SECURITY HANDLING OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PRODUCTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A003500030038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 13, 1961
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relee 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A00030038-1
TOP SECRET
Copy of 30
13 November 1961
COMOR-D-.49/2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States
Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite
Reconnaissance Products
1. At the meeting of the United States Intelligence
Board on 9 November 1961, the Board instructed the Committee on
Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to prepare a recommendation
on. the security handling of satellite reconnaissance products, using;
as a premise that the collection of ELINT and COMINT by satellite
is less sensitive than the collection of photography by satellite and
therefore does not require special security handling.
2e The recommendation of COMOR in response to this
assignment is set forth in Tab A in the form of a memorandum to the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
3. Recommendation: It is recommended that the
United States Intelligence Board approve the attached paper.
Attachment
Tab A NRO review(s) completed.
Cop 2---State TCO
4-DIA
-JCS TCO
6, 7-1.-9ACSI TCO
App r I ase 2004/17/07 - - -
9, 10, 11-AFCIN TCO TOP SEC ET
12,'l3--NSA TCO
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rel a 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A0O t 0030038-1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Security Handling of Satellite
Reconnaissance Products
1. This memorandum is in reply to your oral request
for advice on whether the Presidential Directive of August 26, 1960,
which establishes the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System
for the protection of the products of satellite reconnaissance, should
include products other than photographic intelligence.
2. It will be recalled that the Presidential Directive
arose from the need to protect the product of CORONA (which provides
a quality of photography from which information can be drawn applica-
ble directly to intelligence estimates). Subsequently,, by White House
direction the products of ARGON (from which can be drawn geodetic
control data. but not information bearing on intelligence estimates)
was included in the TALENT-KEYHOLE System without a requirement
for a special compartment. Recently by directive of the United States
Air Force the products of SAMOS (presumed at this time to be only
photographic) have been included in the TALENT-KEYHOLE System,
Weather photography from Project TIROS has never been included in
the TALENT-KEYHOLE System on the grounds that it did not provide
Approved For Release 20
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Relee 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A00030038-1
TOP SECRET
data which would contribute to intelligence estimates as well as that
the weather data which it could collect had a major bearing on the
peaceful pursuits of mankind.
3. At the present time ELINT collection is being accom-
25X1
25X1
plished by means of satellite reconnaissance, and it is anticipated
that before long COMINT will be collected by these means. In the
future other sensors may be included in satellite payloads for the
purpose of collecting intelligence information. It is proposed that
when such other sensors included in satellite payloads are available,
the United States Intelligence Board should consider what security
controls should be applicable in the handling of products of these sen-
sors. Accordingly, this memorandum will deal only with ELINT and
COMINT products of satellite reconnaissance.
4. It is already clear from the nature of the successful
ELINT collection to date that the collection of both ELINT and COMINT
by satellite reconnaissance will be extraordinarily useful to the U. S.
It is also clear that the data collected will be of massive proportions
and b be uxtIi to intelligence must be painstakingly processed? the
results being correlated with other all-source data collected by a
variety of means Paricularly at the initial stages of processing,
great numbers of personnel will be required. The USIB has explored
Approved For Release 20
25X1
 Approved For Rele 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000030038-1
the requirements of controlling these types of data by special security
methods,, including the application of the TALENT-KEYHOLE System
to the products and a special security compartment within the COM1NT
System. The realization of the potential administrative complications
and burdens of either of these approaches has in part provoked the
Board's consideration of whether indeed special handling was necessary
in the national security interest.
5. Telemetry is a publicly known component of the
launching; control,, and recovery of satellites. TIROS photography
so acquired has been released to the newspapers by the U. S. The
interception of electronic emanations,, whether signals or voices have
long been known to be possible from line of site. Whereas the electronic
eg1.3.o .ert s+'~!2.T?~j3 { P. rtt. 3.sb !!v v. PS'.fi here .e of not rep:"rsl n. thn
collection by satellites presents highly specializedAtechnical break-
through represented by our satellite photographic collection or that
which we may achieve in the future. The capture of the U-2 in May
1960 with the photographic gear reasonably ir)act must have given
the USSR a portent of U. S. photo reconnaissance capabilities. Their
concern about such reconnaissance is understandable because of the
tremendous quantities of critical intelligence information that can be
acquired immediately and with relative small exploitation effort.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004@6W ; t9B01709A003500030038-1
 Approved For ReIL a 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79BO1709AO 00030038-1
D
6 If the USSR were to become aware of the quality
and extent of our satellite photography. we believe that they would
perhaps intensify their efforts to achieve physical countermeasures
whether by destroying the satellite or by camouflage or obfuscatory
activities on the ground. It is also quite possible that they might
initiate politicalac:ivity aimed at preventing continued collection. It
is doubtful that the same sort of action would be initiated if they were
made aware of satellite reconnaissance by electronic means o It is,
of course, not proposed to inform them of the latter, but rather to
suggest that the protection afforded by the TOP SECRET security
procedures in the case of EL1NT, and the COMINT procedures in the
case of COMINT provide the necessary protection and that the factors
incident to the processing and exploitation of these materials for
National Security purposes tend to override such slight risk as remains
?, The United States Intelligence Board accordingly
concludes:
a, That it is of first importance that the
photographic satellite reconnaissance capabilities of the
U. S. for the purpose of gathering intelligence data and
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79BO1709AO03500030038-1
 Approved For Rese 2004/07/07: CIA-RDP79B01709A0Mf500030038-1
TOP SECRET
data bearing on geodetic control should be accorded
effective security protection in regard to the fact of
its accomplishment as well as the scope and content
of the results
be That the fact of electronic recon:?
naissance (EL,INT and COMINT) is not of comparable
security sensitivity and that the normal security pro-
cedures of TOP SECRET control are adequate for the
ELINT products and the normal COMINT security
controls are adequate for the COMINT
C, That the security controls requisite
for the products of other sensors in satellite recon-
naissance be subject to the recommendation of the USIB
when such products become available.
8, The foregoing conclusion relating to ELINT and
COMINT (b above) necessarily requires consideration of the security
procedures surrounding the operation which produces these products.
Both yt tss i,'ojece.n -Hour operational. and those in the planning
stage are under Presidential injunction that they shall be accorded
severe security protection. I
It may be necessary to continue such
Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : ,CAA-RDP79B01709A003500030038-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 ? Approved For Rel*se 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000030038-1
restrictions on operational grounds. This however should not extend
to the handling and use of the products. Thus when they have been
delivered to intelligence for exploitation analysis and correlation with
other data, they should be handled under the security procedures
indicated in paragraph 7 b above,
9., Recommendation: It is recommended that the
ELINT products of satellite reconnaissance should be handled under
normal TOP SECRET procedures and that COMINT collected by satel-
lite reconnaissance should be subject to normal COMINT security
procedures.
2.5X1.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 200410 O -
 Approved For ReleYe 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP79B01709A003500030038-1
TOP SECRET
Copy 1--DDI(P) TCO
14--OCI TCO
15--OSI TCO
16--ORR TCO
17--DIR NPIC
18--TSO CIA
19--C/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
20- -C / DMD / NPIC
21--LO/CIA/PAD (NPIC)
22--DDP TCO
23--Intel/DPD
24--SO/DPD
2 5 - 30 . -C /SRS /DPD /DDP
Approved For Release 20
25X'
25X1:
25X1,