CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS: A NEW PHASE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800400001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1966
• Content Type: FORM

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CAMBQtIA AND THE VIETNAMESE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
GROUP 1
Excluded from outomotic
downgroding and'
declassification-.
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 1574/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 June 1966
Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists:
New-Phase?
Summary
Cambodia's foreign policy is in another difficult
period of adjustment. The impact of US military oper-
ations on the war in South Vietnam has caused Sihanouk
to re-evaluate Cambodia's relations with the Vietnam-
ese Communists and the West. His calculations have been
complicated by the fact that US operations have forced
the Communists to make greater use of Cambodian terri-
tory. This has significantly increased the danger that
the fighting will spill over into Cambodia.
Cambodia's ambivalent course over the past year
has been the result of Sihanouk's efforts to counter
this threat. Despite increasingly important differences
with the Vietnamese Communists, he has still been ma-
neuveringfor diplomatic leverage with them by offering
political and material support. He has also, however,
moved to increase contacts with the non.-Communist world,
while renewing long-standing proposals for internal in-
spection and control of Cambodian territory.
The direction of Cambodia's foreign policy over the
next several months will probably continue to reflect
Sihanouk's efforts to strike a safe balance between the
Asian Communists and the West. He will continue to be
influenced by the situation in South Vietnam, although
it will take a dramatic turn of events there to cause a
major realignment of Cambodia's foreign policy.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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1. The changing complexion of the war in South
Vietnam over the past year has been accompanied by
an apparent change in Cambodia's relations with the
Vietnamese Communists. The direction of that change
might seem surprising. At a time when Communist
military fortunes have been. declining, when circum-
stances suggest that some fence-mending with the West
might be prudent, Cambodia appears to be accelerating
the accommodation with Hanoi and the Viet Con.g.
2. Sihanouk's course is more complicated than
it looks on. the surface, however. For one thing, the
swing to the left in. some ways has been more apparent
than. real. The rhetoric and tangible offerings of
support have obscured but have not eliminated important
differences between Cambodia and the Communists. In
addition, the leftward overtures have been accompanied
by a quiet but nonetheless concerted Cambodian campaign
to improve relations with the non-Communist world.
By indicating that Sihanouk is not yet ready to burn
all his bridges to the West, these developments raise
key questions concerning his view of the war in South
Vietnam and the future course of Cambodia's relations
with Hanoi and Peking. They also suggest that another
look at the basis of Sihanouk's.~ past and current re-
lationship with the Communists might be important.
Cambodia's Shift Toward the Communists
3. Cambodia has been moving steadily toward the
Communist camp since the early 1960s. The basic
reason for the swing has been Sihanouk's belief that
the political future in Southeast Asia belongs to the
Communists and that he must reach an accommodation
with them if Cambodia is to retain any significant
degree of independence. The move has been influenced
by Sihanouk's own idiosyncrasies, his elephantine
memory for real and imagined insults, and his increas-
ing suspicion. Of US intentions toward Cambodia.
4. It is no accident that the reorientation of
Cambodia's foreign policy coincided with the recru-
descence of Communist activity in South Vietnam. At
an early stage in the game, Sihanouk calculated that
the Diem regime would not beat the Viet Cong. He
therefore launched what proved to be an involved cam-
paign to gain a diplomatic hedge against the prospect
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of a Communist victory. From Phnom Penh?s perspective,
a Viet Cong triumph would drastically shift the bal-
ance of power in Indochina against Cambodia, since,
with their country reunited, the Vietnamese would re-
sume their historic encroachments onto Cambodian soil.
5. The disparity in strength between. Cambodia
and Vietnam meant that Phnom Penh had to look for ex-
ternal support. Some limited protection, Sihanouk
believed, might come from the international community
and the international accords and organizations to
which Cambodia was a party. Sihanouk therefore began
to promote a new Geneva-type conference which would
recognize Cambodia's neutrality and territorial in-
tegrity. He actively pursued this for several years
because he felt it would serve Cambodia's interests in
two ways. First of all, a conference would cause the
great powers to recognize once again the legitimacy
of Cambodia's boundaries and, in a sense, its legiti-
mate role as a nation. state in Indochina.
6. The conference would also provide an oppor-
tunity for Communist China, North Vietnam, and the
US to reach a settlement of the war in South Vietnam.
Sihanouk believed--probably incorrectly--that Hanoi
and Peking would accept a neutral and nonaligned South
Vietnam, at least over the short term, as long as the
Viet Cong had still not achieved a position of over-
whelming power in. the South.
7. While he was promoting an international agree-
ment on Indochina, Sihanouk followed a second path
aimed at strengthening Cambodia's relations with the
Communists, particularly with Peking. He made it per-
fectly clear what lay behind his overtures to Commu-
nist China. Although not sanguine about Peking's in-
tentions, Sihanouk hoped the Chinese leaders would cal-
culate that it was in China's interest to exert a
restraining influence on the Vietnamese. In return,
Sihanouk was prepared to pay a high price. He was
willing to embrace the Chinese line on a whole series
of peripheral foreign policy issues. In addition, he
indicated that, if forced to choose, Cambodia was pre-
pared to become a satellite of Communist China rather
than lose its national identity to the Vietnamese.
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8. The question of timing soon became the criti-
cal factor in Sihanouk's day-to-day maneuvers. Common
sense indicated that it would be politic for Cambodia
to come to terms with the Communists before the Viet
Cong victory was in the bag. However, an imperfectly
timed move could precipitate sharp retaliation from
the South Vietnamese Government. By the fall of 1964,
nonetheless, the Viet Cong's alarming gains in the
field, the growing political dislocation in Saigon,
and the dim prospects for an international conference
apparently convinced Sihanouk that the time was ripe
for the long-postponed negotiations with the Vietnam-
ese Communists.
9. When. Sihanouk went to Peking in October 1964,
it was clear what was on his mind. In the weeks pre-
ceding the trip, he had begun to talk for the first
time of extending diplomatic recognition not only to
North Vietnam but also to the Viet Cong. The Viet-
namese had in return only to recognize Cambodia's
neutrality, its territorial integrity, and its ver-
sion of their common border. From Sihanouk's point
of view, Peking was the perfect place to talk with
Hanoi and the Viet Cong. The Chinese, after all,
figured critically in Sihanouk's plans. Peking was
expected to act as an honest broker which, freely
translated, meant to instruct the Vietnamese to give
Cambodia exactly what it wanted.
10. Sihanouk was in for a rude awakening. When
the Communists refused to accept some of his more
extravagant demands, the talks broke down.. To Sihanouk,
the episode was but another example of Vietnamese per-
fidy, a fresh warning that the Vietnamese, whatever
their political persuasion, were a threat to Cambodia.
For their part, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
soon learned firsthand what they had probably long
suspected, that Sihanouk could be an extremely tough
negotiator on matters directly affecting Cambodia's
interests.
11. Disheartening as this experience in Peking
was, even darker days in. Sihanouk's relations with
the Communists were in store. With his move toward
accommodation stalled, Sihanouk turned his efforts
toward organizing a political settlement in Vietnam
in the form of a "neutral solution." In Sihanouk's
view, such a settlement would be along lines which
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would leave the Vietnamese divided and not strong
enough to threaten Cambodia. In early 1965, Sihanouk
organized the Indochinese Peoples Conference (IPC)
with the hope of demonstrating that there was a ground-
swell of opinion in Indochina for a Geneva conference
to arrange a "neutral" South Vietnam. When the IPC
was convened in February, Sihanouk found to his annoy-
ance that his effort to get at least some non-Communist
representation had failed.
12. During the course of the IPC, Sihanouk gave
two remarkably candid speeches which revealed the
peculiar duality of his statecraft and also indicated
that he was coming around to a fresh appreciation of
the situation in Indochina. The first speech was
scheduled for delivery at the opening of the plenary
session of the conference but was never presented orally
because of the objections of the Communist participants.
In, it, Sihanouk argued dispassionately that the time
had come for Hanoi and the Viet Cong to reassess their
position on negotiations. He claimed that the growing
US presence in South Vietnam had dramatically changed
the situation, and that the Communists could no longer
drive the US from South Vietnam by force of arms.
Sihanouk's efforts to talk turkey with the Communists
were a total failure, and he later vented his frustra-
tions in a highly emotional speech before a Cambodian.
military audience in which he warned about the dangers
of "Vietnamese imperialism."
13. The IPC debacle, and an equally disappointing
meeting with Chou En-lai in Djakarta a month later--
during which it was made plain that Peking would not
support an international conference on Cambodia--repre-
sented the watershed of Phnom Penh's relations with
the Asian Communists. Over the past year a certain
uneasiness has crept into their relations.
Decreased Dependence on Hanoi and Peking
14. The change has been manifested in several
ways. For one thing, Communist China has not been
receiving quite the adulatory treatment in the Cam-
bodian official and semiofficial press that it once
enjoyed. More striking, the leading Cambodian left-
ist newspaper has openly and specifically criticized
Peking's in.tran.sigen.t position on. negotiations, prob-
ably the first time that it has ever spoken less than.
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enthusiastically about any Chinese policy. More-
over, Sihanouk has gone out of his way in private
talks with Western, diplomats to emphasize the ephem-
eral nature of Cambodia's friendship with Communist
China.
15. In practical terms, Sihanouk has also demon.-
strated in. at least three instances over the past
several months that he has no interest in making Cam-
bodia the prime staging area for pro-Communist po-
litical sideshows. He turned down an invitation
tendered by the Japanese Socialist Party to sponsor
an "Asian People's Con.feren.ce" to push for the with-
drawal of US forces from South Vietnam. He ignored
the first anniversary of the IPC, despite the fact
that the anniversary was prominently publicized in
the North Vietnamese and Chinese press. .,He:also
refused to permit the pro-Communist Afro-Asian Jour-
nalists Association. to stage a meeting in Cambodia
and has thus far turned down. Peking's request that
the association be permitted to make its headquarters
in. Phnom Penh.
16. Sihanouk has also begun to expand Cambodia's
contacts with the non.-Communist world.. For the first
time in almost two years, a Cambodian ambassador
is being sent to London, anad diplomats have been dis-
patched to fill other vacant posts abroad. Similar
small but specific, steps have been taken to de-
crease Cambodia's isolation. and, in. some measure,
its dependence on. Peking and Hanoi. Sihanouk's pur-
pose in seeking a limited opening to the West probably
involves a fresh attempt to reconstitute those pre-
1965 conditions under which Cambodia could most effec-
tively play both sides in Indochina while steering
an erratic but generally middle course. Increasing
contacts with the West, particularly with Great Brit-
ain and Australia, also serve to refurbish Cambodia's
badly tarnished "neutrality" while affording Phnom
Penh an opportunity to present its case with countries
in a position to exert some influence on. the US.
17. Sihanouk has still, however, not signifi-
cantly altered bilateral relations with his Vietnam-
ese "friends." In recent months, in fact, he has
granted token gifts of medicine and foodstuffs to
the Viet Cong, and has also raised the level of Hanoi's
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representation in Phnom Penh to diplomatic status,
apparently without exacting a quid pro quo. He
also has held out the prospect--a more ar-
reaching political accommodation with the Communists,
referring in an. April speech to a forthcoming "sum-
mit meeting" with the Vietnamese which will at last
lead to a border agreement.
18. Sihanouk's ambivalent policy is in part
the result of his strong reservations concerning
the justice of the US presence in South Vietnam.
He finds himself torn between. what he views as the
unjustifiable interference of a Western power in
Indochina, and the dire consequen.ces for Cambodia of a
total US defeat in South Vietnam. His recent speeches,
depicting the Viet Cong effort as a fight for Viet-
namese independence from foreign domination, may in
part represent a rationalization for Cambodia's sup-
port of the Viet Cong, but they also seem to carry
the stamp of personal conviction. Sihanouk's sym-
pathies have also been colored by circumstances
attending the prosecution of the war. It has been
US and South Vietnamese troops who have'violated
Cambodian territory and have bombed Cambodian vil-
lages over the years. If they have done so inad-
vertently and because the Viet Cong have purposely
taken advantage of the sometimes ill-defined border
to establish base areas and to mount attacks, it
does not matter. For Sihanouk, this does not miti-
gate the wrong.
19. Sihanouk has also become a prisoner, in a
way, of his own. past policies. It would be not only
embarrassing, but politically unwise, for him to
admit that the sacrifices Cambodia has made to ac-
commodate the Communists were premature and perhaps
unnecessary.
Vietnamese Communist Presence in Cambodia
20. The key factor behind Sihanouk's current
erratic course, however, is the growing impact of
US military forces on the war in South Vietnam,
an impact which has caused Communist troops to make
greater use of Cambodian territory.
21. Sihanouk clearly knows what the Communists
are doing in Cambodia, although he is probably not
aware of all the details nor of the magnitude of
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their incursions. His initial reaction, revealed
in an August 1965 speech which first described the
illicit outflow of rice to the Viet Cong, was to
limit and if possible prevent Cambodian. in.volvemen.t.
When he found that he could not by fiat curtail an
operation. rooted in the cupidity of Cambodian Offi-
cials, Sihanouk put the best face possible on his
impotence by claiming that the rice flow was a ges-
ture of support to the Vietnamese "brothers." He
soon made his own informal deal with the Communists,
so that Cambodia's depleted treasury might benefit
from the inevitable transactions.
22. Far more disturbing to Sihanouk than this
rice traffic, however, were indications that the
Vietnamese were physically encroaching on Cambodian.
territory. In a widely quoted speech in late March,
he referred to information. that the Viet Cong had
established medical facilities on. Cambodian terri-
tory. Although he tried to placate his Communist
"friends" by offering to treat Viet Cong wounded
in Cambodian hospitals, his real message--that the
insidious Vietnamese were up to their old tricks--
was perfectly clear.
23. Although Sihanouk undoubtedly has his sus-
picions, he is probably not fully aware of the extent
to which North Vietnamese Army elements are using
Cambodian territory in the isolated and sparsely
populated northeast area. The most important reason
is that the overextended Cambodian security forces
almost certainly do not report Communist activity
to Phnom Penh, either because they are unaware of
it or because they have made their own peace with
the intruders.
24. The increasing Vietnamese Communist use of
Cambodian territory poses, in. the final analysis,
the gravest problems for Phnom Penh. Acquiescence--
the course which Sihanouk has thus far followed--
opens Cambodia to a. very real threat of US and South
Vietnamese retaliation. The immediate alternative,
a determined effort to limit the Vietnamese presence
in. Cambodia, is just as unpalatable to Phnom Penh,
Such a course would necessitate a major realignment
of Cambodia's foreign policy away from the Communists--
a move which Sihanouk undoubtedly considers premature
at this juncture.
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25. A concerted effort to push the Communists
from Cambodian territory might also make Phnom Penh
a direct participant in. the war, something which
Sihanouk wants at all costs to avoid. Sihan.ouk's
equivocal response to this dilemma has in large
measure caused the seemingly contradictory course
of Cambodian. foreign policy over the past six
months. Sihanouk not only has mounted a fresh
campaign to get Hanoi and the Viet Con.g to sign.
some sort of agreement recognizing Cambodia's pres-
ent borders and its territorial integrity. He has
tried to appease the Communists by meeting some of
their needs--apparently agreeing, for example, to
the construction. of the new "Sihanouk road," which
extends from northern. Cambodia into southern, Laos.
This road provides the first Cambodian link with the
Viet Cong infiltration routes, and has been. used
principally for supplying rice to the Viet Cong.
A Bigger ICC Role
26. Sihanouk has also resurrected old proposals
for an expansion. Of the International Control Com-
mission. (ICC) operation. in. Cambodia under which the
ICC would be empowered to "control" Cambodia's bor-
ders with South Vietnam. Similar proposals, portrayed
by Phnom Penh as tangible evidence of Cambodia's de-
sire to remain neutral, have been. used perennially by
Sihanouk to counter charges that Cambodia is in. league
with the Viet Cong. Phnom Penh's continuing interest
over the past several months in an. expanded ICC, how-
ever, suggests that Sihanouk now attaches more than,
propaganda importance to the proposal. The reason
is that an expanded ICC operation would lessen. the
danger of punitive US and South Vietnamese operations
and might also discourage the large-scale presence of
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese elements on. Cambodian,
territory.
27. Sihanouk apparently believes that an. active
ICC operation along his border would go a long way
toward solving Cambodia's present dilemma. This was
made clear in an unusually candid article on 3 June
in. a semiofficial Cambodian, journal, which complained
that the Communists were proving as unconcerned about
Cambodia's neutrality as the US. The article argued
that the Communists wanted to give "active help" to
their side, but that Phnom Penh had "no wish to play
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the role of pawn for either camp." It is for this
reason, the article concluded, that Cambodia is con.-
tin.uin.g to demand "international control" of its
territory.
Future Prospects
28. The direction of Cambodia's foreign policy
over the next several months will probably continue
to reflect Sihanouk's efforts to strike an appro-
priate balance between the Asian Communists and the
West. He will continue to be influenced by the
situation in South Vietnam, although it will take a
dramatic turn of events there to cause a major re-
alignmen.t of Cambodia's foreign policy. Sihanouk
will continue, however, to angle for a negotiated
settlement of the war, and a recent letter to Soviet
Premier Kosygin suggests that he intends to make
another attempt to get an international conference
convened. Although Sihanouk's everyday tactics will
depend on the vagaries of his imagination, his funda-
mental objectives--to prevent the war from spreading
to Cambodia and to ensure Cambodia's existence as a
nation state no matter what the future political or-
ganization. of Indochina--will remain, the same.
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