ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010067-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: January 6, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 January 1967
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1, The Indonesian government, from its inception in
1945, has been in great part a study in improvisation.
This improvisation is, however, partially determined by a
general structure of legality and a respect for legal
forms.
2. The present basis of government is the "1945 con-
stitution," a hastily written and provisional document pre-
pared immediately prior to Indonesia's declaration of inde-
pendence to support an emergency government. It was set
aside in 1950 but reinvoked at Sukarno's orders in 1959 to
justify his imposition of "guided democracy" and his as-
sumption of virtually unchallenged power.
3. The constitution contains only a skeletal de-
scription of Indonesian government bodies. It provides
for a strong executive empowered with both legislative and
,judicial functions and imposes few formal restraints on
nxoOrrtive powers. It calls, for a president, a presidential
cabirinI, tr par-l 1ttfluent (DPI(G10 whir,h ailrriros legI; I ii ~vr~ and
veto power with the president, and a congress (MPIIS) which
sets the "guidelines of national policy" and elects the
president and vice president for five-year terms.
4. In the post-coup period, a rallying cry of mod-
erate political forces was the "return" to the 1945 con-
stitution. This slogan apparently connoted the termina-
tion of Sukarno's one-man rule and the establishment in
some measure of a "rule of law" which would prevent an-
other personal dictatorship.
5. To this end, the new regime has sought to revive
the institutions required by the constitution and to per-
mit (hem lo carry out their constitutional i:unctionri . It
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is also carefully retaining the sweeping executive au-
thority provided by the 1945 document.
The Executive
6. There is in Indonesia today a lop-sided executive
dualism. General Suharto, who heads the cabinet, has--in
terms of power--largely displaced President Sukarno. Su-
harto's authority is legally based in a presidential mandate
of 11 March 1966 which authorized Suharto to take all steps
necessary 'to improve the security situation, to save the
revolution, and to protect Sukarno. In June 1966, the MPRS
raised this mandate to the status of an MPRS decree and de-
clared it in accord with the 1945 constitution. Suharto is
to retain 'this authority until a new congress is elected
sometime before July 1968. Suharto's practical power, of
course, also rests in his position as commander of the army.
7. Sukarno, however, remains the legal president of
Indonesia and, with the MPRS, is technically the highest
point of appeal in the nation. He continues to sign bills,
meets the cabinet presidium, and presides at various gov-
ernment meetings. His power to influence present govern-
ment policy and operations, although relatively slight, is
obstructive and has been permitted to retard the govern-
ment's program. The extent of his influence depends more
on the individuals with whom he deals than on the legality
of his position.
8. Suharto can use his "11 March powers" at any
time to overrule the president but he does not choose to
do Ho.
The Cabinet
9. The cabinet is composed of a five-man presidium of
"first ministers" who supervise the twenty-four ministers
who actually hold the portfolios. The five areas of pre-
sidium responsibility are defense and security; political
affairs; economics and finance; people's welfare; and in-
dustry and development. Under each of the 24 ministers
are several directors general (formerly titled deputy min-
isters) who have substantive and policy functions and who
report directly to the minister; under each minister is
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also a secretary general, essentially an administrative co-
ordinator who handles paper flow and sees that deadlines
are met.
10. Most policy matters appear to be discussed within
the presidium, and apparently few plenary cabinet meetings
are held. Problems relating to specific ministries seem
to be discussed by the minister with the appropriate presidium
member. Difficult problems apparently are referred to the
presidium or to Suharto himself.
Suharto and Malik
11. The two outstanding leaders of Indonesian offi-
cialdom are General Suharto and Adam Malik.
12. Suharto is clearly the first man in Indonesia today.
Aside from being officially vested with the "11 March powers"
he is chairman of the Presidium, First Minister for Defense
and Security, and Minister/Commander of the Army. Should
President Sukarno he unable to fulfill his duties, the MPRS,
has decreed that Suharto should hold the post of acting
president.
13. Augmenting Suharto's cabinet and army headquarters
staffs are an economic committee composed of specialists
from the University of Indonesia and an unofficial "kitchen
cabinet" composed of at least seven generals. Two of the
generals hold actual cabinet portfolios; the others are from
the army headquarters staff. Mashuri, the Director General
for Higher Education, is said to be Suharto's most important
civilian adviser on matters other than economic or military.
He is a close friend and long-time neighbor.
1 4 . Adam Ma l ilc is First Minister for Political Affairs
:a.nti Ml.ai~istR.~rfor ForoiIYir At'fnirrri, and 4aiporv1,-ioH the min;istrios
of Homo Ai'fairs, Justice, and Information. Malik is orlc or
the few individuals in the government who can deal effectively
with Sukarno face-to-face and has been a strong force in
devising and implementing strategy to downgrade the president.
15. Malik has no significant political base. His
strength lies in his personal reputation and the confidence
that General Suharto and the army generally repose in him.
In this respect, his lack of a power base is an asset since
it relieves him of a following that would require political
accommodation and thereby makes him no political threat to
army leaders.
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16. The Sultan of Jogjakarta, who as First Minister
for Economics and Finance is also a presidium member,
earlier was linked with Suharto and Malik as one of a
triumvirate which governed the nation. Although the Sultan
retains great respect and prestige, particularly in Java,
he is gradually assuming the role of an important and neces-
sary background figure rather than that of a leader.
Congress (MPRS)
17. According to the constitution, the People's Con-
gress "enacts the constitution and decides the outlines of
national policy." Its members are chosen "in accordance
with provisions prescribed by law." It assembles at least
once every five years and elects the president and vice
president.
18. Present members were appointed, some of them six
years ago by Sukarno, others last year by General Suharto
after the membership was purged to eliminate Communists and
leftists. As of May 1966, the MPRS had 541 members.
19. The new regime called the MPRS into session last
June to recast Indonesian domestic and foreign policy.
With careful guidance from Suharto and his various assistants,
the MPRS revoked Sukarno's life presidency but reaffirmed
his tenure until the next congressional elections; estab-
lished a special committee to review presidential decrees
and to determine which are constitutional; reaffirmed Gen-
eral Suharto's executive powers; confirmed the March ban
on the Communist Party and outlawed the propagation of
"Communism/Marxism/Leninism in every form;" authorized the
renovation of economic policy; decreed that a new cabinet
bc7 1'ormod ; (locrood that olocti onr bca hold no later than
July 196H; recommended a free and active .foreign policy
and re-ontry into the United Nations and the International
Monetary Fund; and welcomed "all steps" to solve the
Malaysia problem "by peaceful means."
20. The MPRS then adjourned and left to parliament
and the cabinet the spelling out and implementation of
policy.
21. The regime is considering calling an emergency
session of the MPRS in the next few months which would
either vote Sukarno out of office or find some other means
of nullifying his influence.
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Parliament or Council of Representatives (DPRGR)
22. Parliament is Indonesia's legislative body. Its
members also have a policy-making role because parliament,
as a body, comprises part of the membership of the MPRS.
23. Like the MPRS, the present parliament is an ap-
pointed body. Some of its members were appointed by
Sukarno in 1960; others are replacements for those purged
by the new regime and were appointed by General Suharto.
As of September 1966, parliament had 240 members.
24. Despite the membership purge and appointment of
presumably more reliable members, General Suharto considers
parliament an undependable body. He is considering the
appointment of approximately 110 new members in order to
ensure the enactment of the government's program.
The Army
25. The Indonesian army is the principal political
power in Indonesia. Aside from the constitutionally pre-
scribed government structure, the army hierarchy provides
a bureaucracy which sometimes operates independently, some-
times is coordinated with or infiltrated into organs that
were once largely civilian.
26. General Suharto heads the cabinet; army officers
hold six of the twenty-four cabinet portfolios; and army
personnel have boon assigned to both parliament and congress.
Army officers are governors of 14 of Indonesia's 25 prov-
inces.
yuprnme Opcra'tionM Command (KOTI)
247. Among tho numerous commands and committees which
populate the Indonesian government structure, the most
significant probably is the Supreme Operations Command
(KOTI). Initially it was the ultimate organization for the
prosecution of Malaysian confrontation, but its responsi-
bilities have spilled over into various domestic political
and economic areas.
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27. It has experienced a number of reorganizations,
the latest in November 1966, and its present responsibili-
ties are somewhat imprecise. Sukarno is its titular chief,
and Suharto is chief of staff. The cabinet presidium serves
in an advisory capacity. It seems likely that KOTI will re-
main an instrument through which the army will reinforce its
national and provincial control and extend its functions
into various economic and political activities.
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