CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015500120001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
STATE review(s) completed. 11 February 1970
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No. 0036/70
11 February 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Laos: Chinese road construction is continuing, but
at a slower pace. (Page 1)
Communist China - Pakistan: The Chinese are negotiat-
ing to buy British-built planes. (Page 3)
Communist Chinas Peking is focusing national atten-
tion on an anticorruption campaign. (Page 4)
Jordan: The cabinet has issued restrictions to con-
trol the fedayeen. (Page 5)
Caribbean: The second Black Power Conference is
scheduled for July in Barbados. (Page 6)
Chile-Cuba: A trade deal with Cuba, if carried out,
would contravene OAS agreements. (Page 7)
USSR-Berlin: Four-Power talks (Page 8)
USSR-Yugoslavia; Trade protocol (Page 8)
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AREA CHINA
OF
MAP
NORTH -%:
VIETNAM.
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Communist Chinese Road Construction in Northern Laos
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Laos: Chinese road construction is continuing,
but at a slower pace.
the most significant activity as been conce -
trated northeast of Muong La, where new road con-
struction is in evidence for some 14 miles. Although
rugged terrain has made rapid construction of a road
network there extremely difficult, the framework for
a large bridge spanning the Nam Phak is in place,
and a line of new construction camps is strung out
along the stretch of new activity northeast of Muong
La.
In the Nam Beng Valley,
road construction within one mile north of the vil-
lage of Muong Houn, but. there was no apparent indi-
cation of preparations to continue construction to
Pak Beng. The apparent lack of construction activ-
ity south of Muong Houn suggests that the Chinese
may have decided to focus their efforts on finishing
projects now under way before pressing ahead with
new efforts.
The continued presence of government forces at
the southern end of the valley may be an additional
factor in the Chinese hesitancy to push farther south
for the moment. In recent days Pathet Lao forces
have launched a drive aimed at clearing the last
vestige of government control from the valley. On
8 February the government lost one of its outlying
defense positions, and it appears to be only a mat-
ter of time before the major outpost at Mok Kha
Chok becomes untenable.
(Map)
11 Feb 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Chinese Negotiating with Pakistan to Buy British-built Transports
Hawker-Siddeley Trident 1 E
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Communist China - Pakistan: Peking is negoti-
ating with Pakistan's government-owned international
airline to purchase four British-built Trident jet
transport aircraft.
The status of negotiations is not clear, but
the talks are now reportedly centered on finding an
agreeable arrangement for payment. China wants as-
surances from the British that it would be able to
purchase spare parts. The UK has informed the US
that it intends to authorize the sale of spare parts
subject to consultation with COCOM, the international
i
c
organization that regulates the sale of strateg
items to Communist countries.
Peking probably intends to use the aircraft in
a role similar to that.of the six Viscount turboprop
transports acquired from. the British in the early
196-0s. These aircraft have been used on long-dis-
tance domestic routes, and limited international and
VIP flights. The remainder of the Chinese civil air
fleet is made up of Soviet-built transports, many of
which are now obsolete.
11 Feb 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Communist China: Peking is focusing national
attention on an anticorruption campaign.
A radiobroadcast on 8 February disclosed that
14 persons were convicted of corruption, theft and
speculation at a mass trial held in Amoy in early
January. Mass trials and purges for similar crimes
also took place recently in Peking and Canton.
The principal targets of the campaign are al-
most certainly opportunists who took advantage of
the breakdown in control during the turmoil of the
Cultural Revolution to enrich themselves. According
to a Honan broadcast on 9 February, "entrepreneurs"
have been buying up state materials and often steal-
ing them outright in order to sell them on the black
market for large profits. They were also accused of
inciting labor unrest and deliberately causing acci-
dents in production units in order to exploit the
situation for their own advantage. The broadcast
claims that these manipulators have formed alliances
and even committed murder to cover up their crimes.
Peking's growing concern with rebuilding the
economy has probably prompted the latest crackdown
on rampant corruption in enterprises at all levels.
In this Sisyphean task, however, there will be re-
sistance not only from the intended targets of the
purge but also from many local authorities who are
often deeply involved in the same type of activities.
Moreover, any attempts to "further liquidate"
loosely defined "class enemies" in the economic
field could provide another opportunity for faction-
11 Feb 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Jordan: The cabinet yesterday issued a new
11-point set of internal security restrictions that
provides a framework for greater governmental con-
trol over the Arab fedayeen.
The new restrictions are similar in content to
others that King Husayn has issued in the past but
has not consistently enforced. They prohibit unau-
thorized meetings and demonstrations,.ban private
storing of explosives, and forbid carrying arms in
Amman. A two-week grace period is permitted for
compliance.
The reason behind the timing of the new cabinet
order is not clear, although Husayn has said period-
ically that he intends to reassert his authority over
the fedayeen. 25X1
is also very un-
showdown at this time.
i e y t at e i.ng inten s a
I r,
In the past, Husayn has made only small., careful
moves and has attempted to play one guerrilla group
against another. Atpresent there are rumors of in-
creased dissension within Fatah, the major fedayeen
organization, and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat is vis-
iting Moscow. Husayn may, therefore, be attempting
once again to exploit fedayeen dissensions. In any
event,, the new orders seem certain to increase
fedayeen-government tensions.
I The various fedayeen organizations have already
broadcast a joint statement over-Cairo's Voice of
Fatah condemning the new restrictions and accusing
time government of trying to "drag the country into
a bloody civil war." The fedayeen, like the King,
probably do not seek a showdown. but a minor inci-
11 Feb 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Caribbean: The second Black Power Conference
is scheduled for 9-12 July in Barbados.
Roosevelt Brown, one of Bermuda's more radical
opposition politicians and organizer of the first
conference held in Hamilton last year, has received
permission to hold the meeting from Prime Minister
Barrow of Barbados-. Barrow is probably concerned
about the effect the conference could have on the
local tourist industry. He apparently concluded,
however, that he could not afford to block the
conclave and leave himself vulnerable to domestic
charges of a sell-out to the white establishment.
Last year's conference was a generally peaceful
affair that attracted some 1,300 delegates, largely
provided a back-up marine force to guard against
possible disorders. Despite the publicity accorded
the meeting, few tangible results emerged, and Black
Power in the Caribbean has remained an ill-defined,
nascent concept. Its organizational strength has
waned somewhat in the past year after the initial
proliferation of "Black Nationalist" groups. It
does, however, retain significant potential as a
rallying banner for dissident groups, and the pos-
sibility exists for spontaneous disorders during
the conference.
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Chile-Cuba: A former Chilean senator claims
that he has made a deal with Cuba, which, if carried
out, would contravene OAS agreements against trade
with that country.
Balthazar Castro claims that he has sold wine
and other products to Cuba in exchange for sugar,
which will be delivered by a Cuban ship next July.
Castro is a free-wheeling leftist politician and
entrepreneur who has occasionally served as a channel
of communications between the Frei government and
Fidel Castro. Last year he sold wine, which he
produces, to Cuba apparently by using third country
invoicing.
The Chilean Government's newspaper recently
has twice questioned the legal and moral justifica-
tion for the "continued ostracism of Cuba." More-
over, Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes, in his eager-
ness to establish himself as spokesman for Latin
American independence toward the US, often acts on
his own initiative in such matters. The US Embassy
i
F
re
in Santiago, however, believes that President
intends to restrict Chilean initiatives on Cuba to
the OAS format.
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USSR-Berlin: The Soviet reply yesterday to the
Allied note of 16 December on Berlin proposed that
the ambassadors to Germany of the Four Powers open
talks in West Berlin during the last half of Febru-
ary. The note made it clear that Moscow is willing
to discuss problems involving only the Western sectors
of the city. It also proposed that first priority be
given to an agreement excluding political activities
"incompatible with the international situation" of
West Berlin. The reply was cool to Western proposals
to highlight communications and access problems, and
by emphasizing that East German rights and interests
must be taken into account, it implied that Moscow is
still firmly supporting Pankow's Dos]tion in these
USSR-Yugoslavia: The trade protocol for 1970,
concluded after a long delay, provides for an overly
optimistic increase of 20 percent over the level of
1969. It is highly unlikely that this goal will be
reached. Bilateral trade usually has missed the
targets set by protocols. Yugoslav figures show
that trade last year was 25 percent below the $500-
million level anticipated. Cool political relations
and Soviet unwillingness to settle its trade deficit
with Yugoslavia in hard currency or in commodities
specified by the Yugoslavs are impeding the growth
of trade. Moreover, the Soviets continue to inhibit
the expansion of direct enterprise-to-enterprise
trade, preferring to adhere to the more restrictive
commodity lists provided in the 1966-70 to -term
trade agreement. F 7
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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