INTELLIGENCE REPORT PREPARED WEEKLY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800390001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1966
• Content Type: IR

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STATE review(s) completed.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Prepared Weekly
for the
SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
OCI No. 1203/66
Copy No. 44
GROUP 1
Excluded from outomotic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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2. Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Uruguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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King Hassan II, in the year since he resumed the
Moroccan premiership, seems to have come no nearer to
solving Morocco's economic difficulties. The govern-
ment, already faced with massive unemployment and under-
employment, now anticipates an unusually low agricultural
yield as a result of prolonged drought and is seeking
breadgrains from the US and France to feed the people this
winter.
The chief elements supporting Hassan are the continued
prestige and legitimacy of the Alaouite dynasty, effective
military and security forces under his close personal con-
trol, and the oligarchies which benefit from the existing
order. There is widespread grumbling, but the majority
of the opposition recognizes that no other individual or
institution could replace the King as a symbol of the
nation and thus is not anxious to see the monarchy end.
Parliament, suspended in April 1965, has not been recon-
vened.
Hassan's most pressing concern is Algeria's growing
military strength. He fears that the Algerians may seek
revenge for the drubbing Moroccan forces gave the Algerian
Army during the 1963 border conflict. The Moroccans es-
timate Algeria's over-all military equipment superiority
as seven to one. They have asked the US for $14 million
worth of heavy military equipment in addition to the
squadron of F-5 aircraft which will be delivered start-
ing this fall.
To counter the alleged Algerian threat, Morocco has
sought closer ties with the West and with moderate African
and Arab states. Hassan has turned increasingly toward
the US and Germany for help as relations with France have
gradually deteriorated. Hassan is uneasy over De Gaulle's
apparent preference for Algeria, resents France's demand
that he dismiss his minister of interior for involvement
in the Ben Barka kidnaping, and is troubled over delays
in resolving outstanding economic problems with France.
Although concerned about the Communist threat to Africa,
Hassan has recently stepped up Moroccan contacts with
the USSR somewhat and plans to make a long-delayed trip to
Moscow later this year.
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Three plans for constitutional reform have been approved
for submission to the voters in Uruguay's November general
elections. The legal requirements for electoral approval
are such that unless one of the two major parties wins a
landslide victory of nearly two to one--which is unlikely--
no single plan will get the required majority. The public
demand for reform is great, however, and if it should be
frustrated, political stability could be jeopardized.
All three plans--sponsored respectively by the ruling
Blanco Party, the opposition Colorado Party, and the Com-
munist Party--propose to substitute a president for the
present weak and divided nine-man executive. The two tradi-
tional parties differ, however, on other aspects of re-
form such as prepayment for expropriated land and biparti-
san representation on autonomous agency boards. Many en-
trenched politicians in both parties wish to continue the
system of bipartisan office holding, which assures them
patronage privileges even when they lose elections. Al-
though they pay lip service to reform, their behind-the-
scenes opposition may well help to kill it.
Only a bipartisan project would seem able to overcome
the obstacles and win approval. The Colorados, however,
believing that they are likely to win control of the gov-
ernment in November and can then put their plan through
the legislature, may refuse to compromise. The US Embassy
believes that unless the two traditional parties agree on
a bipartisan approach to reform, potential voter disil-
lusionment could result in a windfall protest vote for
a Communist united front. Communist leaders are elated
at getting some 225,000 signatures on the petition to put
their reform proposal on the ballot. They hope to con-
vince at least some of the signers to support their candi-
dates at the polls.
Politicians of the traditional parties did not expect
the Communist success in collecting signatures; they be-
lieve that the two major parties will always control Uru-
guay, and they discount the threat and capabilities of the
Communists. Unless the politicians can subordinate personal
and political advantage to the national welfare, reform
will fail in November. Although constitutional reform is
not a panacea for the nation's ills, continuation of the
present governmental system--which has fostered economic
and political deterioration--seems sure in the long run to
benefit only the Communists and the far left.
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The recent wave of rumors of a possible move to
overthrow the Illia government in Argentina points
up the increasing impatience among Argentina's mil-
itary over the pace of the government's progress in
solving the nation's most pressing economic and po-
litical problems.
Although the top military leaders in all three
services are considered "constitutionalists"--those
who favor civilian rule and military subordination
to elected officials--they have become disturbed by
the series of strikes that have plagued the country
in recent months. They also fear that the Peronists,
about a third of the electorate, will be able to
gain control of the Congress in elections scheduled
for March 1967.
Despite government gains in reducing inflation
and the foreign debt, some military officers see
the Illia administration basically as a lethargic,
do-nothing government. Several high-ranking gen-
erals have made it clear that they favor Illia.'s
!a 's political opposition has seized on military
dissatisfaction and appears to be encouraging the
generals to throw out the present administration.
Illia has reacted strongly to the threat of a
military coup. He has made several speeches indi-
cating that he intends to prevent military inter-
vention and on 10 June called an unprecedented work-
ing meeting of the cabinet. Several resolutions
emerged from the meeting that may well mollify the
military and put an end to the present crisis.
However, the military consider themselves the
final arbiter in Argentine politics. Although they
may feel that this particular battle is over--with
more or less satisfactory results--they will prob-
I continue their Pressure on the government.
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