chosen as commander-
inachief.
25X1A
From then on, the authority of Mao Tseatung was to dominate the peaty and
never again to be. seriously questioned. If one wishes by comparisons to place
the three most influential chiefs who have directed the CCP, it is necessary
to say that Ch"enTuahsiu was the Chinese Lenin, as has been done several times;
but the comparison is only external, for if Chnen Tu-hsiu was the creator of
the party, he had neither the genius nor the audacity of Lenin; expelled from
the party by another faction, his memory is forever held in execration by Chinese
Communists. The likeness between Li Li-san and Trotsky is much more striking,
and their destinies were similar. As to Mao Tseatung? one can bestow on him
the title of Stalin without forcing the phrase. Of the three Chinese leaders,
he shows more boldness than Gillen Tuphsta and more flair for politics than
Li. Li-san; he understands better how to adapt Communism to conditions in China.
While his predece-sors relied most of all upon the urban proletariat, he on the
other hand, with a tenacity which Overcame all opposition, put the emehasis
on agrarian policy.
We stop awhile cn the State of Kiangsi to examine the work of organization.
The strategy of the Russian Communist Party, which rose to power thanks chiefly
to the eupport of the peasant class to which it had promised all the land, has
been strictly followed by the CCP. These demagogic tactics have chiefly borne
fruit in the provinces which have suffered most from civil war and where
extreme poverty was most widespread amongst the nassee.
When the Red troops take nossession of a district, their first act is
the calling of a general assembly of delegates of the people to elect a governments
But the active candidates have been previously chosen by the Communist chiefs
from among their sympathizers, and once elected, they stay under the vigilant
control of sections or cells of the party. This holds for all levels of the
administration.
The administration establidhed? the first legislative act of the Soviets
is to issue a decree ordering the destruction of all the documents, titles,
contracts relating to landownership; confiscation of the lands of "landlords"
and of comfortable peasants, their redivision into the hands of the poor
population; and the abolition of taxes collected by the former authorities.
The distribution or land is effected in proportion to the members of each
family. Besides, the party drives for the organization of peasants unions
connosed of poor and moderately well-off peasants, who serve as a means of
penetration to the heart of the rural population. The more radical of these
peasant unions are orgaeized into "Committees of the Indigent", charged to
protect the interests of the reral proletariat. Finally.thnee committees are
in turn controlled by Communist cella established at their heart. In brief,
the administrative machinery and control is tne wont solid. The grip of 'Ie
party is absolute.
Looking at the situatice particularly of Chinese 'Communism, the party only.
leans on the working masses with hesitation, because hitherto the Sovietized'
toms heve been in places of little importance, wnere large industrial nnterpriees
are not found. Fron the viewpoint of orthodox Communism the artisans, who
constitute the working proletariat, do not offer the same assurance of support
as do the urban eroletariat of the industrial centers. Also the party dons
not depend on itself alone. Nevertheless the role of labor unions is no less
important in the Red districts than in the UT industrial centers. These
occupational unions serve well the cause of the party and enable it to meet in
Important gatherings for study of the workers' movement and the policy to follows
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All the large induotrial and commercial enterprises arc nationalized, as well
as the tank and credit concerned hoteil shops and artisans are not molested It
first, but in course or time they are the object of all sorts of persecution; they
are crushed under the weight of taxes and that vhich remains of individual trade
pasees into the hande of peddlers, made similar to the proletariat.
In the :atter of "social deeds", the party trensforms hospital? into free
dispensarieol if that is possible; beeides, it starts consumer cooperatives; amusement
places, popular theatres. All buildinne for vorship? paaodao, tool-Aces churches,
are transforued into vorkeret clubs or other eetabliShnente for nubile use.
It is ulto natural to understand that one of the greatest arececupatiene ef the
yerty is the education of youth. All schools become "aroletarian schools' vhere the
instruction 13 LenAniet, atheistic above all. Voreever the youth are regimented into
unions of all eorts? "League of Co:mtelist Youth", "Vanguard", for the youlg of 16 years
end above, "noncom" for children from 8 to 16. These organizations play-a great part,
au much for the formation of elite Coemunists as for missions of control or propaganda
which are entrusted to them.
25X1A
Fieally, to have necessary reserves on hand, the party has introduced a syaieen of
militarization of the population, according to vhich all the urban and Tura proletaeiat,
women included, must receive military instruction.
To complete the outline of the Soviet organization of Riangsi some figures will
give un accuracy and instructive comparisons. At the second general congress of Soviet
China, which also vas hold at 3u1-chin, from 22 January to 1 February 1934, Hao Tse-tung
presented a general aicture ef Communist activities in 'Clangs/ in. nhich Be gave amm
statistics, valuable for shoeing us the importance of the vork accomplished. Led unions
in the central region of Kiangei and nearby Sovietized districts totalled 229,000 meubers;
from 6,988, landlords, 317,539 Uou of land had been confiscated. Farm products had ine
creased 15 or cent in a year, anricultural offices end schools were started here and,
there. Industry vas only begun in 1933, eithtie setting up or restoration of paper-nil:Ls,
textile mills and ougarewerks; to peke up for deficiency of ealtf, for the RUT forces
maintained a strict and effective blockade, they made synthetic salt. From tho educational
point of ellen, 3052 primary Leninist schools and 6,462 night courses yore being carried on
in 21,932 villages of Uangsi, Fuld= and Emangtune, with a total of 183,617 pupils.
Higher education included the Red army University, Soviet University, Larxist and Coneranist
University' end many other technacal inetitations.
These developmente vere helped by the ctrugglesnhich Chiang Lai-shek had to carry on
against the northern generals. But uhen these had submitted the Nanking noventmeat ee-
turned to the last faction that threatened Rational unity, that is, the Com u sts. After
several months of preparation a general offeneive vas launched ngaiest them at the end
of 1930, en both the poll:deal and the military fronts. At the first, the means of
communication between the Comtntern and the Far Eaet vas destroyed; Hsiang Chungefa, sec-
retary general of the party uas arrested along with thousands of others and ahot, the
chief vital organs for paety guidence VOTO broken up; the last bleu wee specially painful
to the Communists, and the debris of the Central Committee hastened to leave Shanghai.
They Imre replaced bn . commission of young members, Little imolai, but energetic.
Under the pusher these young men, there soon appeared signs or renewed activity of
the Commullist Party? The volume of propaganda noticeably increased; thus the number of
publications circulating in Shanghai in September 1931,nae 66, while a month previous
there wen? alnost noee.
From the military point of view, operations commenced after a conference held in .
Nanking from 12 to 18 November 1930, In Pecanber? tho NUT army penetrated the Red
territory of Kiangsi by five different routes, with plenty of distrust,. In a month by
a series of manoeuvere which censisted invithdrawing? scattering before superior forces
in order to fall upon isolated groups,the Communist army put their adversaries to rout.
In February 2931 there vas a second empedition under the general Ho Ying.-chlin; the
regular troops advanced across the mountains, were intercepted and decimated according to
the former tactics and had to beat a eetecatd Imuedlately Chime. ICai-dhek himself launched
a third effonsive in the following Juno, which opened with brilliant sueeno; the importart
centers of Tang-Ica and Shih-ch5eng were encircled and taken by assault; after several
nooks of respite to clear up and clean up the region occupied,elhe canpaign wee vigorously
resumed in September, when the Japanese suddenly invaded Manchuria and took Zukden (18
September 1931).
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To face this UM7 situation, the rankine geeermment had to levy troops and in October eesieted
from its struggle against the Leda. The Eanchurian conflict vas followed by the firot
ehaeghsi car (January 1932)0 So for a long period the Nankine armies were obliged to
eeirtaLn a defensive attitude. The Coneuniets took advantaee of this to attacr and retake
a large mat of the lost territory. when an arc/lot:Looms signed with tho Jayanese (Lay :t932)?
the goverment planed a now offensive against the Soviet areas of Hupeh? Hunan and Anhwei.
::11 the towns they hunted vigorously and round many secret bureaus of the Communist Party;
there acre nany arrests and a good number of defections appeared in the Led ranks rellevieg
an unpopular nomination; lisianf; Chung-fa was replaced as secretary general by Chien Shao-yu,
alias gang Fang (16) a young man of 25 recently graduated from the Sun lat-son University
in Eoscou. This choice displeased tho senior members of the party and provoked a schism. In
order net to make mattersuorse, the Comintern had to name hir to another poste In revenee,
to avoid nee defections and to strengthen these vies tiers vavorine? tho party urdertook
campaign of terror against the derevtees.
As military events, there were no major operations during the course of 1932. Tho
Coumuniste advanced to the gates of Hankau, Amoy, and even of lianhine. On each side,
there eere alternations of success and failure. To be definite, the rationalists attacked
Communist points in Anhwei and Uupoh and wiped out the fortified nest which Ho Lung had
built for himself in the mid le of Lake Bung on the north bank of the Yangtze. A fifth
campaign was launched in April 1933 and began successfully but ended in disasters In
October 1933 or mpedition was undcestanen on a grand scale. On the advice of Gorman ()Moors,
his uadvisers", Chiang Kai-shok began a new steategy which bore fruit in erecting a oeriee
of block houses, in general on high ground, at a distance sufficient for mutual defense,
arornd the Sovietized territory. Satisfying progress had been made when ho 19th Armz-, which
had fought oe bravely against the Japanese at Shanghai in 1932, rovolteduith its chief
Teal Toineech'ich (17) asses-pet the goverament, and tried to set up a republic in Fuhien-,
It took several months for the central troops to evell tnis rebellion. in January, ).934,
the affair vas liquidated. During the months following, operations ewe resumed actively
against the Reds, in what may be considered a eixth offensive. This time there was greater
? determanation than ever to finish them once for all, and preparations wore else on a
larger scale, Cheng Hebeh-limag repulsed a Communist army vhicb tried to capture Kietiare;
In May? the Reda sex() driven from 7ukien; in August, from Aneseei; they returned to Foceeea
in Auguet,blit were driven au'e again. Vine/1y the cordon was tightened around the Soviet
territory. Despite their manoeuvoring skill, their rapidity of movement, their fiehtieg
spirit, they were not equal to resisting the very superior government forces. On 16
October 1934, their general azodus began.
The causes vhic obliged the Conmunists to leave their base in Kiangsi were not solely
military. From the economic eoint of view, the Rod renublic had not been a unecess; the
agrarian policy which had been carried out in a very rigorous fashion had detracted from,
it seemed, the prosperity of the new stet(); eost of all, in the view of ileoese,tung, the
blockade strictly enforced by the central aersies would have serious consequences; food
supplies most necessary, such as salt, ewe lacking. 'dhile the bull: of the Led arty
succeeded in breaking through the cordon, a certain number of detachments remained .e rear-
guard in Kiangsi. Jel-chir, he Geeital, was only captured on 11 :lovember. Chtiu
Ghtluepei, former secretary general was ecizee eed shot. In fact, the earliest Coneemiee
elements to undertake this Almon "Long !larch" were the troops of Nei= Koo (10 in Aleepeet
1934; breaking the first line of encirclement, they came into the south er? Hunan, crossed
Kvangsi and Kweichew? and arrived:11Mo banks or theft Diens a stream which flan north
of Keei-yarg the capital of Kweichov; but a eatienalist army was awaiting then and they had
to retrace their stops; after this they stayed within the throe provinces, Szechwan,
Nueichow? Hellen. Ho Lung's army reached that vicinity. Together they ordered HA Hs4eee,
Wien? who had carved for himself a new Fed domain in Szechwan, to open up a way of
communication with Shensi and Kansu,
? Under the direction of its high chieftains, Deo Tseetuug, Chu Toh, Lin Piao 19) and
'others, the bulk of tho Red any gathered near :Meta in southern Kiangsi. The marching
oedors were given on 16 October 1934. On the 21st, in extreno secrecy, the Reds attached
and pierced the first line of defense bordering on Nwangtane and Hunan; on 3 idol/ember, they
broke clown the second, a week later the third, and on the 29th the fourth and last. Care-
fully avoiding all important opposing groups, they entered Kuoichau in two coin= which
eaanited under the walls of &me-yang, with the intention of rejoining the advance guard
of 'Asia? -Vey in the frontier zone of Szechuce-Hunan. While Chiang Aal-shek took measures
to bar them from the Yangtze route and access to Szechuan, wishing at all costs to keep
them math of the river, suddenly they veered torrerds the south, crossing the Wu River (in
the north of Kweichov) on 4 January 1935; but the provincial troops of Liu Hsiang military
WocnTor of Szechwan, were on vetch and forced them to turn back tewarde the south; they
crossed the Feeetecen Peen. on 17 April, entered Yunnan the following month, passed near
the capital and finally arrived in sight of the Yangtze which flowed deeply shut in through
this region of high mountains. There, thanks to the darkness and secrecy, they crossed the
river by surprise, disarmed the stunned garrison, and undertook to help the other troop to
cross; nix large boats labored for nine days to get the Red arey across.
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25X1A
The central authorities were then obliged to go to bar their nay across the
5:hrtliL no (River), ehich floes parallel to the Yangtze on the north. Afteriraversing a
barren region, the Red army arrived at Aneshunechfang and tried to cross the Ta-tu Ho
(26 !ley); one column succeeded at great cost; seeing vhich the generals decided to go
4C order order to cross the Tt-tu at the westernmost bridge, at Luetingecholao, The
her/ ereived there on 30 May and crossed it vith heavy losses. In all the journey-
to She, S., this wee the most critical period, even in the vim of Communists
Z'serth of the Ta-tn Ho, it vas neceseney to climb high snowy mountaino? to coma down
ins, for it me June. Hero too the losses were hcavy when the tuo net
et Tore Dr., they thrust into vest Szochuaa? arriving on 16 June at 1..euekezie, and made
J1I'Aar'Al near Sung-plan, nith the army of Hsi Hsiang-choien and Chang Kuoetlao, vho had
this region some months before. The pursuing army being far away? they rested
i'nwa Teek; then being thus refreshed, the Reds resumed their march northuerd.
rivieg on 10 tlialy at Vasteerh-kad., tho tf710 arffiy groups ehich had just merged held
ueeting to deteemine the course to follou, They could not eeree. Boa Hsiangech'ien
end Mane ihmet'ao? already established in Szechuan, felt it preferable to remain in the
demin which they bad carved out, and consolidate it rather than to o on into Shensi, a
country co destitute of resources. The Central Committee, with Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh?
a contrary 71.0170 in fever of the north in the hope of Russian aid. Finally, in
ugrizt 1935, the Kiengsi forces turned northuards? leavine Chu Teh commander of the
eouthern troops vith Hs' Hsiang-chgen and (Thang Kuo-t0e.o. On 23 August, supplied vith
grain and meat, the Red army found itself in steppe lanas, inhabited by hostile nomad
tedleIs, Uanetsu and Hsi-fan? vho inflict?, serious losses on the invaders. After crossing
Vas eselands, they wore joined at Feasts? by the southern group, who had yielded to
the rajoreity 71=0 There the differences broke out emu and still more sharply. Flaying
A) the soldiers' fear of a 21-day march across the steppes from Pal-ManesChiang to Memo
Mare groet3eo re-Z=0d to follau the belk of the army end returned vith flea Hsineg-chuien
to ileceerbekaio Thence he led his troops to Sihang, but difference of languce:e and customs
cet eff all facilities for development. He thought of passine over into Sinkiang (Turkesta4
to get into contact vith the USSR, but the Russians showed no opnfidence in him. In despaie
he isoznid -ap icy obeying Pao Toe-stung and came into Shensi. Volested on his arrive!, hr
continued to criticize and ra.s imprisoned. On 17 April 1938, he escaped and rejoined'
o1
old friend Chem Tuehsiu lafthan. Naturally there me an explosion of anger and curses
on Wm and his memory 'is as mud!' execrated as that of the late Ch'en Tuehsiu.
gas Sh and 't A tieX esekvW.e."5.....12.4.4?).
On 20 October 1935, a year after leaving Klanesi the vanguaod of the Red army made
Stmetion with the troops of a small Sovietized zone in the north of Shonsi? under the
eontrol of Liu Tzustan (20) and Usti. Hai-tung. Proud of this Ion: varch of 25,000
(atrietly speaking not more than 18,088) flarxist writers gladly mho comparison'uith
Zapoleon and Hanniba18, 7.ey pretend to have marched 235 days and 18 nights; of the 100
days of resting, 56 wore spent in the north of Szechwan. The avera e dail mereh uas 70 21,
But the croosine of high mountain-ranges, of iehty rivers lined vitn enemies, ce-,,ntless
1 ne combats, and fatigue, had decimated the (new; of 100,000 mon eho left Kiangei only
20v000 reached Tomei, or one man in five.
Xn Shensi a totally different policy vas folloued, as much because of the experiences
in Shensi as because of neu conditions. The chief point of the mu programtr s the famous
slogan "United Anti-Japanese Front',. Communists fish in troubled vatere; their erouth
; China has coincided with the Nankim government es ram; in 1928, against the northern
generals, in 1931-32 against the Japanese in Eanchuria and Shanghai, in 1933, the revolt
of Tsai Teine-ch'ieh and of the 19th army. It was then to their advantage to cash for a
mu total tar against Japan, vhich mould permit them not only to reorganize their forces,
but also to develop their potential to the highest point. On their arrival in Shensi,
they uere exhausted, also it vas necesenry at all colts to divert the attention of the
central government. On the other hand, vas there any be'ter means of capturing pepIllar
sympathy than by calling for uar against Japan and nreparin; the best patriots? Naturally
1-stad not go so far as to deny all patriotic sentiment in their calculations, but it is
undeniable that their interests accorded admirably mith their patriotic pretensions.
In harmony uith this nen word of the general command, they softened considerably
their eethods of Sovietization. Land-confirmation vas almost abandoned.
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It is true thet north Shensi beineBF5.-Nciff? t lend itself to this policy,
large landholders ewe rare. They dt o? crime youpe ere were recently
molested; they took nothin: save from Very rich (more. Even private traria and in-
dustry had liberties unhnoun a short while heforo in Kiangsi; even chambers of commerce
received permission to eeist. 'e'orkere -- the class "dear" above all others -- could
not get too much mixed up in the controlcf production. In the administration, they
allowed the urban bourgeoisie to share in the government alon:siC:e of peasants, uorkers,
soldiers. Finally, foreign policy was also revised; they did not molest foreieners in-
discriminately, and they agreed to collaborate with anti-imperialist nations on certain
conditions, Such is a resume of the program of action eublished by Wang fling in "Inter-
national Correspondence" under date of 15 February 1936. The author gives to his article
a significant title "For a turning in all the domains of our work"; and he says: "It is
necessary to make a determined end of our regrettable faults and our factional 'left'
traditions, in both policy and in work on the masses throughout the EUT provinces. But
in turning, it is equally necessary in the natter of policy that we remain in the Soviet
regions, particularly in the sense that it is necessary to confer on it a more pronounced
poplar and national character"..
25X1A
for
?
In August 19350 they began to nroposo cessation of civil Item and the union of all
parties in a struggle against the Japanese aggreseer, under the aoeis of a deneeratic
government, which would ally itself with the USSR and other countries friendly to china.
Skill in this new policy won much sympathy, and event.; more responsible for showing
opportunism. On 9 December 1935, Peking students, "led by our Party" sego Vac) Ise-tung,
demonstrated in favor of national liberation. The Japanese intrigued more and more in
the northern provinces; witness the seizure of Jehol (1933), the autonomy of Hopei-Chaha:
under a Javanese protectorate (1935), the invasion of Suiyuan (1936). Those events
greatly increased the national feeling a:ainst the Japanor,0?.who each year since the in-
vasion of nanchuria (1931) had nibbled off a bit of China. The Communists skillfully pro-
fited termaking themselves the champi-ns of patriotism and accusing Nanking of being de-
ficient in boldness. At the beginning of 1936, they attacked the neighboring province of
Shansi but were quickly repulsed and forced to recross the Yellow Uver. On the other
hand, in the seath0 the generals Li Tsung-jen (21) and Pal Chung-hsi (22) chieftains of
luangsi, and Chten Chi-Vang (23) military governor of Ktrangtun: attempted a separatist
movement in the southwest calling it the national Army of Salvation" against Japan.
Happily, the crisis vas uickly passed and the rebel generals submitted (June-July 1)36).
But if the rebellion had been crushed so easily, it vas perhaps not without influence
on a crisis vhich arose in northwest China at the end of the sane year. To oversee the
new Red zone of Shensi, Chiang Kai-shek had designated Chang Heteh-liang (24) and his
northeast army as veil as Yang Huech9eng and the 17th army. Die please. kieere these anpoint-
ments, officers and men easily let themselves be perauaded by Communist propaganda to desie:e
from the civil var. Seeing their wilful inertia, Chiang Kak-ohek wont in person to eebeke
theen On 12 December 1936 he nes made prisoner by Chang hsuoh-liang and Yang Hneheng.
Such vas the famous "Sian Incident", which plunged the people into stupefaction. But
popular reaction was quite different from what tins hoped for by the captors. On this
occasion one could put his finger on the profound respect and affection felt by the
Chinese people for their chief. Before the attitude of t-ne people end of the government,
the rebellious generals were compelled to release the "oncralieeimo" on tke evening of
25 December. Mon the news became known throuTeaut the country, the enthusiasm vas as
delirious as consternation had been keen since ne capture. The authors of the coup d'etat
were made prisoners or deprived of paver and their troops transferred to the south. A
loyal army came to replace them and to begin the blockade of the Sovietized zone.
The non-aseression agreement concluded between the Comnuniets and the 'northwest"
army was not however effective for lone. Frustrated in their hopes, the Reds intensified
their eropaganda for mien of all parties against Japan and the ceseacdon of civil var.
The Comintern, in the course of the Seventh Congrees of the Third Internationale, approved
this reversal of attitude, for the international situation vies becomine more and more
menacing, followine the Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 Dovember 1936, between Goemaret Italy
and Japan; it was necessary to cease civil 11 r in China in order to oppose her aeainet Jaeae,
and therefore to ask the Chinese Soviets to find a ;round of agreement with the national
government by sacrificing for a time certain essential points of the Marxist pronenn.
On 10 February 1937, the Central Committee of the Communist Party sent a letter to the
Nankine government and to the Third Plenary Assembly of the K12T0 proposing a coesetion
of the civil very freedom of speech, press, and assembly, zelease of political prisoners,
settilv up of a plan of resistance to Japanese aggression and return to the "Three Peoplecs
Principles" of Sun Yat-sen. In return they promised to change the name of the Rod armyand that of Soviet governnent, to realize a democratic form of government in the Red areas,
to suspend the policy of land confiscation and to concentrate all their efforts on the task
of resisting the aggressor.
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the MIT Coagroso, rhioh it fram STWISIry, took no notice of the telegram.
r rejecting the resignation of Chiang Nai-sholt and panning a motion to retake the
04 territory in Chahar and Hopei the membene of the congress closed their sessions
ning a long menlfosto demanding the abolition of the Red army and the Soviet republic,
eeeeticn of Oen-3=1ot propaganda and abanderment of clasp var. The negotiation? for
eabente (nee to amount to nothing. Nevertheless they beennagain'hom the Red side
ne March. On his part Chiang'1!.aieshek 'eed stopped the civil vary promised amnesty and
liberty of the press and it as clear th-t he was actively preparing for vor with
which rae all too near.
Curiously enough at the time of these dealinge,ihe prime minister of Japan made a
'etcally goatuee l',euards Chinn by inviting her to renew cultural and economic ties bee
..ezeihe tun e untries. Mat consternation in the Red camp if the impossible rapprochement
:1(1 taken plecel But this nanoeuver was perhaps only an artifice to canoe delay and to
t wampleions. However that be, Japan1s 'traditional policy soon resumed its true fon
proseatl,ag of nen demands on Nenkinze. The result of these intriguee vae? as all
" the Lu-kou-chtlao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident (7 July 1)37) and thnt of Shanghai
eugust) with which hostilities comenced between China and Japan.
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The first act of the Reds was to issue
effectlehat they had already severaltim
.icy of class varfare? land-confiscation:
a manifesto, in rhich they promised to -out
es eroposed, namely the ending of their farmer
Soviet government, and independent Red ermy.
After the publication of this doenment? the names of the Lod axle/ And government were
ehanged; from now on the Shansi base carried the designation "Special CEN- should be Border'
raetrict of Shensi, Kansa and Dingsia". The army vhich MA, made the Long Uwech" was re--
greed and re-named aSigkshto uteArfizro. She :remainder of Red forces scattered over the
eenntry and which had played the role of guerrillas were reorganized and christened 'Mew
heurth Army". Chu Teh was made commander of the former with Pleng Teehuai (25) as dept-ti3
"Vine was raised to be head of the New Foaeth with Hsiang Ying as his second-inecomend,
-i7n,ce the beginning of the var? the Eighth Route Army claimed the privilege of merely makirg
a:hmple ear as guerrillas and not taking pert in larle-scale battles. Naturally Nanking
agreed, for a veto would have meant nothing. The guerrilla warfare which those two armies
=Tried on in north China against the Japanese was moreover, suited to their principles of
military strategy, In their infantry manual, cititied oft:err/11a Ilaefere"0 one finds this
rrinelpies never a defeat!" To realize that, they never engage in large-scale combat;
eercovr they do not have the equipment needed for large operations; also they are seeenle
ets in ambuscades and surprise blows. Their skill in manoeuvers comes in large TA from
heir extreme mobili.ty; during the Long flarch the nationel ^ruf could not overtake then
."-ey were able to acoomplish on foot astonishine; distances in record time. FAO effort aleo
Med soldierstoughoned and inure,' to hardships; but how much tnej paid in life for
.he rigors of the journeys
Weave right in askin:; at what results the "pa-lu? (26) arrived against the Japaneee.
:T we can believe Elmo Tse-tung. in 1943 there were 64 per cent of the Japanese forces in
territory controlled by the Reds as against 36 per cent in the kW zone; in 1944, the pro-
pertion was slightly different; 56 per cent in "pa-lu" country and 44 per sent on the
eouthern front. Let us admit for a moment that these figures are exact. Do they nece
,eearay prove what their author intended t'em to suggest? Did the Japanese really foe
the Reds more? e do not thinh so. Never, at any moment of the var. did the Conmuniots
eoleasesgainst the Japanese a long battle line, necessitatin: on the onemy1s part a grand
Ceploying of forces; the entire effort of the vary 01 the offensive and defensive oponatione
endertaken on a larle scale, were supported by the MT armies. It would teen be quite
estonishine if the Jaeanose had feared the Communists most of all. The tnue reason for'
.';eese :figures -- if they aro real, we repent -- is quite different, in our opinion. Tho
apanese lived on north China 412 an economic and industrial way, they supervised all the
work in order to hasten is results in than country: while they hooed to detach to their
edvantage a large part of the north; for all this they needed numerous garrisone, useleee
f;e1 the south, which at least concerned them less. 7:e do not wish to say that on occasion
each an isolated Coo:mist group, admitted to fight by the s'.de of the =2 would not act
heavely; but that was the fact with only a fee token detachments.
The COMM/118f troops roseared themselves foe a cease hi_per in their eyes than de-
fa)nno of the national territory. Convinced that the aggressor would some day be obliged
to return home defeated, the Reds prepared most of all for the poet-var time? It la
amusing enough to road the following accusation which flao Tee-tune =premed about his
WIT adversaries: "Politically and economically they regard the Communists as their enemy
11 and the Japanese aggressors as enemy 1No. 21; so they are actively preparing for
another war to exterminate the Communiets"c, If we return this slanderous reoeoech on the
eecuser? we think no one will be tempted to contradict us; and oven if there be truth in
the Communist accusation, uhat does that prove? Ueroly that the two foes foresee the
,aturo and are preparing for the actual earn war which Is Inevitable. Fleeeever tbe Reds
eertainly exploited the situation adm-rably by ?nereztsin their effectives Erom several
7.ozen to several hundred thousands at least. Edgar Snow hinself, though very sympathei.',10
towards the Reds, admits in "People obinje94,44qt the Communist troops obtained feu
aosults because they were poorly armatE ikaWsion is valuable comln; from his
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From the oelitical point of IRESTRICTEDgoIng to develop a neu ideology utone
basis is the acceptance of a revolutionary three principles of the people, such as one
finds in some of the first yorks of Sun Yat-sen. They wore then oolno to dispute with
the HUT the inheritance of the three principles. According to a small tract circulated
in the 1943 campalgn, here are the chief lines in this neu body of doctrines.
China must pass throuoh several steles before arriving at tho goal of a socialist
earthly paradise. In effect, one can arranse in Um groups all the aspects of revolution;
one is the democratic revolution, the other is tho socialist revolution. China is not
yet ripe for the socialist era, she must first pass through the democratic Anse. Th13
democratic revolution, however, is no longer the French revolution of 1709, that of the
17th century in England, of 1)11 in China, yhich yore born at a time when capitalism Yes
in full grouth; in China a neo-democratic revolution is necessery, similar to the hussian
revolution of February 1905 brought about in the period of imperialism; that is to say, in
good Marxist doctrine, in the period of decadent capitalism. The one is capitalist
democracy, the other is socialist democracy, the stage of transition. The Chinese revalue
tion is of course not an affair of any particular country, it is a linh in an immense chain
of world revolution vhich began with the Russian revolution of October 1)17. "Assuredly
socialism is a stage far superior to tho rico domocracy; vie olll realize it some day, but
actual conditions do not pernit us to do more than dream of it". (27) Ay? Because in China
there still exist many survivals of the obscurantist past, yhich hinder social nroyess;
besides China no longer has full political independence to eller: her elbou room.
The rico-democratic revolution has for its nission to bring the theories of Sun Yat-son
to full bloom, for the triple revolution, national, political and social, advocated by the
"Father of the Nation" has not yet been achieved.
At first what eill be the essence of the ney State? Modified capitalism or
socialism? Neither one nor the other. "The neo-democratic republic has neither a
capitalist administration nor a proletarian government; it is a denocracy directed by all
the revolutionary classes operating togother". In these terms the dictatorship of the
proletariat is abandoned. The verbal concession is a limited one. 3ofore the skepticism
ohich this statement- ould cause, Ilao Tse-tuno felt obliged to give reaosreino words 1-et
year, at the seventh national party congress. "Some ask if the Communists, once in pouer?
eill establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a ono-party nsvernment as in tho
USSR. Ile can say to such persons that a neo-democratic state c netituted by the union of
all democratic classes is dif"orent in principle from a socialist state uith dictatorship
of the prole:on:lat. China, during the period of her neo-democratic syoton, cannot have,
and ought not to have, a government monopolized by one party. :le have no eoason for not
co-operating with non-Conmunist tartieo yho agree to york yith us and are not hostile to us
(28,
The practical form yhich this not; democracy cull adopt oil be a tripartite government:
ono-third composed of members of the Communist party, one-third of prooreeeive ropreoenta-
Ulm of the capitalist class, and finally a last third of delegates of the middle claso.
Often this generous diointereetedness of the party does not prevent them from having a
high hand for effective direction. Aro not its members the leaven which gives life to
tho uhole lump? So they will to fully justified in being of first rami: in the new city.
To assume their role of leadership, they -All have recourse neither to vie:Lome nor to
dependence on fixed lens like the MIT, but will rely on the confidence ale protection of
the multitude.
If the form of the non government is nideuay betmen capitalism and socialism, the
same is true of the economy of the nevi state. In this field, the grand coacession of the
party is the recognition of of the right of ounership and the cossatyon of land-
confiscation, a condition gine mom imposed by the MT for collaboratton between the
two parties. As the rural class comprises the enormous majority of the notion, stay 8) per-
cent, it is the principal force on which the nay regime roots. Moreover in its solicitude
for the peasants, the nee-democratic state proclaims very hist equality in rights to the
soil? Yet tho amelioration of peasant conditions must be obtained -without injwf.ng the
landoeners1 rights- it is stfficient to limit land-rent and interest, that is to say, the
profits of the lanherds? while leaving to them their lands. In 1945, U20 Tse-tug on
-
affirmed the some doctrine in the re ort already cited; "Since the outbreae of hostilitlee?
the Communist Party has madc a great concession in replacing the policy of "Land to the
tiller by that of reduction of rent and interest -- To unite all classes in the anti-Jap
anese Common Front, we rapt not deprive tin landlord of his right to prepwty? but namely
persuade him to accept reascnable rent and interest, and encoura7,e him to tneeei, his
capital in industrial enterprises Lich farmens are encouraged is inereaes thefe duction". (29)
(29)
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If private capital is treated thFtnThatlat is not the same vele% the
finencing of ler enternrises; banks, factories, lar;e,scale, air and rail traffic,
vill be ovarated by the 'State, The reason offered is that monopoly by private
capital over nationel 7000VW0S canlot be tolerated in tiEC of war. It is
capitmliem controlled by the State. The remainder is surficient for private
indueteee
One my eak. whet esmaina of Communist principles after tlec abandonment of an
equality program. The tnheo seems to have been so radical ao to upset corheia faithful
ones of the party aue to have made then fear even the ruin of Communiam in China;
awarding to them, the adoption of a policy remote from the party's essential principles
vill necessarily bring on its decline. To which the official or Ana roply-that they are
MDt executing a retreat, a concession of principle, but a change of method imposed by
cireueotances. To an American journalist, Haldore HODSOU, Liao Toeetung replied one der.
nho Coemenist Party }Ts not ceased to be Conmunist. Our fimelesal is unchanged. But
the forces of revolution have recently been modified =duo oueht to chane our pro7an
in haesoeyvithihis evolution. For ten years, the principal enemy of the Chinese masses
'ens boon the landlord and the usurer, or, in other words, the feudal forces. It was
then necessary to divide private property and hill landlorde In order to weaken the
forces of reaction. But gradually tho danger of Japanese invasion has onershadeued the
evils of Chinese feudalism. You have been able to see with your own eyes that the
tereor inspired by tho hostile army exceedod by -far the op= ;aion of feudal lords eur
immediate objective is to free China from her semi-colonial status. This is the actual
phase ot the Chinese Revolution. The revolutionary forces included peasants above all,
but else laedloroe ani eeeitalists. That is what re call the National United Front". (SO)
Such are the verde of the political chiefs, the ideas expressod in journals and re-
v:teas, Did real conditions coereolond to these statement? It seems that it is often
necesserente eey yes, for reasons entirely different from the motives alleged; but this
was for from being absolute, and vtried ereetle-vith different sections.
Collaboration between theNUT and the Communist Party during the war pith Japan was
marked by several clashes. The Communist press organs in Chunekine yore under close
eueveillance; at one time the famous "Shongbuo" (Life) bookstore, the .rout center of
"leftist" publications, was temporarily closed alonseith its numerous branches; con- "
centration camps were filled with dissidents. One of the most important events was tho
attack in 1940, south of the Yangtze in the rogioe of Shanghai, of a"Nea Fourth" de-
tachment by a group of governnont soldiers; the chief officer, Yoh Twin, nae eaetured?
his deputy HsSeng Xing and several of the staff were killed and reelaced in turn by
Chen Yi; this man took general command of the army in ',lace of Yoh ring, who crashed
an airplane carrying him from Chungking to Yemen (Uey or Juno 1946)
Eau the mar is over. Are the theories of "neo-denocracy" still current? It is
? certain that the press campaign is on the whole much leseened. Is their eropaelnda role
then finished? Yes, so it would seem; was not that a wartime ideolo;y thousht up to
camouflage the real ends of the party behind a visible facade of patriotism and to give
to Narxiam equasi-bourgeaist beniens good and saintly look? But something of it ro-
reine
in now eloean launched by Mao Tse-tung, "federated government", uhichlexposes his
peetenr plan: winfiti&i, of the government monopolized by the KW and representation by
all parties -- liberty of speech, association, publication, thought, and loyalty, ---.---
re:ace:Cul and democratic union of all citieone to cease civil vox continuation of a
liberal police toverds landovners to discover gradually a means for giving to each peasant
land oufficiont for his livelihood; libeety to private capital to develop and to c' id
in the industrialization of the country, but State supervision of all large entorprison,
with protection of tho working masses (vookeday of eight to ten hours, social insurance,
right to form onions) and admission even of foreign capital; -- dovelopwent of popu3nr
odarcation and preparing of technical persons of all sorts (science, literatuee, education,
median?, arts); -- approval of tho Atlantic Charter and of the decisions taken at the in-
termational conferences in Ubscow, Cairo, Teheran, Yalta. In brief, the ideal has not
changed a bet. It is the policy of opportunism, so combated of late by the same Jae Tee-
tueg; for it matters above all else for the success of the propaganda that the Communist
Paehy repudiate at least in words his political utterances.
The same American journalist whom tie have quoted oeveral times, finally put the
foLscaing, question in the course of his interview nith Deo Tse-tang: "Do you mean to say
that the Chinese Conmuniot Party desires to support a democratic government after this
war and does not seek to ranee its struggle against the landlordo?" nao nodded his head.
"Hoe then, I ask, do you hope to issue in Comuunism? Flow build a socialist eeeublic?"
Uho eepressed his hope of seeini tho change from the democrat3c to the socialist stege
accomplished by evolutien, not revolutians the principal mane would be education and not
violent action. "But there is no historical vecodent for a emceel introduction of
socialism", I protested. Uao smiled and added: "Our endeavor is to make history, not
to leitate it". (1)
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The facts belie these words. Communists arc 3:)eciP.l1nto in camouflr ;o.
Is not the first point in Marxist :iorality that all ulich servos the tri,..41 of thoir
causo is essentially good? Retrortt on princip cr. is novor moro than a tomora.y
podiont; the suprome pal remains unchnngod. Translator's note: The renaining two
gag= of the original document aro a forecast of conditions likely to obtain after 22
Septemivr 1946, the docurent date. This forocad:, hao boon discredited by gventh, and
aff., nothing to the value of the procedirr: material. hence it is omitto
IKIDM
;,7o:Fedia-- 2,3,4
Chang, Fa-hluoi -- 4 Li Ta-ohno 192
Chang lantlehAiang -- 941
Lenin
efireS
2,5,7
?MIND
Li Li.nan 2,495,697,
Li Tsung-jen -- 11
Chan g Kuo-Va -- 640 Liao Chug-kai -- 2
Ch,om Chi-t'ang 11 Lin Piao -- 9
WO4 Shao-yu (Nang Ming) -" 9 Liu :iaag 9
CWou Tu-hciu -- 192,304950697910
Ch'on Yen-mien --
2
Chou Yi -- 16
Chiang Zai-chek
203,89991/9
12
Ch'iao-nioa 2
Cu. Ch,iu-pei --
9
Chou En-lai -- 2,3
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai --
2,6
Chu Toh 29496079901042
Fong Yd-hniang -- 6
El%Imon, Rs-adore -- 14
1707:1 In
Ezaang Chung.- fa -- 4.8,9
Eniamg Yips -- 12,14
9
? Hai-tung 196,10
? Baiang-ohlien -- 6,9,10
Zu Shih -- 1
JogTo -- 2
It
Web
Liu Li-tcao --6
Liu Tsu-tan -- 10
Mao Tne-tung 293,6979899910911912
13,14
Pal Chung 1. -- 11
Pcong Te-huai -- 12
Roy -- 4
Snow, Edgar -- 12
Stalin -- 2,4,5,7
Tal Chi-t'ao -- 1
VisTA Ping-shaa --
T,ang Lan-1i .- 5.
Trotnkyito -- 5,7
.Tn'ai 29ing-oh9ioh -- 9910
V
Voitinsky -- 1
Nang Chinvami -- 3
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an Ming -- 1/
(Chen Shao-yu) -- 0
norm:charm -- 2
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Y '
7a2g Hneeleong -- 11
Ydh
in ,:n12.?14
Yen HSieshan
leonenien (Chen Yiennnien) -. 2
(1)
25X1A
FOOTEOTES
Chen Tu-hsiu, first head of the CCP, born in 1879 at An-ohiling in Anhwei,
student in Japan and France, founded and directed the "New Youth" magazine
so influential in its own tine (1915-1921); then he threw himself into
Communism. Expelled from the party by an opposition clique, he was imprisoned
by the Nanking government; pardoned in 190F, he was readmitted into the KMT,
but died in 1942.
(2) Li Ta-chao, colleague of Moen Tu-hsiu at Peiping University, worked with his
friend from the beginning but unfortunately was arrested and shot by Chang Tso-
lin about 1926.
(3) Pal Chi-t?ao, an important personality in the 111MT; born in Szechwan, studied in
Japan, joined Sun Yat-sen very early, banished by the Manchu Government, took
up journalism; attracted for a while by the Communists, he later left them, and
held high posts (President of the Examination Yuan, Ministers University officer).
(4) "Comintern" denotes the Comnunist Interantionale or the Third Internationale.
(5) Van Poing-shan, born in Kwangtung in"1887, was one of the first Comnunist
leaders, but was expelled from his party in 1927; he founded the "Third Party"
formed of persons expelled from the Communist party and from the KMT; but he
left it and re-entered the HMT about 1927.
(6)
(7)
Chou En-lai, born at Huai-an in Kiangeu, in 1898, studied in Japan and France,
and in the latter country organized a section of the CCP; returning to China
In 1924, he served under Sun Yat-sen, and was secretary of the Vihampoa Military
Academy which Chiang Kai-shek directed; arrested as a Communist after Chlaenos
coup, he escaped. He organized the Canton Commune, hid himself, rejoined the
Communist base in Kiangsi. Lie finally became vice-prosident of the Chinese
Soviet government, and general Communist delegate to discuss matters with the
Wanking government.
Mao Tse-tung, President of the Chinese Communist government since 1931, was
born in Hunon in 1893, studied in his native province, later in Peiping. He
was one of the founders of the Communist party (1921). Ae never was in France,
though this has been stated several times.
(0 Chang Fa-K0uei, born in Kwangtung in 1691, head of the formidable any called
"Ironsides" during the southern expedition against the north (1926); but part
of his troops went over t/ Communism in 1927; he quelled the Communist
uprising of Canton, and commanded the region of Pootung, near Shanghai, in 1937.
(9) Ho Lung, one of the most famous Communist Generals, a native of Hunan (1897),
like Mao Tse-tung; at first an officer under Chang Fa-kluei, he later entered
the Communist party a-little before the Aan-ch2ang uprising in 1927; coming
from a peer peasant family, his education was quite limited; he commanded the
Communist troops which attacked Ta-tung, in the north of Shansi.
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(10) Yoh Ping, another famous Communist general from the army of Chang Pa-klue
who revolted with Ho Lung; he had never officially joined the Conmunists, but
this story is only fiction. He was killed in June 1946 in an airplaae crash
when flying Prom Chungking to Yenan.
Li Liesan? born in Hunan, studied in France, where he helped found a branch
of the CCP emong Chinese students; coming back to Shanghai, he shuttled be-
tween Shanghai and Hankow, dominating the party from /929 to 1931. Once
overthrown, he was recalled to Russia to continue his "studies"; his stay
was destined to last a long time; he reappeared on the scene a month or tuo
ago, in Manehuria.
(12) Chu Teh, the most famous Communist general, closely associated eith Mao Tse-tung;
born in 1,886 in Szechwan, studied at the Yunnan Military Academy joined the
army, quickly distinguished htmsolf? rose to high rank led quite a dissolute
life as an opium-smoker; then suddenly in 1922 joined the KUT with a revolutionary
purpose, quit the drug and uent abroad. He studied military science in Germaey;
where he joined the Communist party; he stayed a while in Paris and in Moscow,
returning to China in 1926, just in time to take part in the Northern Expedition..
He revolted against the KMT in 1927; after various campaigns, he united his
forces with those of Mao Tse-tung at Ching-kan-shan (Kiangsi-Hunan border).
Prom that time on their destinies blended; he is conenande?-in-chief of the Rod
armyn
25X1A
(13) Hell Hai-tung, born in 1900, near Hankow, of an humble pottees family; in his
childhood he had frequent quarrels with more fortunate young comrades, which
prepared him to become a perfect Communist. At first a potter, he abruptly
caft home because of a quarrel and joined the army of Chang Feeneluei, whore he
became a Communist; he took part in the Xlerthern Expedition of 1927. Then he
began to gather his former comrades, potters, and peasants, who became the
nucleus of a Communist army; he organized the base of 0-y11-wan (coined from
the alternate names of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei). In 1934, forced to leave
Honan? he established a new base in the south of Shensi and made junction with
the troops of Liu Tzu-ten.
(14) Hsil Heiang-oh,ien, graduate from the Rhemnoa Military Academy--whick -anent;
Kai-shek directed when he began his expedition against the northeeane was a
former officer in the MAT amy. Ho directed the organization of the 0-wan
base; then forced to retire before the KMT army he formed another domain in
S_echman and threw in his lot with that of Chang guoetlao aqalist the othee
Communist chiefs; that nearly brought on a schism.
(15) Chang Kuo-teao, a returned student from Moscow and one of the first chiefs of
the Comeunist party, friend of Ch' en Tu-hsta. He was the president of the
0-yelewan government, with Hs 4 Hsiang-oh,ien as his right-hand-man. Pushed
back by the central government, he went with his friend to set up a new
Sovietized zone in east Ssechwan, in 1934, whioh proved very useful to the
Communist armies in their retreat towards Shensi; but not wishing to abandon
his Szechwan base, he fell into conflict with the majority led by Mae-Tec-tung;
when he yielded and arrived in Shensi, he was imprisoned by Mao Tse-tung
despite his title of vice-president of the Soviet government. Provoked, he
fled and left the Communist party. His memory is execrated among the Reds.
(16 Ch' en Shao-yu, alias Wang Ming, a returned student from Russia and almost
immedietely named secretary general of the Communist Party in place of
Hsiang Tsung-fa in 1931, was quickly ousted by the all-powerful faction of
"indigenous Communists"; partly because he was too young and excited jealousy,
partly because ho belonged to the "Ruseian clique",that is to say, students
returned from Ruesia. He remained the chief doctrinal authority on policy
and messenger from Russia.
(17) Ts'ai ringech'ieh (Tsai Ting-kai) born in 1890 in Kwangtung? joined the
army when very young; celebrated for his courage; rose from the rank of a
plain soldier to the ,rade of general, commander-inefleof the 19th Army.
Ho distinguished himself by his heroic defense of Shanghai against tne
Japanese in 1932; then named pacification commissioner in Fukien with the 19th
Army, against the Rads. Rebelled against the government, 1933-34. Since
then has lived abroad.
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13) Heiao Ko, a former linT officer who mutinied in 1928, helped in the establishing of the
first Communist base in China and of the first Rod army; a famous expert in guerrilla
eerfare, he came to raise the siege of Tatung.
tg) Lin Piao, graduate of the talampoa Military Academy, reputed to be one of the most skilful
l'reei tacticians; born in 1908 in Hupeh; son of a ruined industrialist, he managed to get
n good education and entered the Whampoa Military Academy, under Chiang Kai-shek and
the Russian general Blucher, adviser to Sun Yat-sen; he joined the expeditice against
the northerners in the army of Chang Fa-k"uei in /926; he was with Ho Lung and Yoh Ting
in 1927; in 1932, he was made commander of the first corps of the Red army, 20,000 strong,
wno were never to be defeated thanks to his extraordinary talent as, a tactician; his
articles on military questions have been translated or commented on in Soviet Russia,
Japan, end even in KNT circles; this is why he was named President of the Red Military
ncademy. Now he commands the Soviet zone of Manchuria?
:1)) Liu Tzu-tan, another cadet of the ranampoa Military Academy, who laid the first
foundations or the Communist state of Shenei-Kansu-Ningsia; native of north Shensi,
he became; a Communist and a young officer of the KMT on leaving the Ilhampoa Academy
in 1026; took part in the northern expedition, left the national armies when Chiang
Kai-shek announced a purge of the KMT party and army, and returned to his native
province in 1928 to begin guerilla warfare From 1929 to 1932 he met successes and
reverses, and finished by establishing a Sovietized base at An-ting (Shensi) and
thereabouts in 1933; he made junction with the troops of Hsil Hai-tung fleeing from
Homan in 1934; in 1935, the entire Red army of Kiangsi arrived in north Shensi? He
had the reputation of being very sanguinary?
21)/aTsung-jenn born in Kwangei in 1890, commanded a southern army in 1926-27, took
Niukiang, stopped the northerners from retaking Nanking by the battle of Lunn-Van,
Kiangsu; named to the highest military posts in 19289 but deprived of all honors in
/929 for having fomented the defection of the /Wangs/ generals; pardoned in 1931, ho
was promoted to be commander of the Kwangsi forces in 1932; intrigued anew against
the Nanking government in 1936; commanded the Anirweiekiangsu-Shantung zone of operations
in 1937-380 One of the most important military Chieftains.
22) Pal Chung-hal, a Moslem, born in Rwangsi in 1893, called the brains of the liwangsi
generals; after having received many important military posts in 1927 and 1928, he
fell from favor in 1929 for having supported the defection of Li Tsung-jen; pardoned
in 1931; intrigued anew against the Wanking government in 1936; but during the mar
he was the most famous military chieftain against the Japanese; he was the actual
minister of national defense and many thought of him as the virtual suocessoe of
Chiang Haieshek? in case of need.
23i Oh' on Chi-t0ang? born in Kuangtung in 1890; took part in the northern expedition in
1927 as the head of an army; from April 1931 to July 1936, he was the dominant military
personage in the south of China, as military governor of Kmangtung; but his insubor-
dination against the Ranking government in 1936, as an ally of the Kwnngsi generals,
caused him to be relieved of all commands and to be sent abroad "to study"; he returned
during the war, but does not seem to have been put back into posts of first importance.
IZI) Chang Hsteh-liang? son of the telebrated governor of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lie, born in
Manchuria (Liaoning) in 18980 succeeded his father as pacification commander of Mannchuria
in 1928; honored with all the highest military titles and posts; visited Europe in
1033; member of the Superior War Council, of the KMT Central Committee in 1932; named
commander-in-chief for the suppression of Contunist forces in the northeast in 193d:
like Ts'ai Tyingechgieh judging himself to be relegated to a rear position are. more
or lase under suspicion, he revolted against Chaing Kai-shek, whom he made prisunor
ror 14 days, in thegiam Incident" (December 1936). Since then he has lived deprived
of all activity?
25) Peng Te-huai, famous Red warrior, who appeared in 1932 as chief of the Rirst Red Army;
born in Hunan of a peasant family in good circumstances; not being able to got on
with his step-mother, he left home at the age of nine and tried various ways of making
a living; at 16 he joined the army, becoming a spy in the service of Sun Yat-sen;
captured at Changsha, he was tortured every day for a month; once liberated, he took
a course at the Hurn Military Academy; in 1926 he read various Comeunist classics,
and put his faith in them; in /927 he was a mod= of the Communist Party; in 1928 he
rebelled against the KMT troops; for a long time he has been second to Chu Teh as
head of the Eighth Route Army.
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26) u" country mean3
(X7) 71.:rtzacts ',:rom a snail
D=ocraceo
"ne Figh:.4 for a Zrri Chi2a" by n3 Tse-tung, page 390 This
translation into English of a report made by Mao Tse-tung to
cozvess f the CCP, 241 April 19E4 only a few months before
with Japaz.
(20) 'Tllo Fight for a Yeu China" ppa,57.
(SO) "HTIEan Endeavor", by Haldore Hanson, 2 3030
(31) 11tuman Endeavor", by &adore Henson, p 3100 This work finished in January 1939 relates
the interviews of an American journalist in unoccupied China during the var, chiefly
in.opei and Shanzio
in our usage, "pa-17a"
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25X1A
territory administered by the Commuzxist "Eighth Route Armyg
stands fcr'Communist soldiery".
comunist -orochltrep only mimeographed, entitled "The New
brochure is the
the seventh national
the end of the war
c-end-
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