CURRENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00810A001900420005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 30, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SESEET
SECURITY INFORMATION
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
COUNTRY USSR REPORT NO. 25X1A
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
Current Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy DATE DISTR. 30 July 1953
Na OF RAGES 4
25X1A REQUIREMENT Na RD
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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SOURpE:
The following analysis of the internal and international conse uenteS at
Stalin vi death in presented here 25X1X
I. At the time when Stalin died and Malenkov became his successor, most experts
in Soviet politics agreed that it was imposSible to expect any profound
changes in Soviet foreign poliby and that:one could rather expect further'
severance Of EattWest relations, Surprising political Maneuvers of Malenkov
and his companions to a certain degree have :prattled Western political circlet,
which aTe now ready to accept the theory about Soviet good will% aiming at
reconciliation between the West and the East. In order to have at least an
adequate idea about the aims pursued by this Soviet policy, it is necessary
first of all to discuss the intended effects of these Soviet political .
maneuvers from the internal and foreign political points of view.
Internal ,Political Effects'
2. Stalints death presumably caused cOnsiderable uneasiness, not only in the
USSR but also in the satellite states. No One of the present Soviet leaders,
including Malenkov, Possesses that degree of personal authority which Stalin.
used to have. .Coneequently% Malerikov cannot be regarded .as his actual
tucces00. In all his decitions? Maletkov is far more bound by the opinion
Of Berl*, Molotov, and Bulganin than Stalin was end, therefore, he cannot
be regarded as an absolute dictator of the Stalinist type. Since no form
Of dictatorship, such as it exists in the USSR today, tolerates anycollective
leadership, it can be expected that the present leaders will struggle with
each other se to who is to become the real dictator in the USSR. It must be
borne in mind that Communism) better to say: Stalinism, became in the USSR
a sort of state political religion which must have its god. Such a god
Stalin was until his death, The present Soviet rulers are taking pelt!! to
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preserve this political monotheism iA the USSR,. because this is one of the
mainstayS of the Soviet system. The question is?. of course, who Will be
this political god after Stalin's death? Therefore the Soviet rulers need
some period tf rest in order to fight this struggle undisturbed.
. There exist already several indications that the Soviet rulers are now trying
to gain the Soviet people for themselves and to prove that they intend to
tAke a better policy than Stalin. These indications are the following: the
announcement Of amneetyi the reduction of prices? the release of the arrested
physicians, and the punishment of those who had accused them of various crimes.,
the arrest of the former Deputy Minister of State Security Ryumin, the de-
privation of the Secretariat functions of Ignatyev, etc, When these indi.
cations lire canaideredi there might arise an ingression that the new. Soviet
management iS entirely cotpact when it is able to do this, Past experiences,
however, teach us that such a vie* would be unrealistic.
4. Stalin, in the period of 'struggle for power,- collaborated with the right wing
of the Party, namely, with Rykov? Tomskiy,and Bukharin? in order to oust
Trotskiy, Zinovysv, and Eamenev. Having succeeded in this maneuver, he then
removed Rykov and Tomskiy as well. Later onl Marshal TUkhachevskiy was liqui-
dated, as well as other Soviet generals, under the pretext that they collaz
borate& with the Germans. None the less, Stalin did not hestiate to conclude
a treaty with Germany in 1939.
5. The above examples show that Machiavellism is an inherent component of Soviet
policy. The present Soviet leaders are merely collaborators and/or disciples
of Stalin; it cannot be expected, therefore, that they will deviate from this
Machiavellian policy. It can be anticipated that he who will most adroitly
use the principle Divide et impera among them will win the future struggle
for power.
6. None of the Kremlins new men feels already strong enough to be able to liquidate
his rivals and to became thus an absolute dictator of the Soviet Union, They
all now agree on the policy of appeasement, which they need for the stabilization
of their power in the USSR. It leas as though the present Moscow management
is trying above all to achieve internal stabilization in the USSR before it
will launch any other political actions.
7. The USSR itself is not the only concern of Soviet rulers in the performance'
of this scheme. The political and economic situation it the satellite countries
is far worse; the living standard is falling and, consequently, mistrust toward.
the Soviet system is increasing. If Moscow 'wants to keep these states in
submission, she will sooner or later be compelled to make certain concessions,
especially of an economic character, which will raise the living standard of
the local population. The question is whether or not the USSR is able to
solve these difficulties at all. It is apparent already today that the estabi.
lishment of the Economic Council (Council for Mutual Economic. Aid CMEA) in
Moscow brought to the satellite states only disadvantages and not advantages.
If the Soviet Union should Succeed in mitigating international tension and
slowing down the tempo of Western armament, a certain portion of Soviet armament
expenditure might be devoted to the economic stabilization of the satellite
states. Thus, the present Soviet regime in the satellite states would be
reinforced. Moscow cannot have in her struggle for world supremacy weak and
dissatisfied allies. fllerefore, before launching the general offensive,
Moscow must try to consolidate her influence in these states, even at the
cost of certain political and economic concessions. Alleviation of inter-
national tension would greatly help these plans.
Internationaliblitical Effects
In an attempt to mitigate international tension, Moscow naturally also pursues
certain international political aims, which may be swilled up as outlined below.
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Various ictsof the USSR, aiming at the alleviation of international tention,
must be ionaidered as mere gestures, which promise much but which canna be
regarded as a proof of actual good will of the Soviet government. The fact
that the Soviets are willing to conclude the armistice in Korea and that they
made several conciliatory gestures at the UN session does not mean that the
general international political line of the USSR has altered. From a closer
examinatiOn of Soviet foreign policy since 1944, we may infer that the political
tactics were based on the following principle: to drive up international tension
to a certain point When war Seemed inevitable---and suddenly to make a con-
ciliatory gesture to alleviate that tension. These variations of Soviet foreign
policy had cOnsideralAe psychological effect on world public opinion. In any
slight hint at the Soviets, individuals, and often even leading Western
uied to. see more than was actually intended.
10. At the present moment (April 1953), the Soviets probably are exploiting certain
hesitations of France and England .and trying to convince them of' 'Soviet "peaceful"
intentions, In this way, the US is to be isolated from her West European allies
and, compelled to a more yielding disposition regarding Soviet wishes, Let me
add that a Soviet ambassador to a Western nationr once told me that the USSR
believes that it might be possible to reach an agreement with Churchill, pro-
vided that England 'would gain a certain profit from such an agreement, There
fore,it can be exPected that the USSR will continue its policy to sow the seeds
of dissension among the, NATO nations and to exploit such difference's to its
awn advantage,
11. Another- objective of the USSR is to impair the vigilance and preparedness of the
West. NATO becomes more and more a serious obstacle to Soviet expansion? The
Soviets are well aware of the fact that the integration, direct or indirect, of
West Gernany into the Western defense system would represent a further serious
check to Soviet aggressive schemes.
12. It can be expected that the Soviets will be ready to make far-reaching .con-
ceSsions to the West in the question of the unification 0 Germany, provided
that in this way the re-armaMent of Germany and its integration in the Western
European defense System can be prevented. This, of course, does not mean
that the Soviets are willing to leave Germany out of their agsressive plans.
After the departure of the allied armies, it would be possible to Organize
more easily various propaganda campaigns and to prepare slowly the ground for
Communist political schemes. The Soviets now mostly need time,.' even at the
cost of temporary concessions. The concessions the Soviets currently offer
the West are Of such a kind that they cannot convince Western political circles
of their sincerity. Until now, the Soviets have not expressed the least in-
dication that they would be willing to give up their influence in the states
they conquered :after 1945. The case of Czechoslovakia in 1948 was particularly
alarming. They also firmly refuse to conclude the :peace treaty with Austria,
because thus Czechoslovakia and Hungary would have longer frontiers with the
western world, and this would lead to a further weakening of Soviet influence
in these states. Let the Soviets manifest their good will by their readiness
to settle the Austrian question and the problem of the satellite states of
Central Europe, where it would suffice to arrange free elections, which would
most probably fail to bring victory to the Communists.
13. Also, Soviet disarmament proposals are to be considered as mere phrases.. The
proof thereof is the recent offensive of the Indochinese Communists against
the state Laos and the recent declaration of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister,
Viliam Siroky, who officially announced the reinforcement of the Czechoslovak
army. It is extremely doubtful that the Soviets would be ready -to deal with
the aforementioned questions at the eventual negotiations at all.
111. The Soviet rapprochement proposals can also be regarded as a part of their
over-all "peace" propaganda. The outcome of the last session of the World
Peace Council in Vienna has shown that the so-called "peace movement" is
in a certain state of stagnation, as was-evident from the speechbsof some-
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delegates. The recent Soviet proposals will act as a certain injection for
the "peacealovement"1 which has been one of,themoWpowerfUl.propagande
weapons Of the Soviets. It can be expected that the activity of various organs
of the "ieace movement will soon be resumed. Interestingly enough, the lead-
ing organa of the "peate movement" until nov have not adopted_en attitude
toward the Soviet "peace" proposals. They evidently await directives from
Moscow,. Which in turn is waiting to see how the situation will develop.
15. On the whole/ it can be said that there are DO convincing proofs to the effect
that the USSR has really changed its foreign political line. There has been),
rather, a change of tactics, and the final foreign political objectives remain
unchanged. This supposition seems to be corroborated by the fact that Moscow
until noir ha i not exchanged her diplomatic representatives in the West, though
such a mtaSure would be a logical consequence of an actual change of Soviet
or
feign olicy. This has not happenedj-therefore? all the gestures of Soviet
Government functionaries must be taken with a certain reserve.
16. This is not to say that all Soviet proposals should be refUsedapriori. It
Cannot be excluded that they contain a little sincerity too, owing to a certain
political exigency. Refusal, (by the US) of Soviet proposals without prior
dealings would merely benefit Soviet propaganda and could even exercise a
certain unfavorable influence on Western European public opinion, which yields
relatively easily to the Soviet " peace campaign".
17. Therefore, it is necessary to choose in dealings with the Soviets a way which,
provided the change of Soviet foreign policy is actual and sincere, would benefit
both sides. gowever, if the apparent change in Soviet policy is merely a change
of tactitS0 a more probable case, it will be necessary to proceed caUtiously
In order not to provide a propaganda weapon in the hands of the Soviets and their,
satellites. It is very difficult to fulfill these tasks,considering a certain
isek of unity among the Western states. A dictatorial regime ie More impressed
by Strength than by ideological democratic persuasion. If, howevert the Western
states were united and. strong, this latter argument would be applicable to the
Soviets more, than any other. The Soviets are aware that their expansion
against the united and strong democratic world of the West is less and less
likely to have success, and for this reason they try by all means to prevent
this unity of the West. Let me add once more that one of the main tasks of
the Soviet and satellite diplomats in the West is to follow closely all the
discords between, the Western states and to report on these discords to their
respective governments.
18. The present international political situation gives an opportunity to test
Soviet Sincerity and true Soviet intentions. In the meantime, when the future
development cannot be safely predicted, it would be an error to be excessively
optimistic, as for instance the French paper Le Monde is. Only time will show
what are the real intentions of the present SFMT-niers.
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