THE RAPIDITY AND METHODS OF MILITARY ROADS CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOVIET ARMY DURING THE WAR PERIOD - 1941-1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500390199-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 199
• Publication Date: February 15, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

ruKm No. 51-40 DEC 1951 Approved For Release 2004/0 7)K1 CIA-RD 8 -00809A000500390199-7
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
The Rapidity and Methods of Military Roads
Construction in the Soviet Army Duri g the
War Period 1941-1945
THIS DOCUMENT [ON-INs INFORMATION AFFECTING TIIE HAIIOHAL DEFENSE
Or COL NI TED STATES. ?ITIIIN TOE MEANING or TITLE 14. SECTIONS 703
AND TSA. OF TOF U.S CODE. AS AMCNO Cl. ITS TRANSMISSION ON DCCC?
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT OY AN UNAUTIIOAI(CO PERSON 15
L~N~~y_FNFP NO OUCTI Qj~O( THIS NCP OIIT IS PNOHIR.1U.
1) Conclusions and Observations
2) Cinder and Other Dressings
3) Graveled Roads
5) Log Roads
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DATE DISTR./S Feb 195
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
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end -
DISTRICUTION 4 STATE ARMY - NAVY I IAIR
This report is for the use within the USA of the Intelligence cpmponents of the
Agencies in ~(Fpp~ I6 ~&Y ~q~ti~g8ngA (~gSflD' q~q~19~9 ne
originating o e t trough tZ~e sslsCan 17.~ec$r r of the 113oe o G~o71ecL~on an~~3iasem7nn~ion, IA
.
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THE RAPIDITY AND METHODS OF MILITARY ROADS CONSTRUCTION
IN THE SOVIET ARMY DURING THE WAR PLBIOD, 1941 - 1945
1. Conclusions and Observations
a. Concerning the question of the specific role of mechanized
transport in Soviet Army operations
In any attempt to determine the specific role of mechanized
transport in the facilitation of military operations of the Soviet Army
on the territory of the Soviet Union, in particular, and the European
theater of war, in general, it is absolutely impossible to approach the
subject through the usual methods of material and technical estimates,
i.e., on the basis of quite approximate data concerning the transporta-
tion of goods in the Soviet Union and an estimate of the percentages of
the specific types of transport involved, and to draw conclusions concern-
ing their relative importance. For example, proceeding on this basis,
one might infer that since the figure representing the share of motor
transport in the over-all annual transport was two percent, it would
be logical to assume that its present, post-war share is not higher than
1+-6 percent, with furi;her conclusion that, compared with railway trans-
port, its possibilities are very low. However, an analysis of the facts
based on the experience of the "Great War" of 1941 - 1945 acts as an
important corrective to such a point of view. This viewpoint remains
correct if it is a question of so-called strategic transport in the
broad sense of the word, but it is incorrect as regards the role of
motor transport in the solution of operational problems (within the limits
of an army group), and all the more so in the solution of tactical prob-
lems (within the limits of separate armies).
that,
Wartime experience for the Soviet aide showed the relatively un-
developed network of railway communications and acute shortage of rolling
stock, chiefly, freight and flat cars, completely altered all the former
notions about motor vehicle transport as a means of carrying freight over
short distances (the 1941 norm for trucks was not more than 60 kilometers
from the front line; for horse-drawn loads, up to 40 kilometers). Taking
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into consideration, in addition to all this, the great liability (in the
first period of the war) of railroad lines and bases to destruction by
the enemy from the air, motor transport in a number of cases was the sole
means for the conveyance of military supplies and equipment from the home
front (200-250 kilometers). In the course of military actions, and more
especially, in the preparations for them, simultaneous transport by
motor vehicles of entire army groups for distances up to 500 miles took
place. In such actions, moreover, not only were the front-line supply
bases relocated, but also a significant proportion of the armies' personnel
(the transfer of units of the former Don front in February 1943 from
the Stalingrad area to the area of the so-called "Orel-Kursk Arc"). On
principal sectors of the front (the bridgeheads at the Vistula and the
Oder), so-called "motorized kulaks" rfists7 were organized by the Soviet
command, which, to a large degree, were responsible for the successful
conduct of offensive operations, a detailed account of which does not come
within the scope of the present subject. Not without interest in this
connection are the confidential data of the Engineering Administration
of the General Staff of the Army indicating that 400,000 trucks were
simultaneously engaged in transport operations at the fronts in the period,
1943 - 1945, with an average maximum run of 100 kilometers, and a quantity
of freight moved (including personnel) amounting to 300,000,000 tons.
On the whole, insofar as the observations of the author, in the course
of activity on separate fronts (army groups), permit, the figure for
the share of motor transport in military materiel transport, within a
limit of 300 kilometers from the home front to the front lines must be
raised to 25-30 percent, and in special instances to 75 percent.
b. The question of the military and administrative solution of the
problem of the lack of roads
The decision of the Soviet Government and the Military Command
to create a special roads service (in the nature of engineer troops)
within the army was not the product of long and careful thcught, but
appeared as a nefural reaction tc the problems posed by life itself,
when the months of the war made apparent the failure of the usual "sapper"
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units and construction and special road exploitation battalions and
regiments to ensure the passage of trucks and other types of motorized
transport, under conditions imposed by maneuvers and the tremendous
extent and. depth of the front. The history of the Soviet military roads
units bears manifest traces of this "administrative breakdown."
The first stage: In September 1941, by an order of the State
Committee of Defense (Gosudarstbennyy Komitet Oborony), the Administrations
the Gushossdor NKVD,
of Military Road Works (UVDR) were created and plac~8`undei'" Main Ad
ministration of Highway,
of the latter were placed military road detachments (VDO). Service in
the UVDR and the VDO was placed on the same footing as service in the
army. The executive personnel was drawn from the administrative and
engineering-technical staffs of Gushossdor NKVD or from the territorial
(local) highways Sections of Glavdorup /Main Administration of Road,
a civil organization. The rank-and-file personnel was recruited. through
the local Military Commissariats. Military uniforms (second and third
categories), food, and other items of material and technical equipment
were supplied from local bases, on request of the Main Administration.
The wage scales maintained corresponded approximately to the pre-war
scales prevailing for Gushossdor employees. In this connection, wages
were also paid to the rank-and-file workers (150-200 rubles a month).
was,
The workaluated according to the Uniform Work Norms (ENV) and the
technical accounting followed the peace-time forms.
There does not yet exist a precisely defined table of or-
ganization for UVDR and VDO, although there is a breakdown in the latter
into companies and platoons. The VDO personnel varies from 400 to 800
men, with temporary assignment to them of militarized "labor battalions"
for the execution of urgent, emergency works, such as the construction
of the metal overhead bridge across the Sosna River in the city of
Yelets in the \,/inter of 1941 - 1942. The VDO personnel, carrying out
this task, numbered 854 men.
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Second stage: In June 1942, all six of the UVDRs in existence
at this time, with their entire personnel (there were then about 30 VDOs),
were transferred from the Gushossdor NKVD to the newly organized Main
Administration of Military Roads under the Engineering Administration of
the Army, which was renamed the Main Administration of Motor Roads in
194-4 (GUAR NKVS, later MVS USSR). The UVDR were renamed tV VDU (Military
Roads Administrations). The VDU and VDO personnel became henceforth
an integral part of the active army, with all the consequent rights
and duties, such as the provision of clothing and food according to army
norms (secondary norms of supply behind the front line and primary norms
at the front or in close proximity to it), the acquisition of military
ranks, the taking of the military oath, the disciplining rights of com-
manders of military units, liability to investigation and trial by the
military prosecuting office, and courts-martial. A precise table of
organization and a table of technical equipment were set up. Pay rates
were established for command ranks of the army engineer forces. The
rank-and-file and non-commissioned officers were paid according to the
scales prevailing for regular military units. The total number of VDUs
was raised from six to ten. The VDU and VDO were always considered
"reserves of the High Command," subject to operational (tactical) as-
signments, depending on the requirements of the military situation, to
the various fronts (army groups), and even. to separate armies (for
example, the 3d VDU in 1945 was assigned to the Fifth Shock Army), with
the preservation, however, of the territorial situation when possible
(the 1st VDU, throughout the war, was maintained in the northwest with
the Leningrad and Baltic Fronts (military groups), while the 3d VDU
was maintained in the central area on the southwestern, Stalingrad,
central, and 1st Belorussian Fronts (military groups)). The territorial
dispositions of the VDU and VDO in the first and second stages of their
activity, 1941 - 1942, were behind. the front, 50-150 kilometers from the
front line, and in 1942 - 1943 in the army rear, 20-50 kilometers from
the front line.
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The third stage
19+3 - 1945, the end of the war. This stage
of the military roads units as a
represen
ed the final organization
t
combat reserve of "sappel" units.
tion in I
bridge constructi
detachment's" were
Great stress was laid on specializa-
on. In each' VDU, special "bridge construction
establilshed (officially termed Military, Bridge, and
Road Detgchment, or VNDO)
whose personnel was numerically equal to that
standird VDOs, but differing in their professional aspect.
mand stafji was composed of bridge construction engineers, and the rank-
and-file consisted, mainl, of carpenters and other professional workers
familiar with wood and mixed wood-and--m&:tal bridge construction. The
"bridge detachments" existing from the very beginning and attached to
each VDO (one company to detachment) were strengthened with especially
qualified personnel and reinforced with technical equipment.
They were employed in direct proximity to the front and
even at tai so-called "bridgeheads," i.e., bridgeheads at river lines
(detachments of the 3d VDTJ were used in operations at the Oder in
Germany; he 2d VDU in Berlin, and in Austria). The necessity of the
above-named units was dictated by the significant losses among the
personnel of the "sapper" units in the! course of military operations.
The fourth stage: the transition to peace-time conditions.
With the conclusion of mi itary activity in Europe and the partial
demobili Ition of the army personnel, the situation was as follows at the
end of 19iS,I:
(1)
The transfer of military roads units from former
front areas' to the Soviet Union. In this connection, the 3d VDU was
construction
r
on the Turkish border, whi e two other VDUs were sent to the Far East,
to the Manchurian frontiers, for the execution of similar tasks.
(2) The older personnel of the rank-and-file and NCO
staffs ;aerlldemobilized and replaced by cadres of young draftees,
first senli to the Transcaucasus for the
partially from former repatriates -- "Ostarbeiter" -- mobilized for
military service.
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(3) The total number of VDUs was reduced to five, with
the following disposition: one oriented toward the European area of
the Soviet Union, in the Belorussian area; two in the Caucasus and the
Transcaucasus-alternately, on the Turkish and Persian "rontiers; and
two in the Far East, with the task of building main highways and bridges;
the roads were asphalt-concrete and the bridges were of metal and mixed
construction and ferro-concrete 1si_J
During the entire war period, a peculiar dualism of ad-
ministrative subordination was preserved in the military road units.
Although assigned,for the purpose of securing trafficability of the
roads, to the various Fronts (to military groups) and, even, to separate
armies, although supplied by these Fronts (military groups) and armies
with materiel and food rations, and although subordinate in a definite
sense to the Engineering Branch (Administration) of the Staff of the
Front, the VDU and the VDO were at the same time directly subordinate
to the Main Military Roads Administration, later the Main Administra-
tion of Motorized Roads (GUADu) in matters concerning the receipt and
execution of orders dealing with transfers (to the Fronts, military
groups), changes in the table of organization, the staffing of the
units with leading cadres (engineers and technologists), detachment of
personnel, technical accounting and instruction. In the post-war
period, the VDUs, attached, on a territorial basis, to the appropriate
Military Okrug LDistric7 Administrations and supplied locally with
equipment and food rations, saw their dual lines of administrative sub-
ordination considerably diminished. Their subordination to the Military
Okrug Administrations now consisted only in the maintenance of personnel
files, the acceptance of new enlisted and NCO personnel and accounting
of supplies and food rations. With the conclusion of a production as-
signment, their service in a given Military Okrug was usually at an
end, and the VDU and VDO were transferred, by order of the Main Ad-
ministration of Motorized Roads (GUAD), without the slightest hindrance.
In wartime, the administrative dualism had a negative significance in
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certain cases. Cases of intervention of the Front Command (military
groups) and of individual
armies occurred in purely technical questions
of construction, and ther were attempts by individual VDOs to break away
VDU, and to assume the status of separate
battalions directly subordinate to the Engineering Administration
(Section) of the Front Sta
ff (military group).
The very nature of the origin and organization of the
VDUs and the VDOs gave ride to a number of special characteristics
distinguishing them from the other types of engineering corps of the
Soviet Army and even from the former (now dissolved) "highway exploita-
tion regiments." Though they had in their ranks a significant number
of experienced and highly competent technical specialists in highway
and bridge construction (some engineers in the VDOs have academic degrees
for published specialized scientific works), the VDU and VDO were
noticeably lagging in problems dealing with the military (combat) train-
ing of personnel. Concern with combat training (the study of military
regulations, tactics, the handling of personal weapons, etc.) was
sporadic in wartime and could not give satisfactory results. For ex-
ample, the fact that until the end of 1942 only the VDO chief and the
`may be cited as an illustration.
four company commanders had personal?we'ap-oris`(p3stols In the entire
VDO there were not more than. a dozen rifles. After the war, great
efforts were made to remedy these shortcomings. Daily drill was intro-
duced among the rank-and-file and the NCO staff, and a combat-training
seminar for officers and firing practice. A table of personal arms to
be used by the VDU and VDO personnel in wartime was drawn up. (Officers
have personal arms in peace time.)
c. The activity of the military roads units in practice
The information al ilable to the author about the 35th Military
Roads Detachment of the 3d Military Roads Administration may help, as an
example, to define the practical activity of the military roads units.
The 35th VDO was created in September 1941 in the city of
Voronezh. Its practical activity extended from October 1941 to July 19115,
after which the VDO was sent from Eastern Germany to the Soviet union
to be disbanded.
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In that span of time, the 35th VDO was employed on 16 highway
routes with a total length of 1,430 kilometers and on 14 separate targets
(the construction of large-scale, multi-span bridges), namely:
(1) The Voronezh-Ostrogozhsk highway, LOO kilometers in'
length. Reinforcement of the roadway (at the beginning of the war, con-
struction work on the highway had not been completed); construction a A
repairs of bridges, designed to bear the weight of 30-ton and 60-ton
(2) The Voronezh-Tambov dirt road, 208 kilometers in
length, which was given winter maintenance.
(3) The construction of a metal highway bridge across
the Krasivaya Mecha River, 40 meters long.
(4) The construction of a metal highway bridge in the
of Yelets, 200 meters long.
C ity
(5) The Voronezh-Zadonsk highway, extending 80 kilomete sS
reinforcement of the highway and modification of bridges to bear calcul
lated weights of 30 and 60 tons.
(6) The servicing of ferries crossing the Don River in
the city of Zadonsk, at the time of the spring floods.
(7) The construction of underwater wooden bridge across
the Voronezh River, 80 and 120 meters long.
(8) The Michurinsk-Ryazhsk dirt road, extending 100 kill-
meters, which was cindered and given summer and winter maintenance.
(9) The Bol'shaya Privalovka-Tambov dirt road, extending
162 kilometers, which was given summer maintenance.
(10) The Ranenburg-"Lev Tolstoy" Station dirt road, ex-
tending 40 kilometers, which was given summer maintenance.
(11) The reconstruction (reinforcement) of the wooden girder
railway bridge at the village, Ilovay-Brigadirskoye, with a total
trafficable length of 65 meters.
(12) The winter maintenance of the Ertil'-Borisoglebsk dirt
road, extending 120 kilometers.
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(13) The preparation of elements of the highway bridge
across the Don River at the city of Serafimovich.
(14) The winter maintenance of the Voronezh -Gorshechnoye
dirt road, extending 70 kilometers.
(15) The Novyy Tim-Zolotukhino dirt road, which was
graveled, and given winter, spring, and summer maintenance. Bridges
were modified and strengthened to bear an estimated weight of 60 tons.
(16) The building of a wood-construction highway bridge
across the Snova River at Zolotukhino Station, whose length of roadway
(17) The Fatezh-Kromy highway, extending 60 kilometers,
which was given summer maintenance; the roadway was repaired and bridges
were strengthened to bear an estimated weight of 60 tons.
(18) The Klintsy-Novobelitsa dirt road, extending 75 kilo-
meters, which was given winter and spring maintenance; a paneled road was
constructed and bridges were modified and! strengthened to bear an esti-
mated weight of 60 tons.
(19) The erection of a wood-construction highway bridge
across the Sozh River at the city of Gomel', whose roadway was 410 meters.*
(20) The repair of the Mozyr'-Ovruch highway, extending
75 kilometers. Tracked and paneled roads were constructed; bridges were
constructed and modified (strengthened) to bear an estimated weight of
140-kilometer
(21) The/Ke chit sa -Glus sk dirt road, where planking was
(22) The Kobrin-Brest highway, extending 45 kilometers,
which was given summer maintenance; bridges were restored and modified
to bear an estimated weight of 60 tons.
(23) The repair of sections of the Sedlets-Miloska Stara
high- y, extending 70 kilometers. The highway was given summer maintenance,
and bridges were modified to bear an estimated weight of 60 tons.
Bridges built in cooperation with other sections of the 3d VDU.
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(24) The construction of the wooden highway bridge across
the Western Bug at the city of Drogichin with a roadway length of 350
meters.*
(25) The construction of the wooden highway bridge across
the Vistula at the city of Warsaw, with a roadway length of 500 meters.*
(26) The Tornov-Berval'de dirt road, extending 40 kilo-
meters, which was given spring maintenance.
(27) The construction of the wooden highway bridge across
the Varta River at the city of Landsberg, with a length of 200 meters.
(28) The construction of the wooden low-water bridge
across the Oder River at the town of Tsellin, with a length (including
the approaches) of 320 meters.
(29) The construction of the wooden low-water bridges at
the junction of the Oder and Vorta rivers at the city of Kyustrin
nine units with a total length of 450 meters.*
(30) The construction of a wooden highway bridge across
the Oder at the city of Frankfurt, with a length of 150 meters.
Certain Data on the Volume of Work Completed
1
Dirt roads: constructed
shaped
improved
200 kilometers
410 kilometers
100 kilometers
2
Drains laid out
1,070 kilometers
20 kilometers
4
Crushed-stone surfacing of highways
with local materials
40 kilometers
5
Construction of graveled roads
12 kilometers
6
Holes repaired: bridges
asphalt-crushed
75 kilometers
120 kilometers
70 kilometers
30 kilometers
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10 Highway bridges: new construction
repaired and modified
11 Wooden low-water and submerged bridges
12 Railway bridges
13 Winter maintenance of roads
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100 kilometers
3,700 meters
6,000 meters
970 meters
65 meters
820 kilometers
From the quantitative evidence of r' ad projects carried out,
their character may be determined and their rpneral. trend established
as follows:
(1) The avoidance, when possible, o
materials and projects requiring large capita
execution, and above all., those requiring muc
heavy expenditures of
investment for their
time.
(2) The tendency to improve existent roads and not to build
new ones; to limit new constructions to tempollary types (wooden covering
and the use of local materials, in particularly crushed brick). The
proolem of the military roads units was to enlure trafficability, literally,
for a relatively short period of time, and to do everything in the
shortest possible time in order that military cargoes might move on
the roads without interruption.
Such a solution of the problem was ratural and appropriate under
Illustrative Information Concerni the Technical
Ejuipment of Military Roads Units
In 1941 - 1942, each VDO had on the averge: (a) eight ZIS-5
trucks and eight GAZ-AA trucks; (b) three or our towing-tractors;
(c) two graders; (d) two road rollers. This fias all the road machine
equipment. The construction of multi-span, high over-water bridges was
carried out with the use of primitive equipment; the pile-driver apparatus
did not deliver above 40 or 50 blrws a minute' steam-hammers were
I I
altogether lacking; and the coefficient of rai ing power was exceedingly
low.
In 1943, in each VDO there were on the average: (a) twelve ZIS-5
trucks and eightGAZ-AA trucks; (b) ten towin tractors; (c) six graders;
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(d) four road rollers. Improvised triangle-type snow-removers and plows
were replaced. by mechanical rotary snow-removers. Mechanical pile-
drivers (steam hammers) appeared, with an appropriate "head" assembly
weighing from 500 to 2,000 kilograms, as well as mobile repair shops
equipped with a diversity of instruments and machine tools.
In 1944 - 1945, the number of motor vehicles attached to each VDO
plus the motorized units assigned
six mechanical pile -drivers
The mutual assistance 5revailii
the fulfillment of specific' tasks,
them, served to bring about a con-
siderable degree of smoothness fo-f operatio7.
The higher command, in particular, the Main Administration of
Motorized Roads, bore little responsibility for the growth of the
technical equipment; the greater part of this equipment appearedlin the
form of war trophies. In a number of cases, these were seizures
independently carried out by the VDOs while passing through the front
area, and, therefore, carried the trade marks of French, German, and
other firms (mechanical pile-drivers and mobile repair shops). Motor
vehicle pools were later stocked in a formal manner, throughout the
entire army, which was being supplied with "lend-lease" motor vehicles.
The German "trophy" trucks were surrendered and replaced by American
Dodges or Studebakers; similarly, at the front, motor pools were sup-
.
plied home-produced five-ton GAZ-AA trucks, which were gradually
turned in as they became unprofitable in military road operationsl
because of their small volume and load capacity, the rapid wearing
out of parts, their low roadability on dirt roads in the spring' and
fall seasons, and the absence of a mechanical dumper for loose freight.
As is apparent from the postwar data, the peace-time VDO motor pool
(the number of motor vehicles required by the tables of organization)
and the bridge construction equipment was reduced in quantity (25ZIS-5
trucks and 4 mechanical pile-drivers to each VDO), but this is compen-
sated for, in operation, by the rapid notification of shortages in
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equipment in the execution of individual assignments, i.e., the rental-use
system (arendnoye pol'zovaniye).
During the war, the duration of stay of the military roads units on
any one route or objective was reduced. For example, the same 35th VDO,
in 1941, serviced two highway routes (3 months) and was transferred only
once; in 1942, it serviced four routes and five special targets, with
three total and five partial relocations; in 1943, it serviced six routes
and one separate target, with six total and three partial relocations,
in 1944, it serviced four routes and two separate targets, with twelve
total and two partial relocations; in 1945, in a 4-month period, it
serviced one route and five separate targets, with eight relocations.
Thus, in 1941 - 1942, they transferred, on the average, once every
3-4 months; in 1943, once every 2 months; in 1944, once a month; and
in 1945, once every 2 weeks. The figures will be more significant if
the increase in the distances involved in the relocations is taken into
account. The average distance in 1941 - 1942 was 50-75 kilometers; in
1943 - 1944, from 100 to 250 kilometers, 11 1945, the jump from Poland
to Germany, involved a distance of 400 kilometers and was made in 5 days,
with all the equipment. Throughout the war years great attention was
given by the command staff of the military roads units to the problem
of maneuverability (the rapidity of relocation). In view of the fact
that the VDO was burdened with heavy, motorless, slow-moving equipment,
and the long-felt shortcomings in motor transport facilities, it is aasy
to understand the complexity of the problem to be solved. Approximative
(variant) plans were elaborated for operative (rapid) relocation, en-
visaging minimal expenditures of transport facilities for "damage-repair"
operations, such as snow removal on the roads in winter, the clearing
of roads during the spring and autumn when the roads become mired. Ac-
cording to these plans, the problem was solved thr gh the "method of
small forces." Simultaneously, with the receipt of an order for the
transfer of any unit to the site of new "damage-repair" operations, a
so-called "operational group," in several of the best vehicles, equipped
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with everything necessary in the evert of repairs or fueling on the road, was
dispatched in advance and sometimes much earlier than the arrival of the
main VDO forces. The numerical strength of the operational group de-
quality of its men (the best officers, sergeants, and enlisted men).
repairs. However, in no case were they to scatter over the whole site
(the matter concerned a highway, for example), but they were to proceed
along it in a previously determined direction. Usually, under the
wartime labor conscript system, the available civilian population in
areas was enlisted for road maintenance operations (the ensurance
of trafficability). Arriving at the road site, the basic VDO forces
began to distribute themselves from the opposite end of the rxighway, so
as to meet with "operational groups." Experience clearly dictated such
a solution. It was, indeed, in this manner that the danger of failing
to fulfill a battle order and even the nullification of military
The most effective and expedient methods of distribution} along the
road sectors were gradually worked out. The desirable extent of a road
sector to be serviced by one VDO on dirt roads, which are characteristic
for military operations on USSR territory, did not exceed 70 kilometers.
The usual disposition of a VDO on a road sector may be outlined as follows:
Somewhere -- approximately, in the center of the road sector -- the VDO
staff was stationed, with the 4th (automobile mechanics) Company attached
to it, the latter charged with the task of furnishing transport services,
administrative help, and supply dumps to all the other VDO subdivisions.
Each road company (3 in all) serviced a section of the
20-25 kilometers. Thus, each platoon was responsible,
for a road sector of 5-7 kilometers (25-30 troops to a
road, averaging
platoon). The
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dispositions of the companies and platoons were subject to change even
in the servicing of a single highway route. During the stay of a VDO
on a given route, according to the degree of need, partial relocations
frequent
might occur, which were particularly n the case of platoons that had
been combined with other platoons for the execution of some recurrent,
urgent operation on a small road sector. In the matter of winter
maintenance of dirt roads, experience showed the expediency of a timely
erection of fixed snow defenses in the form of braided brushwood and
screens along the entire road on both sides, excluding sites with high
embankments and populated areas. This was true, above all, in the
central belt of the European part of the USSR, with its strong winds and
high sn3wdrifts. In the absence of materials for the construction of
brushwood fences and fixed snow screens, the same problems might be solved
through the erection of snow walls and embankments either by hand or
mechanically (with the aid of snow plows). Along road sectors likely
to be snowed in, a duty-service was organized, with snow-removal equip-
ment, with a servicing norm, in the case of tractor-drawn snow plows,
of 15-20 kilometers of road, and 5 kilometers in the case of horse-drawn
"triangle" plows. In this connection, the presence on one and the same
road sector of both types of plows was not impossible, since the horse-
drawn plows had the primary function of daily "preventive clearing" of
small drifts, more exactly, the prevention of the formation of bulges
and obstructions by the snow. Heavy-tractor apparatus or rotor-type
snow plows were used for the removal of the consequences of a protracted
snow storm and deep drifts across the trafficable part of the road.
2. Cinder and Other Dressings
In the complex of military road operations whose task and limited
objective was the ensurance of trafficability along the motor roads in
the shortest possible time and with the minimum expenditure of men and
materials, a role of special importance was assigned tL, ijad covers con-
sisting of so-called "local materials." These included sandstone, soft
limestone, crushed stone and sand mixtures, broken brick, and furnace
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were needed, in the neighborhood of Khobotovo Station, which was also in
the immediate viciaity of the road, without the necessity of constructing
special access routes.
It was decided, in the first instance, to apply cinder dressing to
a 9-kilometer sector of the road to a depth of 20 centimeters (0.20 x
8 x .75 x 8,000 = 9,600 cubic meters); sand was used in the following
proportions: 0.20 x 8 x .25 x 8,000 = 3,200 cubic meters.
Thus, a total of 12,800 cubic meters of local materials was re-
quired for construction.
The organization of the work may be outlined in the following way:
At the Kochetovka Station site, two so-called "shuttles" were in
operation, feeding the cinder supply as close as possible to the site of
the road work. This was a combination of two separate railroad flat-car
assemblies, each one in turn being moved along a narrow-gauge siding by
a switch engine, in a continuous operation. The "shuttle" could trans-
port 160 tons of material in one trip (each assembly loading and un-
loading once). Two shifts, working 10 and 6 hours, respectively,
handled the loading and unloading operations in two groups of 20 troops
each on the flat-car assemblies with a norm of 20 cubic meters of slag
for each group in a ten hour working day (loading the material on the
flat cars and unloading it into trucks).
In the latter operation, they were assisted by the troops assigned
for the servicing of the trucks (one to a vehicle).
Twelve cargo trucks transported the cinders to the road site,
with a norm of 20 trips over an average distance of 3 kilometers in
16 hours. The movement of 9,600 cubic meters of slag was accomplished
in 16 days, i.e., an average of 600 cubic tons a day.
Seven cargo trucks were engaged in conveying sand to the road site,
with a norm of 12 trips over an average distance of 5 kilometers in a
16-hour period. The movement of 3,200 cubic meters of sand were fulfilled
in 15 days, by increasing the number of trips (the Stakhanovite method),
i.e., an average of 215 cubic meters a day. This was above the daily
norm required for mixing the material with the cinders moved to the
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road site (600 cubic meters), the norm being 150 cubic meters. Thus, a
reserve of sand was accumulated at the work site.
Two shifts (10 and 6 hours, respectively:) were engaged in loading
operations at the sand pits, which were of the open type, each shift
enploying 16 troops, with an individual norm of 9 cubic meters of sand
per 10-hour day.
A light grading of the roadway with a grader (the restoration of
the grade was achieved by going over four times with a "GL" grader)
and the construction of a curbing of crushed rock preceded the cinder
dressing operations. Two platoons (40 persons) were engaged in spreading
the slag, in which connection the so.called "conveyer" method, for the
increased scale of operations, was employed, although only partially,
i.e., the troops were subdivided into several groups (sections), each
work team following the other in succession. Thus, at the time, for
example, that the third group was distributing the cinders (evening
them out), the second team mixed cinders and sand and spread the mixture
on the next section of the road, while the first team marked off the
surface of the roadway further ahead (set up guide markers), continuously
preparing each successive section of the road in the same way. A port
of the same troops went ahead to build the curbing.
The cinders were spread in two layers, 10 centimeters in depth each,
with a light roller (5 tons) rolling each layer and a medium motorized
roller (7 tons) rolling it a second time, going over it 7 to 12 times.
Water was poured on the cinders at the same time.
The first 8 kilometers of cinder dressing were done in 18 days,
with two shifts of road workers, i.e., an average of 4-40 meters of road
per day, or 11 :peters for each worker per 10-hour shift. The work on
the remaining 12 kilometers was carried out at the same rate and. was
completed on the 15th of September. Subseque-.cly, the depth of the
cinder layer was increased in places to 25 centimeters.
In the September-November period the section dressed with cinders
gave full satisfaction, subjected to a daily flow of motor-vehicle
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columns averaging 1,000 vehicles, as against the usual volume of 100-200
vehicles daily for an unimproved dirt road.
The period of the autumn thaws passed without', consequences, in the
sense of reduced trafficability. Subsequent observations showed the
necessit:, in the case of extended use of previously dressed sections,
of preventive repairs by filling in separate sections of the roadway
and additional rolling. As it turned out, a part of the covering was
carried off by the wheels of passing vehicles, leading to the appearance
of t:'ack marks and. "bald spots" on the roadway. T1iese defects, with a
little effort, were eliminated in the course of day-to-day maintenance.
Many roads at or near the front were dressed with crushed brick, available
in large amounts as a result of military activity in the neighborhood of
populated areas.
Reconstruction work was undertaken in the Sumawr of 1943 on a sector
of the Fatezh-Dmitriyev L'govskiy road (40 kilometers), with the preliminary
laying down of a sandy layer, 20 centimeters deep,along the grade of the
roadway. The crushed brick was scattered, evened out and rolled, unlike
the usual temporary covering with analogous material, in a single layer
10 centimeters deep, with brick fragments of about 50 millimeters, and
a supplemental covering of brick fragments and slaked lime, as well as
an outer covering of gravel. The rolling of the surface with powered
rollers, first with a light roller and then with two medium rollers, was
carried out in the same way as on the cinder-dressed roads.
The brick dressing operations on the above-mentioned road sector
employed two roads companies (150 workers) with the division of the sector
between them into two approximately equal parts, in terms of extent and
the amount of work involved.
Forty vehicles from a motorized regiment were assigned to assist
in the movement of the crushed brick and sand from the open pit, with
an average daily norm of 16 trips over a 5-kilometer distance.
In the preparation of the crushed brick and the loading and un-
loading operations, 45 troops were employed; 105 persons were used in
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the road-dressing operations. Labor productivity averaged 9 meters of
covering per man per day (in a 10-hour shift). Thus, 945 meters of
road was dressed each day. In the transport work, trucks with mechanical
dumping devices were employed.
3. Gravel Roads
The classification of "capital road-construction work," which
occurred. during the war, includes, first of all, the construction of
light-duty gravel roads with an estimated endurance of not more than
five years under continuous use. The majority of these roads were built
in small sections not exceeding 20-30 kilometers. The data cited below
deals with one such construction project carried out on the Novyy Tim-
Zolotukhino military route, in the "Orel-Kursk Arc" area in May and
June of 1943.
The sector of the dirt road in the environs of the village of
Mokhovoye, was found to be in a highly unsatisfactory condition during
winter maintenance work (snow drifts),,with damage done by the spring
thaw (deep mud holes). In order to prevent decisively a threatening
situation in the future, it was decided to undertake the construction
of a gravel road along a 12-kilometer section with the advent of steady
summer weather. Thirty workdays were assigned for the completion of
the task. Carrying out the work was a military-roads detachment (three
companies) and two truck battalions assigned them from a motor pool to
assist in the movement of materials.
The basic operations consisted of the following:
a. The construction of an embankment averaging 3 to 5 meters
in height along the entire sector of the road;
b. the construction of a drain;
c. profiling, with the construction of curbings and ditches;
d. the rolling and packing of the dirt subroadway;
e. the construction of a "trough," with a hard cover;
f. time construction of a sand foundation 20 centimeters thick;
g. the preparation and transport to the work site of con-
struction material: 14,400 cubic meters of gravel (crushed stone) and
19,200 cubic meters of sand;
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h. the spreading of a single layer of gravel, 15 centimeters
i. the profiling and packing of the finished surface.
For the execution of the work, the VDO had at its disposal 290
persons -- troops belonging to the road companies -- 50 trucks with
automatic dumpers, and 54 tricks without such dumpers. The following
the "open" pits;
equipment was employed:
2 "GS" graders
3 light and medium motor rollers
6 belt conveyers
4 ChTZ tractors
Besides that, 12 cars were employed on a narrow-gauge railway, traveling
parallel to the construction site, plus wheelbarrows, tampers, and other
light construction equipment.
The distribution of labor was as follows:
a. 80 troops were employed in loading and unloading work at
b.
c.
150 troops were
60 troops were e
mployed in gravel
spreading with the
d.
In the transport
operations, 40 trucks were employed to
deliver gravel to the construction site over a distance of 10 kilometers,
with a norm of 10 trips per 10-hour working period; 64 trucks were em-
distance of 8 kilometers, with a norm of
10 trips per 10-hour working period.
It was decided to construct a crescent-shaped profile, with a road-
way 8 meters wide, dirt shoulders 1.5 meters wide, and drainage ditches
The "conveyer method" of roduction was to be applied wit:. _,11 the
possible operations performed s.L...altaneously in a successive ser'es.
The working day was 10 houre.
The task of constructing 12-kilometer sector of gravel road was
carried out in the designated period of 30 days, with the completion of
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transport operations in the delivery of sand in 20 days, and of gravel
in 24 days. The earth work was to be completed in 20 days, and the
grai'el surfacing in 20 days.
The Volume of Basic Operations Completed
a. Earth works -- 36,000 cubic meters
b. Sand moved, spread, and rolled -- 19,200 cubic meters
c. Gravel transported, poured, and rolled -- 14,400 cubic meters
d. Gravel surfacing -- 12,000 cubic meters, in a layer 15 centil''
meters thick
The labor productivity was as follows:
a. Loading and unloading operations involving the use of
conveyers -- 20 cubic meters per man per 10-hour day;
b. Earth operations (medium soil) carried out by hand --
12 cubic meters per man per 10-hour day;
c. Construction of the gravel cover, 10 meters of finished
road per man per 10-hour day.
The road surface performance gave fully satisfactory results in
subsequent use. The first major repair he filling of hole of the
4. Tracked and Paneled Roads
Under conditions of total or partial impassibility on roads, with
a dangerous interruption of movement, in marshy and ;wooded areas, temporary
light, portable, sectional wooden tracks and road panels, quickly and in-
expensively assembled, rendered a great service to Soviet Army operations.
Their total extent in the European territories of the Soviet Union during
the war was measured in hundreds of kilometers. During the war, through
practical experience, a study of the best methods of construction and a
selection of the most expedient designs were made. Altogether 40 types
of designs were employed during the three-year war period.
An approximate classification of various construction designs was
established, depending on the type of movement and the kind of soil'.
According to this classification, the construction of a tracked road
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out of loge or wooden beams (the latter, in"the event of proximity to
a sawmill) was recommended for intensive motor vehicle movement (up to
500 vehicles a day) in heavy or marshy soils: in the last instance, a
timber flooring (paneled road), on reinforced foundations, was recommended
for mixed traffic, including caterpillar-tread transports (also on
heavy or swampy soils).
On the Klintsy-Novobelitsa, Mozyr'-Ovruch, and Rechitsa-Glussk
military routes, 70 kilometers of timber tracked road (two-way) were
constructed by one military roads detachment.
The tracked road in one instance employed plank jr boarj con-
struction and in the other boam (nakatnik) construction. In both cases,
they were built with holding clamps, not made of metal, having the
following dimensions: .75 - 1.00 - .75 meters, totaling 2.5 meters, and
with wheel guides. Construction of tracked roads was carried out on
the surface of the soil, outside of the trafficable part of dirt roads
or highways already in existence in certain places. This was done with
the aim of providing additional traffic routes and also in order to
avoid traffic blocks during necessary repair work on the roadway
sectors of the basic routes.
Paneled roads employed plank construction, with transverses angled
diagonally to the flooring, and panels 3.2 x 4.2 meters in size.
This type of road was also built alongside of primary roads, on
the ground surface. The dimensions noted, for tracked as well as for
paneled roads, were used not only out of consideration for the ensurance
of intensive transport movements, but also for the facilitation of trans-
port of the structural elemeuts to the installation site (the weight of
a panel could not exceed 400 kilograms). In the construction of paneled
roads, the junctions of the panels were arranged in such a manner that
the wheels of the vehicles should rest simultaneously and continuously
on two contiguous sections of the paneling. In this way the weakest
point in the construvtion of paneled roads, i.e., the disruption of
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where the foundation was Weak or where the paneling used was very thin.
(The required thickness of !the panels ranged from 4 to 7 centimeters.)
Stakes 0.7 ter in length and 10 centimeters in thickness were driven
1'
on both sides in checkerboard fashion three or four to a panel, to secure
the panel ill place ans hold it from shifting under the passage of
When time permitted, flanges were constructed out of planks
or beams along the side ofi~~the assembled panels, to prevent the vehicles
from skiddiing off the oad.
The construction of a tracked road involved the following opera-
tions: (a) the procurement and processing of materials (beams, stakes,
and wheel-gli'des) on t e site, in wooded areas; (b) the preparation of
a foundation for the tracked road (earth operations); (c) the trans-
portation of prepared materials to the construction site in accordance
with the planned schedu a (operations plan); (d) the assembly of the
.structural elements on he site. In the construction of paneled roads,
the latter process conslatedilin the assembly of the shields and the
reinforcement of the assembled road.
II'
In all Irnatruction of tracked and paneled roads, great attention
was paid to tie regulation o'! movement (the erection of road markers,
the assignment of troops to direct traffic, etc.). Sometiies the
timber flanges and outside Wheel-guides were painted white so that the
roadway might be more easily identified.
Work on the construltion'!of a road was carried out by companies
and by platoons, while special teams prepared and transported the ma-
terials.
The preparation and grading of the earth foundation is executed by
a "GL" grader, or manually by a force of 10 to 25 troops. The assembly
of the panels is carried out by groups of six men when the road is con-
structed from one end, and, by110-man groups when the section is simul-
taneously built from botti,d .da. The aseemL,,ay of the connecting cross
the junctio' , was ci cumvonted. This occurred especially frequently
by groups o~P four and five, and the construction of
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wheel-guides or flanges by groups of two or three men. The reinforcement
of the panels and tracks is carried out by groups of six. Each group
was assigned daily a definite section to be completed.
Labor productivity attained on the construction of tracked and
paneled roads may be judged by the following date
a. On highway No 1, a single VDO company (85 persot,s) con-
structed 0.6 kilometer of two-way paneled road daily, and 0.8 kilometer
of one-way tracked (planked) road.
ib. On highway Nos 2 and 3, these same forces built daily
0.5 kilometer of tracked road employing poles.'
In the above example, the time employed in preparatory work on the
foundations of the road was included.
5. Log Roads
Whenever it was necessary to establish trafficability for military
transportation in the shortest possible time in wooded and marshy areas,
the simplest type of temporary wooden covering,; logs or poles, may be
employed. The construction principle consists *n laying, across the
designatedsection (the traffic course) -- frequently, with a primitive
type of surface preparation of the soil ("roadbed") -- unpeeled "bolsters,"
averaging 3', to 5.5 meters in length and notche&for the subsequent
laying of the log flooring. The "bolsters" are laid in parallel
at a distance of 2 to 2.5 meters. Poles averaging 8-9 meters in length
are laid lengthwise in the notches with minimum "play" and in staggered
order to provide the most rigid structure. They are secured to each
other at the ends by a "tongue and groove" lock (the groove is half the
diameter of the pole). In the second variation, a transverse flooring
is laid, in which longitudinal bolsters, 6 to 6.5 meters long, are laid
down along the projected route, in series of three, with one-meter intervals
between them. Poles 3 to 3.5 meters long are laid across he bolsters.
In both variants, the poles are fastened to the bolsters by means of
wooden pegs; and in the second variant, the ends of the bolsters are
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locked by a tongue-and-groove joint. The el des of the flooring are
strengthened by wooden stakes in checkerboard fashion at intervals of
.5 to 1 meter. The service life of the flooring is short, but that is
compensated by the rapidity of its construlltion. To facilitate traffic
and to lengthen the service life of the flooring, it is recommended
that it be covered on top with a sandy soil. The allowable traffic load
must not exceed 250 vehicles a day. Overloading is permissible only
for the shortest periods (on highway No 3, the daily vehicle traffic
over the pole flooring, numbered 800 motor vehicles a day for three
days prior to the offensive launched by (A}i' nary groups) the First
Belorussian Front, after which the road wasjabandoned.
Labor productivity in the construction1of log roads may be judged
from the following data:
12.6 kilometers of log road was built in six days (with a 12-hour
working day) by one VDO force (three companl s of workers numbering
270 persons), with an average of 7 to 8 meths per man per day.
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