THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002900170001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
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Information as of 1600
14 November 1967
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Port conditions at Haiphong are deteriorating,
but North Vietnam's essential needs are being met.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: Four-
teen encounters were reported in the Quang Nam - Quang
Tin border area late on 13 November involving units
of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division (Paras. 1-4).
Communist military action against US forces in the
western highlands continues (Paras. 5-11).
in Binh Dinh
Province indicates that enemy forces there have been
receiving large numbers of replacements from North
Vietnam (Paras. 12-15). The Communists may have moved
140-mm. rockets into northern Phuoc Long Province--
the first such deployment in III Corps (Paras. 16-18).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
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A newly formed "Committee Campaign-
ing to Unite Bu ism" held a rather inconclusive
meeting on 12 November in an attempt to resolve the
charter dispute (Paras. 5-7).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
Truck traffic in the Laos panhandle has resumed
(Paras. 1-4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi
has belatedly announced that the Soviets honored Ho
Chi Minh with the Order of Lenin (Paras. 1-2).
VI. Other Major Developments: Port conditions
at Haiphong are deteriorating, but North Vietnam's
essential needs are being met (Paras. 1-7).
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NORTH
`IIETN~s*
N
Phu My'
SOUTH VIETNAM
I
J L ~u -7 - 1b IOOMiles
1 25 50 75 170 Ndnmbter,
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1. Widespread, scattered engagements were re-
ported on 13-14 November.
2. During a nine-hour period on 13 November,
US forcesi'n the border area some 18 miles northwest
of Tam Ky reported 14 separate clashes. The enemy.
forces involved, tentatively identified as elements
of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division, lost at least
18 killed.
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Activity in the Western Highlands
5. Elements of the B-3 Front--the highest Com-
munist command in the western highlands of II Corps--
continue to initiate military action in the Dak To
area of southwestern Kontum Province. Three separate
clashes were reported late on 13 November.
6. The first engagement was a mortar attack,
probably by an element of the North Vietnamese 66th
Regiment, on an American artillery fire support base
some ten miles southwest of Dak To, In the second in-
cident,.just a mile to the northeast, 45 rounds were
directed at an American command post. US casualties
were light.,
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7. The third incident occurred some 14 miles
southwest of Dak To when an army patrol engaged an
unknown-size enemy force. Nine Americans were
killed, 21 wounded, and six are missing.
8. An undated note captured last week in an
area some 14 miles west of'Dak To provides additional
information on the 1967-1968 winter-spring campaign
of the B-3 Front. The document indicates that many
large-scale, coordinated, offensive operations are
to be conducted in order "to destroy" large allied
forces. These ambitious plans purportedly are to
be carried out on an "urgent and continuous basis."
9. The document included four major objec-
tives to be achieved during the campaign. These in-
clude the annihilation of'a major American element
in order to force the Americans to deploy large num-
bers of additional troops to the western highlands,
and the destruction of as many South Vietnamese troops
as possible. Another goal emphasized the need to im-
prove the technique of concentrated and large-scale
attacks which would ultimately "liberate" an important
area and strengthen the B-3 Front base area.
10. The fourth goal is to coordinate the campaign
in the western highlands with other major battle areas
throughout South Vietnam. Attempts to achieve this
goal are suggested by the recent large-scale enemy ac-
tivity in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces
to the south.
11. The winter-spring campaign plans also
stressed the need to overcome supply difficulties in
order to carry out attacks in areas far from Viet Cong/
North Vietnamese Army base areas. The captured paper
also mentioned the need for such redeployments as the
recent northward movement of B-3 Front units from Pleiku
Province to Kontum.
North Vietnamese Replacements in Binh Dinh
12.
unit has been receiving large nu ers o
replacements from North Vietnam.
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left North Vietnam with a -man Infiltra-
tion group in early April and arrived at the head-
quarters of the 2nd VC Regiment in southern Quang
Ngai Province in August. He said that 434 men sur-
vived the march. The remainder were lost to illness
and desertion. He further claimed that two addi-
tional replacement groups, each consisting of 400-
500 men, were scheduled to reinforce the 2nd Regiment
this fall. ndicate that two
infiltration groups entered South Vietnam in late
August or early September en route to North Viet-
nam's 3rd Division.
14. Although these reports have not been con-
firmed, they are consistent with the long-term Com-
munist objective of maintaining an active threat in
the heavily populated, rice-producing provinces
along South Vietnam's central coast.
15. Very little large-scale fighting has oc-
curred in Binh-Dinh in recent weeks as enemy forces
have attempted to procure a share of the fall rice
harvest. If replacements are coming into this region
on the scale reported, a step-up in enemy activity
can be expected during the forthcoming "winter-spring"
season campaign.
Large Rockets Possibly De
16. An enemy base camp estimated to be large
enough to support two Communist battalions has been
discovered some five miles south of Song Be in
northern Phuoc Long Province by an airborne observer.
Foxholes, trench lines, and numerous crew-served
weapons' positions were sighted. Just to the north
of the camp a large object mounted on a wooden plat-
form was seen.
14 November 1967
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17. The description of the object suggests
that it may be a 140-mm. rocket launcher, which is
normally mounted on a board. Although there are no
known instances of 140-mm. rockets previously being
used in South Vietnam's III Corps, their introduc-
tion is a possibility. The proximity of the area
to major enemy infiltration routes from North Vietnam
could facilitate introduction of the weapon and the
remoteness of this area would make detection diffi-
cult.
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14 November 1967
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Buddhist Reconciliation Efforts
5. A mixed group of Buddhists and politicians,
calling themselves the "Committee Campaigning to
Unite Buddhism," met on 12 November to seek a reso-
lution of the current charter dispute. Although
representatives of both the militant and the moderate
factions were present, the meeting apparently did not
have the blessing of either Tri Quang or Tam Chau.
This may, in fact, signal the beginning of the "third
force" reported to be emerging as a middle-of-the-
road grouping intended to work for the unity of the
church without reference to the extreme views of
either leader.
6. Some 30 people from various Buddhist sects
and organizations were present at the meeting, along
with acting lower house chairman Nguyen Ba Luong
and Senator Trinh Quang Qui of the Farmer-Worker-
Soldier slate. Thich Huyen Minh was the chief repre-
sentative of the moderate faction and Thich Phap Sieu
appeared to be the militants' sole delegate. Both
Minh and Sieu spoke at some length on the charter
problem, each professing his desire--and the desire
of his faction--for unity. Minh, moreover, expressed
the hope that the meeting's participants would work
to convene a Buddhist congress which would examine
both charters and decide on the retention of one.
The others present, however, seemed unsure of exactly
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what they should do--whether to establish a formal
organization to supersede both V:'ri Quang's and Tam
Chau's factions, convene a Buddhist congress, or
merely initiate informal contact between the two
factions.
7. The meeting ended on that inconclusive
note, but a group of six "representatives of Buddhist
organizations"--not including, significantly, the
one militant representative, Phap Sieu--remained be-
hind to draft a declaration. The declaration was also
rather inconclusive, pledging only to "promote the
creation of an association to unite Buddhism." The
association, which would include "many" Buddhist
sects, would have a permanent office and a board of
directors rather than a single leader. The declaration
further calls for a congress, apparently to consider
specifics of the proposed association.
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LAOS PANHANDLE
15 ha ph Hoa
Principal road
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Supplies are again moving through the Laos
_~,.r::andle in support of the Communists in South Viet-
nam.
2. Reports from Route 23 south of the Mu Gia
Pass indicate that about 120 trucks, or 11 a day,
moved south between 1 and 11 November. Some of the
trucks carried rice. On Route 911 the daily average
came to seven southbound trucks during the first
week in November. Stockpiling has probably been un-
der way in the pass area since September and aerial
observers claim that during late October over 300
trucks were operating on Route 912--the second route
from North Vietnam into Laos. Thus far there has
been no indication of increased truck traffic in
the southern panhandle.
4. 1 lindicate
that durilig er large quantities o supplies---
mostly Y-.- ce --were shipped from Cambodia via the
Tonle : _.i jer to Communist forces in southern Laos.
The shipments were apparently halted for a time in
October when supplies failed to arrive at the Cam-
bodian transshipment point for delivery to Laos.
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port.
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. After a delay of almost two weeks, Hanoi
has acknowledged that the Soviet Union awarded the
Order of Lenin to President Ho Chi Minh. A broad-
cast on 14 November reported that Ho sent a message
of thanks to the Soviets for such a high honor. Ho,
however, requested that presentation of the order
be postponed indefinitely until "our people have
driven off the US imperialist aggressors."
2. During the Soviet anniversary celebrations
in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese had ample opportunity
to publicize Ho's award. Their failure to do so at
that time is an indication that the 77-year-old
leader may have been too ill to receive the award
publicly and that the regime decided to avoid men-
tion of it. Acknowledgement of the award may, in
fact, have been prompted by an article of 12 November
by a Western journalist who was in Hanoi during the
anniversary celebrations and who reported the absence
of comment on the award. The same journalist also
wrote that Ho was "very weak" and was confined to
bed when the Soviet ambassador in Hanoi came to in-
vite him to the anniversary celebrations in Moscow.
14 November 1967
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NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels
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I EM Maritime Port Maritime Anchorage
Principal Waterways
A SONG THAI BINH
CANAL DES BAMBCJS-
LACH TRAY
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OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. North Vietnam?s port operations continue
to be hampered by cargo handling difficulties. Es-
sential needs are being met, however, and in recent
months port congestion has been somewhat eased.
2. In the first half of 1.967 imports by sea
reached a record high of about 128,000 tons per
month. Imports at this pace placed heavy demands
on port facilities, particularly at Haiphong. As
cargo backlogs stacked up on the docks, ships had
to wait longer and longer to unload. By August the
turnaround time for ships in North Vietnamese ports
was averaging more than 30 days.
3. Since that time, imports by sea have been
cut back considerably. The total for October was
about 90,000 tons. This has helped to ease port
congestion and has reduced the average turnaround
time for ships visiting North Vietnam in October to
19 days. Turnaround time is still higher, however,
than in 1966 when the average was only 13 days.
4. Silting in the main channel into Haiphong
is getting to be a problem. It has meant that most
ships must now enter the harbor at high tide. Ships
drawing 26 feet of water have been forced to wait
ten days or more for the high tide of the month before
entering. Recent reports indicate that the average
load per ship is being reduced--possibly to permit
entry to the harbor at any high tide. In some cases
small Soviet ships carrying flour have been diverted
to Hon Gai, a port normally used for the export of
coal, in order to relieve the overcrowded conditions
at Haiphong.
5. Damage to key bridges at Haiphong has slowed
the movement of goods out of the port area. In-
creased use is being made of pontoon bridges, fer-
ries, and inland waterways, and this has minimized
the impact on the transport system. Frequent air
raid alerts in Haiphong, both real and practice,
are reported to cut substantially into working time.
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6. Despite these problems, North Vietnam con-
tinues to import essential nonmilitary goods by sea.
Bulk foodstuffs accounted for over 65 percent of im-
ports in October. Petroleum accounted for another
13 percent. Hanoi should be able to maintain this
level of imports despite the growing problems in
handling cargo.
7. Instead of using Haiphong, incoming ships
could anchor in the many island anchorages in the
Gulf of Tonkin and unload cargo into barges. This
has been done in the past by tankers. Barges are
vulnerable to air attacks so Hanoi would adopt this
course only as a last resort.
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