IG SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76B00734R000200090011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 82
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 14, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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14NOV197Z
;. _~ ". 3-)~~ %~b
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science "T""ecc`hi:C61"ogy"?'"
SUBJECT : IG Survey of the Office of Research and
Development
1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of the Inspector General's
Survey of the Office of Research and Development, which was initiated
at your suggestion. I am fully aware that a number of the points
covered in this report confirm matters of which you were fully aware
and on which a number of procedural or organizational changes have
already been made. I do, however, invite your comment on this Sur-
vey, with particular attention to the recommendations made by the
Inspector General. I would suggest that these comments be received
by 15 January 1973.
2. You might also consider some of the following points, which
occurred to me:
a. Recommendation No. 1. I express my own interest in
seeing as much consolidation of these reporting systems as
possible. I would particularly hope that a single input action
might suffice to provide the basic information to satisfy the
needs of various offices feeding off a single information system.
b. Recommendation No. 3. The IG makes a useful sug-
gestion that DD/S&T take the initiative in exploring the possi-
bility of rotation of technical officers. May I volunteer the
services of the Office of Personnel to provide staff support for
any such effort and my own supporf`wh respect to any other
Deputy Directors you may wish to approach.
c. Recommendation No. 5. In part, of course, the new
R&D Board and its panels should assist in the process of dis-
semination recommended here. DD/S&T's established R&D
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publication produced byl also contributes.
These might be supplemented by dissemination of R&D devel-
opments which are not CIA projects but which would be of
possible interest to different technical elements of the Agency.
d. Recommendations Nos. 6 and 7. Our recent discussion
of a possible policy statement with respect to contracting offi-
cers should solve a great part of the problem in these two
recommendations.
N ADD/S&T with respect to possible conflict-of-interest cases.
I share that confidence. I am sure that the DD/S&T will take
steps to ensure that all cases of possible conflict of interest or
"steps
misunderstanding as to possible conflict of interest are
raised with him as a part of the normal management process
of the Directorate, rather than being handled by staff levels
below him.
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3. One of the most interesting recommendations appears at the
end, pages 85 and 86. The IG suggests the possibility of the establish-
ment of uniform standards and mechanisms for the management of
R&D activities and for the evaluation of the results of the Agency's
R&D efforts. I confess some doubt as to the possibility of establish-
ing uniform standards and mechanisms for managing all Agency R&D
activities, but I do find most attractive the possibility of some uni-
form system of evaluation of the results of our R&D efforts throughout
the Agency. This, of course, relates to my interest in systematic
evaluation of the Agency's activities in all fields, not just R&D. I am
fully aware of the complications involved in trying to evaluate the suc-
cess of R&D, but nonetheless I think this would be a very useful goal
to set so that we can begin to measure the success of our R&D activi-
ties. This in no way suggests any change in our desire to focus the
R&D Board on the substance of R&D and the Agency's needs. Rather,
I suggest that the R&D Board not get involved in the allocation or
measurement of the effectiveness of financial expenditures but that a
separate system be developed in the program process for this purpose.
W. E. Colby
Executive Director -Cor}dptroller
-CLA
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
?
OCTOBER 1972
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
1
ORGANIZATION
2
Office of the Director
2
Support Staff
6
Procurement Management Staff
19
Physics-Chemistry Division
20
Radio Physics Division
21
Applied Physics Division
22
Optics Division
23
Analysis Division
24
Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division
25
Biological. Sciences Division
25
Special Projects Group
26
THE ROLE OF ORD
29
THE WORK PROGRAM
CONTRACTING PRACTICES
49
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
59
MANAGEMENT
Policy Guidance
76
Organizational Factors
78
Reporting
81
Looking Ahead
84
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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No. 1 12
No. 2 14
No.3 17
No. 4 28
No. 5 46
No. 6 53
No. 7 53
No. 8 56
No. 9 63
No. 10 80
No. 11 80
No. 12 84
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neceuary to limit the a
of the highly tec
r survey because
s of most of the work of the Office of
Research and Development (OkD). We made no *Usmpt to raaly
ttigoo the scie ftc worth of ORD's programs not to make any
specific evaluation of the contributions hose programs have nude to
the intelligence process, bscasse to do so would naive been beyond our
competence. This report of survey this is coaftasrd primarily to such
matters as the clarit
ORD mission the adequacy of or$sni
National *tractor*;** =&=er
on duty during that ported and not to the present Director who was
assigned an 3 Juky-l97g.
that are made to the Director of D relate to the Director who
Consequently, the stteations that are described sad the references
2. The major portion of the formation-gathering phase of the
yrvey was camp d during the period from April through Juno 197Z.
&D activities are plowed
managed, and evaLuat pod; and the efficiency of ORD's operations,*
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OFFICE. OF RESEA.RCh AnD DEVELOP? TNT
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PRCJCiIRE! I
i GK TWT
STAFF
DIRECTOR
M. DIRECTOR
tXECtTPIVE
OFFICER I-
TECLAICAL ASSISTANT/
PLATS & PROGRAMS
SIWPOFf2
STAFF r
J
ANALYSIS
DIVISION
SCIMITIFIC ADVISOR
/' ?PLIED
PHYSICS
DIVISION
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BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCES
DIVISION
MEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE
D VISION
OPTICS
DIVISION
PHYSICS
CHLR4ISTRY
DIVISION
RADIO
PHYSICS
DIVISION
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SPECIAL
PROJEC'T'S
CROUP
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of the Office of the Director, two staffs, seven operating divisions,
. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) is composed
and one special projs
time of our survey.
The annual "rating
ORGANI
on duty at the
l Ju v 1972
currently rune
a-ly
rat breakdoera of the office
and the distribution of personnel by component appears on
Pafe?
Miles pf the Direete:
The staff of the Office of the Director. O RD. consists of
Technical Assistant for Plans and Programs, a Scientific Advisor,
a Techarcal Assiststt to the scientific Advisor, aid three secretaries.
The Deputy Direct** bad been on sick leave since January and, as of
the last report we had, the prospect of his retying to full duty was
not promising. The Scientific Advisor was serving as Acting Deputy
the Director bime?lf, a Deputy Director, an f sc ve officer.
Director in addit
his other duties.
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tudividual raspon.t i...# "So assigned to the Office
of the Direectorr, with few e*ceepte? *to met clearly deelineeated.
The work of the Office I. apportioned amoa$ them largely een the
basis of the ts&vUW's oam background. The DtV*aU r (a physicist)
and the Scientific Advisor (a chemist) concern t selves priva&rily
with the work of** divisions dealing with the physical sciences,
The Deputy ti ter (a doctor of medicine), Were his illuess,
concentrated on t wowk of the two divisions dealing with the life
scieenees. The Analysis Division, which is engaged primarily in
e xploration of cowipe r applications, has no "steward" In the front
office. although the Teen atcal Assistant for Plans and Programs was
formerly designated as the Technical Assistant for automatic data
processing. The Executive Officer monitors adn"otration, support,
and internal liatee The Technic al Assistant to the Scientific Advisor
has been given special assignments. but he has not bean assigned any
specific duties Of a regular and continuing asters.
4. The Tochatcal Assistant for ins and Pr rams has sat
assortment of jobs, many of which have little or wing to do with
plans and programs. It is our understanding that His present respenst
bilities grew out of and are is addition to the functions origiaally
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assigned to him in the field of automatic data processing. He does
prepare the office pi
call, the annual budget proposals, and
assembles the information needed for the quarterly, project review
meetings with the DD/SEAT. He spends part of his time writing
technical studies sad reviewing scientific journals and Agency
publications for :meads that may stimulate technical innovation to the
various divisions, H. has prepared a large number of technical
papers, some of which have been published by professional societies.
We tried, without agecess. to discover of what value these papers
may have been to O RD in carrying out its responsibilities. He has
also participated siveely in a variety of Internal and external
training coarse"
sod scientific training course. for the
Agency, and servos as an instructor in some of them. He a appeared
to be an aggressive and hard-working individual with many trans
0
in the fire. The results of his diverse act .vitl*s -are no doubt of some
benefit to the Agency, bat we fear that the mi.celUmeous tasks in
which he is engaged interfere with the proper falfllls t of his primer
role as plane and programs officer.
5. The Scientific Advisor is used by r ,ay ORl3.e ff'icor. as
a s< ding board for ideas, as a gaugo of the political climate, and
. 4
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as a source of advice on Agency procedures. The Director of ORD
uses him in much the same way. He also is often the office briefer
and serves as office representative on several boards and committees.
He, as well as others in the front office, reviews the Blue books
(project proposals). Although the reviewers themselves no doubt
think otherwise, we have the distinct Impression that these reviews
are quite superficial, going little beyond ascertaining that the required
papers are in place and are real ..bly well written.
6. With the exception of the Technical Assistant to the Scientific
Advisor, who has no regular work, everyone in the Office of the
Director appeared to be fully occupied, but the arrangements for
overseeing the work of ORL) seemed to us to be very loose and
unstructured. The staff takes care of the usual routines of pushing
papers through the front office, of responding to problems as they
arise, and of attending meetings. However, many of the tasks that
occupy them are self-generated as a consequence of a personal
interest In a particular subject. Staff members commented that they
had eceas(onally made studies of or recommendations on ways of
improving the work processes of the office. A few of these had
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evoked comment from the Director, but none of the staff members
could recall an instance of action having been taken on any of them.
7. The atmosphere is casual and easy-going, and all of the
mbers appear to have satisfactory personal relationships
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with the Director, but they receive little guidance from him and see
little visible evidence of his interest in their work. One staff officer
remarked that he never knew if he was doing well in his Job or not,
because the Director never commented on his work--one way or the
other.
Support Staff
8. The position of Administrative Officer was established in
OR D in 1963, and a technical officer from within ORD was assigned
to the position. Various duties accrued to huge., and gradually a
support staff of a sort evolved but not along conventional lines.
The Administrative Officer interested himself in or was directed
to engage in a variety of activities not normally delegated to a
support officer, and not enough attention was paid to the specialized
administrative and routine housekeeping tasks for which a support
staff is normally responsible. The Security Officer, the Finance
Officer, and the Librarian were not under the Administrative Officer
but reported directly to the :kxeeutivee Officer.
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9. That arrangement remained in effect until 3 April 1972
when the present
as established. A professional
support officer was named to head it, and the former Administrative
Officer was reassigned to another Agency component. The present
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to organised along conventional lines;
finance, logistics, security, registry, library, and personnel. In
the ensuing months a number of actions have been initiated designed
to raise the standards of support service and administration in ORD
to the level that prevails generally in other parts of the Agency.
Housekeeping
10. The space occupied by OI'RD on the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 12th
floors of the Ames Center Building is well laid out and is adequate
for ORD's needs.. We noted at the beginning of our survey, however.
that poor housekeeping practices prevailed in many of the offices.
Offices were cluttered with unneeded administrative equipment and
with disorderly and untidy accumulations of books, pamphlets. and
other documents. Prototype and pre-production pieces of equipment
were stored in some offices, contributing to the clutter and in some
instances representing possible safety hazards. The work area
7-
IS ECRE A
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occupied by the Registry was overflowing with boxes of documents
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and with equipment haphazardly stored and seemingly forgotten. ORD
initiated a clean- up campaign while our survey was in progress,
which resulted in a noticeable improvement in the appearance of
many of the offices.
Property Management
11. ORD is responsible for property valued at approximately
consisting of (a) administrative or operating property
for which it is accountable on consolidated memorandum receipt,
(b) government-furnished equipment provided to contractors, and
(c) prototype or pre-production items of equipment received from
contractors. An audit report for the period ending 30 September
1971 called attention to certain deficiencies in ORD's management
of its property; discrepancies in the records on property held
under consolidated memorandum receipt, excess and/or unserviceable
property on hand, and lack of central control over prototype and pre-
production items received from contractors. ORD has taken steps
to correct these deficiencies, but continued monitoring and enforced
discipline by ORD management will be required to ensure that they
stay corrected.
R E T
S E C R E T
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Suety
12. ORD receives some 2, 000 documents each month of which
about 500 are TOP SECRET codeword. Large numbers of contractors
visit ORD's offices in Ames Building for consultations or briefings,
and ORD currently is using some
consultants on an tater-
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mittent basis. Arrangements with some contractors allow for their
use of ORD computer*, and some contractor representatives have
no-escort badges. Contractual arrangements with industrial concerns
and with educational institutions require constant appraisal and re-
appraisal to ensure that proper security standards are maintained.
ORDD has had significant problems in the past in connection with the
control of 1D cards and visitors' no-escort badges, compliance with
courier and mailing instructions, and clearance and control of visitors.
The present Security Officer has recently made studies and has issued
notices designed to improve ORD's security posture and practices.
This is a. good start, but what is needed additionally is strong support
the security program by the Director of ORD and by his division
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Contract Information Systems
13. Most of ORD's work relates to contracts awarded to
industrial concerns and to educational institutions. Asa con-
sequence, much of its reporting and record-keeoping relates to
such things as the status of funds available for contracting. the
pre-award work required prior to entering into contracts, contractor
progress reports, and project officer inspection reports. At the time
of our survey ORD was involved in the care and feeding of four separate
contract information systems. Two of them, the DID/S&T Contract
Information System t'CI S) and the Office of z ogistice system (CONIF ),
were designed primarily to serve certain Agency-wide needs for basic
information regarding contracts and the management of them. The
other two are internal ORD systems. One to known as the ORI)
Contract Management System (C S), which to run on ORS computers
using the ADEPT software package. The other, known as CHEQUE,
to a manual system based on a Kardex card file. The two ORD
systems were created to satisfy needs for contract information that
were felt not to be met by the two Agency systems.
14. We believe there is an urgent need to take a close look at
the manifold contract management systems now in use in ORD. The
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duplication of effort and the paperwork involved in supporting these
0
four systems need careful examination, as does the use of-or the
failure to use--the reports derived from thorn. Each of these systems
does something that none of the others will do, but essentially similar
data is input to each of the four systems. The information contained
in the reports derived from any one of those systemais not synchronized
with Information derived from the other systems, and in many instances
the information to not fully usable for management purposes without
laborious manual reconciliation and remaanipulatton.
15. We realize that this is a complex subject on which widely
differing views are held and that studies are now under way concern`
tug possible improvements in the CIS and CONIP` systems. Presumably
those studies will give attention to refinements needed to provide
Information required for contract management purposes at the levels
of the office, division, project officer, and contracting officer.
lb. Meanwhile, we believe that ORD must begin preparing to
adjust itself to abandoning its internal CMS ruachine-operated system.
The former Administrative Officer who programmed and maintained
the system has left, and there is no one in ORD available to continue
the work. A too, the D.
T has decided that the ORI3 computer to to
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be removed, which means that no machinery will remain in ORJ)
on which to run the system Moreover, this system is designed
specifically for operation using the AI)ZPT software package and
cannot be run under the software system commonly used by the
Office of Computer Services. And, finally. the ORD CMS system
and the DD/S&T CIS system are to a very large degree duplicatory,
two systems are not needed where one could be made to serve.
Recommendation No. I
That the DD/S&T have a review made of the Contract
Information System to determine if its content can be
expanded or otherwise revised so as to make unnecessary
the continuation of OR!)'s Contract Management System.
Libr!rX
17. The O RD library contains some 9 50 technical books and
standard reference works; an assortment of studies by various
learned societies, private companies, universities, Do!, and other
Government agencies; and various Agency publications. The libra
also now keeps one copy of each final ORD report, although these
a have not been catalogued and the collection is far from complete.
0
The library subscribes to 68 technical periodicals and receives semi-
rnonthlyr listings from two Government clearing housesc the Defense
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Documentation Center and the National Technical Information Service.
These listings contain abstracts of reports of current R&D work done
by the Government or under contract to the Government. Some of
these documents are classified; some are not. In addition, "Topical
Announcements" of unclassified documents in specialized fields are
received from the National Technical information Service and are
routed to appropriate divisions of ORD for review.
18. The librarian catalogues the holdings, monitors checkouts
of library materials, and responds to requests for book or document
searches in the ORIJ library or for the relay of requests for other
searches by the CIA central library. Some ORD project officers
use the library and library search facilities quite extensively; some
use them infrequently or not at all. Books checked out to individuals
often are held for long periods of time, and some ORIJ officers have
ignored the librarian's requests for their return. Thirty-one boo
were reported as lost or unaccounted for at the time of our survey.
There is a need for senior ORD management to take a hand in enforcing
discipline in the use of its library.
19. We note that there are two other libraries in Ames Building:
one maintained by the Office of Communications and another by the
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Office of Logistics. We question whether there to need for three
separate libraries in one building--each with its own unique cataloguing
and indexing ystern- -occupying in all five rooms in the building and
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to operate them. When we
asked about the feasibility of merging them and operating the combined
facility as a branch of the main library, we were told that this had
been considered In the past but that the idea was abandoned in favor
of keeping them separate. It was felt then that a merger was not
practical in view of the differing needs of the three offices and of the
complications that would attend trying to manage a combined facility
through coordination among three Directorates. We are not convinced
that these are good enough reasons for maintaining three separate
libraries if combining them would result in savings, especially of
personnel. We suggest that additional study be given the matter.
Recommendation No. Z
That the DD/ S& T take the initiative in exploring with
the DD/S and the 1)3)/I the feasibility of combining the
three libraries is Amos Center Building and operating them
as a branch of the main library.
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Personnel Magna ement
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20. The Support Staff provides certain services of common
concern in the area of personnel administration, but personnel
management is handled primarily at the division level. O RD has a
Career Service Panel that was established in February 1967. It
confines itself to matters affecting the careers of professional
employees. A special panel for career development of secretarial.
clerical, and administrative personnel was established in, April 1971.
It concerns itself with career matters affecting ORt's clerical
employees and those support and administrative personnel who do
not belong to the DDIS&T career service. The criteria used in the
past-by the Career Service Panel In ranking ORD professional
employees were ill-defined and inconsistently applied. The Panel
recognized this, and improved ranking criteria have been devised.
The new criteria had not yet been applied at the time of our survey,
but a new competitive rankin
them was about to be undertaken.
21. The minutes of the Career Service Panel meetings reveal
that the subject of rotation has been discussed repeatedly, but little
has come of this talk. Two officers from ORD's Analysis Division
are assigned to the Intelligence Directorate to work on computer
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applications. OMS has detailed a psychologist from the Psychological
w=ervicees Staff to work in ORD to improve understanding between the
two offices. An 05I specialist in BW/CW is working in ORD. These
attempts at cross-fertilization appear to have been of appreciable
benefit, but it to a minimal effort. We believe that an effort should
be made to expand it. The reasons are many. ORD's project officers
are very much isolated from the rest of the Agency and have little
familiarity with the work of the offices whose missions they are trying
to support. Likewise, few outside of ORD have any real understanding
of ORDr:e capabilities or of its approaches to R&D. Rotation would
? also help to relieve the parochialtems and the antagonisms that
now exist and almost surely would broaden and enrich the talents
of the officers concerned.
Z4. We are aware that recent efforts to encourage inter.
Directorate transfers earns to nought, but we wonder if an effort
confined to the technical field might not have a somewhat better
;:fiance: of success. Within the last four years we have surveyed
six of the Agency components with major R&D responsibilities.
Each of the offices has a few technical officers working in very
narrow specialities, but, for the most part, all of the technical
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officers are doing essentially the same sorts of things in basically
the same ways. The work of an electronics engineer in ORD, for
example, differs little from that of an electronics engineer in TSD,
OS?, O LL, or Comma. We believe it would be feasible and beneficial
to encourage movement of technical officers among these tectmical
components. Whether this in accomplished by scheduled rotations
on a tour baste, by two-way exchanges, by unilateral assign cents
from one component to another, or by temporary details matters
little--as long as the exchanges are made with the deliberates intent
of benefiting both the individual and the Agency.
Recomnieen d .heel No. 3
That the DD/S&T take the initiative in exploring with
the other Deputy Directors the feasibility of an expansion
of rotation of technical officers among the various Agency
technical offices.
23. ORD has been most generous in sponsoring training for
its employees. A bout live percent of its work force wae8 in a training
atatus during P'Y 1971, and 4.8 percent of man-hours spent in a duty
status was devoted to training. O.RD employees are given wide
latitude in choosing the courses they wish to attend. They have
participated in both internal and external courses devoted to both
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technical and managerial subjects. While we think it proper that
ORD should sponsor a variety of training for its employees, it has
been too lax in acquiescing to requests from employees for training
that is of interest to the individual and perhaps of personal benefit
to him but not to the Agency. There is need for a more careful
review of training requests in order better to relate the potential
benefits to the needs of the Agency. The new Chief of Support for
ORD has taken recent steps to sharpen the review of training requests.
This should place the Director of ORD in a better position to judge
the worth of the proposed training before he approves it.
24. We received only one formal complaint on personnel
matters from those we interviewed. That complaint alleged personal
misconduct by certain named employees. Since there were distinct
security implications in the allegation, we referred the matter to
the Director of Security for investigation. We did not pursue the
matter further and take note of it hers only for the record.
Z5. On the whole, we heard remarkably few adverse comments
about personnel matters of a type that usually are the subject of
criticism; for example, rate of promotion, working conditions,
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fitness reports, and unfair treatment by supervisors. There were
no complaints about uninteresting or unchallenging work; on the
contrary, most of those with whom we spoke liked their work and
were enthusiastic about it. Most of the criticisms that were made
to us arose from a deeply felt concern about matters of major import:
permissive and inefficient 01W management, lack of clear policy
guidance, uncertain delegations of R&D responsibilities, and inter-
and intro-office rivalries and disputes. We discuss these subjects
in detail in later sections of the report.
Procurement Management Staff
26. The Procurement Management Staff was established in
February 1969 and was given responsibility for reviewing, negotiating,
and executing ORD's contracts with its suppliers. The Staff consists
of a chief, two contract negotiators assigned from the Office of
Logistics, an auditor assigned from the Office of Finance, an
industrial security officer assigned from the Office of Security, and
The auditor reviews the accounting and
cost systems and the financial reliability of the contractor, The
security officer examines personnel and physical security. The
negotiators review the business and legal aspects of contract
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proposals and work out the technical details with the project officer
with whom they jointly negotiate the contract.
27. Although the Procurement Management Staff met with
some hostility within ORD when it was first established, the
relationships between the Staff and the division chiefs and project
officers are now good. The team approach has worked well in
practice and has resulted in noticeable improvement in ORD's con-
tracting practices.
28. The Procurement Management Staff is responsible for
only about two-thirds of ORD's contracts. The other one-third
are negotiated and administered by the Office of Logistic sII 25X1
ment Staff acts In an advisory capacity to the Director of ORD on
some aspects of these contracts and coordinates the activities of his
The Chief of the Procurement Manage-
own staff with those of
The
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separation of the two staffs poses some awkward problems of
communication, record keeping, and reporting.
Physics-Chemistry Divisi
29. The Physics-Cheemistry Division, which was formed in
1964, initially focused its efforts on the nuclear area but did some
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work on power, materials, and electro-mechanical systems. Over
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and technology to enhance intelligence collection capabilities.
the years, the scope of its program expanded, and the emphasis
changed. It now is engaged in a broad program of exploiting science
30. The division consists of the chief. ~echnical officers,
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.
secretaries. The division a
and had are FY-72 budget allocation of
Radio Physics Division
31. The Radio Physics.D
During the period from 1964 through 1971 the Physics-Chemistry
Division completed 13 R&D projects that were identified by ORD as
being technically successful. Seven of the 13 projects became
operational. The division chief does not believe in carrying any
project beyond the prototype stage. It is then turned over to the
operational element for development of an operating capability.
1963
February
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part
contracts. During the
1964 through 1971 the Radio Physics Division completed
15 Ithf) projects that ORD characterised as being technically successful.
Five of the 15 projects became operational.
A Iced Physics Division
33. Work in the fields of audio sarvoiltancs and audio coeenter-
measures was began in the Radio physics Division in 1963. The
division was split in February 1965 with the audto?rslated work
and the people associated with it forming a new division, Audio
physics. This name was changed to Applied Physics Division in the
fail of 1166.
U. The division consists of the chief,
It currently administers
technical officers,
Isecrstactes. Its budget allocation hr TY-?2 was apprQxLZM&`tsly
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34. The division consists of the chieef,Otechnical office
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secretaries. Its budget allocation for TY-72 was
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Optics Division
44 R&D projects that ORD categorized as being technically successful.
Nineteen of the 44 projects became operational.
ing the period 1965-71, the division completed
The Optics Division was established in January 1963.
Initially, it directed its efforts to optical collection devicss~
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36. The division consists of a chi*
technical officers,
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contracts. Fourteen of the projects that Optics Division completed
during the period 1964-71 were classified by ORD as being technically
successful. Five of the 14 were put to operational use within the
Agency, and another three were used by the Department of Defense.
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na1 sis Division
37. The Analysis Division was formed in 1964 and was given
responsibility for research and development of information handling
devices, of techniques and systems at or -near the edge of the state
of the art, and of developing computer technology that could not be
tested in an operating environment. Its work has evolved over the
years to include such things as improving computer networks, time
sharing, computer security, interactive processing methods, mass
memories, display technology, microprogramming, and communications
technology.
38. The division consists of a cbief,efficers, and
secretaries. Its budget for "Y-7E was
At the time of our survey, the division had
was doing a considerable amount of In-house research using 01
IBM 360150, a PER-3 graphics processor, and the hybrid analog-to-
tal computer equipment
ORD categorises 28 of the division's projects completed during the
period. 1964-71 as having been technically successful. Eleven of them
were put to operational use.
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Agency's capability to measure, asees*, predict, influence, and
nable the development of systems or methods that will enhance the
Medical and Bahavi ral Sciences vision
39. The Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division, as presently
constituted, came into being in June 1965 when the former Life
Sciences Division was split, forming two now divisions. Its concern
is with the exploration and application of advanced technology to
control human behavior. Its worse; includes
having to do with narcotics and dangero
officers, and a secretary. The officers do a small amount of in-
house research, but the major portion of its R&D work is done under
portent program
40. This is a small division consisting of the chic
contracts at an annual cost of
ORD records reveal that the division completed 15 major
projects during the period 1965-71 that were considered technically
successful. Six of them were put to operational use.
Biological Sciences Division
41. The Biological Sciences Division was the other division
formed in 1965 by the splitting of the former Life Sciences Division.
The division was given the mission of studying biological systems
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and their application to the intelligence process from the standpoints
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of covert action, collection, and processing. While human factors
engineering would seem to be more appropriately placed in the
Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division, by agreement between
the two division chiefs it has been retained in the Biological Sciences
Division.
4Z. The division consists of a chief,
secretaries. The FY-72 budg
of which about
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~echnical officers, 25
at for the division was
Contracts at the time of our survey. ORD
records reveal that 14 technically successful projects were completed
during the period 1965-71. Only two of the 14 were put to operational.
use.
Special Projects C roap
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44. To see almost six years of work go down the drain was
it traumatic experience for the members of the Special Projects
Group. Their situation was made worse by the fact that the group
tinuad in being after July 1971
25
but without any specific guidance or direction as to its future
mission or area of responsibility. The group chief hail found other
assignments for two of the technical officers and one of the secretaries.
25
45. This program, no matter how imaginative it may be,
does not justify the continued existence of the Special Projects Group
as a separate entity. Each of the elements of its program directly
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ecommendation No. 4
That the Director of OR.D abolish the Special Projects
Group and reassign its members to other elements of O:R0.
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S E C R E T
THE ROLE OF ORD
1. The Directorate for Science and Technology had its beginnings
in February 1962 when the position of Deputy Director (Research)
was established. ORD came into being, on paper at least, in July
1962, but it did not begin taking shape as an office until November 1962
when the Assistant Deputy Director for Research was assigned the
additional duty of serving as Acting Assistant Director, Office of
Research and Development.
2. ORD's founders envisioned that all Agency R&D activities
would be centralized in OR.D, but this concept promptly ran afoul
of opposing views held elsewhere in the Agency. The opposition to
understandable, because ORDD was a Johnny-come- lately into an area
in which some Agency offices had worked for nearly two decades and
in which there were well entrenched operational and proprietary
interests. Those opposed to centralization argued that%
It would be Insecure and inefficient.
- It ran contrary to the already established concept that
the diversity of the Agency's activities required that
it operate on a decentralized basis.
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missions0. ORD, however, is charged with con4ncting R:&D at common
technical c ncern. t - a u Agency components, and R&D
The- ftn t :drsfV
for pu*bltcatla in :Agency regulatio
over eight yiivra to- reach agree m en
of thse "s t men ;,
repo rtedly sip re cord and one of which we have eao e t pr+ ud.
The text of the published statement is reproduced an the facing pageo
A review of the records pertaining to efforts to coordinate the
reveals that the dell
in publication was attributable primarily to
strong differences of opinion among the various Agency technical
ent
to precisely what OF D's role should be and as to the extent
and nature of coordination between ORD and the other technical offices.
its only
ant of. ORD'ss zrss scion and-functions
spared in.1962:: It; took
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The final text was the best compromise attainable among those can
tending views. It is an ambiguously worded document that tends to
institutionalize and perpetuate the conflicts and differences of opinion
on R&D responsibilities, rather than to resolve them.
f-. The functions that OR D actually performs bear little
resemblance to those enumerated in the regulation. Most of its
activities relate to the function assigned im
IThe function of
serving as essentially a bridge between Agency technical components
and the rest of the scientific world, to the extent it to performed at
all, is not carried out through any orderly mechanism. There is
no provision for ORD' a undertaking R&D work on behalf of other
Government agencies; yet, it has done so to the tune of
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per year.
6. It might also be noted that the definition of ORD's mission
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the Executive Director-Comptroller to all of the directorates dated
8 March 1974 on the subject of R&D. which defines three types of R&D
is in conflict with the provisions of a memorandum from
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efforts to be conducted by the ,Agency' (a) l~: lorator R&D to probe
new areas that may potentially contribute to CM, Is mission, (b) Direct support R& D to support ongoing operations through the development
of new equipment and techniques closely related to ongoing operational
needs, and (c) Multiple application R& involving the support of more
than out current need or operation. That memorandum assigns
primary responsibility for direct support R&D to the respective
operating directorates, assigns responsibility for exploratory R&D
to the .DD/:S&T, and provides that multiple application R&D efforts
may be routed through the newly created R&D Board for determination
of the as stgnrnent of a particular R&D effort to an appropriate technical
office. The memorandum also establishes a Technical Coordinating
Committee to faster technical exchange, coordinate programs, surface
gaps and redundancies and other special problems, and makes important
provisions for reporting on R&D activities.
7. We were tempted to recommend that ORD revise the statement
of its mission and functions to conform with its actual role, but we
were dissuaded by the realization that this would be a hopeless
exercise. The present statement to a compromise document, and
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it is unlikely that ORD would be able to negotiate a new statement
that would be any more realistic. Furthermore, the zmechaaisma
established by the Executive I)
tly sensible and workable.
of 8 March have not yet had time to prove the
h. Experience
may demonstrate that modifications are necessary, aitbough the
general concept as
ctor-Comptro ,er's memorandum
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THE WORK PROGRAM
1. In simplest terms, ORD is charged with conducting
R&D of common technical concern to all Agency components,
and R&D is its only assigned mission. It is charged with "the
investigation of scientific and technological developments
relevant to the accomplishment of the Agency's mission. "' The
statement of functions
provides that ORD will deve-
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lop and implement, in coordination with other R&D offices of
the Agency, basic and applied research; will provide conceptual
analysis as to technical feasibility of advanced systems; will
conduct research and feasibility studies on techniques, com-
ponents, and systems of common technical concern; and will
administer specific external contracts.
2. These broadly stated responsibilities are broken down
by division into a series of specific objectives. The following list
of these objectives is not all-inclusive, nor are all of them being
worked on at any one time, but the list does give a feel for the very
wide range of scientific and technical areas with which ORD is
concerned.
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3. ORi3 does some internal research, but not very much. A
few of its objectives can be met by monitoring the work of others
at no cost to the Agency; however, most of its work program is in
the form of external contracts with industrial concerns or educational
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institutions. Some of the contracts, especially those calling for
years. In cost, they range from
the building of hardware, are relatively short-term efforts; some
of them, especially those involving exploratory research, run for
4. The results of ORD's work program are difficult to evaluate.
A major problem in this regard arises from differing definitions of
what constitutes success in an R&D effort. ORD takes the long-
range view that continuous exploration into the state of the art is
necessary to acquire the knowledge needed by the Agency to adapt
and to improve its processes. ORD considers an R&D project to
have been successful if it realized its intended technological objective.
The customer components take a shorter range view. They consider
an R&D project to be successful if it yields a product that is needed
at the time it is developed, that can be engineered and produced at
an acceptable cost, that is suitable for use in the expected opera-
tional and security environment, and that will do the job intended
for it.
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5. Thus, many of ORD's completed R&D projects are
a larger undertaking destined to end in costly failure.
evaluated as successes by ORD's definition but as failures by
ORD's customers' definition. Some of them achieved the techno-
logical objectives that were sought, but there was no requirement
for the product at the time it became available. Some of them
found application in operations, but the benefits derived from
them were minimal. Some had the potential for yielding significant
benefits but at a cost that would have been prohibitive. Even a
project that was unsuccessful by ORD's definition may have made
a major contribution in the form of a fallout of useful knowledge or
a by-product with application elsewhere. An unsuccessful project
that disproves a popular theory may form the basis for avoiding
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is
6. ORD recently made a statistical tabulation of its technically
successful projects that were completed during the eight-year
period from 1964 through 1971, with these results:
The total of R&D funds expended on R&D projects during
the period (exclusive of management-support costs and
funds transferred from other government agencies) was
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Approximately 42 percent of the funds were spent on
projects that were technically successful; 58 percent
on projects that were not successful.
--- There were 150 technically successful projects. The
unsuccessful projects were not tabulated.
--- Of the total of 150 successful projects, 55 were imple-
monted by Agency operating components; 95 were not.
--- Of the 55 projects that were implemented, 35 were
developed in response to formal requirements levied
on ORD; 20 were developed without a formal require-
ment, although some were started with the acquiescence
of an operating component.
--- Approximately 20 percent of the total funds spent was
devoted to projects that were successful and were imple-
mented; about 80 percent was spent on projects that were
either unsuccessful or, if successful, were not implemented.
7. We doubt that these statistics provide a basis for any broad
conclusions about the worth of ORD's work program, nor does ORD
so represent them. Perhaps the most significant of the findlrg s was
that only about 20 percent of the R&D money was spent on projects
that resulted in usable end products, but even this finding has little
meaning in the absence of a fixed goal against which to measure it.
8. It can be (and has been) argued that auecesa-to-failure
ratio is not a fair measure of the value of R&D worts, and this is
a thesis with which we tend to agree. When one is working at the
far fringes of the state of the art, as OLD often is, there are a
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great many unknowns. Sometimes the only way to discover whether
something can or cannot be done successfully is to try it. ORD
cannot be faulted for its failures, or at least not for too many of
them. Where it can be faulted, in our opinion, is in the very large
number of projects that were identified as being "successful but
not implemented" (63.3 percent of the total of technically successful
projects). In our interviews in the components using ORDts ser-
vices, these were the reasons most frequently cited for failing to
use an ORD product:
There was no requirement for the product when the
project was started, and there was no application for
it when it was ready for delivery.
There was a requirement for the product at the time
the project was launched, but the requirement had
vanished before the project was completed.
The ORD project was designed to meet a requirement,
but the product it delivered was not configured to fit
the specific need or could not be used in the operational
or security environment of the operating site.
There was a requirement for the product. but by the
time it was completed a better or less costly product
had become available from another source.
The product that was delivered would not effectively
do the job intended for it.
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9. Over the years. various mechanisms have been created
for achieving a better match between operational needs and R&D
programs. Same of the mechanisms worked poorly or not at all;
none of them worked well. Committees or panels of distinguished
scientists have bin formed to examine future R&D needs. Their
reports have been of value, but it is difficult to judge what real
impact they have bad. We are lit lined to doubt that it is possible
to build an effective bridge between operations and R&D when they
are widely separated, both physically and organisationally. We
noted in a recent survey of TSD that, in our opinion, one of the
vasJor impediments to more effective performance in the audio
field was that development and engineering was too far removed
from operations, yet the two are in the earn* division. ORD is a
directorate away f most of the operations it supports.
10. Many of the officers that we interviewed in ORD's
customer components highly value. ORD's advisory services on
technological matters. and the as sistence ORD gives thorn on their
own R&D programs. They consider this advice and assistance to
be of more benefit to them than are the results of the formal R&D
projects undertaken by ORD. Admitting that our sources have a
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bias in this regard, we still believe theta is merit in their point
of view. The role assigned to ORD includes evaluation of world-
wide R&D programs as well scientific discoveries, monitoring
of research conducted by private enterprise and the academic
community and making its benefits available to the Agency, and
conducting liaison with other Dove t agencies to identify
findings that have intelligersrce application. ORD does some of this,
sometimes on specific request, but snore often an a sort of a,-we-
see-fit or as-time-permits basis. In our view, maintaining a
capability to advise and assist others should be a deliberately
scheduled segment of ORD's work program. R is not, We found
no evidence of any established mechanism for performing these
functions or any systematic method of dinevminating information
to other components of the Agency to keep them apprised of current
R&D activities elsewhere in the scientific and technical community.
Recommendati n No. 5
That the Director of ORD establish a formal mechanism
within his *Me* for the conduct of those functions specified
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i
note that the statement of mission and functions of ORD does not
provide for the conduct of R&D for other agencies of the Government,
although it has been done for several years. We encountered
differing views within ORD as to the appropriateness of OR's
engaging in R&D activities on behalf of other agencies. There are
many who believe that a net benefit accrues to ORD from access
to the much larger pool of R&D money available to the Department
of Defense and from the technical spin-offs that result from this
research. Also, many of the projects have direct application to
Agency operations. There are others in ORD, however, who believe
that the time and talent expended by ORD on behalf of other agencies
could more profitably be used on higher priority Agency-funded
projects. There are some who look on these external funds as a
means of reviving a project proposal that was disapproved for fund-
ing with Agency money.
12. We are in no position to choose between the contrary
points of view, although we lean in favor of the position that external
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0
funding of R&D projects results in a net gain to the Agency. It is
something that should be kept under close scrutiny, however, to
avoid allowing an imbalance to develop between the work ORD does
for the Agency and the work it does for others. Certainly, external
funding should not be employed as a way of circumventing the pro-
ject approval process. We understand that the DD/S&T now requires
his specific approval of each externally funded R&D project.
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Procurement Management Staff for review. recording, and acknow-
lodgement. They should then be forwarded to the project officer
for further study and review and for refinement of specifications
and work statements and the like. There are a number of resee nn
why it would be desirable for the contracting officer to deceive a
contract proposal at the earliest possible date:
To allow for an early check on the contractor's pre-
vious performance under other contracts with the
Agency or with the Department of Defense.
To ascertain if other divisions of ORD or other
components of the Agency are currently negotiating
other contracts with the same contractor and, if
so, the type of fees that are being negotiated.
To examine the availability of alternate sources
before the proposal becomes so specifically tailored
that only one source can be considered.
To call attention to a possible need for refinement
of specifications and work statements.
To identify as early as possible any legal, patent,.
or other similar problems that may need clarification.
To prevent informal negotiations from proceeding to
the point where moral obligations become binding.
To provide the ORD Contractor Selection Board
with the information needed for an objective selection
of the best contractor.
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13. The Procuremeement Staff works closely with
the project officers to ensure that contract specifications and work
statements are dearly stated in the contract and to try to separate
the work into phases or parts that are susceptible to performance
measurement; such as, fessibility, study, breadboard or prototype
hardware, or definable development work. This is sometimes
very difficult to do, however, because clear specifications and
work statements are hard to come by in the ease of exploratory
research contracts. We noted that proposals from some of the
prospective contractors are In the nature of academic dissertations
containing no action verbs clearly defining what the contractor is
required to do.
14. The Procurement Management Staff is always on the
lookout for contractual arrangements that might involve a conflict
of interest--real, apparent, or possible. May ORD employees
have worked for contractors in the past, and many former Agency
employees are now working for contractors. It the Staff has any
reason to suspect that a conflict of interest may exist, it seeks
advice from the Director of ORD, the General Counsel, or both.
We noted instances of inquiries having been made of contractors
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to ascertain if a former Agency employee would be engaged in work
on an ORD contract. Occasionally, clauses are inserted in con-
tracts specifying that a former Agency employee is not to work on
the contract nor to have any interest in it.
15. The inquiries we made of those we interviewed (admittedly
in very low key) did not surface any cases of possible conflict of
interest not already known to ORD management. The cases that
were known to exist had all been surfaced and checked out with the
Director of ORD and with a representative of the General Counsel.
In most instances, however, these checks were informal, and the
records available for review did not always disclose the reason
why a contract had been initiated when an "apparent" conflict of
interest existed or why an alternative contractor was not chosen.
16. The DD/S&T and the A/DD/S&T are very much aware of
the possible embarrassment to the Agency if good judgment is not
used in the handling of such cases, and they take an extremely
hard-nosed approach to the matter of possible conflict of interest.
We did not find a comparable degree of awareness and concern at
the ORD level.
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COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
. The responsibility of the Director of ORD "does not
include research and development activities which are specifically
delegated to other Agency technical offices."
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statement assumes that a clear and precise distinction can be
made between those R&D activities that are assigned to ORD and
those that are specifically delegated to other Agency technical
offices. In fact, however, if it is possible to make such a clear
and precise distinction, and this we doubt, it is one that is im-
possible to maintain over time. The Agency's R&D pie has been
rather oddly and quite messily sliced. There is inevitable over-
lapping, redundancy, and gaps that can be overcome, if at all,
only by continuing coordination and cooperation among the several
technical offices.
2. There is much room for improvement in this area between
ORD and the other technical offices and within ORT) itself. The
problem of internal coordination is for ORD to solve. There are
things It might do to improve its external relations, but cooperation
is a two-way street, and ORD meets at least as many obstacles to
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betterment as it creates. One of the major problems that ORD
faces in this regard is that, because its own R&D activities cannot
be clearly differentiated from those of the other technical offices,
many of its programs run in competition with programs elsewhere
in the Agency, and competitors do not often coordinate graciously.
3. Let us first consider the matter of internal coordination.
ORD is fragmented into eight tiny divisions (actually seven divisions
and one group) along lines of scientific disciplines. In practice,
however, much of the work of the office does not follow the pattern
of its organizational structure. Two factors contribute to the
mismatch between organization and work, One of them is that often
the work does not fall cleanly within a single scientific area. Fly-
ing platforms, for example, can be configured in a variety of ways
to accommodate an assortment of collection devices and techniques.
It is not surprising, then, that we found a number of ORD divisions
involved in some fashion with the exploitation of flying platforms.
The other factor has to do with the differing ways in which ORD
projects originate. Those that are conceived in response to external
requirements usually are assigned on the basis of the primary
technology involved in the development of the product. Many of
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them, however, begin as the brainchild of one of ORD's technical
0
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officers, and the practice has been to allow the man who came up
with the idea to develop it as a project. It is not uncommon to
find a project in one division involving a primary technology that
is the specialty of another.
4. It is widely believed among ORD's technical officers that
the man most likely to get ahead is the one who has the most pro-
jects involving the most money. The belief may have no founda-
tion in fact, but it exists nonetheless. Since surrendering an idea
would mean losing a project, there is a tendency in all of ORD's
divisions toward possessiveness, secretiveness, and competitive-
ness. Some of this can be attributed to a proper concern for the
need for compartmentation, but much of it is nothing more than a
reluctance to share ideas or technologies. Some of it, we are
sure, is a consequence of professional arrogance--an unwillingness
to concede that someone else might have a better idea. Another
element is that of "getting credit. " a near obsession with many
of ORD's officers. These are typical of some of the examples
that were cited to us:
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who are developing the somewhat similar
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5. The extent of consultation and exchange of technical informa-
tion within OR1 varies by division and by individual. Most of it
is informal and oral. There is, in our opinion, less of it than
there should be. Some of the work is highly sensitive and must
be tightly compartmented, but much of it is not. There is no
excuse for one division submitting a contract proposal for work
that had already been done by another division, and we know of at
least one instance in which this has happened. What is lacking is
a mechanism for administering an orderly and controlled exchange
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of technical information in ORD. There is at present no central
location in ORD where an officer can find out what R&D work has
been completed or is currently being worked on by other divisions
or by other technical officers. We believe that it would be feasible
to develop something along this line and that it would be preferable
to the present situation, which is heavily dependent on individual
initiative in seeking out information and on individual willingness
to release it.
Recommendation No. 9
That the Director of ORD consider establishing a
central repository of information concerning R&D work
that has been completed, is in progress. or is contemplated.
interviews with regard to each of ORD's divisions.
63 .
owever, to summarize our observations and the results of customer
6. Let us look next in some detail into the nature of ORD's
working relationships with other Agency offices to which ORD
renders R&D support. These relationships vary so widely in nature
that it is impossible to generalize about those of the office as a
whole. To tally them fully would almost require treating them on
an officer-by-officer basis, because the extent of coordination
and the degree of cooperation is heavily influenced by personalities
within ORD and among those it serves. It may be illustrative.
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Radio Physics Division
Applied Physics Division
9. TSD and the Office of Security are the primary users of
products developed by the Applied Physics Division. TSD is less
than happy with the Applied Physics Division. Although the
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reasons were expressed in such general terms as non-coordination,
lack of communication, or lack of cooperation; we believe that
personality conflicts and historical animosities are the prim
causes of friction. Neither side is without blame. The division
chief told us that he tries to obtain a memorandum of interest or
coordination from the interested component for any work he plans
to undertake; however, some work is performed without coordi-
nation if the division chief feels that the operating component is
wrong. TSD cited this as being a practice to which it objects.
10. The Technical Security Division of the Office of Security
had nothing but praise for the Applied Physics Division. Technical
Division stated that there is no competition or duplication of
effort between the two organizations. Technical Division holds
fruitful discussions with the Applied Physics Division on require-
ments to ensure that they are fully understood, that the operational
climate is spelled out, and that targets are fixed. The two com-
ponents work together in defining concepts, in selecting contractors,
and in preparing work statements. They jointly visit the contractor,
attend briefings, and review contractor progress reports. There
is no formal procedure governing this close relationship. It has
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simply evolved over the years. It appears to be mutually
beneficial.
Optics Division
11. This division stresses that every R&D requirement
should be related to an end product and be able to stand the test
of relevance to the intelligence process. Division officers
state that they constantly strive to interface with the customers
during every stage of the R&D process so that the end product
will conform to the original requirement, be compatible with the
operational environment, and satisfy the customer's need. The
results of this approach are noteworthy. Customer components
were high in their praise, not only for the success and profes-
sionalism of Optics Division's work, but also for the cooperation
and close coordination that exists.
Analysis Division
IZ. Historically, relations between the Analysis Division
and many of its customers have not been good. The frictions
appear to have arisen, in part, from disagreements with the chief
of the Analysis Division about the nature of requirements for R&D
work in computer technology and, in part, from lack of understanding
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on the part of the customers of 0RD's role and of the contribu-
tion it could make. We found, however, that working relationships
have improved noticeably within the last year or two. OCS,
which in the past complained that ORD initiated projects without
consultation and that the end products often were not applicable
to needs or would not work on existing machines, reported that
relations with ORD have been vastly improved recently. OCS is
now working closely with the three branches of Analysis Division
on projects of direct interest to OCS. Worthwhile results are
being obtained. ?SI and CRS feel that they are being provided
useful service by the Analysis Division and have noted a much
greater interest in their needs on the part of Analysis Division
within recent months. OSR
report beneficial inter-
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faces with Analysis Division. NPIC is the only office we found
that still has less than satisfactory relations with Analysis Division.
NPIC is not at all sure that Analysis Division's R&D efforts on
image manipulationI I will produce results of
benefit to NPIC. There also is evidence of some rather sharp
jurisdictional disputes between NPIC and ORD, which may be the
main cause of the friction.
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13. The general improvement in customer relations seems
to be the result of initiatives taken at the branch level and by
individual officers in Analysis Division to focus more sharply on
the specific needs of each user and to spend more time and effort
in consultation with the using offices and on in-house research.
This contrasts with the former approach of developing devices
or systems and then trying to "sell" them to the customer. It
was clear from our interviews in the using offices that the cus-
tomers prefer to deal directly with branch chiefs and individual
officers in the division, rather than with the division chief.
Many officers in the using components consider the division chief
to be unfamiliar with the requirements and operations of the
Agency and to be needlessly difficult to deal with.
Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division
14. This division works reasonably harmoniously with CSI
and the Office of Security, but its relations with some elements
of OMS and TSD are very much in disarray. OMS has detailed an
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18. In the final analysis, most of the frictions and
disagreements arise from differing interpretations of ORD'a
role in the Agency's R&D arena. It is a problem that was
addressed directly by the Executive Director-Comptroller in
his memorandum to the directorates of last March in which he
defined and assigned responsibility for exploratory, direct
support, and multiple application R&D. Because the directive
was of such recent date at the time we were pursuing our
survey, we did not have an opportunity to observe and to report
on its impact.
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MANAGEMENT
?
1. The recently retired Director of ORD was the first
full-time director of.the office. He built it into what is is today;
and its organization, methods of operating. and style of manage-
ment are largely of his making. The office now has a new
director with a different personality and background, and many
of the situations and practices that we observed during our survey
are likely to be changed. Change. In our view. is desirable,
because the style of management of the former Director was not
well geared to getting the most from the resources available to
him.
2. The dominant feature of ORD management to date has
been permissiveness. The Director has never really taken charge
of the office. Many of the very fine technical officers in ORD
have turned in work that has been of immeasurable benefit to the
Agency. but many of them have been allowed to drift into fields
of activity that are of personal interest to them but which offer
little or no prospect of benefiting the Agency. There is consider-
able variance between the R&D work that is programmed and that
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which is actually undertaken. The distribution of work among
the divisions is not consistent with the organizational structure
and delegation of functions. Since positive direction and guidance
by the Director has been lacking, the divisions have been left
to their own devices for solutions to problems that should be of
immediate concern to the Director. We did not consider the
management standards and procedural mechanisms we found in
ORD to be adequate to ensure proper validation of R&D require-
ments, allocation of priorities, review and monitoring of work
in progress, or evaluation of the work force and of the R&D
end-product.
3. In our discussions with the Director of ORD, he defended
his management concepts in terms of the inherent difficulties of
managing and evaluating R&D activities; the historical evolution
of R&D activities in the Agency with the attendant fragmentation
of functions, indistinct authorities, rivalries, and imbalances;
the necessity of avoiding bureaucratic rigidities in order to main-
tain an environment that was conducive to creativity and innovation;
and the failure of top management to identify gaps in the intelligence
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process requiring R&D effort. While acknowledging that there
is some merit in each of these points, we feel that the Director
of ORD has had the authority and the latitude required to make
needed improvements, but he has failed to do so. Although he
was highly regarded for his technical ability and for his imagina-
tiveness, we received criticisms on the way ORD was run from
employees at all levels within ORD and from officers of other
Agency technical components.
4. Oddly enough, or perhaps not so oddly, many of the
officers in ORD who were most critical of the loose management
of the office were quick to add that they personally preferred to
work under this style of management, because it gave them a
great deal of freedom in their work. There probably is a quite
fine balance between maintaining control and encouraging innova-
tion, but we carne away from this survey with the distinct impres-
sion that maintaining control has been lost eight of in ORD.
Policy Guidance
5. The most frequently heard refrain during our interviews
at all levels in ORD was over a lack of policy guidance from the
upper echelons of the Agency. There is a widely held belief that
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it should be possible for some individual or group to identify
long-range priority national intelligence R&D objectives, which
OR,D could then translate into a work program specifically
focused on major gaps. The five-year program forecasts were
criticized as being too general in nature to identify these gaps
and that, as the forecasts filter down, not enough interpretation
or guidance is added to them to enable the technical officers to
design R&D projects directly responsive to major needs.
6. We think that the difficulty lies primarily within ORD
in failing to identify and to concentrate its efforts on programs
of major significance. One officer that we interviewed over-
stated the problem, but he identified it correctly: "3RD kills
itself with thousands of little projects. " Most officers would be
happy to see definitions of the R&D scientific disciplines for
which they are responsible, a clarification of criteria for the
validation of requirements, standards for evaluating on-going
projects, and provisions for an open and mutual exchange of
technical information between ORD and other technical components.
They believe that, if these things were done, their concerns
over lack of policy guidance would diminish.
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Organizational Factors
7. The organizational structure that we examined in ORD
is not, in our view, well designed for efficient management.
The office is fragmented into a series of small divisions. Six of
the seven divisions have
professional officers
assigned; one, the Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division,
The divisions supposedly are organized on the
basis of scientific disciplines, but they do not actually operate
that way. This is so, in part, because many of the projects
that are undertaken require the application of several scientific
disciplines for their completion and, in part, because the divi-
sions are allowed to initiate projects that are incompatible
with their assigned areas of specialization.. Furthermore, it is
not uncommon to find two or more divisions working on essentially
similar problems. Because there are so many divisions and
because they intrude in others' areas of specialization, there
are problems of coordination and communication that would be
of a much lesser order if the organizational breakdown were less
fragmented.
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8. Consolidation would also make it easier to apportion
the workload evenly, or at least more evenly than it now is.
The average workload is now about three or four projects per
technical officer, but it is highly variable. We found one officer
handling 15 projects and some with only one or two. In addition
to variations among individuals, the workload is not apportioned
evenly among the divisions. The Medical and Behavioral Sciences
Division is a case in point. It does not have the funds that are
really needed to conduct in-depth research in all of the areas
selected for exploration nor does it have the staff that would be
required to properly oversee work in progress. Its resources
are stretched too thinly. A partial solution to this problem
might be achieved through reorganization and redistribution of
the workload within Oltl, but we believe that what is needed in
this case is a realistic appraisal of the worth of on-going and
planned projects in terms of the staff time necessary for their
proper management. It may be that the best solution would be
to assign more people to the division, but we have the impression
that some of the division's lower priority work could be eliminated.
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Recommendation No. 10
That the Director of COD review the work pro-
gram of the Medical and Behavioral Sciences Division
in terms of staff and resources required to manage
these activities properly and terminate those activities
for which adequate staff or other resources are not
available or cannot be provided.
9. We also believe that there would be advantage in con-
solidating separate activities that are closely related, which
probably would call for organizational adjustments. This
observation is based on our repeated encounters with technical
officers in the various divisions who were working on the deve-
lopment and testing of flying platforms. Even Optics Division
has a program in this field. While it is true that each of the
divisions that is developing sensors has a valid interest in the
use of flying platforms as a means of emplacement, it appeared
to us that each of them was addressing itself to an essentially
similar problem: how to get the device to the target. We
believe that it would be worthwhile to explore the feasibility of
centralizing ORD's activities relating to emplacement platforms.
Recommendation No.. 11
That the Director of ORD review all on-going
or planned projects concerned with emplacement
platforms to determine the feasibility of consolidating
these efforts within one organizational element of ORD.
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10. The organizational structure that we examined in the
was a Radio-Physics Division contract
course of our survey was obviously one that suited the style and
disposition of the then Director. In our view, a number of other
ways could be found for apportioning and supervising the work
that would be more effective than the present arrangement. We
are sure that it is a topic to which the new Director will give
early attention.
Reporting
11. ORD's division chiefs keep abreast of the status of
their projects by reading their technical officers' trip reports
and contractor progress reports, by occasionally accompanying
the technical officers on visits to contractors, and by discussions
in daily contacts with the technical officers. Most of the division
chiefs are thus able to keep themselves adequately informed on
those projects for which they are responsible. This informal
system breaks down sometimes, however. A recent example
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that did not come to the attention of the division chief until after
the contractor was already deeply in trouble. That contract was the
subject of a special report to the Executive Director-Comptroller.
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12. We found no evidence of a systematic mechanism for
keeping the Director of ORD similarly informed on the current
status of work in progress. He held two staff meetings each
week and kept an open door for division chiefs or technical
officers to brief him on work under way; however, the initiative
for passing information to him rested with the division chiefs
i
and technical officers. One division chief reported to us that
there were only throe occasions on which he discussed project
work with the Director of ORD: (a) when a project was in trouble,
(b) when a project was completed and the results were to be
presented, or (c) when the Director of ORD specifically requested
information. We believe it imperative that a means be devised
for keeping the Director of ORD informed of the current status
of all work in progress. He needs less detail than do the division
chiefs, but he certainly needs more than he has been receiving.
13. The Procurement Handbook
specifies that 25X1
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responsible for, among other things; "periodically documenting
the progress and prospects of each project under its jurisdiction.
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ORD management does not have a clearly enunciated policy or
even a consistent attitude toward this requirement. As a con-
sequence, we found considerable variation in interpretation of
and compliance with the responsibility among the technical
officers. Some divisions require their officers to submit these
progress reports, and we found thorn in the project folders;
however, some divisions do not require the reports, and they
are not made. The divisions who do not require progress
reports by the technical officers justify their action on the
grounds that the division chief is in such close daily contact with
his officers that oral reporting is sufficient.
14. Progress reports are received from the contractors,
but the ORD technical officer is not required to make any sort
of written analysis, evaluation, or comment on them. The tech-
nical officers do submit the required contract inspection reports,
but their preparation calls for little more than placing check
marks in a number of boxes.
15. We believe there is a need for periodic written pro-
gress reports by the technical officers in which they are required
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to state their own analyses of the contractor's work to include
an evaluation of progress and an assessment of future prospects.
It would be a beneficial exercise for the technical officer, and it
would yield a basis for summary reports to the Director of ORD.
Recommendation No. 12
That the Director of ORD review present report-
ing standards and practices within ORD and revise
them as he feels necessary to keep himself informed
on the status of work in progress or planned for the
future.
Looking Ahead
16. Many of ORD's management practices are open to
criticism, but these are problems that can be attacked and solved
internally; however, the Agency's policies and standards for
conducting R&D have a profound impact on the way ORD conducts
its business, and ORD has limited influence over these externally
imposed policies and standards. The Agency has chosen to
disperse the R&D functions among a number of technical components,
but it has not in the past established a framework of common
management disciplines and practices that would apply to all com-
ponents engaged in R&D work to ensure that they work together
toward common goals. There are wide differences in opinion
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and practice among Agency technical offices as to the pre-
requisites for undertaking an R&D effort, the manner in which
it should be conducted, and the method of evaluating the results.
The Executive Director-Comptroller's memorandum of 8 March
1972 establishing an R&D Board
Technical Coordinating
Committee is a major step toward clarifying R&D goals and
resolving disputes that arise in the R&D arena. We believe that
a legitimate follow-on endeavor would embrace the establish-
ment of uniform standards and mechanisms for the management
of R&D activities and for the evaluation of the results of the
Agency's R&D efforts. The ultimate goal should be:
-- To ensure that R&D proposals are consistent
with the Agency's primary missions and objectives.
--- To ensure that there is a realistic match between
technical and operational feasibility.
To foster purposeful consultations and disciplined
interaction and coordination of effort among the
Agency's technical offices engaged in R&D.
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To foster a freer exchange of technical information.
-+- To minimize unprofitable rivalry, competition,
and duplication of effort.
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SECRET
To strengthen the requirements and standards
for pre-contract work and the monitoring of
contracts in progress.
To synchronize and improve the Agency's ADP
contract management systems.
To establish a system for evaluating R&D efforts
in terms of contribution to the intelligence process.
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SECRET
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