REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00926A000300040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 11, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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Translation
25
E REPORT
fear/ amentary Commission
(States 'General)
uich East Indies
of the
TRANSLATION APPROVED OF BY
PROF. :IR.' C. L. VAN DER GILT
PRINTED BY r"eakdbt
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General at'he Hagueon1vlay 6th 1946, Mr. van Poll, Chairman
pf the parliamentary Commission which had visited the Nether--
D rin the sitting of the Second Chamber of the States-
will not "now pbrsue' but I want to give a rep y
rj.L V11
attacks on the accuracy of the Commission's report, which I
1 + one remark
the Commission went to Indonesia to supply the C am
1Vauviiui .~-____-
In itself, this fact is correct, but I would like to point out that
h ber with
tl t it has not heard progressive elements m av T ?hr:r
but especially-Mr. Palar - have reproached the Commission
J a among the
which at least"has the appearance `of being true.
statements made by ' the Minister of Overseas Territories
Parliament, LLI-is Excellency was very worried that this Com-
shouldT iriferfere in the negotiations taking place
between The Lieutenant Governor-General and Mr. Sjahrir. In
would gage` the position of the Lieutenant dam Governor Generaas a ne otiator
Minister of Overseas Territories. As is also shown by the publin
t at e o
telephone, to refer him to the Lieutenant Governor-General.
i aorl aoTainst this
adhered to this promise if has avoided contac sy
kith the gentlemen of the group Sjahrir, to such an extent even
th C mmission decided, should Mr. Sjahrir, for instance,
departure the express assur
with these negotiations and because the Commission has
t stematically
ter l,;` ` ' ance that they would not interfere
.,c 11. was ~- -' .,.~j,..~.._.. ..
?`if confirm this to give His Excellency before their
I belie,
attitude."
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INTRODUCTORY LETTER
to the Chairman of, the ' Second Chamber of the
States-General
The Parliamentary Commission Dutch
East Izzdies has the honour,to hand you
herewith a report of its experiences
in the, Dutch. East Indies.
The Parliamentary Commission,
J, VAN ANDEL 'Gzn.
Secretary
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REPORT
To both Chambers of the States General.
The Van Poll-Commission, formed out of both Chambers of
the States General, which, in accordance with the motion,
adopted by the Second Chamber on January 17th 1946, started
for the Dutch East Indies on March 16th last to collect inform-
ation wihch would enable the Chambers to form an opinion
about the policy followed by the Minister of Overseas Terri-
tories and the Lieutenant-Gov.-General of the Dutch East Indies,
has ended its mission in these territories and has returned to
this Country.
It is with deep regret that the Commission commemorates
the death of At. Mr. B. C. de Savornin Lohman, a member of
the First Chamber, who had an active share in the preparation
of de Commissions itinerary and whose further assistance they
have missed very much.
The Commission wishes to express its thanks to the Dutch
Government and to the Dutch East Indies Authorities for the
generous way in which they have complied with the wish
expressed in the decision of both Chambers to aid the sending
of the Commission to the Dutch East Indies. Without this
collaboration it would not have been pdssible to complete the
task in this relatively short time, even with the utmost exert-
ion, had the aeroplane provided not been available.
With this help the Commission has been able to visit the
following towns and in each to confer with all groups of
authorities, private persons, committees of native represent-
atives etc.: Batavia, Bandoeng, Semarang, Soerabaja, Den Pasar
(Bali),''Makass'ar, Ambon, Koepang, Balikpapan, Menado, Ban-
djirmasin, Medan and Singapore. One of the members also
visited the island of Billiton. In the neighbourhood of Batavia
the Committee also visited a number of native villages;' at
Batavia, Soerabaja and Semarang, it paid a visit to the front-
lines of the Dutch Occupation Troops. On visiting Borneo, the
Great East and Timor the Committee was divided into two
parts.
The data and documents provided from all sides are so
extensive that it is impossible to compile them all in one
report, before the date fixed for the approaching General
Election.
However, the Commission feels it incumbent to also inform
the present Chamber which decided to send it to the Dutch
East Indies, about its experiences.
They thought it of prime importance because in their view
also the Dutch people ought not to be left ignorant of the expe-
riences 'of the Commission sent to the Dutch East Indies by
their representatives, expecially now that our nation has to
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express itself within a very short time with regard to the
Government's policy followed. in this territory.
The Commission deems the inadequacy of this report to be
of smaller importance than delay.
It is also prepared to accept the risk of inaccuracy in details
or other facts of an inferior nature that may in the hurry have
crept in, rather than to resign itself to leaving the Chamber
and the Dutch people ignorant of its observations.
Should the Chamber desire a more extensive report the
Commission will willingly prepare it.
For the rest it hopes to meet the above objections by ab-
staining as much as possible in this report from pronouncing
a private opinion and will adhere, in general, to observed facts.
Where an occasional opinion is given, however, the unani-
mous judgment of all members of the Commission is always
rendered, which has emerged irresistibly from the observed
facts, conditions and relations.
The most general incontrovertible fact, about which no dif-
ference of opinion exists among those concerned with the Dutch
East Indies is this, that the character of the present revolution-
ary situation over there was definitely brought about by the
Japanese occupation during almost 3% years and the immedi-
ately following events.
The influence and the consequences of that occupation on
every way of life and on all circumstances have certainly been
more profound and extensive than those of the German occu-
pation in this Country; because in the Netherlands the oppres-
sor met a practically unanimous population of which only a
small group took their side because of idealistic or other con,
siderations; whereas in the Dutch East Indies the oppressor
found a population consisting of many different races which
he could try to play off and stir up against each other.
The Japanese did so, right from the beginning of the occu-
pation with really devilish refinement. Doing so they changed
their methods and purposes as their diminishing chances of
winning the war made it desirable. One thing however, was
unchangeably pursued: stirring up the racialhatred, performed
with the most disgusting and untruthful means of putting
Asiatic against European, of brown against white.
This campaign of hatred was chiefly directed against the
Dutch, but in the beginning more especially against the English
and Americans in whom were seen great enemies of the so-
called liberation of Asia under Japanese autocratic rule.
Very early in their campaign, the Japanese. thought they had
settled with the Dutch; some weeks after their invasion in Java
the Japanese had them fully in their power, so that they could
restrict themselves to highly humiliating and cruel treatment
by which the last bit of prestige, appreciation and sympathy
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among the native population was thought to be destroyed. 'But
with the,English and Americans a military settlement still had
to take place and therefore the native population should be
especially stirred,up against them and should be made mellow
in order to support Japan in its struggle against these mighty
enemies.
By the end of the war, however, when no further military
success could be expcted, the stirring up adopted a particularly
anti-Dutch nature, because this offered the best chances to
provide the Allies with post-war difficulties.
Keeping in mind this possible influence of the Japanese occu-
pation on all relations after the war, the Commission has tried
to investigate on the basis of practical facts how that influence
was manifest in the various groups of the population, how the
mutual relations between those groups were affected, and what
have been the international consequences when, at the moment
of the Japanese capitulation, troops under Allied supreme com-
mand were summoned to occupy the Dutch East Indies. In
other words:
1. what were the relations and opinions among the Dutch
colony before and after the capitulation?
2. what were these-relations and opinions among the native
population before and after the capitulation?
3. what were they among the remainder of the groups of
population, to mention by name, the Indo-Europeans and
Chinese?
4, what are the relations between these groups?
5. what is the position of the occupying Allied Forces; how
do other Nations view their actions?
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FIRSTLY: THE DUTCH COLONY.
a. The concentration camps.
After the military defeat (an investigation into this is badly
needed) most of the Dutch, prisoners of war as well as civilians,
men, women and children were interned in camps under Japa-
nese control. The few exceptions were formed by a small group
of civil administrators and military personnel who could eva-
cuate to Australia, some specialists the Japanese needed for
various purposes and some Dutch born in the Dutch East
Indies. The first group formed the Government of the Dutch
East Indies with Brisbane as their Headquarters. The military
personnel afterwards distinguished themselves under Australian
command in the fighting against the Japanese in New-Guinea
and on certain outposts of the Dutch East-Indies; as regards
the activities of a number of the said specialists a report will
be made by a clearance-committee. The group of civil admini-
strators who formed the Government at Brisbane will be refer-
red to later on.
Within the group of internees were also to be found high
government officials, members of the Advisory Council of the
Dutch East Indies (Raad van Indie), governors, residents, etc.
The Japanese did their utmost to degrade all these internees
as much as possible in the eyes of the native population.
There has been terrible suffering in the concentration camps,
military as well as civil. Of the prisoners of war, many have
been used in Japan and also elsewhere, for very heavy labour
a.o. for the construction of railways in Thailand, for Japanese
defence-works, mining, etc. The food was totally insufficient,
medical treatment almost entirely absent. The clothes of many
prisoners of war consisted during the last period of the war of
nothing but a few square inches of cloth. The deathrate was
appallingly high. The exhaustion often was so great, that strong
men could only proceed by crawling. Even in this physical state
they constantly had to undergo ill-treatment.
Even worse, if possible, were the conditions in the civilian
concentration camps and especially in the women's camps. The
Commission has visited some of these camps, now that they
are under Dutch control. They now contain less than half the
population housed there under the Japanese when 40 and more
women and children were packed in each of the small houses
without sanitation and with the merest minimum of water
supply. These conditions surpass description.
On top of this the utmost humiliations and the most horrible
ill-treatment were daily occurences. Weights of 36 kilos
(a little over 5% stones) or thereabouts for an adult strong
woman were no exception. Examples of ill-treatment were:
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The ?Leader" speaks......
Sukarno addressing a meeting.
Effigies of Churchill and Roosevelt, condemned by Sukarno to be burned
at the stake.
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The Prime-Minisler.
Sjahrir, the Sumatran, the man who was kidnapped by his own forces.
Javanese ?Hitter-Jugend" in procession with banner:
,,Amerika don ingriss Moesoeh Kita" (America and England our enemies).
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,overfilling the stomach with water, hanging by the hands
behind the back, beating and chastising and the infliction of
burns over the whole body by means of burning cigarettes
and cigars.
That the spirit remained unbroken notwithstanding and a
-strong front was kept up against Japanese presumptions, forms
,one of the most admirable pages of the history of the Dutch
race. With certain exceptions, the attitude of the Dutch women,
in the infernal circumstances of the women's camp could form
the subject of a national epic.
In the camps for men similar symptoms of underfeeding, ill-
'treatment and endless humiliation existed; they met with the
same unbroken spirit; the circumstances were a little better,
'however, because the men took, the risk to get foodstuffs
through the intermediacy of the Japanese campguards, especi-
ally Heihos, which made it possible for the physically stronger
to keep up a certain amount of physical resistance. On the other
hand, the women were fiercer and less willing to compromise.
Many high officials and other civil servants, teaching per-
'sonnel etc., were interned in these camps for men. This being
together made it possible for them to confer regarding the
political situation of the Dutch East Indies after the war - and
the measures to be taken after the Japanese capitulation,.-
because `the expectation that Japan would lose the war never
faded.
It is a remarkable phenomenon, that over there, as well as
-in this country, all who busied themselves closely with the
problems of the Dutch East Indies, formed the general opinion,
that after the war a greater degree of independence would have
-to be granted. Without knowing the speech of Her Majesty the
-Queen of December 7th 1942, general opinion was in agreement
with the plans of political reform put forward in this speech.
And., in fact, the conferences in concentration camps had incor-
porated these ideas in a plan of measures to be taken on the
capitulation of the Japanese.
Medical examination of the internees was therefore establish-
-ed.The doctors interned in the camps examined the other intern-
ees chosen and established the grade of fitness which they
possessed. On these lines everybody's working capacity was
fixed and the task he would be able to fulfil was established. In
this way a complete -plan was worked out to take over the
Government of the Country after the Japanese capitulation.
These plans, however, have never been put into effect. The
'reason for this can be found in the measures taken by the inter-
allied command and the Brisbane Government which returned
to the Dutch East Indies. e It is necessary toeexamine
-officials which activities e to smal-I Australia,
of higher rooted and regrettable controversy
because this s touches a deep
The Report of the Parliamentary Commission
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in the,Dutch colony and especially in the civil-administration
machinery..
Here also the Commission will keep to the observed facts.
-Generally speaking the situation in the Netherlands East
Indies concerning the construction of the Government is just
the reverse of that in Holland. Here, with a few exceptions
those who formed the Government in London, have not been
,included in the Cabinet formed after the liberation of our
Country. On the contrary, the Underground Movement has had
a great influence in the composition of the Cabinet Schermer-
horn-Drees, of which almost every member had been interned
or had taken part in the Underground Movement.
In the Dutch? East Indies the situation is totally different.
There the Brisbane Government took the lead.
Those members of the Advisory Council (Raad. van Indie))
who had been interned and had had an active part in prepar-
ations for taking-over the Government after the Japanese capi-
tulation, and who were to be appointed to leading positions
were immediately asked to resign. It can only be said formally
that the resignation made the impression of being voluntary.
So at present the Advisory Council (Raad van Indie) no longer
exists.
A Council of Heads of Departments has been formed, in
agreement with which Council, the Lieutenant-Governor-Gene-
ral is qualified to issue ordnances for the arrangement of the
internal affairs of the Dutch East Indies.
Some of these Heads of Departments are also ex-internees;
the way however, in which this Council has been used in the
Government machinery calls for the same complaints as were
repeatedly heard in our Second Chamber; very important docu-
ments were placed before this Council at the very last moment,
in such a way that members at the meeting saw them for the
first time and then instantly had to voice their opinion, after
which the documents were re-collected.
In general, one can say that the Heads of Departments had
or have practically no influence on the policy of the Dutch
East Indies Government. In their own departments, though, they
have great freedom of action.
b. The Underground Movement.
The Underground Movement in the Dutch East Indies, which
acted heroically during the years of occupation, and whose
members were, beside Dutchmen, especially Amboinese, but
also Javanese, has not received after the war the sympathy to
which it was entitled. As to the activity in this regard of white
men particularly, this was practically impossible from the
beginning, because the difference in colour made the task of
the Kempetai (Japanese Gestapo) extremely easy, so that the
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greater part of those who dared to work illegally had to pay
for this with their lives. Therefore the courage of those who
gave themselves up to this work is greatly to be admired.
For the few surviving, the Brisbane Government, however,
showed as little interest or estimation as for the fallen men of
the' Underground Movement.
At Antjol near Tandjong Priok 250 of these Dutch and Am-
boinese heroes, who were executed there by the Japanese, rest
in a communal grave.
The Japanese at least had fitted this grave with a concrete
tombstone enclosed by a small wooden fence and with a
wooden cross above it.
At present practically all traces of this grave have been
obliterated, the fence has for the most part been destroyed, and
the whole is covered with tropical grass '(alang-alang),
This lack of interest typified by neglect of this burial ground,
has caused great embitterment in the Dutch Colony.
c. Controversy between ex-internees and the Government of
the Dutch East Indies.
Controversy has been caused by the way in which the intern-
ed higher officials and their preliminary work have been
ignored.
There exists a controversy in the Indies, which divides the
Dutch into two sharply opposed groups. The sharp conflicts
which here in the Netherlands have found an echo in the bitter
and personal tone of the criticism on the Dutch East Indies
policy, are hidden to some extent, from those not in possession
of full information, but this does not alter the fact, that in the
Indies the contrast lies deep and the embitterment is great.
Where no representing body has yet been formed to replace the
functions of the People's Council (Volksraad) and the Advisory
Council (Raad van Indie) and the Government has a pronounced
personal character and no free Press exists in Batavia, the
controversy -is acquiring a bitter and personal character.
.The Commission has to state this as an incontrovertible fact
but wishes to be kept from this fight round one person and will
only try to expose the controversy in a businesslike manner.
The ex-internees put forward the following thesis:
If, immediately after the Japanese capitulation (medio August
1945) the Government had been taken over, in the absence of
the Governor-General, by Mr. Spit, the interned vice-president
of the Advisory Council (Raad van Indie), which would have
been in accordance with the laws of the Dutch East Indies;
if the other interned civil-administrators, who after medical
examination could be regarded to be fit, immediately had re-
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turned to their stations and there, as far as possible, had
repaired the native government machinery and police;
if the physically suitably fit men, from the camps had im-
mediately been given Japanese weapons and the Japanese were
instructed under the highest leadership of this reorganised
Dutch Government, to maintain order;
then all that has happened now could have been avoided;
because after the Japanese capitulation the native population
was very favourably inclined towards the Dutch, and the
Japanese were extremely subdued and ready to obey com-
mands.
Undoubtedly, order would then have been maintained; the
moderate nationalist movement would have been fully acknow-
ledged and the rise of extremism and gangs of murderers and
robbers would have been largely prevented.
The reason why this did not happen, must be sought in the
fact, that already in the first few days following the capitu-
lation, an order was proclaimed by Lord Louis Mountbatten,
with the concurrence of the Brisbane Government, by which
all internees were ordered to remain in the camps, or even to
return there. Consequently, Mr. Spit was one of those who went
back to internment, and some 18 prominent men, who went to
Batavia to take over the most important posts, were returned
to the Kramatcam.p in that town.
Dutchmen who refused to go on working under Japanese
command, because Japan had capitulated, were ill-treated by
the Japs even weeks after the capitulation. Consequently, the
internees' plans were shelved for the time being.
The Dutch East Indies' Government and the Brisbane Author-
ities however, who have some followers outside their own
circle (a third group not daring to form an opinion) maintain
that the ex-internees have cherished an understandable but,
nevertheless, dangerous illusion.
Firstly 0it would appear that they had strongly overestimated
their energies. The'physical condition of almost all would have
been such that they could not have been expected to take over
their tasks of before the war.
Secondly they had underestimated the real inclination of a
great part of the population. Their return to former posts would,
as is the contrathesis, have ended in bloodshed.
The internees argue that medical examination had proved
their physical fitness, that many of them 'up to that time had
done daily ten hours heavy labour under Japanese pressure
and that furthermore almost all important Governmentposts are
occupied by ex-internees at the moment.
This cannot be denied; but from the other side it is argued
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that those ex-internees who are now working again have had
time to recover and besides it often happens that one after the
other collapses.
Controversy between the ex-internees and the Brisbane
Government reaches its summit on the opinion about the native
population's inclination. The ex-internees say that, despite their
internment, they had been kept constantly informed of con-
ditions in the Dutch East Indies through various channels,
whilst the Brisbane Government was not so well informed.
Now the facts definitely prove that the Government in
Australia was not well informed during the occupation about
the happenings in the Dutch East Indies especially in Java.
Espionage attempts by means of submarines and other landings,
nearly all have failed and have not resulted in acquisition of
any useful information.
This is also admitted by the Brisbane Authorities. When they
arrived in Batavia, at the end of September 1945, they could act
only on the basis of very recent observations and information
on the one side and, on the other hand on the basis of a pre-con-
ceived mentality as regards the nationalistic movement.
The Brisbane Government has been reproached 15y the great
majority of ex-internees and others for acting on this precon-
ception.
This contrast which causes a large divergence of opinion
within the group of the Dutch population all over the Dutch
East Indies, is made still sharper because the Brisbane-group
which has come into power did not feel anything of the
horrible pressure of Japanese occupation during its residence
in Australia; the ex-internees, however, felt this burden in the
most painful manner.
The Commission will not and is not allowed to keep it a
secret that among the evacuees to Australia, there are people
who lived in luxury far from the hardships, and that, up to this
moment, to the great shame of all those concerned, there is
libertinism and a show of luxury amidst general misery which
ought to be thought intolerable by men who take a leading
position in East Indian society. 1)
'As to the essential difference of view the Commission, 8
months after the time at which a decision had to be taken, will
not presume to judge, whether the opinion of the internees is
to be considered right or not. The circumstances would have
seriously hampered any Covernment and the risk in taking
over management without real power would have been very
great indeed.
The Commission wishes, however, to point out that there
1) The Lt. Gov.Gen, who evacuated to Australia at the express desire of
Gov.Gen. Jhr. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, is not criticised in
this respect.
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have indeed been certain facts which support the point of view
of the internees.
First:
In the South and East Province of Borneo some Dutch Author-
ities who had only very little power at their disposal have, by
firm action killed the development of the situation as it arose
in Java, in the bud.
Second:
The readiness of the Japanese to accept and execute orders
of the conquerors immediately after their defeat was such that
Dutch prisoners in Japan commandeered trucks and motorcars
which were loaded by Japanese and used for Allied work.
These commands were accepted by the Japanese occupants
without questioning.
Third:
At the time of the occupation of Bali and Lombok some
months later, effected by only a small force of Dutch troops,
the Japanese were most obedient; the officiers handed in their
samourai-swords with a bow; the non-commissioned officers
and men could be ordered about immediately for every
purpose.
Fourth:
.Also in Sumatra and Java the Japanese, for a long period,
carried out the task of maintaining order.
Fifth:
- Last but, not least - it is a fact, in the unanimous opinion
of all parties that the population of Java and Sumatra too
showed to the Dutch a kind and friendly attitude during the
first 6 weeks after the surrender. We shall return to the subject
when discussing the influence and the results of the Japanese
occupation on the native population.
However, those facts do not yet give conclusive proof that
in Java and Sumatra measures proposed by ex-internees would
have led to satisfactory results as later on the extreme
nationalistic elements proved to be stronger in Java than
elsewhere. The question is whether those elements would have
had a chance to organise, join together and obtain Japanese
support as has happened, should the internees have acted as
proposed.
In judging this question the mental inclination of the judge
regarding the strength and value of the nationalistic movement
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- insofar as this movement in its extreme form aims at total
national independency - will have a decisive influence.
But the controversy between camp-mind and Brisbane-mind
which maybe thought to have lost reality, as things have taken
another turn remains however very real for (in the opinion of
the internees) the same mentality, the same mental view of the
Brisbane Government which declined the internees' proposals
still dominates the whole political situation.
All the following facts: carelessness regarding the fallen
Dutch heroes of the Underground Movement; lack of interest
in the suffering of Dutch internees, in particular after the action
of extremists against women and children in the camps; igno-
ring and disregarding of high officials and others from the
camps, and moreover the manner of their dismissal; declining
any scheme elaborated in the camps; abolition of the Advisory
Council (Raad van Indie); taking little notice of the Council of
Heads of Departments (Raad van Departementshoofden); basing
the administration on personalities; the way in which negotia-
tions at present are held with more and more abandoning of
the original point of view; all these facts are explained by the
internees to arise out of one cause only: viz. the over-estima-
ting of the nationalistic movement in its extreme form of aiming
at total independence in a ,Repoeblik Indonesia" acknowledg-
ed by the Netherlands.
So far the facts given relate to the Commission's report on
the state of affairs in the Dutch Colony. Separate attention will
be paid to the Indo-Europeans.
In this case the Commisson believes that the way in which
high officials among the internees are ignored and disregarded
especially those among them, who had resisted courageously
Japanese oppression in the concentration camps during 3%
years and who had exerted their strength to build up the N.E.I.
in an independent and post-war state, can hardly be considered
judicious, no more can it be deemed to show a psychological
insight that is rightly so much appreciated nowadays.
Rupture and, alas, deeprooted suspicion which is now evident
in the Dutch Colony could have been avoided if an advisory
council ad hoc had been constituted from interned high officials
whose names could be submitted for consideration and who
enjoyed the confidence of their fellow internees. Such a council
ought to be the least they could expect after un-interrupted
striving, in the most difficult circumstances, for the future
reconstruction of the N.E.I. of a post-war state.
d. Lack of free public criticism.
The natural wish to place from the beginning representatives
of Dutch internees round the very restricted Brisbane-group
which formed the factual Government, is the more important
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as there was lack of any opportunity to free and public critic-
ism by Dutch people. There are no representative organs.
Apparently the two newspapers which are edited at Batavia
cannot be considered to give sufficient opportunity to a public
treatment of public affairs.
At Batavia two newspapers are issued in Dutch; ?Het Dag-
blad" and ?De Nieuwsgier". ?Het Dagblad" is financed bij the
Government. It started as a newspaper and was technically
directed bij Mr. Belonje, a journalist of experience. However,
it was required that Government sponsored leading articles
should appear in the newspaper. Mr. Belonje not being in
agreement in every way with the government policy had
scruples about writing such articles. Consequently they were
written by Mr. Posthumus, leader of the Governments Bureau
of Information (Regeeringsvoorlichtingsdienst). As one of his
articles led to difficulties with the English Authorities, Mr.
Belonje was urgently asked once more to take up the writing of
these articles. Finally he did so, but then, though moderately
and prudently composed, the newspaper gave remarks which
did not agree with the policy of the Lieutenant Governor-
General. An article about ?democracy" led to a conflict. After
that Mr. Belonje was soon asked by telephone by Mr. Posthu-
mus when he would be ready to leave the Dutch East Indies as
a Skymaster was already at his dicposal. Mr..Belonje refused
to go. The managers of ?Het Dagblad" refused to dismiss him
and were ready to publish the newspaper at their own risk.
Then Mr. Posthumus threatened to withhold. the newsprint
required. Now Mr. Belonje has been dismissed. In the opinion
of the Commission it would be wisest not to publish the corres-
pondence concerned but to put the (documents on the files for
examination.
The other newspaper ?De Nieuwsgier" is not printed but
stenciled. They editor is Mr. Ritman who was obliged to do some
work for the Japanese so that he is suspected. This precents
him from expressing himself freely.
These two newspapers which are moreover very small are
the only public. editions in Dutch in Batavia. Practically spea-
king, therefore the population is unable to form a sound opinion
because of a total lack of uncensored information. As a result,
in closed circles criticism on Governmental policy flourishes
and is becoming more and more uncontrollable.
On the other hand the ,Repoeblik Indonesia" has a rather
extensive press printed with machinery and material belonging
to Dutch prinsing-offices occupied by partisans of the republic.
The legitimate owners not being allowed to claim them as this
would ?provoke" the partisans of the republic.
Nor are Dutch newspapers allowed to put right or dispute
false information and lies in those newspapers, because of "the
delicacy of the situation".
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National army charged to wipe out the (white) enemy. (see also ph. 4).
III
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The results of the education of 6-year-old boys and upwards.
IV
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e. Unsatisfactory inside and outside information.
Generally speaking it is a fact that information both in Hol-
land and the Dutch East Indies is very insufficient. People in
the Dutch East Indies are insufficiently informed either about
the state of negotiations at Batavia or about the situation in
Holland,
Moreover, the information is not only insufficient but also
often wrong.. A typical example is the following article in
"Het Dagblad" of Febr. 11th 1946 (Nr. 91, 5th column):
"The motions of the House (de Kamers) are approved
As we learn both Chambers of the States-General have
-already approved the motions which the Dutch Government
handed to Soetan Sjahrir yesterday". This indisputably false
report was strikingly published by "Het Dcjgblad" and never
contradicted by the government.
Besides the Commission has been in a position to ascertain
how extremely restricted information, from the Netherlands is.
On its return to Holland, after 5 weeks, it appeared to have
lost all contact with what had happened in Holland during
their absence.
International information ,(s more extensive than that from
Holland. It starLds to reason that this is little conductive to the
maintenance and strengthening of the relations between the
parts of the Kingdom.
Publicity in foreign countries is still worse. In the first period
after the return of the Brisbane-government it is true, reasons
,of impotence may have existed which could not then be
changed concerning reception, showing round and information
to representatives of the worldpress on the spot, but at present
these reasons do not exist any longer. Some amelioration on-this
-point is indeed to be seen, but enlightenment abroad about the
real situation in the Dutch East Indies is still absolutely insuf-
ficient. This quesion has already been discussed so extensively
in the two Chambers, that in this report it will be sufficient
to mention the fact.
Finally the Commission has to state that according to com-
munications from several parts, reports to Holland about the
situation and conditions in the Dutch East Indies were hindered
because letters and correspondence also those directed to Dutch
newspapers often did not reach their destination, apparently
owing to a severe censorship.
f. Dutch people still kept in prison.
At present more than 8 months after Japan's surrender many
thousands of Dutch people, for the greater part women and
children, are still kept in camps which are inaccessible to their
relations. This fact is a burden hard to bear for the Dutch colony
The Report of the Parliamentary Commission
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in the Dutch East Indies already so much afflicted. The uncer-
tainty about the destiny of those unhappy people in the camps
embitters the population and is a continual source of suspicion
of the real intentions and methods even of those partisans of
the ?Repoeblik" with whom negotiations are now going on.
It is felt as an attempt at blackmail in the negotiations and
the continuation of kidnapping of persons of either sex and
any age strengthens this conception. The maintaining of the
camps by the ?authorities" of the ?Repoeblik Indonesia" forms
one of the greatest obstacles for the rapprochement between
the Dutch population and the leading persons in the Indonesian
society.
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SECONDLY: THE NATIVE POPULATION.
a. Treatment of the Indonesians by the Japanese.
The native people are ignorant of the heroic battle of the
Dutch fleet and the Dutch airforce before the Japanese landed
in Java and the other islands. Only a few Indonesians witnessed
the defence of some spots like Balikpapan and the battle in
some islands.
The only thing they did see, particularly in Java, was the
disorganised retreat of the Dutch army, which, with the excep-
tion of some local opposition, -was trampled underfoot by the
Japanese and-forced to surrender within a few days. On ac-
count of this, Dutch prestige suffered a heavy blow. The intel-
lectual Javanese in particular realised that their country had
been practically undefended. The great majority of the popul-
ation kept more or less aloof of what was happening: it cannot
be denied that in some places the, invaders were hailed with
cheers.
After having interned the Dutch, the Japanese immediately
started the organization of the government. The way in which
this happened, especially the efforts to win the native popul-
ation for the Japanese pan-asiatic ideas and to organize them
as a resource to Japan deserves an extensive description.
The Commission obtained important documents concerning
this but is obliged to keep within the bounds of this report.
The Japanese policy especially in Java is to be divided into
5 marked periods.
The first period is from March 9th to December 8th 1942.
In this period the military government is established, the
state of siege is proclaimed. The Dutch civil administrators
replaced by Japanese, but the native machinery of government
was maintained. The Japanese flag, Japanes9 stamps etc. are
introduced. At the same time the natives afe favoured above
the Eurasians, Chinese, Arabs, etc. The Japanese try to elimin-
ate every trace of Dutch influence. Every utterance of western
civilization and culture is suppressed. All clubs and societies
are forbidden. The new movement ? Tiga A" only is permitted.
It is destined to propagate Japanese ideology. Freedom of press
is abolished.
The second period is from December 8th 1942 till June 15th
1943.
During the war some facts occurred which brought the' initi-
ative on the side of the Allies.It is necessary to prepare Java's
defence against possible attacks from Australia. On December
8th 1942 Lt, General Okasaki, chief of the military government
delivers a speech in which he says that ,,for the moment"
Japanese military power is sufficient to defend East Asia but
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the entire population has to cooperate to relieve the task of
the army.
In order to reach this the ,Fiihrer-principle" is entirely
accepted. The regency councils are closed. The local leaders
see their positions strengthened by a police-system. The regents
instructed by the Dutch and other native dignitaries, who were
,,infected" 'with western ideas and regret their strongly reduced
wages, are instructed in such a way that it must open them to
the ,new ideas". A -system of reciprocal tale-bearing is built
up. The whole organization becomes that of a police state.
There are three kinds of police: the ?Kempetai" or M.P., the
name of which in itself already brings fear to everyone. It
corresponds with the Gestapo and has full authority. Secondly
,,the Keimubu" which takes the place of the former Dutch
police. It consists of natives, commanded by Japanese. It
assists the Kempetai, and has posts in all towns and regencies.
It is also charged with the instruction and the education of the
,,Keibodan", the third police organisation consisting of Indone-
sian volunteers, which has 1.300.000 men and has the functions
of ear and eye of the oppressor, even in the smallest dessa!
The whole system is based on fear and terror.
The police-organization is completed by the ,Seinendan",
a kind of ,Hitlerjugend", which instructs young men from 14
to 25 years of age in the defence of their native country.
The whole of the remaining population has to take part in a
movement called,,Poesat Tenaga Rakjat", abbreviated to ?Poe-
tera" i.e. ?Collection of national power in times of War".
The direct result of this police-system is that the Japanese
oppression becomes very unpopular, the economical sweating
of country and population on behalf of the war which directly
attends this system, still increases this unpopularity.
The third. period runs from the 15th of June 943 until the
7th of September 1944.
As the strategic circumstances are growing more and more
dangerous, the Japanese try more and more to involve the
population of Java in the war. Now the Japanese try to get
popularity by apparently. involving the population in the Gover-
ment of their own country. Advisory councils of the whole of
Java (Tyuuo Sangi-In) and for each regency (Syuu Sangi-Kai)
are established. The members are partly elected and partly
appointed according to a complicated system which guaran-
tees the victory of the official candidates. These councils do
not possess any real authority.
Next follows the appointment of Indonesian advisors, the
transfer to the autonomic rulers of education, registration,
public health, relief, agriculture, etc. and the acknowledgment
of noble titles. Every real power remains in the hands of the
Japanese Military Government. The aim of the change is the
increase of the military incorporation of the Indonesians. The
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incorporation in the Japanese military forces is started. In
October 1943 the ,Balaitentera Pembala Tanah Air" is establish-
ed, the ?army to defend the native country", which comprises,
volunteers (Soekarilla's) as well as recruits (Heiho's). Every
regime has to build an autonomic unit under Japanese command
in order to defend its territory by their own means. The ske-
leton exists of natives, but the instructors are Japanese. The
troops are principally recruited from the Keibodan and the
Seinendan, because these gave a preliminary military training.
All inhabitants are called up for the defence of the territory
under the commafid of these troops.
At this time the Japanese want to enlist all Asiatics in the
defence too. Chinese and Arabs are joined together in one
Asiatic Front with the Indonesian ;the , Poetera" is replaced
by a much bigger organization, called the ,Djawa Hookoo
Kai", whose aim is to make all inhabitants perform their duty
by sacrificing themselves in this holy war.
In order to strengthen the Japanese hold on the population,
local clubs (Tonarigumi) are established, which bring 10 to 20
families under the command of a chief (Kumityoo), who is sub-
ordinated in his turn to the local chief. The task of these clubs
has been regulated accurately. They form the ?cell of the native
front".
At the same time economic measures have to be taken since
food-conditions and those of raw-materials are growing serious.
A system of rationing is established; however the distributed
quantities of rice, oil and so on are insufficient. Inflation and
the black market begin to arise. Now the population starts to
compare the time of the Dutch Government with that of the
Japanese. A general enmity arises which is increased when
many Javanese are obliged to work.abroad for the Japanese.
The fourth period from September 7th 1944 until the capitul-
ation is characterised by the announcement of general Koiso,
that the Japanese government intends to acknowledge in the
very near future the independence of the Dutch East Indies.
This must be seen as an emergency measure born from the
circumstances. The military situation was such that the Japan-
ese had to try to gain all Javanese assistance for carrying on
the war by giving them this decoy.
In Java this announcement had indeed some effect, the
Japanese government never having shown such an intention.
It was greeted with pleasure by the intellectual part of the
population and by the Mohammedan leaders, who in the pros-
pect of founding a kind of theocratic state no longer refused to
cooperate. The above mentioned advisory council for the whole
of Java was convened at once and on September 11th 1944 ?a
motion of gratitude and solidarity" was accepted unanimously,
which said, that ,the Indonesians in life and in death would
adhere to the side of the Japanese before the independence
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was given and in life and in death would remain on the side
of the Japanese until the final victory was gained". The red-
white flag was acknowledged just as the national anthem,
again some sham measures followed in order to increase the
participation of the Indonesians in the government; but the
real purpose was the reconstruction of the army into a power
useful to the Japanese. At this moment Sukarno who had sup-
ported alle measures to strengthen the Japanese hold on the
population demanded the institution of conscription for the sake
of the Japanese.
The military events, the collapse of Germany in May 1945,
the invasion of the allies in Northern Borneo, obliged the
Japanese to accelerate the movement for independence. On
the 22nd of May a new committee came to Batavia to draw up
a new constitution. Sukarno was given the opportunity to
establish communications between Java and the other islands.
A.o. he visited Celebes and Moh. Hatta Borneo. By the middle
of August the committee would come together again completed
by representatives of other islands under the name of ,,com-
mittee to prepare the independence". On August 9th Sukarno
and Mohammed Hatta left for Indo-China by aeroplane. It was
there that they met, General Terauchi, who appointed them
president and vice-president of the committee and who assured
them that the independence would be granted them on the date
of their choice. When they passed Saigon on the 13th, they
were informed that Soviet Russia had taken part in the War
against Japan. Certain of the fact that after this the war could
not last much longer, they decided to return to Java on the
14th and proclaim the Independence in concert with the military
government on the 24th of August.
The fourth period of the Japanese influence on the autoch-
thonic population in Java ends with this; the capitulation fol-
lows on August, 15th.
The fifth and last period is formed by the hastily taken
measures of Sukarno c.s. in cooperation with the Japanese in
the first few days after the Japanese capitulation.
There are some uncertainties about this period concerning
the discussions which Sukarno had with the Japanese authori-
ties. Most probably, the succession of events has been as
follows:
On their way back Sukarno and Hatta were kept in ignorance
about the development of events. They were prevented from
listening to the radio and they even were not permitted to read
the Domei-dispatches.
Returning to Batavia on the 15th, they learned from friends,
that in the town rumours circulated concerning the Japanese
capitulation. They went to see the Japanese authorities, but
got an evasive answer. In the night of the 15th of August some
young nationalists called on Sukarno and Hatta and asked
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them if the report about the Japanese capitulation was correct
and if on the strength of this news the moment had not come
to proclaim the independence.
The two leaders answered, that in concert with the Japanese
military Command another date had been fixed and that they
would have to wait for this. This answer was not to the liking
,of the hot-headed young men, who kidnapped Sukarno and
Hatta and brought them outside the town. In the morning of
the 16th the Japanese learned with a shock what had happened.
They ordered Soebardjo one of Sukarno's assistants to contact
the kidnappers in order to bring. back to town Sukarno and
Hatta. In the evening Soebardjo succeeded in achieving this.
At once the Committee for the preparation of The Independence
assembled at Sukarno's and at four o'clock in the morning of
the 17th of August in the presence of only very few people the
independence was proclaimed.
At the same time secret discussions were probably held with
a Japanese General and with one of the leaders of the Kem-
petai, who had gone about all during the war in Javanese dress.
At these secret discussions the lines of conduct were drawn up
and the transfer of Japanese weapons was regulated.
Thus the ,Repoeblik Indonesia" was born, made in Japan,
under Japanese supervision and under two leaders who during
the years of oppression had served the Japanese war effort and
supported by a power which was instructed and educated by
the Japanese and was penetrated throughout by Japanese ideas.
b. The Japanese education of youth.
People cannot imagine what this means, if they do not know
how the Japanese have established and directed the power
behind this ,Repoeblik". Not only were the Dutch, English and
Americans presented in press, posters, radio-announcements
and youth-organizations, as the hereditary enemies of the Asia-
tic population - especially the Dutch as the enemies of the
Javanese and the other Indonesians -; but also the military
training was devised in such a way as to rouse a Berseker fury,
in order to make them fight in the, war against the Whites.
? For this purpose they let them do spear- and bayonet attacks
against stuffed dolls. Those attacks had to be done under loud
roaring and they had to thrust as hard as they could. When the
roaring was not loud enough and the thrusts not deep enough,
the attacks had to be repeated so long till the desired degree
,of excitement had been reached. Nothing was left untried to
bring the fury against the whites to the boiling point. If they
have succeeded only partially in this - the result of it especi-
ally on the younger people, showed some time later in murders
and nameless horrors - this was surely not the fault of the
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efforts of the Japanese, but of the abovementioned discontent
with the hard reality of the" Japanese oppression which placed
the population against the proclaimed theories and of the
charges against the whites. But especially the younger people
and those groups which had a favoured position in the army
during the Japanese government, have been infected by this
education and they constitute the real authority which supports
the republic.
c. The consolidation of the ?republic government" during the
weeks elapsing between the Japanese capitulation until the
arrival of-the first allied troops.
When in Batavia the first bills appeared proclaiming the in-
dependence, they were torn off by the Japanese police who
apparently had not been informed of the arrangements made.
The Japanese Military Government allowed-the papers to issue
the proclamation, but they immediately demobilised the Indo-
nesian troops, viz. 30.000 volunteers and 70.000 heiho's. Owing
to this a seizure of the power by the republican authorities
was made impossible. The committee for the preparation of the
independence was constantly assembled. On the 18th of August
it adopts six new members, among whom three held communist
conceptions. It publishes the constitution of the ,,Indonesian
Republic", appoints Sukarno president and Hatta vice-president
and decides that the president shall be assisted by a national
committee. The constitution maintains that Indonesia is a
republican unit, the sovereignity belongs to the population and
is carried out by parliament. The president must be a Moslem.
He is assisted by his ministers. The state is democratic and
collectivist. Freedom of conscience and religion are admitted.
On the 29th of August the national committee assembles. It
starts an energetic campaign on behalf of the republic. On the
6th of September the names of the first cabinet are published.
The campaign for the republic was the only way to win the
population which was convinced, of the return of the Dutch
government after the capitulation, for the republic.
There is no doubt that immediately after the capitulation the
attitude of the population towards the Dutch internees in the
camps and towards all Dutchmen was . very friendly. If there
was one thing on which evidence was unanimous during the
time the Commission held sessions in the Dutch East Indies, it
was surely about this. The population took fruit and food;
possessions of internees turned out to have been kept by former
servants;- helpfulness and sympathy were generally shown. All
over Java 'the Dutch could travel freely. Rapwiteams were
dropped and met with a kind reception.
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In Sumatra it was the same. In the North-East of Sumatra
around Medan the managers who visited their plantations were
received with open arms. Strongly the mandoer and coolies
insisted that they should stay on their plantaions. Travelling
.from Padang to Medan was still possible.
On account of this attitude which they, observed around them,
the ex-internees held the above-mentioned conviction that if
the government had been taken over without delay and intern-
ed administrators had immediately returned to their former
posts, the consolidation of the republic put together by the
Japanese might have been avoided.
When once the instigation had started the change in the
attitude of the population began in the second part of Septem-
ber. This was the consequence of the terror with which the
pupils of the Japanese who at first stayed in the background,
now dared to begin. People were forced to put out red-white
flags and to wear red-white badges. Every contact with the
Dutch became dangerous. The attacks against the womencamps
were prepared.
The evolution-of events in this period has already been des-
cribed so often, that the commission. has not thought it neces-
sary to repeat.it. The only power which obstructed the con-
solidation of the republic during this period was, especially in
West -Java, the Japanese. To this power, many Dutch women
and children, to their own annoyance owed their lives, when
the attacks on ' the camps began; from Indonesian side, which
for the first time shook the courage of our women, who had
expected the liberation. That so little notice was taken by the
government of these attacks has embittered many of these
women; they ascribed this to the policy of the Brisbane Go-
vernment not to ?hurt" the feelings of the republic In mid-Java
and Eastern Java the Japanese worked together with the men
of the republic.
The position of the republican government nevertheless was
still rather weak.
A shrewd neutral observer wrote in those days as follows,
which ?pris sur la vif" as it is can still be considered of actual
importance.
?La force du Gouvernement Indonesian doit etre correc-
tement appreciee. Elle ne reside ni dans la volonte popu-
laire, ni dans l'autorite et la valeur des chefs. La masse qui
a ete durement exploitee par le regime nippon reclame de
la nonriture, des vetements, une administration propre, la
punition des oppresseurs et de leurs collaborateurs. Les
chefs, c'est la conviction que j'ai acquise en m'entretenant
longuement avec les cultives et les plus intelligents d'entre
eux, ignorent completement les questions internationales.
La propaganda nippone leur a donne un relief factice. En
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realite leur participation au pouvoir etait uniquement nomi-
nale. Its ri'ont encore aucune experience politique: L'annec-
dote suivante est assez revelatrice. Comme je demandais a
Mohammed Hatta, Vice-president de la republique et grand
specialiste des affaires economiques, si Java disposait actuel-
lement de stocks importants de sucre, de caoutchouc, de the
et de cafe, it me repondi.t: ?je ne sais, les chiffres et les
statistiques ne m'etaient pas communiques".
La force du gouvernement repose sur trois facteurs prin-
cipaux:
le. le magnetisme des mots independance, liberte, 'demo-
cratie, sur lequel comptent les dirigeants pour s'attirer
la sympathie de l'opinion internationale et echapper aux
consequences de leur collaboration avec les nippons;
2e. l'armature totalitaire du regime nippon utilisee au profit
du gouvernement republicain. Celui-ci est en mesure de
transmettre son impulsion juskue dans les coins les plus
recules du pays par le canal des Tonarigumi ou associa-
tions de voisins. Il dispose grace aux Seinendan (trou-
pes de jeunes) aux Keibodan (police auxiliaire) dune
milice. pour foxcer le peuple a l'obeissance. Les fonc-
tionnaires par interet, crainte, ou conviction lui sont
devoues;
3e. 1'appui des nouvelles couches sociales acquises a l'ideo-
logie asiatique. Depuis l'occupation, de nombreux em-
plois administratifs ont ete crrres. En l'absence d'elites
instruites, des candidats recrutes pour leur ardeur a
servir la cause nippone ont ete choisis. Si les soldes des
agents de l'Etat sont tres basses, les pratiques de cor-
ruption permettent a ceux qui savent 'monnayer leur
autorii:e de vivre comfortablement. Ainsi toute une cate-
gorie de fonctionnaires a demi-qualifies, incapables en
temps normales de remplir leurs emplois, sont les defen-
seurs du regime nationaliste, qui, esperent-ils, les main-
tiendra en activite. Les indonesiens ont acquis une con-
science nationale et asiatique plus develdppee, un sens
de la discipline inconnue auparavant. L'apologie de la
violence, 1'exaltation du patriotisme, les exercices mili-
taires, ont developpe chez les jeunes l'esprit combattif.
N'ayant pas 1'experience de la guerre ils ont tendance
a surestimer leur force. Aveugles par leur haine des
hollandais, le nationalistes ne se rendent plus compte
de leur mediocrete".
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How later, when General Christison had landed and in his
first proclamation by radio acknowledged the ,Repoeblic In-
donesia" and announced his intention to occupy only Batavia
and Soerabaja, and when afterwards the discussion between
the representatives of the Republic and the Dutch Authorities
began, the position of the Republican Government at least out-
wardly became ever stronger, need no further elucidation here.
d. The real meaning and the character of the ?Repoeblik Indo-
nesia" at this time; the menacing disintegration of Indonesia
as a unity, the situation in Java.
The preliminary history of the origin of the ?Repoeblik Indo-
nesia" has once more been investigated very accurately by the
Commission, because it held the view that without this it
could not obtain a sufficient and sound insight into the real
importance and Character of the republic at this moment. On
this point especially the Commission has concentrated its
attention. It wishes only to mention the facts which speak for
themselves.
The first question that faces us is the following: Does the
so-called government of the so-called ?Repoeblik Indonesia"
in fact represent the whole of Indonesia, the -whole territory
of the Dutch East Indies?
During its visit to Makassar the Commission, after long and
frank discussions with representatives of all ranks of the popu-
lation about the condition of South-Celebes came to the follo-
wing conclusions:
A small group adopts a waiting attitude as to the discus-
sions held in Java. If Java should become a republic -
rumours of this had reached Makassar - then this group would
claim the same right for South-Celebes.
The greater part of the population however, does not sympa-
thize with the republic. They want a more far-reaching
influence of the Indonesians on the government, especially
also in the higher functions, as far as there are suitable native
personalities for this, though they wish to continue too the
relations with the Netherlands. Th.e member of the council,
Abdoellah Dating Mapoedji has founded a society which tries
to find a solution as to the relation Holland-Indonesia in
accordance with the speech of Her Majesty the Queen of the
Netherlands on the 6th of December 1942. This society has
many members. The representatives of the native population
whom the Commission met were unanimously of the same
opinion and appeared to dislike especially anything that might
resemble a Javanese supremacy. In the -acknowledgment of
the government of Sjahrir over Java and Sumatra they saw
such a domination.
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In .the European group at Makassar the Commission could
not find any supporter of the policy aiming at the acknow-
ledgment of the republic Indonesia; neither among the Chinese.
In Amboina the attitude was, if possible still more disposed
against the republic Indonesia. Without any exception all
representatives of the native population with whom the mem-
bers of the Commission spoke, held the point of view that
nationalistic aspirations should aim at a cooperation with Hol-
land to form one union. Among them there were three Javanese-
Amboinese who supported the declaration of the government
of the 10th of February, but had agreed with the Amboinese of
Amboina itself that, if the republic Indonesia should be
acknowledged, the Moluccas would have to detach themselves
from this republic in order to maintain the governmental union.
In one respect the Moluccas went further than the leaders in
South-Celebes. They wished their islands to form an indepen-
dent unit at the voting for independence after a certain period,
as 'granted in the government declaration of the 10th of
February. Under the Moluccas they meant the old district of
the Moluccas i.e. Amboina with Ceram, Boeroe, Ternate,
Tidore, New Guinea and surrounding islands. They would not
hear of the foundation of a separate council for the South-
Moluccas which was prepared by the government, realizing
that in this way the unity of the Moluccas with the mother-
island Ceram Would be broken up. They wanted one Molucca-
council, if need be with two chambers. There was a striking
frankness in these discussions, *vhich was pleasing. They
demanded extension of participation also in the higher govern-
ment functions and especially extension of education, parti-
culary agricultural and technical instruction. There was a fierce
resistance against the efforts from Java to stir up part of the
Papoeas against the Amboinese. It was pointed out that these
Papoeas until this time were proud of calling themselves Orang
Ambon and the instigation from Java not to join the Amboinese _
evoked a purely artificial contrast.
Similar experiences were gained in the discussions at Koe-
pang. Members of the Persatoean Democratis Indonesia, a
Timorese party, also took part in these as well as the Demo-
cratic League established in;Java, which also had its members
here. The two parties appeared to have many points of agree-
ment and took as their basis the proclamation of the govern-
ment of the 10th of February. ,
Neither here, however was the Indonesian republic wanted,
and here too it was wished to understand the proclamation of
the government in this way, that also Timor and the other
islands Sawoe, Alor, Roti. Soemba, Flores, Soembawa with
more than 2 million inhabitants, would be able to decide inde-
pendently if in due time they would break off relations with
Holland or not. In the constitution of the Commonwealth of
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Indonesia they wanted to stipulate clearly the rights of themino-
rities and of the independent parts as to self-determination.
Here too there was an evident and frankly expressed fear
of a Javanese domination if on this point no sufficient gua-
rantee should be given. In all parts of these islands the
conditions are very satisfactory and quiet. The population is
glad that the Japanese oppression has come to an end and the
Dutch Government has returned.
Typical for the situation is, that in the large island of Flores
-with a population of about 500.000 inhabitants order, can be
maintained by 50 M.P.'s only. Similar experiences did the
Commission gain in the `southern and eastern parts of Borneo
at Bandjermasin, where among others discussions were held
with 8 native chiefs, where the same problems were discussed
and where reactions were alike, as well as at Balikpapan, where
in a public-meeting of about 4000 men, in the middle of Novem-
ber 1945, while hoisting the red-white flag, the ,Repoeblik In-
donesia"would be proclaimed, but where, thanks to the courage
and sense of duty of the Dutch officers and soldiers stationed
there, under the command of the naval captain-lieutenant Mo-
lenaar and notwithstanding the presence of Australian soldiers
who tried to rouse ours to mutiny, this meeting was dispersed
and since then no- other rebellion has been noticed there. On
the contrary, the disposition of the population has become of
such a nature, that at the time of the visit of the Commission,
e.g. without any stimulation from European side, preparations
were started for a very big festival on April 30., 1936, in honour
of Her Royal Highness Princess Juliana's birthday.
The feeling of the representative figures of the Indonesian
population in the southern and eastern department can be
expressed as follows: people do not wish to obtain greater
independence and freedom in a revolutionary way; remarkable
is that people declared, they only followed Sjahrir because
they were not opposed to the Dutch Government that had con-
sented in negotiating with Sjahrir.
The experiences at Menado do not deviate from those men-
tioned above, The riots that took place in the middle! of
February were of an incidental character. They were soon
finished thanks to the action of- military and civilian Menado-
nese themselves. More urgently than anywhere else infor-
mation was asked for here. There were grievous complaints
about the unsatisfactory present situation, which results in
people still being 'afraid of the Japanese who, for instance;
had sent. the Hei-Hoos home with the message that the Japa-
nese would be back within six months, as their Emperor had
stopped the war now out of humanitarian considerations about
the atombomb, but that Japan had not been defeated in reality,
Besides, for years the population has been reading Japanese
newspapers, while since V-J day hardly anythhng has been
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done by the Dutch, concerning a regular distribution of news.
This was the first and most important item that should be
undertaken. The general opinion of the population of Menado
was that undoubtedly, exact information will have the results
desired,
The western department of, Borneo was not visited by the
Commission but it had the privilege of having an interview
with Hammid II, Sultan of Pontianak, in Java, whose entire
family was murdered by the Japanese. This highly educated
prince did hot want to have anything to do with the ?Republic
Indonesia". He would prefer leaving Indonesia and living in
Holland to becoming a subject of such a republic.
In Bali the Dutch after their landing which happened without
any incident, generally were hailed with satisfaction. A large
part of the island is again under Dutch administration and is
quiet. Without any disturbance the Commission has been able
to attend a performance in the dessa, amidst the people which
was presented to it on the night of its visit by the Anak
Agoeng of Gianjar. Only west and north of Tabanan the popul-
ation is still being terrorized by a number of armed pemoeda's.
The western part of the island lies open for infiltration from.
Java and the situation in the parts of the island not yet alto-
gether pacified shows much resemblance to that in Java. The
population of the dessa's in this part has no courage to show
itself when Dutchmen, soldiers or others, enter the territory.
There is a panicky fear of revenge of the pemoeda's if members
of the population should establish any contact with the Dutch.
The local Dutch Authorities, however, had confidence in soon
being able to re-establish a normal state of affairs, also in this
part of the island.
As soon as the population is aware of protection or finds a
leader who has courage enough to take measures against the
terrorists, the oppression of the pemoeda's is soon brought to
an end.
This part of Bali is the only part of the ,Buitengewesten"
(outer islands) - except the four largest islands - where the
,,Republic Indonesia" has some real influence. As is known,
occasional attempts are being made to rouse the.population of
the ?outer possessions" by sending, from Java, propagandists
in armed prahus, sometimes provided with a motor, who give
absolutely untruthful information about the power of the
Republic, the weakness of the English, the disappearance of the
Dutch, etc. When visiting Amboina, the members of the Com-
misMon learned that recently this had taken place at Boeroe
without any lasting result, however.
In Lombok, which had just been liberated when the .Commis-
sion visited Bali, the liberation festivals were going on for
5 days at a stretch. The population is very glad that the Dutch
have come back. The native officials appointed by the. Japanese
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immediately handed their task to the Dutch with a sigh of
relief. They were thoroughly fed up with the responsibilities
loaded upon their shoulders by the Japanese.
And as for Sumatra, in this large island, the situation is more
deplorable and chaotic than anywhere else in the Dutch East
Indies.
The phenomena, which point to a break-down of Indonesia,
as a unity as-soon as the Dutch Government has been eliminated
have progressed here further than anywhere else.
As far as it is possible to get information - at Medan it was
given to the Commission from different sides - the situation in
Sumatra shows the following picture.
In Atjeh the Imams have seized power. Complete Oeleba-
lang-families are said to have been murdered. Subjugation to
the Republic Indonesia is out of the question; the Imams are
trying to restore the Atjeh - Empire. Characteristic for the
situation in this part of the island is, so it was stated to the
Commission, that at this moment- 8 months after the capitu-
lation of Japan - a complete armed division of the.Japanese
Imperial guards camped in or around Koeala-Simpang, prevents
the Atjeh republicans from breaking through to the south and
protects the oil-fields. In the Batak country, the leaders of
the Marga have joined hands and the old ideal of a united
Batak State is reviving. An army of 35.000 men, that according
to information is believed to possess 20.000 rifles - the English
commander in Chief in Medan, however, doubted the exactness
of this number - is said to have taken its positions from Taroe-
toeng to Pematangsiantar.
From Minangkabau there is but little information, but it
seems to be fairly certain that there too, people do not want
to be ruled by a republic government situated in Java.
On the North-East Coast there is some contact between a
few thousands of pemoeda's, in power for the time being -
except at Medan, part of which (Polonia) is occupied by English
troops and the republican leaders in Java.
The inhabitants, however, are very much against these pe-
moeda's, especially the odd-120.000 Javanese coolies on the
estates who with their wives and children, together amounting
to about 500.000 people are living under very deplorable cir-
cumstances and to whom the republican authorities do not pay
any attention. Besides, they have only very little influence upon
the gangs of robbers - estimated at a few thousand-from out-
side the province, consisting of inhabitants of Atjeh, Batak and
Minangkabau, who terrorise the population of the once so
prosperous province and menace it with total destruction. The
stocks of rubber of the estates the value of which has been
estimated at 36.000.000 guilders have been seized by these
gangs; and this stolen rubber iS nowadays sold regularly to
Chinese in Malaya, who in their turn, supply weapons for the
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pemoeda's in Sumatra. Part of the proceeds of these stocks of
rubber seems to land in the treasury of the Republic.
The Malay population in these countries sticks to their self-
governors who have been robbed of their power by the extrem-
ists and many of whom have been murdered. Generally these
self-governors sympathize with the Dutch Government, but the
ordeal which they endure, might last too long, if this govern-
ment is not able to show its power. In these countries, how-
ever, there are no troops of any importance.
It is characteristic of feelings, the Commission learned during
discussions with self-governors, that they look upon the Java-
nese emigrants in the Lampongs as a ?state in the state".
The last question which arises is: what is the real signifi-
cance of the government of the ?Republic Indonesia" in Java
itself?
In answer to this question it must be pointed out immediately
that the western part of Java, Bantam, has separated. itself from
the Republic and has formed a kind of independent state of
its own.
In other large parts of Java the government of the Republic
has only very little influence, which is only too evident, when
it has to admit openly that things are happening against
which it is powerless and for which it refuses responsibility.
For instance, the evacuation of the Indonesian population from
South-Bandoeng; the foolish destructions before' the evacuation
of this part of the town, which the Commission has been able
td note being the first Dutchmen who visited this part of the
town - here and there still burning - immediately after the
occupation by British troops and now the recent murder of
Australian officers near Buitenzorg.
In the above mentioned parts of Java local armed organiz-
ations - perhaps because of the establishing of an army in each
residency under the command of the Japanese - are actually
in power.
Moreover, the old evil: the appearance of gangs of robbers
is gradually increasing. Many members of the republican army
now called T.R.I. are said to carry several badges of more than
one armed gang and are believed to operate now in this. and
then in another capacity.
Often such gangs prove to be under Japanese command or
to be supported by Japanese.
These armed gangs or organizations bring pressure to bear
upon the population. All kinds 'of despotic measures like toll-
barriers on the roads etc. are regularly occurring now. And
there is no saying whether these measures are taken by the
rulers of the republic or by robbers.
In one respect, however, all these organizations agree: by
terrorist methods the population is prevented from communi-
cating with the Dutch government.
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Capital punishment is the penalty for accepting ,Nica-
money".r)
Indonesians who sell agricultural produce to the Dutch in the
territories occupied by the English or the Dutch, are menaced.
In several cases this terror had led to nameless horrors, for
instance the attack on the Christian congregation, at Depok,
the oldest in the Dutch East Indies, where the Commission went
to see what happened. What happened there and in that neigh-
bourhood, cannot be described. The Commission has read the
reports - confirmed by the perpetrators - about murders on
European women and on a native woman, who lived with a
European; red-hot bars were put in the vagina and after that
her stomach was burned open in the same way. Further parti-
culars are not suitable for revelation.
A 19-year-old European girl was taken from a train; one of
the perpetrators stated with a grin - whereupon an Amboinese
soldier killedhim - that she had ?a strikingly beautiful face
which did not prevent them from dragging the girl, who was
constantly" praying for mercy, away by her legs, and hanging
her with her head over a pit, in which they later buried her
alive. In Depok alone there are said to be 150 victims of these
massacres. Senseless damage has been done to all houses.
Furniture and pianos had been smashed, mattresses cut open,,
etc., graves were opened and devastated.
A tenth part of such horrors performed anywhere else, would
have caused the world-press to shudder with indignation. Here,
however, it has been decided to conceal these horrors as they
might influence the general opinion about the ,Repoeblik Indo-
nesia" unfavourably; and because of this preconceived ideology
it was necessary in the name of freedom, democracy, right of
self-determination etc. to write in favour of this republic.
How far the republican government in Central and East Java
succeeded in establishing a more regular situation, cannot pos-
sibly be said, because no Dutch or other Europeans are allowed
to enter these territories.
,It is also very difficult to say what power and influence the
different organizations have in the republican government.
Some time ago, in the first days of the stay of the Commis-
sion at Batavia, word was received, that the communistic lea-
der, Tan Malakka, had been arrested by supporters of Sjahrir,
.which was looked upon as an evidence of the increasing power
of the Sjahrir-group in the republican government. Soon how-
ever the Commission learned from a reliable source that an
atrt of Tan Malakka was out of the question and that this
x) The pictures on the paper-money of the Dutch East Indies, consisting'
of an aeroplane, a completely armed soldier, and a cruiser must be consi-
dered psychological mistakes, the more so as the word ,Nica" has more or
less the same sound as a Malay-word, that stands for devilish power. In the
propaganda against the Dutch this fact is being abused.
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news should be considered camouflage, so that it would appear
as if certain groups, with which the Dutch Government had
opened discussions had much influence in the Republic
Government.
According to reliable information, it is clear that a number
of Japanese officers are regularly orking as advisors of the
Republic and that Sukarno declared that they should be main-
tained in this position. It is clear too, that the army of the
republic around. Djocja and Soerakarta is being trained by
Japanese instructors. The interior government is still using the
organization built up by the Japanese and- that has the same
characteristics as the German, Italian and Japanese systems.
Up till now the republic has not succeeded in shaking itself
free from using its ,vitium origins", its Japanese origin; hence
the terror methods, which are being practised in its name and
its leaders,
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THIRDLY: THE INDO-EUROPEANS AND CHINESE.
In general the Chinese - as the Commission learned in
numerous conversations - sympathize with the Indonesians as
regards their wishes for greater independence. By joining the
,,Democratic League" they support these endeavours.
They have their own wishes too; Indonesian citizenship,
guarantees for the minorities, obtaining the right of owning
land, etc.
The Chinese as a group however, do not sympathize with the
building up of an independent Republic Indonesia. They are
very much afraid of the terror of the pemoeda's and other,
armed organizations of the republic and therefore they indivi-
dually like to keep themselves in the background instead of
openly showing their feelings, though there are amongst them
who have done much for the Dutch. As a group however, their
feelings for the Dutch are just as sympathic as for the Indo-
nesians. This is a sufficient reason for the extremists to apply
their methods of terror also against the Chinese. The foolish
devastation of the Chinese quarter of Bandoeng must be con-
sidered as a revenge of nationalistic republicans for those feel-
ings of the Chinese part of the population. It cannot be denied
that rumours about the republic being acknowledged by the
Dutch Government have caused some anxiety among the Chin-
ese part of the population; but the fear of reprisals mostly
prevents the Chinese from letting the Dutch Government know
about this anxiety of which the Commission was informed by
the Chinese. The Chinese feel that a recognition of the republic
means being abandoned by the Dutch, despite their loyal
attitude.
The same things are also felt by the population with mixed
European and Indonesian blood, though their feelings are much
stronger.
All during the war against the Japanese this group, in
general, has shown character and when the war was over they
unanimously wanted a tie between the Netherlands and Indo-
nesia. This group is not unfavourably inclined to the indepen-
dence of Indonesia within the unity of the Netherland King-
dom, but it is afraid of getting into a desperate situation should
the ,Repoblic Indonesia" be acknowledged.
The supporters of this republic are not kindly disposed
towards this group to put it mildly. It is accused of a kindly
disposition towards the Dutch,, at the time of the attacks on
women's and children's ra selaccording in the first
carefully
period of the republic (pupoy, and
worked out system) many outrages against Indo-Europeans
living outside the camps are said to have taken place.
Again it is very difficult to state how far the responsibilityof
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the republican government reaches, as regards these horrors;
but it is clear, that especially the Indo-Europeans of Dutch
nationality do not expect much from a republic, the authorities
of which up till now acted like this or, at any rate showed
them but little affection. They fear, that there will be no longer
a possibility for them to live in such a republic, and look up
to the Dutch Government for assistance. They even think about
mass-emigration, for instance to ,New Guinea".
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FOURTHLY: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS
PARTS OF THE POPULATION.
The Commission has studied the following problem: whether
the organized instigation of the autochthonic population, first
by the Japanese and afterwards by the leaders of the Repoe-
blik Indonesia would leave traces on the broad masses of the
population, which would result in a definite alienation of the
Dutch on the one side and Asiatics - especially Indonesians
on the other.
As regards the Chinese, there is no reason to be afraid of
such a situation. Their native-country was at war with Japan
at the same time as the Netherlands. This caused such a con-
trast between the Chinese and the Japanese that the first were
practically immune from the Japanese propaganda. And later
on the propaganda from the side of the republic, which was
more concentrated on the Indonesians than on the Chinese, has
had no visible influence on the Chinese. It may be said, that
their relations both with the Dutch and the natives have not
changed noticeably. Only the Chinese self-consciousness will
increase considerably, if China succeeds in surmounting the
recent difficulties.
As was explained above, the Japanese, in spite of their ter-
rific propaganda, have not succeeded in rendering the broad
masses of the population unfriendly disposed towards the Dutch
Government, because of the rudeness of their methods of op-
pression. It is true that this was attained with certain groups,
trained by and privileged under the Japanese Government; but
even Heiho's have often helped the Dutch inhabitants of camps.
How far the second instigation campaign by the republicans
has permanently influenced the greater part of the population
of Java (as for the outer possessions see above) may be judged
from the following facts:
first: that in Batavia the native population is working quietly
again just like the Chinese from the time they knew themselves
sufficiently protected against terror, though there is still an
Indonesian mayor and Sjahrir has a house in town.;
second: that the native population of the campong Buddingh,
in the centre of Batavia under the command of a brother of the
former Member of the People's Council Thamrin, has cleared
its campong of all extremist elements, though, remarkably in-
deed, the campongheads were not able to obtain any official
authority from the Government;
third: that everywhere in the area, occupied by the Dutch
troops, it is quiet again and the population feels liberated from
heavy terror. Everywhere the population sympathizes with the
Dutch. Once they know themselves protected against reprisals
of the Pemoeda's and other armed organizations of the republic,
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their real disposition is shown and they denounce the terrorists.
There is kindness again and kind-heartedness, but nowhere
slavish subjection, the rejectable characteristic of the ?colonial
relation ship".
A Dutch Government official, on a tour with two members of
the Commission as far as 40 km from Batavia, was justified
in saying: ,,Indonesia Merdeka - that is here and only here".
fourth: that in all dessa's liberated by the Dutch so many
want to join the Dutch policetroops that a great part of them
cannot be accepted;
fifth: that in the liberated territories a political party-system
is coming into existence, which cannot happen anywhere else,
because there the ,Repoeblic Indonesia" opposes by methods
of terror the growth of groups that want another political reso-
lution than. the 100% independent republic. From letters direct-
ed to H.M. the Queen by Mr. Mas Slamet it is clear that those,
who want to oppose that method of solving the national
problem, are also being terrorized.
Now that in the towns there is less fear of this terror, it
becomes clear that the nationalists who wish another solution
for the Indonesian independence, are more numerous than those
who want a republic. During the stay of the Commission in
Java a regional Democratic Union was established. Immediately
160 members joined.
In Batavia there is also an important branch of this union
under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rubini, a Madurese.
Also in Bandoeng and Semarang, whereas the union has
branches outside Java as well. Members of this union are
natives, Dutch and Chinese; consequently a practical applica-
tion of the equality of races. During the long discussions,
which the Commission had with the Executive Board of this
party in Batavia, it became clear that all felt equal. The Board
admitted that only in the four large cities parties can be
formed, because they are free from the republic. First of all
they want to re-establish peace and order, in order to enable
freedom of opinion and they are convinced that a large part of
the conservative groups, at the moment still cooperating with
the republic because of the circumstances, are of the same
opinion.
Other parties like the Indo-European Union, the Unity Group,
etc. are developing again.
It should be noted that Mr. Slamet himself, whose fierce
aversion to the republic is sufficiently obvious from his letters,
has kept himself in the background to make room for the Demo- -
cratic Union. Mr. Slamet had intended to go to the Netherlands
to inform our people - and afterwards other countries - in
the same way in which he already wrote several pamphlets
about the Japanese tendencies of the present republic. In his
second letter to H.M. the Queen he has informed Her of his
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being refused to go to the Netherlands. The Governments In-
formation Service has demented -this in the press. Of course
this has not been refused to Mr. Slamet, they said, but he
wanted priority in a Skymaster, which could not be permitted.
The objection of Mas Slamet to the republic in its recent
construction is, that it uses fascistic instead of democratic
methods. He also wishes to establish first of all the possi-
bilities to utter a free opinion; and after this a decision about
the political relations between the Netherlands and the Dutch
East Indies.
With personalities like Mr. Slamet and in general with all
those natives, who demonstrated a faithful attachment to the
Dutch Government, the rumours concerning recognition of the
,,Repoeblic Indonesia", roused embittered reactions. They are
convinced that there will be no place for them in their native-
country; and here and there the Commission already met with
the opinion, that the Dutch are handing over their friends to
their adversaries. In relation to this the word unreliability has
been mentioned already.
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FIFTHLY: THE ENGLISH OCCUPATION AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
a. The Christison period.
The two Chambers of the Dutch Government are aware of
the fact, that as a result of negotiations between the Allied
Nations, the British of their own accord were charged with the
occupation of the Dutch East Indies, after the capitulation of
Japan.
In the name of the Allies, the British commander-in-chief,
Lord Louis Mountbatten. was charged with the responsibility
for:
1. accepting the Japanese capitulation in the Dutch East
Indies;
2. disarming the Japanese and removing them from the
Dutch East Indies;
3. assuring the transmisson of Japanese war-material;
4. liberating the allied prisoners of war and if necessary
sending them home;
5. assuring the security of over 100.000 internees, chiefly
women and children.
It is also known, that owing to the Japanese capitulation at
an earlier moment than had been expected, there were not
enough troops to perform this task on August 15th 1945.
There is no need for the Commission to state again which
were the results of the arrival of the first very small British
unit, more than six weeks after the capitulation when it was
announced publicly that they would occupy Batavia and Soe-
rabaja only.
The Commission has not succeeded in solving the problem
whether the arrival of General Christison at Batavia with his
small unit had taken place against the advice of the British
Intelligence-Service, or of Rapwi-teams dropped and at the
insistance of the Dutch to send troops as quickly as possible,
however small the unit might be. This is rather important,
because this may have been the motive for some of the
measures the British General has taken immediately after his
landing. Perhaps these measures should be attributed to the
fact, that be was totally surprised at the situation he met upon
his arrival and therefore, out of anxiety for the. face of his
troops, has taken measures, which have had a very unfavour-
able influence on the political situation.
These measures were said to have been taken so as to stay
out of the political problems and not to interfere with the re-
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VII
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Another example of education. Boys of the youth movement armed with
wooden guns and spears.
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lations between the Dutch and the Indonesians. In reality they
resulted in a marked preference for the so-called Government
of the.,,Repoeblik Indonesia" and its representatives. The first
proclamation of General Christison already contained an ac-
knowledgment of the actual ?government" of the ?Repoeblik
Indonesia", when he announced that he ?intended to ask the
actual leaders of the movement to assist him in performing his
task", and that ,the -actual Indonesian authorities (were) respon-
sible for the government in the territories where they now
ruled".
. About what has happened during General Christison's period
the Commission has gathered full particulars which, however,
are not mentioned in this report for three reasons. Firstly
because of lack of time; secondly because much of this is
already known ;thirdly because this period is now finished and
the present situation must be considered to be more important.
The Commission restricts itself to state that the information
"received shows the bitterness of the Dutch about the attitude
demonstrated by British troops on several occasions. The Dutch
Government has not omitted to protest strongly against those
occurrences. - ;
On the other hand it should be mentioned with gratitude, how
by the action of British troops, especially in Soerabaja, the lives
of many Dutch women and children were saved.
b. The present situation.
Fortunately this period is over now and it is to be expected
that the danger of an alienation between two recent Allies will
be avoided.
It certainly is not the fault of the commanding generals and
other officers of the occupying forces in the Dutch East Indies
if there are still some difficulties. The members of the Commis-
sion met many of them and they spoke very frankly with them.
The Commission was very favourably impressed. These men
uphold British dignity.
But even the British commanders must obey the orders of
their government; and the British Government has to take into
consideration political factors which the Commission cannot
judge.
The Commission only states that during its stay in the Dutch
East Indies, more than eight months after the capitulation, the
orders of the Allied Nations given to the British occupying
troops have not yet been carried out. This has caused much dis-
content among the Dutch Colony in the Dutch East Indies. Espe-
cially so because, as a result of this, the transfer of Japanese
arms to the extremists, the training of the army of the ,Repoe-
blik Indonesia" by Japanese instructors and the construction
of the ?Repoeblik" on the foundation of Japanese organizations,
totally anti-democratic, could continue.
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Enquiring into the actual situation, the Commission has con-
'cluded that the present situation is caused by the fact that the
Dutch sovereignity, over the Dutch East Indies, which is
acknowledged by the allied nations, is not carried out by the
Dutch Government or by the Government of the Dutch East
Indies, but by the occupying forces.
Even at this moment the Dutch East Inadies, in a juridical
sense and according to international law, are considered by the
allied nations occupied enemy territory. There is still an enemy
force of 325.000 men, which has up till now not been brought
under the control of the occupying forces. During the stay of
the Commission in the Dutch. East Indies it was announced that
290.000 of these 325.000 men had been brought under allied
control. The term ?under control" not to be taken at face value.
Ie. is stated that there were at that moment still 35.000 men of
the Japanese forces who could act totally independently with-
out any control of the forces who had been charged with
their disarmament.
On April 19th 1946 the Commission received the following
information from the Dutch Head-Quarters in the Dutch East
Indies about. Japanese prisoners of war.
Total Total
present disarmed
Sumatra ... ...... 45,270 5.710
Java ....... .. . ............. 72.412 1) 30.710 1)
Great, East-Borneo .............. 165.863 160.354
Total ........... 283.345 196.774
Totally evacuated to: Rampang-Galang Japan
Sumatra .............. )
Bangka-Billiton ...... .........) 77.191 2)
Riouw .. . )
Soembawa ....... .......... 6.500
Further there have been evacuated
14.993 from Sumatra to Malakka 2)
Totally evacuated till 11-3-'46 .... 77.191
6.500
14.993
98.684
The evacuation of Borneo and the Islands east thereof will
begin on the first of May 1945, and then Soembawa, Menado,.
Manggar, Sanga 2), S.-Celebes, Ceram, Kei-islands, Halmaheira,
Sarong, Manokwari, Sarmi, Timor will follow.
1) Including :Bali and Lombok.
2) Not included in the total of Dutch East Indies.
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As long as this situation will go on the Dutch East Indies
will be considered occupied enemy territory, and as the govern-
mental power in those territories is carried out by the com-
mander-in-chief of the occupying forces, the real sovereign
power will be carried out by this commander-in-chief. Such a
situation can easily be a cause of continuous difficulties.
The Commission does not want to consider some phenomena,
difficult to accept for the Dutch population which, however, are
a result of these circumstances( which cannot be disallowed
according to international law), phenomena the Dutch popu-
lation also _met,in Holland when, for instance, our farmers, who
live near the border, were not allowed to bring back to their
own country their cattle grazing on the other side of the border.
The Japanese have requisitioned all kinds of goods from the
Dutch population during the war. These goods now belong to
the booty, and the conquerors - the occupying forces and
among them also the Dutch who live in the houses furnished
by the Japanese - for instance at Timor - are using them at
the moment. The Dutch population thus sees its own furniture,
refrigerators, etc. being carried off by the occupying forces,
for the greater part British-Indian troops, which is, of course,
a very unpleasant experience.
Should these be the consequences of the war which, as al-
ready stated, have to_be accepted, the rule of conduct, pene-.
trating into the whole organization of social and political life
is something quite different.
The,entire food distribution, transport-organization, the al-
lotting of goods to retail trade, in short all those things,
*ich in normal times are settled by free social influences, are
now supervised by the government. Formerly this was done by
the Rapwi (Relief Allied Prisoners of War and Internees), which,
whenever necessary, was charged with all kinds of measures,
'which did not really form part of the task of this corporation.
During the stay of the Commission in the Dutch East Indies
these were 'transferred to another organisation, the Amacab
(Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch). Our
former residents are now called C(ommanding) O(fficer) Ama-
cab or in the outer possessions C.O. Nica. Consequently they
belong to the military hierarchy and' are subordinated to a
British officer. This means that all the organs of the recognised
sovereign need ' for each of their actions the permission of a
representative of the occupying forces.
In the outer provinces, in so far as they have been occupied
by Australian troops, this situation has ended now, as the
Australian troops have retreated, but in Java and Sumatra it
still continues to exist.
This situation, which is the same as for instance in the occu-
pied parts of Germany and Japan, is endurable only because of
the personal qualities of the representatives of the occupying
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force, most of whom are very pleasant, and who leave to the
Dutch Authorities as much as possible. This, however, does not
change the fact, that such a situation is absolutely impossible
in a territory, in which the Dutch sovereignity has been ex-
plicitly acknowledged by the Allies and by the occupying
forces; which forms the real difference between other occupied
enemy territories, where the occupant is in control, as.long as
a treaty of peace has not been signed.
The result of this peculiar situation, territory of an allied
state where the sovereign has returned and which, notwith-
standing this was considered occupied enemy territory for
over 8`months - becomes more serious however because of the
fact that, the occupying forces, on the ground of an order of
their government, had to accept as their rule of conduct that
the sovereign, acknowledged by their own government, has to
be treated in the same way as the so-called ?government"
which has settled on the territory of this sovereign, and which
claims authority over the population. For this is the meaning of
the rule of conduct according to which the occupying forces are
not allowed to take sides between the acknowledged sovereign
and the so-called government of the ?Repoeblik Indonesia".
-The results of this conduct were demonstrated to the Com-
mission when attending the activities at Batavia required to
obtain a building formerly used by one of the departments of
the Dutch Government. In Batavia there is a ?Burgomaster" of
the ?Repoeblik" and according to the above mentioned
situation, he must be informed of steps to be taken to put such
a building al; the disposal of the acknowledged sovereign. When
the Commission was informed of this interesting case, the
object in view had not yet been obtained; but it was assured
that in due course everything would be alright. And the ,,De-
partment" of the ?Repoeblik" where some officials were
wasting their time, would be accomodated in some other
building!
Also the military forces of the sovereign are not allowed to
do anything without permission of the military commanders in
chief of the occupying forces. And then again, these officers
have to keep in mind the above mentioned rule of conduct,
according to which for instance no firing is allowed before the
?troops of the Repoeblik" have fired, a, measure which the
Commission can hardly bring into accord with the idea, that
the occupant does not want to interfere with the relations
between the Dutch and the Indonesians.
Another instruction is that in certain cases no patrolling is
allowed within a circle of four miles drawn on the map from
an occupied point. But the country has the peculiarity not to
mind circles drawn on a map; and it often happens that all
kinds of points in the territory just on the edge of this circle,
for instance houses, hills, riverbends, etc. are extraordinarily
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suitable as strongholds for the opponent from where Dutch
troops are attacked. They' cannot be cleared as they are
situated outside the permitted territory of operations.
The points of contact between the Dutch and the British
troops also cause difficulties.
Without the above mentioned qualities of most of the com-
1naiLding officers these circumstances would no doubt have
resulted in many difficulties, but it is evident that where
human lives are at`stake, even when people are willing to do
their best, contrasts and undesirable differences of opinion
cannot always be avoided.
. It is very difficult for those who have to act in a situation
,as described above to avoid all its unfavourable inherent con-
sequences.'
c, international relations of the ?Repoeblik Indonesia".
The Commission has gathered information from which it is
evident that relations exist between the Government of the
?Repoeblik Indonesia" and communist organizations abroad.
Pamphlets and folders which were issued among the native
population, proved to have been printed in Australia and to
have been issued by the communist party there.
There are also signs of contact with Chinese communist
organizations which are very active e.g. in Malaya.
Branches of these organizations were also established in
Sumatra. At Medan, as a kind of Headquarters, there is a
?Union of Chinese' Youth" with 15 departments for the East-
coast of Sumatra. Furthermore it is known that from December
11th till 14th 1945 at Fort de Kock on the Westcoast of Sumatra
a communtst congress was held, where representatives of the
communist party from China were present.
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FINAL REMARKS CONCERNING THE ECONOMICAL
SITUATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH.
Total damage caused by the war to estates, factories, houses,
etc. is estimated at 8 milliard Dutch pre- war florins. For a
country with a population with so little economical resistance
as the Dutch East Indies such a damage is considered cata-
strophical by all in'Siders. Only by investment of new working-
capital would it be possible to relieve-at least for the first time
- the results and to diminish them by and by. But these
investments will not be possible, the Commission concluded
from repeated discussions, before peace and order are restored,
and the safety of the investment is sufficiently guaranteed.
Dutch industries are willing to invest new capital.
All insiders, even those who were not concerned in any way
in such investments and are only able to give their opinion on
account of their scientific-professional knowledge apparently
agreed to the fact that the Indonesian republic loosened finan-
cially from the Netherlands, undoubtedly could obtain loans
on the international money-market but only on the condition
that,all real power in these territories should be in the hands
of the money-lenders.
The present situation where parts of towns are occupied by
the Allied troops as well as the situation in the rest of Java have
to be considered as unbearable.. Practically all food has td be
imported, as there are no sufficient agricultural districts inthe
surroundings of the Allied occupied areas. In Batavia the
markets are increasing which proves that the population
around Batavia is feeling safer. And Bandoeng has to be
supplied partly by air. In the long run this is far too heavy for
the economical resistance of the country.
More serious, however, is the economical situation in the rest
of Java, where the great impoverishment is already shown by
the clothing of the population. Numerous are the natives who
are dressed in rags or in gooney bags. Because of the activities
of Australian Trade Unions which prevented the shipment of
relief-goods, the Dutch have not been able to do the thing they
would have liked to do, The distribution of clothes in the
dessa the Commission has attended such a distribution-
consequently could only take place on a small scale.
The most serious problem is the food-supply.
It is impossible however to obtain a complete survey of the
crop and the ?authorities" of the ,Repoeblic Indonesia" go on
asserting that there is enough rice but all kinds of phenomena
indicate that in the near future difficulties are threatening and
already exist.
It is doubtful whether the native farmer has used all possi-
bilities of planting. Here and there the irrigation-works have
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been damaged, so that the insufficient water-supply causes the
savaahs to be irrigated only in turns. This causes unsimulta-
neous ripening of the rice which promises rat- and mice-plagues,
wh.ch already occur on an alarming scale at the moment.
Moreover, the charming carelessness of the population is the
reason `that repairs of drains etc., easy to perform, are delayed.
The natives are used to receive instructions from the Dutch
and as such is not the case at the moment, these simple
reparations and up-keep-jobs are not done.
Even if, notwithstanding these difficulties the harvest were
sufficient, there would be the great difficulty of transporting
,the rice from districts with a surplus to the districts where
there is a shortage.
There is lacl of transport and the condition of the roads is
very bad. During the Japanese occupation the beautiful roads
of Java have suffered very badly. They can hardly be used.
From the side of the ,Repoeblik Indonesia" nothing has been
done in order to repair them. The butch immediately started
in .the districts ur}der their control and good progress has
already been made, in spite of lack of material.
Transport will meet with difficulties in every respect and the
result might prove to be most serious for the 45 million people
living in Java.
In the outer provinces, except Sumatra, the economical
situation, of the population is almost everywhere better, which
can immediately be seen by the clothes.
.South-Celebes, where the rice harvest is promising, will
certainly have an export-surplus; Bali and Lombok, too have
possibilities for export; but the means of transport by sea are
even more scarce than the means of transport by land. Co-
operation of everybody is needed in order to avert disasters.
This must also be known by all leading personalities of the
,Repoeblik Indonesia", who know something about the situ-
atiQn. The public health situation is probably even more
critical.than the food-supply. Many hospitals are in the hands
of the ,Repoeblik Indonesia" and not only in Java,'but also in
the outer-possessions, people acquiesce in this situation, as a
consequence of the above mentioned policy.
The hospitals which are still being used and which are under
native control for the greater part prove, that when the Java-
nese miss the capable Dutch organization they cannot do much.
Even when they have very competent native physicians it
occurs very often that there are mistakes in the management.
Parts of instruments are lost and a situation of general neglect
exists as a result of lack of organization and discipline,
fn general there still is, in the Dutch civil and military hospi-
tals too, a severe lack of important medicines.
here too, the Australian Trade Unions which have preven-
ted the shipment of relief-goods, must be held responsible.
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Nevertheless, much is done by the Dutch. Under Prof. Baas-
Becking a hospital has been arranged where Dutch nurses 1)
are working, e.g. near Buitenzorg, in the territory which is
under control of the Repoeblik Indonesia". It is not possible
for Dutch people to travel by land to Buitenzorg without risking
their lives but during the stay of the Commission at Batavia
Prof. Baas-Becking made his 59th journey there. He is always
received with open arms, even by the extremists who appear
to accept good nursing, even by the Dutch, with gratitude.
From this it can be seen how unsatisfactory the medical care
must be in the parts of Java not occupied by the Dutch. This
situation may have very serious results, especially so, should
epidemics break out.
It is to be hoped that in this regard, as well as in many
others, there will be close co-operation between the Dutch and
the Indonesians very soon, first of all in behalf of the bereaved
population of the overseas territories of the kingdom, the
chaotic situation of which has worried the Commission with a
view to world-peace that is not served by a chaos in this part
of the world.
The Hague, May 1st, 1946.
The Parliamentary Commission
Dutch East Indies,
w.s. M. J. M. VAN POLL, President.
H. A. KORTHALS,
H. J. W. A. MEYERINK,
CH. J. I. M. WELTER,
Members.
J. VAN ANDEL Gzn., Secretary.
1) The Commission wants to express its appreciation for the activities
of the Dutch nurses in'the Dutch East Indies, which form a worthy pendant
to the activities generally performed with such an enthusiasm and devotion
by the Dutch troops over there. Concerning the atmosphere of the troops,
their mental and material care and their state of health, the Commission
got a favourable impression wherever it was in touch with units.
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