THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A003000040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1967
• Content Type: IR

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Intelligence Report
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
Secret
27 November 1967
No. 0378/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the
US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or
receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ADINO AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(20 November - 26 November 1967)
Section
Government appointments; Loc's
difficulties; Legislative develop-
ments; Loan resigns; Tran Van Huong
on the new government; Possible moderate
Buddhist political party.
Viet Cong urban operations; Anti-
infrastructure activity; Status
of hamlets being worked by RD teams.
Prices; Currency and gold; Highways
of commerce: Route 4; Routes 20 and
1 (Map)
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
(graph)
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The government has announced the ap-
pointment of Nguyen Van Huong as secretary
general in the president's office and has
established a 19-man Central Revolutionary
Development Council to oversee all aspects
of the pacification effort. Prime Minister
Loc is reportedly having some initial dif-
ficulty in getting his job done because
of what he claims are conflicting direc-
tions from President Thieu and Vice Presi-
dent Ky. Both houses of the legislature
have established committees to intercede
with the government on behalf of persons
they regard as unjustly treated. The Demo-
cratic Bloc in the lower house has issued
a six-point proclamation dealing primarily
with the need to preserve Vietnamese sover-
eignty. An opposition grouping may be
forming a third bloc in the lower house.
Police Director Loan has again submitted
.his resignation, reportedly because of
Nguyen Van Huong's appointment to the presi-
dent's office. Former presidential can-
.didate Tran Van Huong has refused to accept
the chairmanship of the new Inspectorate.
The moderate Buddhist faction of Thich
Tam Chau may be working on plans to estab-
lish a Buddhist political party and begin
publication of a daily newspaper.
Government Appointments
1. On 25 November the government announced
the appointment of Nguyen Van Huong, an adviser to
President Thieu and his campaign manager during the
election, as secretary general in the president's
office. His duties in this position, as enumerated
in the announcement and as Huong had earlier outlined
for an embassy officer, will include administration
of all agencies run directly by the president's office
and liaison between that office and the prime minister's
office, the legislature, and the various ministries.
Huong will have the rank of minister.
2. Also announced was the formation under Prime
Minister Loc of a Central Revolutionary Development
Council to oversee all aspects of the pacification
effort. The 19-man council, according to the announce-
ment, will include most cabinet ministers and the five
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highest-ranking generals, presumably including Gen-
eral Nguyen Duc Thang, deputy chief of the Joint
General Staff in charge of the Revolutionary Develop-
ment Cadre Directorate and the Regional and Popular
Forces. Minister of Revolutionary Development Tri
will be secretary general of the council. Corps-,
special zone-, province-, city-, and district-level
councils will also be established.
Loc's Difficulties
3. Prime Minister Loc is apparently having some
initial difficulty in getting his job done. Tran
Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese Confederation
of Labor, recently told that Loc
complains that he is being hampered by conflicting
directions and statements from President Thieu and
Vice President Ky. Loc ascribes most of his diffi-
culties to a .lack of cooraination between Thieu and
Ky and claims he has to spend a great deal of time
trying to avoid being caught in the middle. He addea
that this is hardly any way to get a new government
off the ground.
4. Some of the difficulties described by Loc,
while possibly symptomatic of the personal conflict
between Thieu and Ky, seem typical of those which
might occur in starting any new large organization,
and Loc is apparently finding it difficult to cope
with them. Buu commented that, although he has known
Loc for a long time and respects his intelligence,
Loc is apt to panic under pressure. Buu also surmised
from his meeting with Loc and from remarks allegedly
attributed to him that the prime minister has no great
respect for Ky and is similarly irritated with Thieu
for what he calls Thieu's "dilettante" approach to
the problems of running a government.
Legislative Developments
5. The lower house "Committee to Intervene for
the Release of Student Demonstrators" has elected as
officers three men who have been quite outspoken in
their criticism of the government. Committee chair-
man Truc Vien, vice chairman Nguyen Dai Bang, and
secretary Nguyen Trong Nho were instrumental in es-
tablishing the committee, which intends to petition
the government for the release of 17 students ar-
rested and subsequently drafted for demonstrating
against the presidential elections.
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6. At the house session on 21 November Nho
said that the committee had already sent a letter
to the government proposing discussion of the stu-
dent cases. He added that if Prime Minister Loc
refuses to meet with the committee, he will be called
before "us"--presumably the full house--to explain
his actions.
7. The Senate on 18 November also established
a committee to intervene with the government on simi-
lar matters, but its committee appears less opposi-
tion-centered than that of the lower house. The
Senate committee will concern itself primarily with
the cases of coup plotters arrested after the abor-
tive coup of 19 February 1965.
8. The question first arose when Senator Tran
Van Don submitted a petition, initiated by him and
signed by 32 other senators, requesting that the
case of former General Lam Van Phat be reviewed. Phat,
sentenced to death in absentia for his part in the
coup attempt, recently sent President Thieu a letter,
through the temporary Senate chairman, "explaining
the injustice done him." Following lengthy discus-
sion of this and other requests for Senate interces-
sion, the Senate decided that the cases of all 45 persons
implicated in the abortive coup should be reviewed and,
for this purpose, set up a "Special Committee to Con-
sider Applications for Intervention." The committee
is composed of two men from each of the Senate's six
slates.
9. In another lower house development, the new
Democratic Bloc has issued a six-point proclamation
which appears to emphasize the need for preserving Viet-
namese.sovereignty. According to a Saigon Post article of
22 November.., the proclamation calls for social revolu-
tion, true national reconciliation, reform of both
the educational system and the diplomatic service,
the protection of Vietnamese sovereignty, and economic
sovereignty.
10. In detailing each of the various points,
the proclamation criticized what it called "the policy
of unilateral determination of the course of the war
and peace efforts." In addition, as a step toward
achieving economic sovereignty, the proclamation called
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for a review of the "entire problem of. American aid."
it is perhaps significant that this added voice in
the recent clamor for sovereignty and against "American
interference" in internal affairs is that of the Demo-
cratic Bloc. The bloc is generally considered at least
progovernment, if not government-sponsored.
11. A third bloc may be in the making in the lower
house and could be the beginning of a concerted opposi-
tion movement there. Au Truong Thanh, a former economy
minister in the Ky cabinet who was disqualified as a
presidential candidate, told a US Government official
on 20 November that he and a few colleagues are attempt-
ing to form a bloc of independent deputies. He mentioned
Saigon deputies Nguyen Trong Nho and Ho Huu Tuong as
participating in the establishment of the bloc. In
view of Thanh's opposition activities and the professed
antagonism of Nho and Tuong to the government, it
would appear that the proposed bloc is intended as
an opposition grouping to counterbalance the essentially
progovernment Democratic and Farmer-Worker-Soldier
blocs.
Loan Resigns
12. Nguyen Van Huong's appointment as the presi-
dent's secretary general has reportedly induced Police
Director Loan to follow through on his earlier desire
to resign. On 24 November, 25X1C
25X10 Loan submitted a written resigna-
tion to Chu Ngoc Lien, an official in the Ministry
of Interior, giving fatigue as his reason and request-
ing reassignment to a troop command position.
13. Van Van Cua, who is the mayor of Saigon and
Loan's brother-in-law, reportedly later told Lien,
however, that the real reason behind the resignation
was Loan's feeling that President Thieu had gone back
on a promise in appointing Huong as his secretary
general. According to Cua, Thieu had promised Loan
and Vice President Ky that Huong would not be given
any public position. Loan's objection to Huong is
reportedly based on his membership in the Dai Viet
Party.
Tran Van Huong on the New Government
14. Former presidential candidate Tran Van Huong
has turned down the government's offer of a position
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at the head of the new Inspectorate and apparently
intends to hold to his earlier announced decision
to remain out of the new government. Both President
Thieu and Vice President Ky had hoped to persuade
Huong to accept the Inspectorate chairmanship, par-
ticularly because corruption, which the new body has
been set up especially to investigate, has been Huong's
special interest and was one of his prime campaign
issues.
15. During a conversation with an embassy of-
ficer on 24 November, however, Huong said he had re-
fused the post because, "as long as there are people
in this country who feel they are above the law," a
body like the Inspectorate can do little more than
go after corrupt officials at the lowest levels. Dis-
trict and even province officials could be pursued,
he said, but "their higher-ranking protectors" could
not be touched.
16. Huong also confirmed earlier reports that
he had been offered and had refused the prime minister-
ship. He portrayed this position in the new govern-
ment set-up as one wedged in among the president,
the National Assembly, and the generals and indicated
he would have been dissatisfied with being merely
an executor of the president's policies.
17. Huong gives the new cabinet a life span of
only six months, claiming it is merely a transitional
body. As for his own future, he is apparently con-
tent to remain out of public life; observing the politi-
cal scene from a distance and occasionally consulting
with younger political figures who often come to him
for advice.
Possible Moderate Buddhist Political Party
18. An unconfirmed article on 22 November in the
Vietnamese-language newspaper Tu Do has reported pos-
sible plans by the moderate Buddhist faction of Thich
Tam Chau to form a; political party, which the paper
is labelling a "Buddhist democratic party." Although
the paper apparently has nothing more to go on than
fragmentary reports and its own speculation, it cites
as evidence "numerous meetings between venerables and
(unnamed) pro-Buddhist political figures." The party,
Tu Do claims, will be nationalist-oriented and will
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have the benefit of a wealth of "operating resources."
Considerable money, rumored to be some seven million
piasters, will also be available to the Tam Chau fac-
tion for a daily newspaper the faction intends to
publish, according to the article.
19. Tu Do speculates that these developments
may signaItFe beginning of a "general counteroffen-
sive" by Tam Chau in the current moderate-militant
dispute over the Buddhist charter. Although the
creation of an officially recognized political party
would give Tam Chau a definite advantage over his
rival Thich Tri Quang and would enhance his position
legally, the US Embassy is doubtful of Chau's prospects
for success. The embassy points out that Chau does
not have a reputation as an effective organizer and,
more important, that most politically active Buddhist
laymen have remained loyal to Tri Quang's faction.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
An apparently increasingly effec-
tive Vietnamese National Police appear
to have thwarted Viet Cong efforts to
accelerate their urban operations. Al-
though the Vietnamese Police have elim-
inated a number of enemy urban cells, it
is still difficult to determine how ex-
tensive the enemy's urban organizations
remain and how much economic and politi-
cal support the enemy continues to de-
rive from urban operations. South Viet-
namese officials have still not accepted
the Intelligence Coordination and Ex-
ploitation (ICEX) concept; however, US
officials believe that they will soon
overcome their misgivings, and better
coordinated and effective anti-infra-
structure operations may result. Accord-
ing to the Vietnamese Cadre Directorate,
by 1 November 149 Ap Doi Moi had been
established by the RD teams. Rd teams
are now establishing an additional 321
AE Doi Moi, along with 65 82 Cung Co
and 57 AE Binh Dinh. As of 17 Novem-
ber 25,765 persons had rallied to the
government under the Chieu Hai or "Open
Arms" program. During the week of 11-17
November 217 persons rallied; this is
400 less than in the same period of 1966.
Viet Cong Urban Operations
1. During the past year, an increasingly ef-
fective Vietnamese National Police organization
has apparently thwarted efforts by the Viet Cong
to accelerate their urban operations. In this
context, the term "urban areas" refers not only
to the autonomous cities of Saigon, Hue, Da Nang,
Cam Ranh, Da Lat, and Vung Tau, but also to other
large cities such as Qui Nhon and Nha Trance. Over
the past year the Vietnamese Security flerv .cc,l (VSS)
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have broken up a significant number of Communist
cells in a number of these cities, including Sai-
gon, Da Lat, Cam Ranh, and Nha Trang. Neverthe-
less, it is still difficult to determine how ex-
tensive an urban organization the enemy has and
how much financial and economic support he continues
to derive from urban operations.
2. As of mid-1967, there were numerous agent
reports, derived from VSS sources, of an increased
Viet Cong interest in strengthening their urban
operations. This greater interest may have been
to compensate for military and political losses in
the countryside and/or to enable them to retain con-
tact with people migrating from rural to urban areas.
3. Captured enemy documents and a few interro-
gationreports suggest that the Communists' key con-
cept in their urban activities continues to be the
promotion of the "general uprising." However, the
enemy's awareness of the situation in South Vietnam
has apparently led him, despite his theoretical
rhetoric, to adopt policies which best fit local
situations. Prior to the September public announce-
ment by the National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam (NFLSV) of its new program, several
agent reports alleged that the NFLSV was seeking to
establish a "new front" advocating, under NFLSV
guidance, a neutralist peace and a coalition gov-
ernment. Any such Communist interest in a "new
front," however, may be a supplement rather than
an alternative to their concept of the "general up-
rising."
4. Viet Cong documents and prisoner interroga-
tions support the conclusion that the "struggle"
movements of 1966 were not under Communist control.
Communist documents tend to attribute their failures
in this regard to poor communications and a lack of
initiative at lower echelons. The documents imply,
however, that the Communist Party is preparing for
similar crises in the future and may, in such cir-
cumstances, allow its agents greater initiative
in creating and exploiting local unrest.
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5. Available information tends to confirm
the Communists' continued interest in promoting
an urban political organization and encouraging
urban agitation. Although target groups within
the cities remain the traditional ones--such as
student groups, tradesmen and trade unions, and
influential social organizations (such as friend-
ship associations and reading clubs)--there are
some indications that the Communists may in fact
be trying to meld together a "new front" with a
broader complexion, including individuals who have
some anti-American feelings, are apathetic towards
the political situation, or are physically or
mentally exhausted from the 25-year prolonged con-
flict. Propaganda directed at most of the latter
is likely to be in low key, while party or NFLSV
members with "legal status" in government zones
attempt, as in the past, to penetrate and gain
prominent positions in target groups.
6. The Communist Party committees responsible
for the larger cities in South Vietnam are appar-
ently directly subordinate to the provincial com-
mittees. For the most part, urban committees have
their own staffs, organic communications, and mili-
tary units--generally a unit with a combined recon-
naissance, intelligence, and sapper capability.
Almost all of the city committees are located in
what the Communists term "safe areas" adjacent
to or near the urban,areas. In some instances as
in Da Nang, the city committees may exercise jur-
isdiction over a considerable portion of the coun-
tryside surrounding the city.
7. The total enemy effort in the cities, how-
ever, involves a myriad of agencies. Urban opera-
tions may be conducted by the party committee di-
rectly responsible for the city, or by certain
staff elements at either province, region, or Cen-
tral Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) levels. Cer-
tain agencies in North Vietnam are also believed
directly to control some operations in the urban
areas of South Vietnam. Most of the operations of
the higher level entities involve intelligence col-
lection or financial operations.
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