THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: September 1, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

F
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : C
A-RDP80-00809A00050018~051-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SUBJECT The Political and Eccnomic Basis of the
Agrarian Reform in the USSR
25
K1
DATE DISTR. l 953
25X1
25X1
NO. OF PAGES ~ 30
SUPP. TO
REPORT NO.
THE CONTINUITT OF STALIII'S AGRARIAN POLICY. (Forecast of the development of a re-
organizational process in kolkhoz villages after Stalin's death).
1. A description of the political interests, plant, and programs of the personalities
representing power in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death is undoubtedly important
for an understanding of the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Goverracat.
2. One must bear in mind, however, that, as it was in Stalin's time, so is it now, under
the "dictatorship of the collegium" which has come into being in the US8R. The
opinions and programs of the individuals in power in no way determine the general
political line of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Government, but, as a rule,
only reflect it.
3. Therefore, the facts concerning past and present activities of the present soviet
"collegium of dictators", although not important in themselves, can, however, serve
either as confirmation of the continuity of Stalin's policy, or as evidence of a
radical change of the political course.
k. In the sphere of foreign policy not a single essential fact has yet come to light,
which migtt indicate,a renouncement by the orphaned" dictatorship of the old plsus
5. The Kremlin's internal policy is subservient, as in the past, to the aggressive
plans of the Communist dictatorship. A classical confirmation of this are the words
This report for the use 'Within the USA of the int,i lgence components of the Departments or
Agencies indicated above. It is not to be transmitted overseas without the concurrence of the
or1F'nating office through the Assistant Director of the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-Rd,,P80-00809A000500180051-
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
which Mal.enkov pronounced over Stalin's bier. "A powerfu] Soviet State", said Nalenkov,
"is the most important preregaisite for the building of communism in our country". As
is known from previous works as well as the last works of Stalin, The Economic Problems
of Socialism in USSR, Stalin links the building of communism in its final. prm
to the ithering of the State. It is quite obvious, that Stalin's brand of socialism
can be built only in one country. But the "withering" of the State is unthinkable
as long as the Soviet Union finds itself in a state of "capitalist encirclement" and as
long as this encirclement has not been destroyed. In other words, communism in.the
USSR can be achieved only or. condition that the totalitarian power of the Kremlin is
freed from the limitations of State boundaries.
6. In these immutable aggressive aims lies the hereditary nature of Communism, which
directs the internal policy of the post-Stalin Kremlin toward strengthening every
aspect of its power -- the military and economic potential of the Soviet State.
7. We see that the "dictatorship of the collegium" officially declared its loyalty to
Stalin's legacy and confirmed this loyalty by a series of subsequent declarations by
the Soviet "leaders" and the cress. More than that, this "declaration of loyalty" is
confirmed also in deed; facts speak for it.
IMAGINED DIFFEP.ENCES I3E1i f'sN KhRUSi3CHEV AND ANDx"2EIEV
8. This is also quite true of the policy in the agricultural field, which is leading to
fundamental social and economic transformations.
9. In uru:r to establish the continuity of Stalin's internal policy, it is important to
ante that the Soviet agrarian program, resulting from Stalin's Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR and the decisions of the 19th Party Congress, ties up organically
into one unbreakable chain the measures carried out under Stalin and those which are
being put into practice after his death. All the important measures introduced in agri-
culture under Stalin were preparations for the fulfillment of the program which has been
accepted and is being carried out now by his .3uccesc0rc.
10. One of the executors of Stalin's agrarian program, who had been active in the practical
preparations for its realization, is Nikita Bergeyevich Khrushchev. The continuation
of Stalin's policy after his death is assured all the more by the fact that it is
precisely Khrushchev who now occupies Stalin's titular place in the Party.
the capacity or Secretary of the Central Committee vofcthe Ukrainian oln unist Party
25X1 in Kiev. A considerable part of his activities concerned agricultural affairs and
showed his competence in that field. Among the workers of the Narkomzem (People's
Commissariat of Agriculture) Ukrainian SSR, the opinion prevailed that, in the
Politburo Khrushchev was considered an expert in agricultural affairs and that for
that reason Stalin usually assigned to him the preparation of ?mportant government
decisions in regard to agriculture.
12. This opinion was founded on toe fact that Khrushchev, in his capacity of Secretary of
the Central Committee of rile Ukrainian Communist Party, took a personal interest in the
production and organization of agriculture. He often visited kolkhozes and called
on the specialists of the Narkomzem for a study of numerous problems and the prepara-
tion of new measures, which were afterwards approved in a Joint decree by the 'Soviet
of People's Commissars USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Within
the limits of the general Party Khrushchev snowed himself to be "a reformer" in
the agricultural field.
13. In the pre-'World War II period, the introduction in the kolkhozes and sovkhozos of the
Ukraine of a system of extra pay for overfulfillment of plans for crop raising and cattle
breeding constituted one o, the important "reformatory" measures. The e..tra pay for
kolkhoz men and sovkhoz workers was introduced on Khrushchev's initiative and
insistence, but it was first put into practice, en a trial basis, in the Ukrainian
Republic alone.
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
19. The editorials .iu inc Kiev newspapers at that time -- Sovetskaya Ukraina (in Russian)
and Komunist (in Ukrainian) -- on agricultural subjects were often printed at.
Khrushchev's personal instructions. Frequently he also reviewed them himself.
20. Just as before World War II the Ukrrr.ino, where iihruchchev was Stalin's deputy, served scan
experimental field for testing the system of extra pay, so after the war the Moscow
Oblast, where Khrushchev was transferred at the end of l9, served as the first
experimental region for the consolidation Lor enlargement/ of the kolkhozes. Already
these two similar facts speak of Khrushchev's "reformatory" role in carrying out
Stalin's agrarian policy. In the consolidation of kolkhozes, which was accomplished
in 1950, K rushchev played the part of a leader and prime mover. His article entitled
"Questions Concerning the 0rsanizational and Economic Consolidation of the Ko3.khozes"
in Pravda of 25 Apr 50, ass the first signal for the universal consolidation of
kolkhozes. Thus, th, importance of Khrushchev's contribution to the preparation of
this measure, which represents an inseparable link in Stalin's agrarian program, cannot
be doubt.ed.
21. The reorganization of rural populated places, connected with the consolidation of
kolkhozes (the resettlement of kolkhoz men, first known under the name of the con-
struction of "agrogorods"), was another inseparable link in the implementation of this
program, as well as its logical consequence. This resettlement, having for its
purpose ti': deprivation of kolkhoz men of their individual land plots, and representing
one of the means of their proletarianization, is part and parcel of Stalin's program
of placing the kolkhozes under the Jurisdiction of the State. The leader and practical
organizer of the resettlement campaign, which was under way in 1950-1951 was also
25X1
SECRET
SI JhET
-3-
14.', The extra pay consietca in inc fact thet a certain perceiitage of the yield in crops and
livestock, produced by a brigade in excess of the plan, is distributed among the kolkhoz
men of that particular brigade. (This principle is applied to all branches of agri-
culture.)
15? The basic pay in kind received by the kolkhoz men for workdays is extremely low.
Therefore, the possibility of receiving extra pay undoubtedly created a stimulus for
the increase in crops and cattle breeding, providing a material motive for kolkhoz
men and kolkhoz labor to exceed the plan.
16.' The results of the extra-pay system being positive, the system was extended to other
republics. At the present time, it is applied everywhere in the Soviet Union, with
additions or deductions of work-days depending on the crops.
17., On the basis of the work done by Khrushchev in prewar years, he was assigned the
1 preparation of the redolution of the Soviet Government and of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party concerning the change in delivery LZagotovitel'nyy 7 prices
for sugar beets, one of the leading cultures in Ukrainian agriculture. For that
purpose Khrushchev created a commission consisting of specialists of the Narkemzem,
who secretly studied the question of whether or not the production of sugar beets in
kolkhozes was profitable. Since the delivery prices were low, the mere cultivation
of sugar beets -- a culture requiring a lot of labor -- kept the kolkhozes on a low
level of economic. development. Moreover, it decreased ti,e value of a work-day and
thus increased the difficulty of including the work of kolkhoz men into the "communal'
production of kolkhozes. Inasmuch as the raising of beets (as, for that matter,
the cultivation of many other cultures) was unprofitable for the kolkhozes, the
egronomic personnel was forbidden to study its profit-yielding capacity. Only the
secret commission, which had received a special assignment from the: Central Committee
of the Party (from Khrushchev) had the riCht to Lollect and process the necessary data
with impunity. Khrushchev used this material as a basis for his draft of the decree
concerning changes in payments to kolkhoz men for beets, which was subsequently approved
by the USSR government. (Delivery prices were increased).
18.1 Khrushchev closely followed also the work of the agricultural scientific and research
institutes and utteudod tests of new models of agricultural machinery.
25X1
25X1
L
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIAO-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
2X1
sl;c;xaz' 25X
l ,rusbcheb', aria the ?nosccti Oblast was again chosen for
th,-. ~:;cper.?tmueet. .
22. Al ead.y at the plenary session of the MoscowlCommittee of VhP (u), which took lace
on 20-22 Dec 50, after a lengthy speech by Khrushchev, a resolution ?.ias adopted oonoern-
ing the resettlement, excerpts from which were published in Moskovskaya Pravdapoa 6 Jan
51. To prove how grsat a part Klhrushchev plays-d in the passage of that measure,II
must draw your attention to the speech he made on lb Jan 51 at a conference, called
at his initiative, on the building and organization cu' kolkhjzes in the Moscow Oblast
LSotsialisti.cheskove Zemledelive Socialist AggriculLUrei, ; Mar 1.)
23. However, the reasoner given below forced the Siremlir. Lo c_-.,.,_d,_r ,.1,e resettlement,' begun
under tnc direction of Khrusihtih?_v, as premature aria, .:uus?:?_]ueni.ly, to suspend it.
Evidem,tly, the opposition: Ho the iminediate iuplertenLat.:ol: of the r':set.tlement plane,
advocated by Knrusihch,_v, within t ,.e Part;; leaderobio 1^d to ;,!he deci.:;ion of the
central organs that; the measure was premature. The e c.r:h of the secretary of the
Armenian Communist Party, Arutyunov, for innt.rce, ;mould be considered a manifestation
of this opposition. Ii, Lis speech at a Party conhreae in that republic, Arutyunov
spoke of the fantas-elc plans of resettlement that some of the prominent members of
the Party were nurturin,> FCoamnunist, 20 Mar 5Erc-vun). No doubt Arutyunov's speech
was directcci against Khru:tcchev who attemptedto launch an immediate and large-scale
campaign of rosettleirn^at. ? Anion; other reasons, the opposition was undoubtedly
stimulated by thc- fear that the resistance of Ithe kolkhoz icon to resettlement, which
was manifest from the very beginning, might aggravate the situation In the kolkhoz
villages, intensify the struggle, and distract the attention from the fulfillment of
the production goal:, of the current rive-Year Plan. In the event of preparations i for
a war, this might have a very paihu?ul effect on the accumulation of supplies of raw
materials and proviiio-ts.
24. However, although the Kremlin was obliged to denounce temporarily the plan of
immediate resettlement of kolkhhoz men and the ensuing reorganization of villages into
"kolkhoz settlements", the project was by no means ahsr_acard
~ on this subject
at the 1/tn Party Congress, Maleokov pointed out that at the present time the primary
objective was the creation of "a material baseI of Couununism", I C., the fulfillment by
the kolkhozes of their production tasks. Malenkov's pror.ouncenu:nts in his-report to
the congress are proof that the resettlement will be resumed, but that, according to
his statement, Lhin, can be done only or, the basis of a well developed kolkhoz.econonG'.
Therefore, iu spite of the declared ')ppo6itionland the respite won, Klhruehchev's plans
can in no way be :;,,risidered as a "deviation" from the general Party line in
agriculture. His activities represented a development of that policy. He only .tried.
to speed up the achievement of its goal without' taking into consideration the factlthat
the time for it was not yet ripe, and, therefore, hir. plans were not completed. however,
since the aim of Soviet policy in agriculture -- the proletarianization of kolkhoz men
and the incorporation or the kolkLozes in the State apparatus -- has not altered, the
resettlement will he resumed when the time for it is considered ripe.
25. In like manner, the development of "squads" (a Ir'or?m of labor organization in the
kolkhozes) in the field of grain production, condemned by Pravda, cannot be considelred
a "deviation" from the general Party line or manifestation of a struggle among various
tendencies in agricultural policy. In an editorial entitled."Against Misconceptions
in the Organization of labor i I_olkhozes', Pravda vehemently condemned, on instructions
from the Politburo, the practice of allocating grain cultures to "squads". There
can be no doubt that such a direct order had been issued Ly the Politburo, since the
article in Pravda of 19 Feb 50 pointed directly at Andreyev, a member of the .Politburo
of the Central Committee of VKP(b), who in 194E headed the so-called Council on Kolkhoz
Affairs at the Council of Ministers USSR, as being responsible for the permitted errors.
Without such a directive, an attack of this natire on a member of the Politburo, which
directed kolktioz policies even before World War II, mould bo inconceivable.
26. In connection with the above-mentioned article in Pravda and the subsequent "repentance"
of Andreyev (customary in ouch cases), two erroneous inferences were made by experts
on Soviet affairs : a) that "Andreyev' b policy" had led the "commu_nal" economy of the
kolkhozec not forward to higher forms of collectivization, nut backward; that, instead
X1
SECFRE'1'/1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
F-
25X1
SEC U 25X1
-5-
of developing the spirit of collectivizatiou among the i:olkhoz men, it furthered their
individual interests; and, that his policy thus ran counter to the general Party policies
in agriculture. b) that Andreyev's reliance on small "squads was in conflict, as
it were, with Khrushchev's kolkhoz "megalomania", and that a silent struggle overltbis
question had been waged between them, which ended in a triumph for Khrushchev, who
carried out the consolidation of kolkhozes.
27. Both opinions are quite erroneous. The first opinion* is based on the fact that Andreyev,
even before World War II had been known to be against the kolkhoz "megalomania
and to favor a forming of groups of workers within kolkhozes -- preferably, small
"squads". To prove the point, those who maintain this vie 7 refer to Andreyev'a
speech at the 18th Party congress in February 1939. At that congress Andreyev,.indeed,
made the following statements.'
"The practice of wage levelling and de-individualization of labor in the
large brigades is the main obstacle to a further rise in the productivity
of labor in the kolkhozes ..... It is necessary to cli:.i.nate these elements
of wage levelling and dc-individualization of labor ..... The more individual
the work in the kolkhozes, whether in the form of 'squads' or individual
kolkhoz men, and the Greater the material incentive attached to it, the higher
is the productivity both in crops and cattle breeding."
28. Andreyev spoke it favor of the "squads" at a conier,r,cc of Siberian "progressiat~" in
the town of Novosibirsk held in 1940. Pravda pointed out chat his speech represented
"a call for the uriver al establlnhment of 'squads' in the Siberian grain economy .1
29. Later, the "squad''syetem of labor organization was confirmed by the following
"legislation":
(a) The Government Decree of January 1941.
(b) The Decree of the Plenary RPaQion of -16K mix( ) of b'ebruary 1947.
(see Pravda of 28 Feb 47).
(c) Th- Decree of the Council of Ministers USSR of 19 Apr. 1948.
30. In examining "Andreyev's policy", it should he pointed out first of all that the
introduction of the squad system of labor organization would not be contrary at all
to Khrushchov's "megalomania". The squad sy:cem teing a form of intrakolkhoz organiza-
tion of labor, could be adopted is small as Well as large kolkhozea. Moreoever, even
while opposing "megalomania".. Audreyev was never guilty of "deviation" from the
general Party line. During a certain period of development of this '"general line", not
only Andreyev but Stalin himself and, of course, Knrushcher, were against "mege,10MO la".
As is known, already in'the initial period of collecti,+ization there developed a
tendency to create "giant kolkhozes". However, in that period, in the absence of
the necessary technology and electric power supply, "megalomania" was defined as the
"bending over backwards" on the part of collectivizere of lower ranks. Stalin wrote as
early as 1930 that, in the absence pi a sufficient number of tractors and a corps
of experienced instructors in kolkhozes, .he time was not ripe for creating "giants"
which have no economic roots in the village. "At this time", wrote Stalin in 1930,
"the attention of the workers must be concentrated on the organization and economic
work of the kolkhozes in smaller and larger villages. When this work has been
successfully accomplished, the "giants" will appear of their own accord.
Towards the end of the first postwar Five-Year Plan the time was considered ripe for
the consolidation of the kolkhozes, and in 1950, 244 thousand small kolkhozea became
97 thousand "giants". Kruehchev 'brought this change about. But Andreyev worked
together with Khrusbchev on the preparations for this reform. Andreyev'a statements
* B I Nikolayevrkiy, "New Campaign against Villages in USSR", Novyy Zhurnal No 24,1952
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release
25X1
SECRETI
I 25X1
with reference to the material. incentive for kolkhoz men and the introduction (at
Khrushchev's initiative) of the system of extra pay in the kollt.ozes, appear to be in
complete accord. Not only Andreyev, but also l rushchev, without deviating from the
11 general. line", followed a path which, in its own way, was oriented toward the interests
of individual kclkhoz men. One should not forget that the purpose was to create in the
kolkhoz men a material interest in the cause of "communal production", ie that this
was one of the measures for the "organizational and economic strengthening" of the
kolkhozee. Both Andreyev andlKhrushchev worked in harmony in order to carry out the
policy. of the Politburo which lwas single in its purpose. It is obvious, that there
could have been no conflict on that ground between the two of them.
As stated above, the squad system of l4bvp organization serves as one of tha measures
for the "organizational and economic strengthening" of the kolkhozes, both small and
large in equal measure. The system was applied widely it the Ukraine, where Kbrushchev
was secretary of the TeK VHP(b). It is being vigorously introduced at. present in the
consolidated kolkhozes. The system, as such, of squads wituin brigades, was not
invalidated, as some authors think. Only after the appearance of the editorial in Pravda
and Andreyev's subsequent "retraction" was the practice of assigning grain cultures
to the "sriuadz" abolished. It is precisely against this practice that the criticism
was levelled. However, the "squads" will be used for a long time in the cultivation
of crops requiring a great, seal of manual labor -- in fact, so long as the cultivation
of these crop.; is not fully :.' chanized.
33? In order to undersLa:,d fully the situation, one must take into account the conditions
which fora- the S,?rr." f;u.'otur.:Ln(. Lo apl,l widely tnu brigade -?- squad system.
34. As is well known i r. t.uc areas ccupied by time Germans, even when the latter attempted
to preserve the kol..h_i,ce s in .)rder to "wr. ins" from then agricultural produce, the
peasants,- more olt?=n ',l-tan t.UL, I arbitrarily divided among themselves the kolkhoz land,
equipment., remaining livc,Lock, and even the kolkhoz buildings, and reestablished as
far as possible individual homesteads. On the other hand, during World War II peasants were
full of hopes that the kolkhozes would be abolished, because the Soviet authorities
themselves, in order to eustaic the will to victory, nurtured those hopes by spreading
false rumors. After the war, a special decree of the Council of Ministers USSR and of
the Central Committee Of th.. 'V%T(b), entitled Measures Against the Violations of the
Regulations oC the Agricultural Art:e1 in the Kolkhozes" and a number of severe penalties
(Pravda, 19 Sep 46) were required to safeguard the knLki.ohes. According to Pravda,
those penalties were administered i:, order to r,alt the practice of kolkhoz men leading
to the weakening of the communal principle in L;.r_ kolkhozc?3 and to protect the "communal"
economy of the xolkhosus against any encroachments. ALl ;rvernmental organs were
alerted in order to deliver the crushing blow to the anti-hd.Ushoz practices of grabbing
the communal kolkhoz lands andilplundering inc kolki:oz prop_rty". (Sotsialistieheskoye
Zemledeliye, 19 Sep 50). Such measures were necessary ?.et Drily in the areas previously
occupied by the Germans or directly touched by t1. war iu: also in all the other regions
of the Soviet Union.
35. Already at the beginning of the postwar period, the Soviet Government realized that it
was impossible to kill in peasants the desire for free work outside of .he kolkhozee, to
exterminate this tendency which became especially apparent after the war, and to surmount
the fullblown crisis of the kolkhoz system by sheer administrative pressure. The govern-
ment's persistent practice of robbing the kolkhozes compelled the kolkhoz man to rivet
his principal attention and to concentrate his main efforts on his individual plot and
on his private homestead.
36. Only throug new and more effective methods of compulsion was it possible, in the
opinion of the government, to draw the kolkhoz men into "communal" production and to
increase their contribution in labor to an extent which ensured reestablishment and
further development of production. Among these measures was the reintroduction of the
squad system, which had been in practice before the war and which binds the kolkhoz!men
from the inside, compelling them to more intensive labor in the kolkhozes.
37. Fulfillment of the postwar Five-Year Plan turned out to be all the more difficult because,
after the war, the kolkhozes suffered from an especially acute shortage of manpower, which
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release l2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 E F -
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : IA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
25X1
was aggravated by the low labor discipline. To compensate for the shortage of manpower
and thus to ensure, at any cost, th' receipt of the produce needed by the State, the
authorities introduced new and higher work norms. This measure, however, did not
increa"e the niggardly income of the kolkhoz men.
38. Under these conditions it was especially Important to bind the kolkhoz'msn to the
land, which was possible only by waking him responsible for the size of the crops in
a definite area. This was achieved by introducing in the kolkhozes the squad system
of labor organization and by strengthening the production brigade as a basic production
unit. The formation of squads within the production brigades was "recommended" to
the kolkhozes.
.7-
39. To that end, the government ordered the kolkhoz administrations to assign to every field
crop brigade a piece of land (for no less a period than is necessary for the growing
of a crop) and a hay field, as well as draft animals, agricultural machinery, means
of transport, and the necessary buildings. 'Fluidity" among brigades was not to be
tolerated. The brigade personnel was to. be. increased through cuts in administrative
and service personnel. Special efforts were to be made to strengthen the squads
already existing within thc_ brigades and to create new ones, and to assign the latter,
in accordance Aith thr decision of the TeKPlenary Session of February 1947, certain
plots of land for ra,6. crops, industrial crops, vegetable cultures, and seeds, and,
where possible, grain ultures.
40. In this manner direct responsibility was placed on the brigades and squads for an
early and high_aualit.y cultivation of the plots allotted to then. on which, the size
of the crop depCndr,. Along with this, a system of material J : fines and rewards was
also introduced.. First of all, the system of extra pay in ki,.c? for exceeding the set
norms of productivity in crops and cattle breeding, introduced before World War II at
Khrushchev's initiative, was preserved. moreover, iu accordance with the resolution
of the Council of Ministers USSR "Concerning Measures for the Improvement of Organization,
Intro se ir: i co iue Li vi i.y, and Regulation of Pay for Work in Ko].khozes ", of 19 Apr. 48,
sut..,i. entary additions and deductions of work-days, depending on the crops, were
introduced. This resolution was taken into consideration by the February 1947?plenpry
session of the Central Corxizitt.ee of the Parity in reaching its decision. The preparation
of the resolution i:, attributed to Andreyevi, which is completely in accord with the
facts of the mutter, :3ince Andreyev was the head of thc? Council of Kolkhoz Affairs
in the Council of Ministero USSR aud?sucii preparation was his direct responsibility.
It is the deduction:; of work-days that represent the system of material fines which
is widely applied in the kolkhozes as a rues sure of compulsion to greater effort and
the. maintenance of high standards of performance. The fines, as we.shall see from
the following, userslly exceed the rewards which consist of additions of work-days..
41. In practice, material fir,eu and rewards arc calculated on the basis of the crops
harvested by each bri~ude and by each squad within the. brigade. From the very
beginning of their work on the plots assigned to them the kolkhoz men know that the
higher their crop yield, th:: better tha Fay; and if the yield is below the planned norm,
a fine will be imposed. According to the above-mentioned government decree of 19 Feb
46, a brigade which has exceeded the established norm in a given crop is credited with
one percent of the total number of work-days spent on the crop for each percent of
the excess obtained. And conversely, a brigade which has not fulfilled the plan is fined
one percent (but no more than ?;; percent) ofl the work-days for each percent of the
unfulfilled quota.
42. At the same time, d.iactpii.nary ,atasr res for violations of the law fixing the increased
obligatory minimu .;;' wc r. k-.lacy:; began to be applied more strIctly.
43. A similar system of ;'i::%J and rewards, depending on the crop yield, was established
also for the squad, wiLhlf,i brigades. This necessitated a system of computation
based on a breakdown of the crop in terms of separate operations (in case of grain
cultures, separate threshing results for each squad). Thus, with the creation of
squads, within brigades not only fur ,:J,e land but also for
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : IA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
25X1
the crop, is finally eliminated, and the personal responsibility of.the kolkhoz men
for the size of the crop is increased.
44. The squad must, through its own efforts, complete all the operations on the plots assigned
to it, except those which require the use of complex machinery and the cooperative
effort of a great number of kolkhoz men. At the same time, an entire squad or its
individual members may be assigned by a brigade leader to do work elsewhere, outside
the plot of the squad. In accordance with the regulation of 19 Apr 48, the kolkhozes
were "advised" to maintain a permanent squad personnel, not only during the year but
also for a longer period of time. The wields intended for spring crops are assigned
to the squads before the autumn ploughing; those for winter crops, before the ploughing
of the summer fallow. A squad must complete the entire cycle of operations on a given
plot and carry full responsibility for the crops raised on it.
45. Every kolkhoz man was thus made responsible materially for the results of the collective
labor of a brigade as a whole and each squad in particular.
46. The aims of the goverc.'cent in introducing the squad system of labor organization are
thus clearly defined. By making every kolkhoz man responsible for the size of, the
crops and, still more, by subjecting him to the pressure of the system of finets.aad
rewards, the authorities endeavored to achieve, with the help of the squad system,
the i ollowin results:
First, to- the kn.lkiioz men, members of a squad, to take a personal
interest in the q+:ality of ploughing on the plot assigned to the squad; to
carry out the operations connected with snow retention; to collect and
transport fertilizers; to till the land on their plots more thoroughly;
and to look after the crops until the time of the harvest.
Second, by intro'zcir.6 mutual responsibility for the crops, to force the
kolkhoz men to watch closely the performance of other fellow members of
the squad or the brigade (because, under such conditions, an individual
kolkhoz man can-.avoid finer. and receive full pay for the total number. of .
actual work-days only in the event that the quota assigned to the squad and
the brigade as a whole has been met).
'Third, to provide help ror ttia bridadr leader by creating squad leaders
from amonL the kolkhoz men themselves, who would act as supervisors; they
are responsible for the work of the squad as a whole and are thus forced
to do their duty, viz.; to see to it that the established order of the
working day is observed; to chuck the work of every member of the squad; to...
ensure fulfillment of the norm and E;ood quality of work.
Fourth, to con ore the maintenance of accurate work records of every individual
kolkhoz mar, and thereby create the conditions for the introduction of the
small-grouip and individual piece-work system.
47. Accerdin ly, the purpose of the introduction of the brigade and squad system vas to
compel the kolkhoz men en masse to work more and better, in addition to keeping an eye
on one another, not only under the administrative pressure but also under the sharply
increased material stress.
48. The introduction of c`ne new pay system based on the crop yield placed at once a great
number of kolkhoz men under the threat of inevitable deductions of work-days. Those
deductions could not bo avaiaed, because the former practice of fixing higher norms of
productivity, (in oxcess of the usual level in a given kolkhoz) especially in the
"lagging" kolkhoze:;, in order to raise their level, of productivity, was still in
existence after the war. While many could try to fulfill and to exceed these higher
quotas, the kolkhoz men knew full well that on~y s few could succeed.
49. Further developtreots in toe kolkhozes confirmed this. For example, according to incom-
plete data concerning the Azerbaijan SSR, in 1943, kolkhoz men in brigades and squads
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-008
 Approved Fod- Release 004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-008 9A000500180051-3
r
25X1
SECRET 25X1
raising agricultural crops received 2,135,000 additional work-days for overfulfillmeat,
of the plan ("Bakinskiy Rabochiy of 19 Apr 49). However, many more days were deducted.
The actual figure was not given by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the
Azerbaijan SSR, A Khalimov, wholwrote an article on the subject. Be merely remarked
that 'for non-fulfillment of the production plan, an appropriate) number of work-days-
was deducted from the earnings of the kolkhoz men." Many examples taken from the
same year, 1948, show the ratio of ,additions and deductions of work-days. In the
kolkhoz imeni Myrasniltov, Nizaminekiy Rayon, 61+3 work-days were added, while about
four thousand were deducted. In the kolkhoz, "Krasnyy Azerbaijan", Agdashskiy
Rayon, cotton squads received 500 additional work-days, while grain crop brigades
lost 3,400 work-days (Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 6 Feb 49). An identical situation
prevails in ocher USSR republics.
50. It :.e obvious from the above-mentioned examples that for the majority -- is the
"lagging" kolkhozes, an overwhelming majority -- of kolkhoz men, rewards for additional
stork were but a cloud ofsmoke, while the fines were very real.
51. That is why in the "lagging" kolkholes the tendency to self -disbandment was apparent
in the squads from the time of their creation, vnen obviously, excessive plan assign-
ments were given to them! This tendency became especially strong e.. harvest time.
This is understandable. Under the prevailing system of keeping separate crop records
for-every brigade and squad, it is at harvest time tha; the threat of fines for
non-fulfillment of crop plans Is carried out.
,2. An eloquent proof of the growth of this tendency is contained in the government decree
entitled "Concerning the Harve'ting of the Crops and Stockpiling of Agricultural
Products in 1949" (Pravda, 14 Jun 49)?: In view of the resistance of kolkhoz men to
the new method of paymentlfor their work, the government found it necessary to warn
once more the Party, Sovier, and agricultural organizations against"de-individualization
during the harvesting period, 1 I that the crops must be recorded by brigades and
squads.
$3. It was just this reminder,~ portending mass deductions of work-days, for non-fulfillment
of crop plans by many brigades and squads, especially in the "lagging" kclkhozes,
that precipitated the dibi'ntetratiois!of squads and even of brigaded. This phenomenon
acquired mass proportions,', for insta"ce,??in Irkutskaya Oblast. According to Pravda,
in that oblast the crops assigued not, only to squads, but to whole brigades, had
been de-individualized by harvest time (Pravda, 5 Jul 49).
54. The antagonism between thfd interests of the State and those of the kolkhoz men, which
thus came out once more ini;o the open; is Inherent, as is obvious, Jin the very essence
of the squad system of labor organ.zation. It is not surprising t, It during all the
subsequent years the authorities were obliged to wage an unremitting and determined
battle for the reestablishment and strengthening of the squad-brigade organization in
the kolkhozes. The kolkhoz men reois1 this system because it represents one of tho
forms of coercion to greater efforts in the "communal" economy of the kolkhozes and,
therefore, infringes upon their Interests.
55. From the above we see how deeply erroneous are the assertions that the squad system,
implanted by Andreyev, prepared the ground for the development of private property
relations. The author of this deeply erroneous statement, B I Nikolayevskiy*,
visualizes the squad as a haven in which the peasant's individualistic soul finds
ground for the prescrvationilof its pristine quality. In reality, however, the work
in a squad responsible tar the crops on a definite plot only chain te kolkhoz man to
the system of "comunal production", the products of which are not placed at'the
disposal of the members of the squad but delivered to the kolkhoz at; rehouse. Where,
B I Nikolayevskiy, "hhew Car.*_paigu against the Village in T)SSR", Novyy Zhurnal,
No 24, 1952, New York.
25X1
SECRIiT
Approved For Release 2004101/21 CIA-RDP80-00809AO00500180051-3
 F_
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
25X1
then, is the ground on which private property tendencies could triumph in a squad2
On the contrary, work in a squad, which demands ever more tine from the kolkoz
man, not only fails to satisfy his yearning for an individual farm, but takes him away
from his small personal plot.
56. Starting from a false premise, B I Nikolayevskiy draws a wrong conclusion about the
alleged struggle of separate:.tendencies -- on one hand, the tendency embodied in
Andreyev's policy, of -establishing squads, and, on the other, the one embodied in
Khrushchev's policy of consolidating the kolkhozes.
57. As we have pointed out, neither the squad system of labor organization, nor
"Andreyev's orientation" toward the development of personal interest on ,ae part of
the koldioz men in increased labor productivity (through rewards, on one hand., and fines,
on the other) are in any way opposed to the consolidation of kolkhozes, and both
principles are applied in the consolidated kolkhozes. "Andreyev's orientation" can
just as easily be called 'Khrushchev's orientation", because the latter, even before
Andreyev, worked on measures to increase the personal interest of kolkhoz men in the
development of the kolkhoz "communal" economy (the system of extra pay for overful-
fillment of the plan for crops and cattle raising.) Khrushchev, just'as Andreyev,
introduced the squads with equal success first in the Ulo:a._ne and then in Moscow Oblast.
58, This shows that there never had been any difference of pri:ciple between Androyev
and Khrushchev, and confirms once more the inviolable unity of the Soviet agrarian
policy.
59. What then brought at,.,ui-, a "change in the course" -- an expression used by B Nikolayevskiy
to describe the sudden. abandonment by the authorities of the practice of assigning
grain cult-area to squads -- which occurred in February 19502 How can one explain the
criticism levelled airn.ctly against Andreyev, which hlurusihchev himself may have
initiated (the above -men L ionod article, "Against Misconceptions in the Organization
of Labor in Kolkhozes", Pravda. 1v Feb 1,0)4
60. It should be empnasize:a that thin "change in course" did not affect at all .the basic
trends of the kolkihoz pclicy. In. no way did it signify the abolishment of the squad
system, as such; it wee airec:t,ed rather against minimizing the role of the production
br-gades and it concerned only the cultivation of grain cultures by squads.
61. No "change of course:" nau talon,jaAce. The criticism was directed against the extreme
infatuation. with the squud system, against the practice of substituting squads for
production brigades. In such casus, not only did the squads receive assignments of
plots of agricultural. cuitnrus, sec also the brigade inventory which was distributed
among the squads for permanent use. Squads received assignments directly from the
kolkhoz administration, over the heads of the origade leaders. The practice of
substituting squads for ozigaucs was especially widespread in Kurskaya Oblast.
62. It Is quite obvious from the above that such independent "isolated squads" can supplant
brigades only in respect to production. The breaking up of brigade fields into small
squad plots, not for one cycle of agricultural operations but for a longer time,
hampered the use of machinery in cultivation. The necessity of computing grain crops
by squads was complicated and held up the work of the combines. AU this lowered the
productivity of the MISS.
63. In other words, condition:; d;_-v(.-loped which were diametri.ally opposed to those which the
authorities endeavored to create by the consolidation of kolkhozes. Inueed, one of the
purposes of consolidation was, together with the isuprovement of the lay-out of fields,
the enlargement of the brigade areas, which would allow a sore effective use of the
machine technique. Rational utilization of the equipment owned by the kolkhoz was
also difficult, since a brigade leader could not maneuver the equipment assigned to a
particular squad for permanent use. A brigade leader had no freedom of action, and the
brigade in cases like that inevitably '.ost its significance as a basic production unit
in the kolkhoz.
64. It is, therefore, understandable why the authorities in 1950, when the consolidation
of kolkhozes was to be carried out, first of all eliminated by radical measures those
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2OO4/01/21: CIA-RDP80-OO8O9AOOO5OO18OO51-3
25X1,
SECRET,
25X1
then, is the ground on. which private property tendencies could triumph in a squad!
On the contrary, wgrk'in asquad, which demands ever more time from the kolkoz
man, not only fails to satisfy his yearning for an individual farm, but takes him away
from his small personal plot.
56. Starting from a false premise, B I Nikolayevskiy draws a wrong conclusion about the
alleged struggle of separate tendencies -- on one hand, the tendency embodied in
AndreyevIs,policy of establishing squads, and, on the other, the one embodied in
Khrushched,'s policy of consolidating the kolkhozes.
57. As we have pointed out, neither tine squad system of labor organization, nor
"Andreyev's orientation" toward the development ofIpersonal interest on the part of
the kolkhoz men in increased labor productivity (through rewards, on one hand, and fines,
on the other) are in any way. opposed to the consolidation of kolkhozes, and both
principles' are applied '!in t:ie consolidated kolkhozt~,s. "Andreyev's orientation" can
dust as easily be called "Khrushchev's orientation, because the latter, even before
Andreyev, worked on measures to increase the personal interest of kolkhoz men in the
development of the kolkhoz "communal" economy (the system of extra pay for overtul-
fillmc-.nt of the plan for crops and cattle raising.) Khrushchev, just as Andrey'ev,
introduced the squads with equal success first in the Ukraine and then in Moscow Oblast.
56. This shows that there never had been any difference of principle between Androyev
and Khrushchev, and confirms once more the inviolable unity of the Soviet agrarian
policy.
59. What then brought about a "change in the course" -Ilan expression used by B Nilcolayevskiy
to describe the aiidderi abandonment by the authorities of the practice of assigning
grain cultures to squads -- which occurred in February 1950T How can one explain the
criticism levelled directly against Andreyev, which!Khrushchev himself may have
initiated (the above-mentioned article, "Against Misconceptions in the Organization
F T-byr n? avcus, 1y b'eb 50)?
60. It should be emphaslzua'uhat this "change in course," did riot affect at all the basic
trends of the kolkhoz. policy,.' In no wa aid it signify the abolishment of the squad
system, as such; it gyn.;; directed rather against minimizing the role of the production
61. No "change of courj~_" one u,kern i,lecu. The criticism was directed against the extreme
infatuation with the squad nyctec,, against the practice of substituting squads for
production brigades. In ouch cases, not only did the s. quads receive assignmonts of
plots of agricultural cult urns, out also the brigade inventory which was distributed
among the squads for permanent use. Squads received assignments directly from the
kolkhoz administration, over ,the heads of the origade leaders. the p-actice of
substitutin,.y squads for uriyedes was especially widespread in Kurskaya Oblast.
62. It is quite obvious rrom tho^bove that such independent "isolated squads" can supplant
brigades only in respect to production. The breaking up of brigade fields into small
squad plots, not for one cycle of agricultural operations but for a longer time,
hampered the use of machinery in cultivation. The necessity of computirg grain crops
by squads was complicated and held up the work of the combines. All this loxer::d the
productivity of the NtSs.
63. In other word-:, conditions developed which were diametrically opposed to those which tale
authorities endeavored to create by the consolidation of kolkhozes. Indeed, one of the
purposee of consolidation was, together with the improvement of the lay-out of fields,
the enlargement of the brigade areas, which would allow a more effective use of the
machine technique. Rational utilization of the equipment owned by the kolkhoz was
also difficult, si`.ce a brigade.leader could not maneuver the equipment assigned to a
particular squad for permanent use. A brigade leader had no freedom of action, and the
brigade in cases like inevitably lost its significance as a basic production unit
in the kolkhoz.
64. It is, therefore, understandable why the authoritieslin 1950, when the consolidation
of kolkhozes,was to be carried out, first of all eliminated by radical measures those
25X1
SECRETA
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP$O-OO8O9AOOO5OO18OO51-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
25X1
"miscon.ceptioes of labor organization". The criticism in Pravda was by no means
dictated by the fear or the government lest private-economy relationships develop
in kolkhozes, relationships which might, allegedly, develop on the basis of the
"isolated squads". The liquidation of "isolated squad-.",existing outside of brigades,
and the re -establishment of the leading role of trim brigade were dictated exclusively
by the requirements of large production.
65. The. "isolated squads" could play the part, attributed to them, of a stimulus for pri-
vate.ownership aspirations only in the event that the crop yield, recorded as having
been produced on their plot, passed through the hands of the members of a squad, it
that the squad itself delivered the final product of its lab ' to the kolkhoz. The
condition, of -production would than really become close in character to the individual
operation of a farm and, psychologically, would revive the interest in private owner-
ship, thus conflicting with the ."education" of trio kolkhoz men in the spirit of
collectivism. The physical sensation of grain running through his fingers in a kolkhoz
man, conscious of his ri;;ht to the products of his labor, would constitute a primary
source of "pernicious" associations.
66. In view of the presence of the above-enumerated "misconceptions in labor organization,
the surmise that "isolated squads" could carry out to the very end the entire pro-,
duction process of grain cultures, i a to produce and thresh the crops on "their", lots,
is sheer phantasy, Waging a constant struggle for the kolkhoz "bread" CgrainT, the
authorities would never allow this product to remain even temporarily in the hands';
of its immediate producers. The authorities have always endeavored, and will continue
to endeavor, to prevent direct contact of the koldioz seer precisely with the "bread"
products. It is for this reason that threshing was never done in "isolated squads,".
If this had taken place, the kolkhozes would have ceased to be.kolkhozec.. Individual
records of the crops harvested on the plots of separate squads are made, as a rule', at
the time of threshing by a threshing machine on the common kolkhoz. or brigade thresh-
ing floor, where the grain after weighing loses its indiv;duality. In case of bar-
vesting by a combine, the brain also goes to the kolkhoz granary, or directly from
the combine bunker to the State procurement point. nut in tnis last isu,tcu..:c the
gra'.n is "de-individualized" ahead of time when it is being cleaned. If squads in
Kursk. Oblast were made to doliver grain to State procurement points, that in no way
meant that the squads were. disposing of the harvest from their sector independently.
The part played by the squad in this instance amounts to merely a transport function.
In all cases, the State, through the kolkhoz, takes away from the kolkhoz man not the
Concrete, tangible product of his personal labor, but a "de-individualized" product
of collective production. This alone ought to serve as a prophylactic measure
against theemergc.nce of "pernicious" associations.
67. Only the ":isolated squads",.t.hose which had replaced brigades, were thus abolished. The
brigade-squad system 'under which squads are created within brigades, was preserved.
This system will exist as long as the cultivation of industrial and other culture'
requires manual labor, i e until the cultivation of these cultures is not mechanized
to the same extent an the cultivation of grain cultures. At a high level of complex
mechanization, the squad system for all cultures would hamper the productive utiliza-
tion of machines. Only then would it go completely out of use.
68. The assignment of grain cultures to squads, condemned by Pravda, was not justified by
necessity, because grai.u.cultures do not require vigorous manual cultivation. At the
same time, keeping separate records of crops for each squad complicated the work of
the combines and sometimes lowered their productivity by 40 or 50 percent.
69. Of course, this it, not the only reason why the squad system was abolished in. the
cultivation of grain cultures. A very important reason was also the fact that the
squad system in grain cultures was the cause of overfulfillment of production plans
on individual plots to the disadvantage of average productivity. The fact of the j,
is that only a part of the area under grain cultures could be assigned to
squads.. According to Pravda, even in Kurskaya Oblast', where assignments of grain
cultures to squads bore a mass character, the whole area was not assigned to them
(Pravda, 19 Feb 51)). In other oblasts, usually only from e third to a half of the
total area under ;rails cultures was assigned to the squads. Obviously, the squads
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
HECIRET1
25X1
concentrated their attention on their own plots, paying no need to other fields included
in the overall brigade assignment. As a result, it often happened that extra pay had
to be paid to squads for exceeding quota on their plots while the brigade plan was
not fulfilled.
70. As a result of he article in Pravda, an erd was put to this situation. Begirning with
the spring of 1950, full responsibility for grain crops was placed everywhere on the
brigades as a whole. However, the principie"of profit distribution, based on the
record of the crops harvested by separate brigades and squads, which had been
"recommended" in the decree of the Council of Ministers USSR of 19 Apr 48, remained in
full force. But, in respect to grain cultures, separate records of the crops for that
purpose were introduced only for brigades.
71. In this canner two results were achieved:
(a) The integrity of brigade areas was re-established, and the areas assigned
to them became, as a result of the consolidation of the kolkhozes, still
greater. This eliminated the conditions hampering the increase of productivity
of the machine and tractor pool,
(b) A prerequisite was created for a s;,stematic increase of crops on the entire
area under r-e'ain cultures, because the kolkhoz men, members of a brigade, were
now obliged to cultivate carefully not lonly the plots formerly assigned to
squads, but the entire area assiiued to the brigade.
72? in Vebruary 1950 Andreyev was subjected to the severe criticism
c to his confession". ' ? .
73. Although the Council on Kolkhoz Affairs undeJ'r the government of the USSR, heade$'by
Andreyev, did recommend in January 1950 tiat~the squad system be applied to all kol]chozes,
it was only carrying out the policy of the Central Committee. Above, we have
enumerated the government decrees legalizing the squad system. However; in the
resolution'of the plenary session of the Party's Central Committee held in February
1947, which approved Andreyev's tnes,:s, it was airectly recommended to assign, as far
as poosible, also grain cultures to squads. Plainly, the responsibility for this
recotmnendation -- under Soviet conditions equivalent to a-law -- lay not with
Andreycv alone. :_owcver, to admit errors ^omaitted by the "infallible" Central
Committee runs counter to :3tablished tradition: Andreyev's acknowledgment of guilt
in a'lowin;; "misconceptions" represents u forced sacrifice, ueceeaary for the
preservation of the prestige of the Party during the repeal of its previous erroneous
decisions.
"DICTATORSHIP BY COLL.EGIUM" COIdTThUES Ti STALINIST AGRICULTURAL POLICY
Hence it 1s clear that u: on ti_ "heirs" of Stalin, Caere never have been, nor are
there now, any disaGreeccnts co:uc?.:rning the Iolkhuz policy. There is not the least
doubt that both Khrnshchev and Andreyev oursied?the same agrarian policy directed
toward the sintie coal which w-, s advanced by Stalin in his work, Economic Problems of
Socialism ].u the USSR. iir_viz.; beeu he executors of this policy before Stalin's
death, they are continuing it also after his death.
75. Its character cc unity and c:ueeession is attested by the fact that Malenkov, also, takes
part in t t:?_ irr.,lc e?e :tai ion c :' the rit;rarian pr Gram prcmot.ed by Stalin.
76; True, e report co th, i ;t h Pui-ty congresp, idr erzkor con idered the living arrange-
Tents (recettlemcrit) o i:olk:loz men as a task secondary importance, which can be
perfomnod only on t.e basis of r: well-developed kolkhoz economy (the task of first
importance was the fi>1m'1llrren~. by kolkhozes or their production plans). But this can
in no way be cons+_cierrd a:. a renunciation of he policy of proletarianizing the kolkhoz
Since the 19th cork;russ 7..1t'. policy of the Party has been directed toward the execution,
in pructice, of social and economic reforms toward solving "the economic problems
2 X1
SEC}Ri:TI
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : Cl -RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-0~0809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
-13-
of socialism" put t'orward by 'Stalin.
25X1
78. In accordance with this policy, Lice entire State apparatus was reorganized. The
reorganization which had been planned already during Stalin's life was carried out
by Malenkov, together with other "heirs" of Stalin. It iz quite obvious that no
reorganization of the State apparatus would. have been necessary, if Stalin's heirs
had had the intention of betraying the policy of the Party, if they had resumed the
old plans of aggression and if-they repudiated the decisions of the 19th Party
congress..
79. In the reorganization of the State apparatus its perfect consistency with, and sub-
ordination to, the new tasks confronting the authorities in connection with the
execution of social' and economic reforms became apparent. It is revealed, in particular,
in the reorganization of the administration of agriculture. The law "Concerning the
Reorganization of the Ministries of the USSR", promulgated 16 Mar 53 (Sotsialiatiches]coye
2emledeljye, No 65,11953), leaves no doubt whatever that its purpose is to-create an
apparatus whose task will be to put into practice the measures necessary for the merger
of the "communal" property of the kolkhozes with the State property.
80. Subordination of the system ofl,government to this task was undoubtedly the main motive
for the merger of the ministries administering the kol.k;hoz sector (the Ministry of
Agriculture USSR, the Ministry, of Cotton Growing USSR) with the ministries managing
particularly the State sector of agriculture (The Ministry of Sovkhozes U88R,?the
Ministry of Forestry USSR). Only preparations for the introduction of the "exchange
of products", contemplated in Stalin's program, could suggest the expediency of the
simultanGo,is mc?r,er of those ministries with the Ministry of Procurements USSR. The
fact that "the excharcr, of products" is hot being introduced immediately does not
refute. the statem'K'nt at all. The merger of the above mentioned ministries represents
an early preparatiot.lof the State apparatus for the forthcoming reforms.
81. Out of all these ministries a single apparatus was created -- the Ministry of ~c^_-, r;?;,
and Agricultural Procurement USSR. In it are concentrated all the technical levers cap-
able of giving ti:e rilhtdir(:ction to the reorGanizational process which leads to the
contemplated ref ores
82. In what does the a, _c rlar program, ltllurite,i L the "dictatorship of the collegian"
consist? Whet arc Li*.,-- paths to and the mr?titods of its execution? These questions,
which dete'r7niir the line of action of the dictatorship of the coll,egium in the future
require particular aiud
'0ill% SUBORDnAT1OII Oh' '1T POST-STALiii AGRARIA:J POLICY `i'O Pi1R OLD PLUM OF AGaMMMN
83? In order to discern the chnrarter of the future economic and social reforms in the
USSR reeiiiting, it. perspective, ;iron the decisions..of the .19th Party congress, it
is most important. to analyze the measures in the agricultural field. In evaluating
their sig;nificailce one must start with the premise that the Soviet agrarian program
is first of all suLordinated to the purpose of increasing the economic power of the
Soviet State as at, agent of Coc::,unist aggression. The preparation of the rear for
war is _ it?:tt of all ~i) kborditnto that goal. I
84. Oilc 1 t ...7I. :' J 1.1. J i.c t-ytG? LiSi nu :.t Jf Cut.'Cmiiiism dependent on the
"frith " ; ; i ?. to acid, vc Sri thou t the previous destruc-
Lion t
One i:,:st .oc. fc E.e; 1t!,er, treat Stalin's heirs
confl -~ -- a bf~l ! t.v ur o..;nouac?oa c:'er t.i, oiei or' t.rc diciator -- that
"the t:., Stu t, Chu rtonr, to the building of
495. These bait ai;c'c after Stalin's st:itute a ctern warning to
the West d.:.ax:ra. i :> . 1t inO , "the night of Soviet State" required rather- for
the reason hunt, ;ri.?.i: t, ?e trci,:;it'aori to Communism, the boundaries preventing the
extension of ti:e uuc y,,:iist', dictatorship to the entire free world must first be
dcstroycd': Why cc it absolutely necessary, in order to build Communism in USSR,
"to' Outd ict,ance tl.e I-'. i.ncipal capitalist countries" it t.',c economic sense?
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-010809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
25X1
86. If in order to ouil.d Cow;aunism, an abundance of products must 'ue acchieved, why is not
the Party guided ':cy the actual requirements of the population, which mast be satisfied,
rather than the level of industrial production of "the principal capitalist countries"T
"Only in the event that we outdistance the capitalist countries can we count on having.
an abundance of products and on.being able to effect the transition from the first
to the second phase of Communism" (Stalin).
87. After the dictator's death, Naleukov corroborated the real meaning of the words that
Stalin uttered as early as at the 18th Party congress.
88. It is not the abundance of products that is sought by the competition with "capitalist
countries" but the building of "the might of the Soviet State" -- the military and
economic supremacy of thle..USSR -- without which "capitalist encirclement" cannot be
destroyed.
89. It was precisely this task -- a premise to the "withering" of the State, and an
essential prerequisite to the obliteration of state boundaries and the extension of
the Kremlin's power throughout the world -- that came under discussion at the 18th
Party con tress .
90. That the State will not exist foreve_' is an unshakable Party postulate. According to
official Party phraseology, the State is necessary as long as "communal" property must
be protected, as long as the country must be "defended", etc. In his report to the
18th Party congress, Stalin answered the question as to how long the state would be
preserved, as follows:
"Will the State be preserved also in the period of Communism?
"Yes, it will be, if the danger of military attacks from the outside is not
eliminated. At the same time, m turally, the form of our State will be changed,
again in accordance with the changes occurring in the domestic and foreign'
situation.
"No, it will not be preserved and will wither, if the capitalist encirclement
- is liquidated and is supplanted by a socialist one."
91. It is clear that the elimination of "the danger of military attac:ka? froaa the outside"
by replacing, by force, the "capitalist encirclement" with a socialist one is possible
only through the development of the military and economic potential of the U8SB to a
degree which. would give it supremacy over "the capitalist countries.
92'. The "withering" of the State in connection with the building of Communism in the Uri
('consequently also the preliminary destruction of "capitalist encirclement" is dis-
'ussed also in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR. Hence it is quite
clear that the purpose of building up "a material base for communism, under Which
slogan the second postwar Five-Year Plan is taking its course in the USSR and that
of strengthening the military and economic tential of USSR 1 e the purpose of
direct preparations for war arc identical.
93'. In order to carry out their plans of aggression, Stalin's "heirs" must introduce a
number of reforms which would enable them to meet the increased mobilization demands
of the Communist apparatus for aggression. It is just for that purpose that "a
single production sector" must be created, the entire production of which must be
completely at the disposal of the State authorities. The center of gravity of future
reforms which lead to the creation of "a single production sector" lies in the realm
of the kolkhoz policy.
AGRARIAN REFORM -- A MEASURE DESIGNED 1110 PREPARE TITS REAR FOR TOTAL WAR
94. It is precisely in the kolkhoz village that the principal line of division between
the contemporary form of Soviet socialism and its final form is to be found. Indeed,
"the difference between the city and the village" reflected in7 the social status of
25X1
SECRET4
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 F
Approved For Release 2004/
SERRETA
25X1
25X1
the peasantry is the formal obstacle which prevents the Stalin dictatorship from
crossing the line into the sphere of c fete domination by the state authorities of
the personal interests of the entire population. This barrier can be broken down and
the peasants' psychology alteredIonly by a radical change in the very essence of the
kolkhozes and the social significance of the peasantry, which still represents by
its vary status a separate class of Soviet society. No other class in the UbSR has
any individual property, whereas such property is the center of personal interest for
the kolkhoz man. Since the domestic policy of the Communists is hampered by the
resistance of the peasantry and by the economic conditions of the country, the kolkhoz
man still owns such property in the form of individual plots priusadebnyye
khozyaystva . Even nominally, no other class owns group or collective (the so-called
"communal"}property, nor does it have the right to the products of its own labor,
auch ac- every group of peasants, united in a kolkhoz, possesses, formally.
1
95. Having built the so-called ."classless" society, Stalin retained, for the time being,
this class distinction. But it will be retained only until the development of the
communal" economy of the kolkhozes has reached its peak. Stalin let the kolkhoz-group
"property stand until the present time in order, first, to transform and to exploit
the sense of property peculiar tolkolkhoz men and, second, to pump over the money of
the city population, through the kolkhoz market, and thus increase capital investment
in agriculture and satisfy the current production needs of the kolkhozes.
96.
It is clear that cooperative communal ownership" is a crude fiction. It is also clear
that this fiction serves Soviet propaganda as a cover for the actual expropriation
of the kolkhozes, whose produce is taken over by the state for almost nothing. It
is understandable that only illusions (that'Soviet propaganda tries to nurture) can
preserve in kolkhoz men the sense of ownership of kolkhoz produce. This illusory
sense of ownership is the only thing that the authorities still hope to use for
some time as a stimulus for the overall development of the "communal" economy of
kolkhozes and the growth of their productivity. (Of course, in this development a
great role is also played by the kolkhoz market which partly compensates for the
losses sustained by the kolkhnzor, h?cause of the lc?:r prroom of products procured by
the state from the kolkhozes). When this goal is reached, when the accumulation of
"communal" property and the production volume - increased by full utilization of
the kolkhozaik a labor which is now spent on his personal plot - have reached their
maximum, the fiction of cooperative and group property will be abolished. The
communal" property of the kolkhozlwill, become "national" property, to be controlled
by the central authorities. The state will become its master in name, too.
97. This is a vital necessity for the Kremlin dictatorship, in light of the USSR's prepara-
tion for war. The attraction that the kolkhoznik's individual plot has for his work and
the impossibility of placing a considerable part of his production under state control
are facts that obviously conflict with the tasks of the complete "appropriation" of
agricultural "productive forces" by the state. Even the fiction of kolkhoz-group
property harbors an organic contradiction between the interests of the state authorities
and those of the individual 1oi):hiznik and his transformed sense of property. The
struggle of the authorities roi? 'griain" was alwayrs the culmination of their conflict
with the pPCoantry and this struggle is resumed every year at harvest time. The
principle of distributing profits in kind on the basis of work-days, which is connected
with kolkhoz-group "ownership", inevitably provokes stubborn resistance on the part of
the kolkhoz men to the stockpiling of grain by the state. The reason is plain: the
compulsory delivery of grain to the state depreciates the value of the workday.
Continuous existence on a sent-starvation basis exacerbates the conflict between the
kolkhozniks' sense of ownership toward the products of their collective labor, their
sense of having a right to that "grain", and the tendenoy of the state to appropriate
these products. At the same time, the interest of the kolkhoc men in increasing their
labor productivity is to a great extent extinguished.
98. This is exactly what Stalin defines as the "contradiction between productive forces and
production relationship". At present, this contradiction is neutralized by compulsory
measures, But, considering the plans for further development of kolkhoz production
and the increase in the volume of the produceappropristed by the state, the existing
"production relationship" will hamper evermore the development of the 'productive
25X1
SEMM
. Approved For Release 2004/
1/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
25X1
forces"., ;It'd the ccntrad.r, ction between the. too wi.LL i.ne:v.r ,ab...y brow into a "conflict".
99. That is why thu State authorities must change the "production relationship" -4
I -e
abolish kolkhoz-group property, which -- with the land and the means of prod
uction
n
belo i t th
n
g
g o e State -- is still formally represented by the produce of kolkhozes.
This measure is ra idl c i t
ern
h
p y
ng o a
ead because it is the only way for the Communist
policy of aggression 'to avoid a "conflict"which, under war conditions, might-prove
fatal. Only after the process of p~:oletarianizatiun of kolkhoz men and stripping
them of any sense of ownership has been completed can the central authorities
unhampered in their retention of full control over the production of kolkhozes.
100. This the State will achieve by abolishing the 'privileges" of the peasantry which have
been temporarily preserved; by abolishing the right of the kolkhoz men to, own any
property; and later, by openly expropriating the kolkhozes. By that time, the perfected
methods of compulsion to work will easily replace the -illusory sense of collective
,ownership, as the principal "stimulus" in the agricultural production. ?Kolkhozes will
become State agricultural enterprises. In this way the situation of the workers and
the peasants trill be made equal -- "the difference between the city and the village",
which prevents the establishment of complete monopol;, of the State interests in
kolkhoz production, will be wiped out.
101. The charge of the social nature of kolkhozes leads to a complete proletarianization
of kolkhoz men e.nd necessitates a change in the existing forms of payment for their
work. It represents the corner stone of the preparation of the rear forwar conditions,
a transition of' the USSR to "perfected", completed, Soviet socialism.IConsequently,
the tasks envisaged by the Fifth Fivl-Year Plan and designed to create'"the premises
for the construction of a Communist society" cannot be considered without taking into
account their relationship to the general goal of social and economic reforms in
agriculture -- their relationship to the forthcoming agrarian reform. This reform,
while being introduced by gradual steps, will not be completed, however, before the
development of "communal" production in kolkhozes has reached the highest level
possible within the limits of the existing "production relationship".
102. Obviously, the :,tats cannel clluuaate the fiction of koikhoz-group ownership imrnedla ly.
As long as the exploitation of the kolkhozniks' labor does not produce, sufficiently
high results; as long ae tf.,- conditions of"profitability".of the kolkhoz economy,
necessary for their conver6 ior: Into State enterprises, have not develoied, it_ia - not
worth while for rile State to destroy formally the fiction. It makes no sense to
undertake to pay t;.c kolkhoc men i?ot? their work when, preserving the fiction of
kolkhoz--group ownership, tin' kolltiruz men can work for nothing.
,;MTAIN INDICES OF THE GROW'.fii a--' THE MPfI IAL EASE OF CONMUNISl4 IN AGBICULTUR
103. The published data taken roc,,cnkov's report to the 19th Party Congress doe not
testify at all to a sharp iicreas.' In labor productivity which allegedly has already
been achieved in r_(;riculturc?_ Fir::t of all, although, according to'Malenkov's date, the
strength of the tractor pool, :~onpa med to the pro-World War II level, increased by 59 pez'aent
and the number of co:aoines b: I. percent, it does not follow that the level of mechanize,
tion per urea unit, rase as much. The Five-Year Plan, foresees complete
mechanization of basic operations in agriculture oy 1955, is indicative of that.
Besides, a confir?nnttiorr O. the saris may be found in toe general exp]ssnation which can
be given concerning tin.- production of :1,000,000,000 poods Ca pond equals 36.113 lbs T
of grain, allegea:Ly attained in l5>2, and the 1951 production of raw cotton (exceed-
ins- the prewar rr?c,ss production by 46 percent) and that of sugar beets (31 percent.),
as well as other similar indices. The reason for this rrrewth in gross production is
not only the productivity level. but also the enlargement of the sown area by 5,300,000
hectares, rx,nditlonod by the increase in the machine and tractor pool. It is also
difficult to es ti.:.,te the amount of production added to "the gross receipts" by war
reparations and other levies from vassal states.
104. In order to get a:. indirect idea of time necessary for the implementation of the
forthcoming; atgrarian reform, one must first o_ all lied ttu: ar,i,wers to the following
questions : to what 'rztunt is the increase in er',niculrazral produr.t io :, envisaged in the
25X1
sbCIIET/I
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECR&T
-1'?-
25X1
Fifth Five.-Year Plan, realistic? Can the gross collections of grain be increased by
40-50 percent; those of raw cotton, by 55-65 percent; ;nose of flax fiber, by 40-50
percent; those of sugar beets, by 65-70 percent; etc.? Can a fodder base be created
which would be adequate to the increase in live-stock .-- cattle by 18-20 rercent,'
sheep by 60-62 percent, pigs by 45-50 percent -- and still guarantee a high productivity
in stock raising?
1C5. As measures guaranteeing the future growth of productivity -- in agriculture, the
follo'dng changes, according to plan, must take place: the irrigated area of agriculture,
in particular must be widened. It is planned to increase the irrigated area by 30-35
percent during the Five-Year Plan by building 30,000 - 35,000 ponds and reservoirs
in.kolkhozes and state farms Lsovkhozej. The old system of irrigation must be changed
for a new one. A further development in the fulfillment of the plan of field shelter
belts is also envisioned. During the period of the Five-Year Plan, a foundation for
at least 2,500,00 hectares of field shelter belts in kolkhozes and state farms must
be laid, and about 2,500,000 hectares must be seeded or planted as State forests. in
order to fulfill the increased program of agricultural operations, the'strength of
the tractor pool must be increased by approximately 50 percent by the end of the
Five-Year Plan, thus completing the mechanization of the basic operations in agriculture.
l
106. Such are the basic indices in the development of agricultural production during the
Fifth Five-Year Plan, the achievement of which would, to a considerable degree, meet
the requirements of the State in connection with the implementation of the agrarian
reform.
107. However, the conditions deteriaining the dynamics of agricultural production and, at
the some time, the timetable of the future agrarian reform, require a critical
analysis.
108. The principle of the grassfield system of agriculture is the scientific and technical
basis of agricultural production in the Soviet Union. It includes all branches of
agriculture, and unites the economic and agrotechnical factors affecting the level
of work productivity in agriculture.
109. They are directed toward A.n i?,cr ccc In t.._ ieeLility of land and a complex development
of all branches of the economy. Grassfield crop rotation, compulsory development of
stock raising, creation of field shelter belts, construction of ponds and reservoirs,
etc, are parts of it.
3Y). The evaluation of thu effectiveness of the grassfield system of agriculture -- achieved
by interplay of orgaui7ational, technical, social, and economic factors -- must be
expressed first of all in the size of crops. Being a synthetic and natural index,
characteristic of the condition of agriculture, it will also reveal the degree to
which the Soviet-State has mastered "the production fon:es" in agriculture.
111. As a criterion, take the indices in grain production. The gross grain collection in
1950, according to official Soviet data, amounted to 121,600,00 tons. In accordance
with the planned increase o' 40-50 percent, the amount in 1955 ought to be
17-182,000,000 tons. Do the production conditions in kolkhozes'and state farms warrant
such a jump?
112. But this is only the first rung of the ladder. Combining the economic tasks of the
Fifth Five-Year Plan with the prospect of social reorganization of kolkhozes, this is
not the only question to be answered. No less important is it to determine the follow-
ing steps too, i e to give a forecast, based on acientii'ie facts, of the development
of agricultural production in the USSR during the nest, five years.
113. The introduction of gra:;sfield crop rotation and the development of field shelter belts
was begun in the Soviet Union as early as 1946. The agrotechnical significance of
organized crop rotation in the increase of productivity of agricultural crops, consists
in the two-fold effect of the rotation on the soils 1) greasfield crop rotation restores
fertility to soil; this is achieved by the obligatory inclusion in crop rotation of
perennial cereal grasses and leguminous plants; during two or three years they are
capable of forming a layer of soil in the field which, in respect to its physical
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECR I ET
18-
25X1
structure and the reserves of nitrogenous sub.stauces, compares to a natural 20 year-
old deposit; 2) the characteristic peculiarity of grassfield crop rotation is also
the so-called cultivation of fallow fields. The significance of this agrarian method
consists in cleaning up the fields of weeds, the mineralization of organic substances,
and the accumulation in the soil of moisture reserves.
114. A study of experimental data of a number of scientific research inEtitutions, covering
many years, entitles us to speak on thee, subject of the great effectiveness of the
grassfield system of agriculture. Applied to grain production, provided the entire
grassfield agroteclmical complex is well organized, this system can double the harvest.
Obviously, the time it would take to achieve such results depends upon the conditions of
production. Knowing these conditions, Lt is impossible to assume that the growth of
productivity on the entire territory ofUSSR can occur in a sudden jump. Besides,
according to a phenologically-based chart, the influence of the field shelter belts
laid during the first period of forest planting (i.e. before 1950),can begin to come
into effect, due to their age, firm in1958. It will be able to grow steadily only
during the following seven years, when more the-i a half, -- and in case of pre-term
fulfillment of planting plans -- 3/4 of all field shelter belts will join the ranlra.
115. Thus, the practical conditions of production during the next few years will greatly
lower the increase oflcrops that is theoretically possible. Taking all things into
consideration, up to 1965, as much as a 1150 percent increase of harvests on fields
subjected to a single 1, grass sowing is actually possible, while on fields that have
been sown to perennial grasses twice,anlincrr se of as much as 75 percent is possible.
Only later on, when al large area will have benefited from field shelter belta, will an
overall doubling of the yield on fields that have undergone two grass plantings
be possible.
116: We take the entire cultivai.ed area of about 200,000,000 hectares as the point of
departure in our estimates. We establish the correlation of crops on the basis of
typical diagrams of c"op rotation that has been introduced. We take into account the
fact that the planting of perennial grasses has resulted in an increase of harvests
einrn 1Qli9 We .later...'{n?, - the Of u
? i.~ ~'~ .^.owplc;l ur+otci'ili6 Ji .he total gY'dpd ni'on
on the basis of the possible reproduction rates of perennial grasses. In this way we
find. that. the entire cal tivated area cannot be subjected to the effects of one
perennial grass sowing until 1966. In 1958, the process of subjecting a certain
part of the fields to a second plantin;; of perennial grasses will begin, and it can
be finished in 1975.
117. Having obtained a clear picture of the fields affected by perennial grasses, according
to the years, we can now estimate the possible increase of grain crops on these
fields. Taking into consideration the gradation, arriEed at.in connection with
the number of crop rotations and the extent of the influence of field shelter belts,
we establish, in perspective, the following dynamics of the growth of grain production
in USSR according to five-year periods:
Year
Average increase of
grain harvests as
compared with 1950
(in percentage)
Average grain
harvests in centners
per hectare
Gross grain collections
on unchanged sowing area of
105,800,000 hectares
Percent
Centners
Tons
1955
14.2
13.7 144,
goo, 000
1960
40
16.8 178,1
00,000
1965
58.;
19.0 201,9
00,000
1970
92.5
23.1 244,5
00,000
1975
100
24.0 253,9
00,000
118. We have established Lhcfirst limits of the increase of grain production in the U86R
which can be achieved under certain conditions during the period of two cycles of
grassfield crop rotation. The results of our estimates represent fully realistic
quantities. In our prognosis only the terms of attaining thecae results are conditional.
At the same time, our, of the most important prerequisites to the. achievement of these
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Apl~roved For Release 2004/01/21
SECRET/1
CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
25X1
results is the obtaining of large yields of the green mass Lzelenaya mass) of perennial
grasses -- which are characterized byIthe development of a great mass of roots In the
soil -- over the entire territory. Only then can the formation of the soil structure
be vigorous, and the structure acquire stability. As long as the grass yield is. low,
either there will be no increase in grain crops at all, or, if there is, it will be
quite' insignificant.
119. The sI a pertains not only to grin crops but. to all the other varieties of agricultural
production.
120. The most uncertain factor is the time at which the agrotechnical organization of the.
grassfield crop rotation will be firstl achieved. We have in mind a number of practical
problems connected with field grass sowing in the USSR which have not yet been solved.
Prerequisites for a good development of perennial grasses are far from existing in
every! soil and climate zone. It is true that in our estimates we did not take into
consideration such independent factors as the development of irrigated agriculture,
the deepening of the arable layer, the introduction of crops of greater. productivity,
or the raising of the general agrotechnical level of production.
121. All these factors taken together can meet the 5lanne7 increase in gross grain
collections, an increase that is possible provided only that a grass layer of full
value lis developed to the extent that we have taken into consideration. But even under
such conditions the 105,800,000 hectares of grain crops can produce at the end of the
current Five-Year Plana gross collection of only 145,000,000 tons instead of the
170-1812,000,000 tons stipulated by the lplan.
122. That ils why, in conjunction with the dUstribution of the land of the consolidated
kolkhozes, a temporary "crowding" of grassfield crop rotations with grain crops at the
expense of the areas of.perennial grasses of low fertility is taking place in the Soviet
Union. Our estimates were based on the optimum -- froathe agrotechnical point of view --
proportion of grain crops -- 52.9 percent of the cultiva,;ed area. This corresponds to
the arable area, which, according to the plan, amounted to 105,800,000 hectares in 1950.
In order., however, to obtain the wanting' 25-37,000,000 tons of grain in 1955,. this
area must be extend_d, an achievement being sought in the "crowding" of crop rotations.
We du L ',L kuuw i.u wuaL exLeUL ;:iris snortage of grain production will be. overcome at.
the expense of the vassal states. If, however, this source is excluded, the acreage
under grain cultures would have to be increased by 11-a7,000,000 hectares by means of
"crowding". Grain crops would then take up 56.3 - 66.4 percent of the total acreage
under cultivation. But there is nothing incredible in this either. According to the
plan for 1950, grain cultures constituted 66.6 percent of the total acreage under
cultivation.
123. In this way, with the average productivity of 13,7 centncrs per hectare, the plan for
the amount of "gross collections", if partially supplemented by the vassal states,:
could be achieved. However, in view of lthe lack of the most vital agrotechnical
prerequisite to the stability of the crops, namely, a grass layer of full value, this
will greatly depend on frequency of ray.
124. It is evident that during subsequent years, in proportion to the increase in fertility
of the perennial grasses supplementing the fodder base of animal husbandry, the
acreage, under grain cultures will gradually reach optimum magnitude. The reduction in
area under Drain cultures will be eomapensated for by the increase in fertility afforded
by the perennial grasses. Thus, only aflter the first period, that required for the
organization of grassfield crop rotation, has been concluded, will the grassfield
system succeed in promoting a snaxp increase in the productivity of labor and serving
as an index of the skill of Soviet agriculture. Until this result is achieved, the
development of animal husbandry and other branches of agriculture will remain a heavy
burden on the kolkhoz economy.
? SOCIAL MWCUS OF THE KOI.KhOZ .ECONOMY
125. Serving as the basis of the general development of the economy, the grassfield system
of agriculture contains large reserves of labor productivity which the Soviet State . .
appropriates. Or. one hand, it -leads to a fuller absorption of kolkhoznik's labor and
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21
: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 F
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET1
25X1
results is the obtaining of large yields of the green mass Lzelenaya mass) of perennial
grasses -- which are characterized by the development of a great mass of roots in the
soil -- over the entire territory. Only then can the formation of the soil structure
be vigorous, and the structure acquire stability. As long as the grass yield is.low,
either there will be no increase in grain crops at all, or., if there is, it will be
quite insignificant.
119. The same pertains not only to grain crops but to all the other varieties of agricultural
production.
120. The most uncertain factor is the time at which the agrotechnical organization of the-
grassfield crop rotation win be first achieved. We have in mind a number of practical
problems connected with field grass sowing in the USSR which have not yet been solved.
Prerequisites for a good development of perennial grasses are far from existing in
every soil and climate zone. It is true that in our estimates we did not'take into
consideration such independent factors as the development of irrigated agriculture,
the deepening of the arable layer, the introduction of crops of greater. productivity,
or the raising of the general agrotechnical level of production..
121. All these factors taken together can meet the )lanned7 increase in gross grain
collections, an increase that is possible provided only that a crass layer of full
value is developed to the extent that we have taken into consideration. But even under
such conditions the 105,800,000 hectares of grain crops can produce at the end of the
current Five-Year Plan a gross collection of only 145,000,000 tons instead of the
170-182,000,000 tons stipulated by the plan.
122. That is why, in conjunction with the dAstribution of the land of the consolidated
kolkhozes, a temporary "crowding" of grrassfield crop rotations with grain crops at the
expense of the areas of.perennial grasses of low fertility is taking place in the Soviet
Union. Our estimates were based on the optimum -- trcw the agrotechnical point of view --
proportion of grain crops -- 52.9 percent of the cultivated area. '!`his co responds to
the arable area, which, according to the plan, amounted to 105,800,000 hectares in 1950.
In order, however, to obtain the wanting 25-37,000,000 tons of grain in 1955,. this
area must be extended, an ao icvement -being cc,.ght in the "crc::dinon of crop rotations.
We do not know to what extent this shortage of grain production will be. overcome at
the expense of the vassal states. If, however, this source is excluded, the acreage
under grain cultures would have to be increased by 11-27,000,000 hectares by means of
"crowding". Grain crops would then tape up 58.3 - 66.4 percent of the :total acreage
under cultivation. But there is nothing incredible in this either. According to the
plan for 1950, grain cultures constituted 6t.6 percent of the total acreage under
cultivation.
123? In this way, with the average productivity of 13.7 centncrs per hectare, the plan for
the amount of "gross collections", if partially supplemented by the vassal states,.
could be achieved. However, in View of the lack of the most vital agrotechnical
prerequisite to the stability of the crops, nar.ely, a grass layer of full value, this
will greatly depend or, frequency of rain.
124. It is evident that during subsequent years, in proportion to the increase in fertility
of the perennial grasses supplementing the fudder base of animal husbandry, the
acreage under grain cultures will gradually reach optimum magnitude. The reduction in
area under grain cultures will be compensated for by the increase in fertility afforded
by the perennial grasses. Thus, only after the first period, that required for the
organization of grassfield crop rotation, has been concluded, will the grassfield
system succeed in promoting a sharp increase in the productivity of labor and aervim;
as an index of the skill of Soviet agriculture. Until this result is achieved, the
development of animmal husbandry and other branches cf agriculture will remain a heavy
burden on the kol.khoz economy.
SOCIAL BSFEC7S OF THE KOIZhOZ ECONOMY
125. Serving as the basis of the general development of the economy, the grassfield system
of agriculture contains large reserves of '.abcr productivity which the Soviet State
appropriates. On one hand, it -leads to a fuller absorption of kolkhoznik'a labor and
ELCRE f/ i
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-p 0809A000500180051-3
25X1
25X1
to a more productive utilization cfthis laud' for the exc:l.usive benefit of. the
Soviet S"ate.I on the ether, a6 fi Consequence of the above, and counter to the perooual
interests of the "kolkhroznik, it tends to tear hits awaymore and more from his individual
plot. The propaganda significance of the so-called "plan of the transformation of
nature" whichleads, from the economic point of view, to economic progress, is at
the same time destroyed, because, from a social point of view, this economic progress
hastens the proletarianization cf the kollrhozniks.
126. The nationali lation of the communal property of kolknozes, which, in accordance
with the pro am of "'building up Cor aunism" must take place after their "productive
forces" have been thoroug1l; developed, will only formally sanction a certain degree
the situation in which the }:olkhoznil now exist. The kolkhozniks realize perfectly
well that they, own their "cor;.^runal" farm only in naive, that in fact it belongs, as
well us the produce o_' their labor, to the State. Being forced to work in a "communal"
farm and, at the Caine tires:, not being able to make use of the products of their labor, .
the kol}hozniks do not envisage in the economic development of the kolkhozes the same
future prosperity that Soviet propaganda promises. he goal of the world hegemony
of Communism, which a;;ricultural production in the USSR was also made to serve in the
first place, liar, nothirr_; in common with the interests of the kolkhoz peasantry.
127. The passive r""sistance of the kolkhoz men to the introduction of the elementu of the
grassfield system of agriculture is aggravated by the lfact that the performance of
the labor involved in it has a direct adverse effect on wages in the kolkhozee. The
most graphic example of this is the work involved in the planting of field shelter
belts. The execution of that cask costs the kol1:1,ozes a tremendous number of
workdays, while the results of that work may appear only in the distant future. The
kolkhoz man are compelled to perform additional work free of charge, since the addi-
tional workdays spent in forest planting lead to the depreciation of the value of the
workday. Thisi applies in equal measure to other types of work (for instance,. the
construction off ponds and reservoirs).
128. Owing to the ahme econo:"i?_ conditions of kolkhozes, the development of "communal
animal husbandry, whirl, r,presents an inseparable link in the grassfield system of
agriculture, is directl;; contrary to the vital interests of the kolkhoz peasantry.
The growth in the number of cattle on kolkhoz farms, accelerated by the Soviet .
government by every means, long ago far outstripped the establishment of a correspond-
ing fodder'bas The governr..ent was compelled to admit that the production of fodder
now, as before has failed to meet the demands of the growing animal husbandry.
129. Reiter it follows with fu01 clarity that maintenance of the "communal" cattle on the
farms greatly lowers the already niggardly economic level of the kolkhozniks, be
the feeding of1the cattle absorbs a considerable portion of the natural resources
which could otherwise be partly used for distribution on workdays.
130. By the way, ii many cases it had an indirect effect on the rate of adaptation of the
system of grassfield crop rotation. Seeking to decrease, as far as possible grain
and fodder reserves (which also swallow up a.considerable portion of the production
intended for distribution on workdays), the kolkhoz mean try to increase the reserves
of coarse fodder, hay, in particular. Therefore, grasses on grass sown areas are
often mowed for hay, as occurred in Stavropol' Krai, as a result of which there were
no seeds.
131. All the examples of resistance on the part of kolkhoz~men to the adaptation of the
elements c'f the system of grass field crop rotation and their indifference to the
development ofl"communal" economy," of the kolkhozes stem from the same cause: forced
labor at the present time and forced' labor inseparable from the future economic
progress of kolkhozes.
132. The.grassfieldjsystem of agriculture represents an efficient scientific and technical
basis for the realization of these prospects. However, the social basis for the
realization is in irreconcilable conflict with the interests of the kolkhoz peasantry.
The agrarian policy of the'Bolshuviks did not eliminate the "contradictions between.
productive Forces and production relations" which hampered the implementation of the
25X1
SECRET/
Approved or Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-0809A000500180051-3
I
 F r-
25X1 li:
25X1
grassiield sys Of a~.iau._turc in pre-r::volutic~irary ltu ia. heir policy which
leads toward the utopian goals of Commuaism has only given this contradiction a new
and harsher form, under which the products al production are absorbed by the gigantic
machinery of the share--owner state, while the in-erest5 of the producers are suppressed
by the crude force of a totalitarian regime.
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
=CHANGE OF GOODS", AS AN INS`IIZUMIUT FOR TIM FDCF'ROPR ATIO1; OF KO13CliOZSS
133. Does this mean that it is too early to sneak of the existence of primary foundations
of the "econumic Lase of Communism," representin,~l lthe production maximum,.into which,
under the prevalent "production relations", the forced labor of kolkhoz men could be
embodied? Does this.m1an chat it is too early to speak of the approaching obsolescence
of the kollrhoz -- group economic formation acting,, as a brake on the further development
of the "productive forces"? Does this mean that~it is too early to speak of the time
becoming ripe for transferring the kolkhozes int. ii a new social quantity? Not at all.
The. introduction of measures necessary for the complete adaptation of the grassfield
system of agriculture depends on the degree of excellence of the measures which the
Soviet government takes to force the kolkhoz men to work harder. These measures
deterzine, to a ]a.rge extur_v, the ti: e factor onlwhi.en ti:c release of productivity
reserves of agriculture inherent in t:.e era nsfield cystoid of agriculture depends.
13k. Moreover, on what level uous tl.e curve of labor productivity determining the beginning
of the "joicnunict Tiros: er-it.y" run? Will not the results, which can be achieved during
the ' current Five-Year Plan, turn out, in the o7 : inion of the Government, to be adequate
for carryin ; out tlIic :irst. ;tz;;co of the agreriai reform?
135. We cannot help ut se;: vital ei;::s ci tih?-: real. imminence of the agrarian reform.. The
Fourth hlv :-Year Plan encic u in the enactrx nt of a' great measure by the Soviet authorities
-- the connoliur_ticin of kolk:i:oces. present, there are 97?,000 consolidated kolkhozes
in thr: USSR inntead of d h,o0U s::.all kolkhozes w'6ich cxisted on 1 Jan 50. This re-
presen.,cd -eomplecion of collectivization which enhanced the commanding role of the
state eni 1.ys influence on the economic lire of the kolkhozes. It was also an important
stop in the preparations of the rear for war. 'F~rst of all, reliable and well qualified
personnel were se-. ctux acs i:r?ll:.".: .. Lnu;ere. Thy:l labor force was partly augmented by
additions iron ti c~adu:i.aisrrati e :.crsonn_l before consolidation, numbered
several million mern.
136. ;i, conooliiating tII e kolicooze:: ti:e trove: ru-s-,nt crl:ated favorable conditions for drawing
nearer the date of the liquiut.c-Toe of the ;:?i,:ulttu?al artel -- a contemporary Socialist
form of kolkchoses and their transLur:::atic,n Late. nterprises of the "consistent
oocialist type". This :w.anura :. t; b1y narrcwed he 1-ula' between theo growth of the
technical-power batie, at _r:uu of Stt moans of production, and the rrte of
the development and accunudutiun of their 'co.wunal" property.
13 7 - An important practical result of the corlsolidltipn :ran the liquidation of a great
nunb rof ln1;3i1, farms which were ai~sorbcu by More powert'ul kolkhozes. The concentration
of indivisible reserves reoultin _ro:l coru;clid at ion is undoubtedly favorable to the
acceleration of the rate of "u::pr;axed reproductimn". Suitable conditions were also
created for a full.br :-itili atiin cY th- technical: means of !?iS, as a lever of government
)ressurc on the de?elopment of the "communal" eccnoi* of kolkhozes. At the Same time,
the increas,: in nroductivl t;r' of toe machi .e and tractor pool guarantees a more painless
re?case Of hum n lcscrvee holl:hoz productiop in case of mobilization for var.
138. The uo eiit.i cus created by ti:._ consolidation of kolkhozes are undoubtedly favorable to
the increar;e of their "Tc:r:Lrl.oct'' /zate of co::rrdity production to the total output
and to :.n :Lccu u1tYiou.of "? :=.:1rna1 property, til'though the "tovarnostof kolkhozes
is an extr.:raely :elati.a e :::crap ion. (their "tovarnost" can grow not only at the expense
Of. increanc1 productivity yet :also at the :pensk: of a reduction in natural reserves
dr-sti:led for diotributio:t :..ec_e:dirg :.o wori:ciays). The fr.ct which Benediktov pointed
out at 19th Corurre:as tku. ? the iudivio1-'1_ _ n ds of the kolkhozes, in connection
sit: the i.nercase In :flolhe,:ur i.rofitc, w.:r?- : or"than twice as big in 1952 than they were
in 1X10 PhIL3' be CU 1l ideeed .IL:; n cocrmequc Of the growth Of "tovarzwst j ". course,
Sov.Let.e.tatistion includeu aluo the Jocle1i1IZ1ed. property of the new ktolkhozes in
the anuoxed obl:~.s1.5. But, the Ul:d of the r'uiL!rth Five-Year Plan, under the same
25(1
sac1ci`i'/j
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RD 80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SEChEf4
25X1
r-
conditions, the increase amounted to only 1.6 times. One cannot help but admit that
the increase of indivisible funds, and, consequently, of "communal" property, in one
year following consolidation s significant. The rates of this growth resulting
from the transition from a one-aided specialization to a general development of a
"communal" economy, connected with the introduction of 'the grass-field system of
agriculture, must continue to increase., This conclusion follows logically from the
variety of the "tovarnost "' which is being built up and from the improvement of the
financial situation of kolkhozes connected therewith.
139. The great number of measures of Soviet leadership applied in that direction pursue
the following practical ends: 1) an increase of monetary profits of kolkhozes -- the
transformation of kolkhozes into "xolkhoz millionnaires"; 2) depending on the
above increases, an increase of indivisible funds of kolkhozes, i.e. the.strengthenling
of the main source of capital investment in the further development of ."communal"
economy -- the maximum-accumulation of the "communal" property of kolkhozes; 3) an
increase in kolkhoz production with a simultaneous substitution of monetary payments
by work-days for payments in kind, i a the establishment of premises for bringing
the kolkhozes, in respect to payment for work, to the level of State farms.
140. Is it riot clear that the intensification of the "expanded reproduction" of kolkhozes at
the same?time leads to the kolkhoznik's breaking further and further away from his
individual plot and to a more complete absorption of his work by the "communal" economy
-Df the kolkhoz?
141. Stalin's last "work", The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", and the materials
of the 19th Party Congress fully confirm our prognosis of long ago that .82.1 this .is
preparation for nationalization of "communal" kolkhoz -- group property and for the.
transfer of this property into the category of "national" property which is.adminiatared
by the central authorities, 1 e for its formal merger with State property. Before
appropriating the accumulated fruits of labor of 'the kolkhoz men, i.e before
expropriating the kolkhozes, Stalin's government is striving to develop their production
to a maximum degree and to enlarge their "communal" property while at the same time,
liquidating the individual plots oi' the kolkhoz men.
142. Stalin speaks plaii,ly of '.ham "by gradvtal stages . . . . to raise kolkhoz
property to the level of nn.tiolal property, and, also by gradual stages, to repla
the circulation of' goods by -a syotcu of barter, so that the central authoritlesr
or some other couounal economic center, can seize the entire production of oGMMtusal
production .... " (uol'shevlk, ivc; 15, 1 12, p 35)?
143. Stalin attempts to covCr with L. .i i;. lei f' plarnie": absorption of the kolkhoz sector
by the state sector, is the direct expropriation of the kolkhoz.For that purpose, he
tries to picture the "society", and nct the state, as the future master of the
expropriated property of the kolkhozes. Be considers as adequate to the task-"a united
all-national organization", formed with representatives of State industry and.the
kolkhozes, the functions of which will be to keep records and to distribute the
entire consumers' produce of tLe cou::try.-
144. Stalin also confirms that the liquidation of kolkhoz-group ownership temporarily
preserved as a "sltmulus to an increase in work productivity and to a quicker
accumulation C of ?J in kolkhozes, monetary receipts from the kolkhoz market
included -- is not a distant vista but a matter of the near future. Speaking of the
group-kolkhoz ownership and the circulation of commodities, Stalin plainly atatas:l.
"at the present time these phenomena are being utilized successfully by us for the:l
development of socialist economy, and they are . . . . extremely useful. Undoui Y
they will continue to be useful in the near future. Thisserves as an Intimation
that the implementation -of Stalin's program with respect to the liquidation of these
economic phenomena will begin "in the near future".
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
-23-
25X1
145. This is understandable. Stalin clearly foresees a further exacerbation of the :"conflict'
between the interests of the kolkhoz peasantry and those of the State, which strives
to concentrate in its hands and subordinate. to its control all the "Production forces
of society". We have already examined the essence of the phenomenon defined by
Stalin as "the growth of contradictions between productive forces and production.
relations". The latter, according to Stalin, "have already begun to hamper, the
mighty development of our productive forces, in as much as they create obstacles to
a complete inclusion of the entire national economy in state planning....." That is
why Stalin makes haste "to liquidate these contradictions by gradually transforming
kolkhoz property into national property, and by gradually introducing barter
instead of commodity circulation".
146. It is quite obvious that the transition to "the exchange of products" will only be
an instrument of confiscation in the hands of the authorities. With its help the state
will be able to swallow up the entire kolkhozproduction, including the "surpluses"
distributed to kolkhoz men according. to work-days and those produced on their individual
plots,. as well as those left to the kolkhoz for sale on the kolkhoz market. The
seizure of the entire produce of kolkhozes will thus become not a result but the very
essence of expropriation. Stalin says plainly: "In order to raise kolkhoz property.
to the level of national property, the. surpluses of kolkhoz production. must_be excluded
from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of the exchange
of products between state industry and the kolkhozes. In this lies the essence. Such
is the "method" by which Stalin planned "to include the basic property of the kolkhozes
and the.produce of-kolkhoz production into the general system of national planning a. That is exactly what he ccsrrtders "a realistic and decisive means for raising.kolathoz
property to the level of national property," a means which must be used more and more
"under present couditions". This leaves no doubt whatever that the main purpose *of.
the gradual "trans format icn " of kolkhoz property into national property into enable
the authorities to extend daily, "step by step" the compulsory delivery of kolkhoz
produce to the state, until it is completely drawn into "the orbit of national ??
pl.asning. "
147.
It is not rtit'1icult *.o uruerstaud Stalin's method of "mastering" the entire produce
of the kolichoz village. St-.al in promises to give to ti}e kolkhozes, by way of, "the
exchange o:" products", more industrial goods, and at cheaper prices than under the system
of the circulation of goods. This shows that with. the Z-radual introduction of "the
exchange of producl._", a monetary evaluation of the products will exist. It is_.
obvious that there i-, no tifferenc;: in rrinciple barween commodity-money circulation
and the future "exchange of products". But the essential difference lies in the fact
that, under the former system, the kolkhozes and xolkhoz men sell part of their
produce in the kolkhoz market, while under the' latter this produce will be used in
a planned, 1 ? compulsory, manner as payments: for state goods. It does not follow,
however, that the "goods allotment" will correspond to the ful], value of the agri-
cultural produce: The state will pay for parto~ it in money at a ratio fixed by
this name state. In this manner, the transition to the compulsory "exchange of
products" will be carried out irrespective of the level of production of industrial
goods which the village needs. Gradually releasin3 commodity supplies on hand Into
the compulsory "exchange of products, 1 e forcing the kolkhozes to pay for purchased
goods not with money, but with products, the state will shackle kolkhoz production more
and more, drawing it away from tho kolithoz market.
THE ThRE STAGES OF I'? ALRARIA;i 13Sr ORM
148. One can noni unerri gly cut.i: ne thu pay.h along which, all stages of the forthcoming agrarian
reform will pass. This process, whi,,h leads to consecutive changes in the Agricultural
Artel Statutes, cau be divided into at least three ''asic stages -- the three links
of the agrarian reform.
149. The consecutive development of these stages isdetcrmined by the immediate task of the
Stalin program, namely, the core iscation of the entire production of kolkhozes under
the guise of "r,uv exchange of products". The Soviet procurement system, even under
25X1
SECRET,
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRET
25X1
the system of commodity.circulatiou, amounts to the compulsory confiscation of products
which are "kolkhozproperty" with almost no compensation. However, while the kolkhoti
market is still in existence, there is inevitably a certain "leakage" of agricultural
products. The kolkhozes themselves sell part of their produce that remains after the'
state procurement quotas have been exceeded. A part of the produce received according
to cork-dayp and cultivated on their individual plots -- the latter more significant!
in overall quantity -- is sold by thekolkhoz men. These prodLtats are sold in the.
market by the producers themselves and are consumed by the city population, circumvent-
ing state regulations. Consequently,'the task consists, after the "exchange of products"
has replaced the goads circulation, in.the gradual restriction of the channel through
which the "leakage" of products occurs, and then in the closing of the kolkhoz market
altogether.
150. This cannot take place:: however, until the causes which fc.rced the government to allot
kolkhoz trade are eliminated. These causes were the following: a) the impossibility
of satisfying the minimum food requirements of the urban population by means of routine
state trade; b) the chronic unsound state of kolkhoz finances., caused by low
procurement prices and seasonal monetary receipts inevitable in ore-sided development
of the economy. The cultivation by kolkhozes of certain products for sale on the
market and their saw at prices set by !a free exchange of goods turned out to be the.
main source of monetary income, which; enabled the kolkhozes to satisfy the immediate
requirements of production and to increase capital investments in the development of
"communal" eccnouiy. The State was thus able to shift the burden. of kolkhoz losses
caused by low procurement prices or, to the shoulders of the city consumer; c) the
necessity of p,,,.lfying the peasants who, in view of the meager money payments per
work-days, had no monetary income whatsoever.
151. As we see from the above, the :Liquidation of the kolkhoz trade cannot take place
before the "tovarnost "' of kolknozes has been greatly increased; before the "communal."
production of kolkhozes has, on the basis of the grassfield system of agriculture,
reached an all-round level of development and has produced a variety of "tovarnost'".I
This 1 t.1?? moat .mpurtati'. prerequisite for the improvement of the kolkhoz financial
State, tu; we it as i or the i ncreanc c:1' nwnetcry payments per work-days.
152. In view of c.las , 1ui tu} toe ,"irb t stage , the rood:; anal nuney cir ctil.ation will be
supplanted gras?ully by "ti,,, exchar,r;e',:01 products", Slowly l:.mitino the kolkhoz salesll
in the koU: oz mark,. t . 'rne ct-art, of "the e.xcl,~uge of i _ caiuct,s", in the form of
"otovariv niye " cif ug .i eul, ural products Lirrd,m tr ial prc-,duct.s used instead of money for
payment for agz?r,:ulcural produces7, had long ago partially taken over the production of
the kolkhozes prodtrc:Lng cotton, flax, beets., etc. The "otovarivaniyo", mentioned by
Staliu, conCl..tr; to the Staid {ivt:cg goods in court suppl to these kollshozes in part'
payment for ?t,,eir? produce. I? view of the ge:rerul e;iuortage of goods, the aui,horities
thus s'.imul_,Le th produetl.ce: of strategically l.:uportaut. raw materials. In procurement
practice th':re .t:; stall a:letter form of "otovarivauiyc" of production which the kol-
khozni3cs _,1 rv?r? 1.urou& h t o Mate "cooperative". In this case it serves as a device
for additic,,,e.i, weeping uf f provieiora from the villages. Because of an acute shortage
of footwear ar,u r:autl.inl; .0, kolkhozulk is forced to deprive his family of part of
his produce and i.-1_.ve.?r it to the e_ociperative", in order to obtain the necessary goods.
153. Nevertheleb: e compulsory, "excl,auge of products" can
swallow up tau: Lac ier .'r koik-. -:.cc comparatively easily during the first stage,
the produce of ate kolkhoc r.v n will still elude its sphere of operations. Sven if we',
imagine a fent.asti.:? picture Of an ritcuudance of industrial goods, even so it is impossible
to expect ttae kolkic z ar?_ri .., exchar.1Su without resistance their "surpluses" for an
arbitrary aesortr.,eot of g,,eds supplied "in a plan_-red manner" througY, the kolkhozes
when iL is possible to sell food supplies in the kolkhoz market and to have a free
choice of Goods in the State commercial network.
154.. This is why during ti,c subsequent, second stage of the reforming process of
expropriation of the "surplus" provisions, which ere at the disposal of the kolkhoz
men, a more radical measure involving the first important change of the Agricu.1
Artel Statatec, wi11. he introduced. More than two year:; ago we observed a tendency
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
25X1
to repla_- cowpiec,cly payments in kind per work-days with payments in cash. On one
hand, it increases the "goods" bulk of the kolkhoz production; on the other, it-'is
in accord wito aspirit1ouG to equate the conaitions of payment, for the work of the
kolkhoz men with those of the workers in State farms. As early as two years ago timid
attempts were made by the Soviet press to discuss the possibility of a "renunciation"
of the system of evaluating work-days in kind in the kolkhozes. The introduction in
kolkhozes of the evaluation of a work-day in rubles, with the products being issued
on the account of the monetary payment due per work-days, is absolutely inevitable.
The kolkhoz man must be transformed from a nominal owner of the produce he produced
into a buyer of that produce within the limits, of course, prescribed by the
State for personal consumption.
155.', The kollshoz man will have no more production "surpluses" on hand which are distributed
per work-days. The entire production will remain in kolkhoz warehouses. Having
by-passed the individual kolhl-:oz men, the State =-7111 thus without difficulty draw their
former "sapluses", via the kol.khozes, into the planned carter". This will also serve
as a psychological preparation of the kolkhozniks for the acceptance of a formal
expropriation of the ko..U hozes .
156. Simultan:ou:sly, or su.ae.wiat later -- depending on the process of maturing of the
necessary economic conditions -- another measure will be introduced. This measure,
connected with the second essential change in the Agricultural Artel Statutes, ban
been in preparati.nr., for a long bone. It is: the liquidation of the individual plots
of kol.Moz men. In this lay the Mal,, purpose of the resettlment of kolkhoz men, which
was begun in couu.!c, ion with she co>nsol.idation of kolkhozes and then temporarily
suspended. The unequivocal significance of this measure is fully revealed in an
essential detail of the model plans of reconstruction of populated points, which at
the begi.nnin,_, More the resounding name of "agrogorods". )Disguised by the kolkhoz
"way of lice" this detail conuists in that the individual plots where the kolkhoz men
do their own farmir.,_, are allotted, as a rule, outside of the limits of the populated
goint. Thir. is done so that these allotments, the size of which is even now limited
by the Agricultural Artel Statutes, in time could he excluded altogether froaf the
personal ur,c of kolkhoz men and included in the "communal" crop rotation system.
157. It would to i'lt.tirL8 to poirt out, .ii, connection with tuts that as early as 6 Nov 4+9
the Moscow newspaper, Izvestiya, published eloquent arguments to the effect, that it
,does not make sense for kolkhoz men to waste their time or. their individual plotey-on
their own. etc. Even then it was not difficult to foresee the development of
further prripacandru, concerning the "renunciation." by the kolkhoz men of their
subsidiary farming. In co.:firiuitior. of our prognosis of long standing, in December
1951 hol'r?tcvik de-,;loped still more definitely the idea of the gradual withering
away of individual farming by kolkhoz men. in 1952, hol'she_i-k (no- 10), reiterated
,that "when the public economy of kol.khozes attains a high level of developasnt .....
there will be no necessity for individual farming ....." and that "the only all-
embracing form of ownership will be that of national ownership".
158. While preparations for t:te liquidation of individual farming by kol.:hoz men continued
without interruption, the Soviet authorities were forced to give up their premature
infatuation with the ilea of compulsory resettlement of kolkhoz mei. The resettlement
was suspenders. However, it was only temporarily relegated to second place. Malenkov
confitn d that-, too, when he stated at the 19th Concret;s that the problems of "the
way of lire" in the kol-khoces can be. successfully solved only on the basis of a
well developed "corm-ninal" production.
159. Of ootir's t:,,. "way of life" is a sneer figment of tine imagination. Many cases are
knownwherc, duriu; testy re;,cLtlem?_nt, kolkhoz men were moved from habitable quarters
into mud tuts. It, is not difficult to understand the reasons behind the enforced
temporary retreat whirih was necessary for a future "running Jump", if we take the
following into r.on,,ideratlon: a) the desire of the authorities to ensure first of
all fulfil.Lment t,y kolkhozes of their production plans, on which depend speedier
accumulation of supplies or raw materials and provisions in the event of war;
resettlement inevirably- would distract koll?.hoz resources from this problem, which,.
25X1
SEDRET/4
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
SECRETI 25X1
under thu prevalent conditions of kolkhoze5, could loe.r appreciably the level of
their "tovarnost"; (b) the government's intention of earry.tng, out the resettlement
without governc:tent assistance, at the expense of the kolkhoz men themselves' (the
latter will pay an the future for any expenses involved) which can be achieved only
with adequate economic development of the kolkhozcs; c.) the impossibility of balancing
the food situation in the country if individual farming to knikhozes were limited
in the near future; d) a sharp reaction of resistance atrong the kolkhoz men provoked
by the compulsory resettlement in 1950-1951-
160. As soon as The conditions necessary for the liquidation of the kolkhozniks
individual farming are thought to have been achieved, the Soviet politicians will
not. delay in resuming the forceful resettlement of the population. Provision for
this is also made in technical planning, according to which the land of the
consolidated koikhozes is organized.
161. The liquidation of individual plots is thus a predetermined matter. As the moment
for carrying out this measure, the authorities will choose the time when the
resistance of the kolkhoz men will have been weakened, when the kolkhoz man will be
compelled to give up his individual plot 'voluntarily". The compulsory measures
will bind the peasants more and more to "communal" farming, which, in proporton
its general development, will demand more and more work from the aolkh zimen.
The time will come when the kolkhoz man will not he able to spare any time at all
for his individwal plot. Thu volume of labor exploitation in kolkhozes will increase
immensely by that time. The production of "communal" farming will increase. This
will be exactly th~- righu, moment for a final liquidation of the personal property
of the kolkhoz cart.
162. So the final goal will be reached. The remaining productive base -- individual plote
outside of the sphere c= stab: planning -- will be transferred to the kolkhozes.
After that, only the kolkiroz-group, "communal" property will be preserved for a
certain time in agricultur_.
163 . Both meat; rc s -- M- Leans ltzoc, to moneta_ compensation for work-days and the'
liquidation of iz:dLvid.ual -- will completely deprive the peasants of any
produce "a,..?phu; s", From that tLtm- on, the entire production of a kolkhoz village
without exceptior_ will peso through the kolkhoz storehouses which are accessible to
the state. The lcolki-ioz cost will receive provisions, as well as industrial goods;.
on the account of money payments due them, within the limits of a living wage
arbitrarily fixed. by the government, and at prices fixed by the government. The
kolkhoz market. ac; well as other chenn:l5, through which a "leakage" of'a certain
part of the "commodity" production was possible, will be closed tightly and forever.
With the :1 iquldx+, iu._ of ti.._ kofl'Ilni mark t the second etage of the reform will be
concluders,
164. It is easy to imat,iue how much tree-ter the exploitation of the kolkhoznixs' labor
by the s r,lte will us a' ter the liquidation of the kolkhoi market_ The exploitation
will become more ext.ensivr in proportion to the increase of the bulk of agricultural
production, which is rak.?', away from the kolkhozes i,: the form of "barter" at.low
procurement prices;. Stalin attempts "scientifically" to draw a veil over this
obvious truth wits an empty fiction of "the law of val?A", which eer:cs him and
Soviet propaganda ;:nlely s:; a method of covering up financial and exploitative
machinations, con?-ealed unh,.r chc guise of monetary c:alculations of value. The
procurement. pricer; fixed by the authorities do not reflect the socially necessary
expenditur,~ of lui,..;r fur m e production of one unit of agricultural production
(as requic'ed, nc, criirig t.... Stalin himself, by "the law of value") it is that the policy oc' nrocu:??.:ment prices serves the Communist regime as an instrument'
for the maxhrtir,: a,i,, opric.,;ian of the free labor of the kolkhoz men.
165? An irr,.fut.',ble m'oot' of r:,ie is found in kolkhoz practice. If procurement prices,
which have an iurnediate effect on the level of the payruente, for work in kolkhozes,
were really e.stab.1isned in accordance with "the law of value", 1 s taking into
account the socially necessary expenditure of labor for the production of a unit
of production, then payments for the work of kolkhoz met: wolr-i l k:pend exclusively
25X1
S.ECRETJ
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 1 CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
s;;cfr'i / 25X1
on t;h+. p'.?i.u+rr Lvi-i., ., ;' 16bi+r in varicci ts kolS:hozcs. Ila:,urala;r, wage payments can
vary in diffc.ec:+. hclk:,ones and they depend on the production results achieved. in a
given 'rcore unal" e':vn.try by the collective body of the peasants -- its nominal owners.
Thie fully corresuouds to the socialist principle: "tu mach according to his labor".
166. However, in reality, the difference it wage payments, for instance, in cotton and grain
growing kglkho! S and lolkhozes, which had been hitherto separate, was combined into one process.
The plan for MIS tractor work and the plan of the development of the kolkhoz economy
now represent two Indissolubly bound parts of one government program. On the one
hand,lithis guarantees the greater development of all branches of the economy in the
interests of and Tully dependent upon the state. On the other hand, it reduces to
naught the role of the kolkhoz as a collective owner and manager of its "conmmnaln
property.
178? Along ith the gradual organic merging of state and communal "property", the conditions n o
cns fnorganization and payments in the kolkhozes are gradually approaching the
state enterprises. Among the measures forcing people`to'
work this goes on simultaneously with the deepening of the process of the proletariani-
zation of the kolkhozni;cs and is, at the same time, Subordinate to a more rapid
accumulation of raw-material and. manufactured reserves of a military nature.
179. Such are the premises -- e;:isting and d.veloping -- for the formal liquidation of
kolkhoz-group property. Developing during all previous stages of the process of
transformation, they are gradually preparing for the liquidation of agricultural
artels as a "socialist" form of econo and for their transformation into government
enterprises cf a higher social type, a state farms. Whether agricultural enter-
prises f this new type are termed communes or not,, in the main their character
will no;lchange. This will be the culmination of the agrarian reform and will
transform the kolkhozes into a new social entity. The repeal of the Agricultural
Artel Statutes and the corresponding amendment to the 1, Constitution of the USSR will
legafl onfirm the expropriation of the kolkhozes. This act will signal the complete
proletarianization of the kolkhozni}:s -- the transition from a form of distribution
of money income for products to a unified system of wages.
180. The elimination of the "difference between the city and the countryside", i.e,, the
rise of the "all-embracinL; state production sector with the right to regulate the
entire consumer-goods production of the country", w:11 also create those new
"productiion relation: nips ' that will no longer inhibit'' the development of productive
powers. The state will, evenforn:ally, be the sole owner of all means of production
and all products c,f production, including the agricultural, The state will be the
sole proprietor o.? all labor rLseurccs. This will strengthen the slave system and
crown the cdif i::c of Soviet "socialism".
181. This is really i.hu ru?i::cipai. ~.,ou1 of Sovie c agrarian policy, as seen in the light
of Stali.n,'s COIIOmiC Profile ::a of Socialism In the USSR" and the decisions of the
19th Part;
y Congress. The Utopian goals of the beautiful "fut.ure ", painted by
25X1
pproved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
 Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3
25X1
s3CRET4
25X1
propaganda, are too obviously connected with plans for a new war and practical
preparation therefore. The expropriation of the kolkhozes by means of "barter"
is merely one of the necessary preliminary conditions for the "transition from.
socialism to communism". Another necessary premise, according to Stalin, is
the growth of heavy industry, which has priority.
182. Is it necessary to discuss what kind of "prosperity" awaits the peoples at the. Soviet
Union ancl the whole world after the setting up of these premises? Their realization
would turn the Soviet state into a mighty apparatus for world Communist aggression.
183. This is far from meaning that, as long as this result has not been gained, the
"collegial dictatorship" will refrain from further gradual. expansion of the..
Kremlin's empire. In the future all measures -- not excluding military ones --.will.
be applied to this end. As soon as the preparation for an all-out war has been
completed, total aggression against "capitalist encirclement" will ensue..
25X1
S3C1 T
Approved For Release 2004/01/21 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500180051-3